Richard Bertrand, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Sioux City Community School District and Brian Fahrendholz, Defendants–Appellees. (2026)

Placing the cart before the horse ensures you get nowhere fast. Such was the case when Richard Bertrand planned to sell land—of which he only owned a portion—to a developer. To execute his plan, he needed to acquire another portion of land from the Sioux City Community School District (SCCSD). SCCSD declined to sell Bertrand the land, and his plan fell apart. Bertrand claims SCCSD declined to sell him the land because its employees had previously accused him of stealing dirt from an earlier SCCSD project, an allegation Bertrand denied.

After the sale fell through, Bertrand sued two school district employees for defamation and SCCSD for vicarious liability. The district court dismissed one of the employees, concluding that the defamation claim against that employee failed as a matter of law. Thereafter, the other employee, Brian Fahrendholz, and SCCSD filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Bertrand's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuit.

Bertrand appeals, arguing the district court erred in concluding that the discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute of limitations and his claims were therefore time-barred. After asking the parties for additional briefing on whether Iowa Code section 670.5 (2023) prohibits the application of the discovery rule to defamation claims brought under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), we agree that the discovery rule does not apply and that Bertrand's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the reasons stated herein.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

As early as October 2021, Bertrand, a commercial real estate developer and farmer, began planning a proposal to sell approximately fifteen acres of land to a developer to construct apartments near an SCCSD school. The fifteen acres consisted of approximately ten acres of Bertrand's farmland and an additional five acres of abutting land owned by SCCSD (Unity Land). To complete the project, Bertrand would need to acquire the Unity Land.

In June 2022, Bertrand entered a non-binding letter of intent to sell fifteen acres of land to a construction company for the development. In the fall, Bertrand reached out to SCCSD's purchasing manager, director of operations and maintenance, and interim superintendent to discuss a potential sale of the Unity Land. Bertrand claimed that the Unity Land was the “missing piece” to his farming operation, omitting his plans to sell the land for development. Bertrand was told that he would have to follow the proper bidding process.

In December, SCCSD's Finance and Facilities Committee met and discussed the sale of the Unity Land. Ultimately, SCCSD decided not to sell the land to Bertrand.

On January 2, 2023, Bertrand called Dan Greenwell, the chair of the school board, for an explanation of what happened with the sale. Bertrand claims that during the conversation Greenwell told him it was “common knowledge” that Bertrand was a “dirt devil” and accused him of stealing a large amount of dirt removed from a Sioux City high school during a landscaping project in 2018. Bertrand alleged that Greenwell heard this information from SCCSD's then-director of operations, Brian Fahrendholz. Fahrendholz denied making such a statement, but Greenwell recalled asking someone about where the dirt went and they replied, “I think it went to one of Bertrand's properties.” Greenwell remembered that he told Bertrand it was clear that Bertrand wanted to develop the land, not farm the land as he represented to school officials.

On January 6, the construction company rescinded its letter of intent because without the addition of the Unity Land “the apartment project wouldn't be feasible.” Bertrand claims he could not purchase the Unity Land because of the dirt-stealing accusations.

On January 9, Bertrand filed a defamation claim against Greenwell and Fahrendholz and a vicarious liability claim against SCCSD. SCCSD answered on February 3, claiming that the interim superintendent, Rod Earleywine, told Bertrand that the Unity Land was not needed for school purposes but that the sale of the land would need to go through the proper bidding process. SCCSD claimed that once it learned of the true purpose of the purchase, it did not want to sell the land because of safety concerns with having a housing development so close to the school—not because of any personal views related to Bertrand. SCCSD denied that Greenwell ever called Bertrand a dirt devil or alleged that he stole dirt. Additionally, SCCSD argued that Fahrendholz's employment with SCCSD ended in January 2021, so he must have made any allegedly defamatory statements before his departure.

As for Bertrand's allegations, he did not produce any open meeting minutes or recordings that supported the dissemination of defamatory statements. The open meeting recordings and minutes are available online to the public. Closed meetings are also recorded and minutes are kept, but Bertrand did not produce any closed meeting minutes or recordings to support his allegations. Likewise, Bertrand did not produce any witness to the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements. In an affidavit, Fahrendholz attested that he never informed the school board that Bertrand had taken dirt without compensating SCCSD.

In February 2024, SCCSD, Fahrendholz, and Greenwell moved for summary judgment, which the court granted as to Greenwell but denied as to the other two defendants.¹ Shortly thereafter, Fahrendholz and SCCSD renewed their motion for summary judgment, arguing that any allegedly defamatory statements were made more than two years before Bertrand filed suit and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. In November, the district court found that Bertrand's remaining claims were time-barred and it would not apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. The district court dismissed the matter. Bertrand appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of summary judgment rulings is for “correction of errors of law.” Hollingshead v. DC Misfits, LLC, 937 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Iowa 2020). “We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Andrew v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Hosp., 960 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit” and requires the nonmoving party to submit the evidence supporting its position. Slaughter v. Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 808 (Iowa 2019) (citation omitted). The nonmoving “party may not rely on the hope of the subsequent appearance of evidence generating a fact question.” Thornton v. Hubill, Inc., 571 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).

III. Analysis.

Under Iowa Code section 614.1(2), which applies to defamation claims, lawsuits based “on injuries to the person or reputation” must be brought within two years of the claimed injury. See Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Iowa 1970) (applying section 614.1(2) statute of limitations to defamation claim). Prior cases have concluded that the statute of limitations for a defamation claim begins to run on the date the allegedly defamatory statement is made. Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 1990) (noting that the statute of limitations for defamation cases “begins to run on the date of publication.”).

Bertrand concedes that his lawsuit was filed more than two years after the claimed defamatory statements were made. On appeal, he has one focus: the discovery rule should apply to save his defamation claims from the statute of limitations because the statements “were made in such a restricted manner, it made them inherently undiscoverable” until they were made public, at which point the harm occurred. Bertrand argues that the discovery rule should apply in two respects: (1) Iowa should recognize an exception to the statute of limitations when statements are “secretive and inherently undiscoverable until made public,” and (2) Iowa should recognize an exception to the statute of limitations when the harm does not come immediately but only when the statement is made public.² The defendants argue that the district court correctly concluded that the defamation claims were time-barred and further argue that the claims fail as a matter of law and that the school district is not liable under a vicarious liability theory.

Because Bertrand's petition raised two theories of liability, we address both the defamation claim and the vicarious liability claim.

A. Defamation. As Iowa law stands currently, our supreme court has not applied the discovery rule to defamation claims against municipalities or governmental subdivisions,³ so we need not reach this issue. A school is covered under the IMTCA as a municipality. Iowa Code § 670.1(3). The defendants asserted in their answers that Bertrand's claims were barred by the provisions and defenses under Iowa Code chapter 670. On appeal, the defendants argue that the time to bring a tort claim against municipalities and governmental subdivisions, such as SCCSD, is not extended by the discovery rule as the requisite timeframe begins from date of injury, not date of accrual. See Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792, 807 (Iowa 2019) (applying section 670.5 of the IMTCA to bar a defamation claim against the city). Additionally, in Venckus, the supreme court rejected the date of accrual as the starting date for statute of limitations in a defamation claim and confirmed the action is barred if not filed within two years of the date of injury. Id. at 808–09 (“The date of injury for a defamation claim is the date on which the defendants performed their last allegedly defamatory act.” (cleaned up)). To erase any doubt, our supreme court again held that the “discovery rule does not apply to claims under the IMTCA” and stated the claim accrues when an “aggrieved party has a right to institute and maintain a suit.” Abrahamson v. Scheevel, 31 N.W.3d 20, 27 (Iowa 2026) (citation omitted); see also Doe v. New London Cmty. Sch. Dist., 848 N.W.2d 347, 353–54 (Iowa 2014) (finding the section 670.5 limitation period commences on the date of injury).

So, with that guidance, we consider whether Bertrand's tort claim of defamation and related vicarious liability claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We are undeterred by any argument that the court of appeals decision in Betz, 2025 WL 706729, at *4–5, might apply here, because our supreme court has stated that the distinction between the section 670.5 timeliness standard and other statutes of limitation exist because “the legislature has placed greater limitations on actions against municipalities compared to actions against the state because municipalities operate under greater fiscal constraints than the state does and municipalities have special problems with respect to formulating and implementing budgets.” Venckus, 930 N.W.2d at 809 (cleaned up).

Turning to the facts here, Bertrand alleges that he was told in January 2023 that “when the dirt work was performed at [an SCCSD high school], ․ Fahrendholz informed the S[C]CSD School Board that [Bertrand] had taken the dirt and not compensated the school district in any way.” These alleged statements could only have been made between 2018 when the high school project was ongoing and before January 14, 2021, the last day of Fahrendholz's employment with SCCSD. In his affidavit resisting summary judgment, Bertrand summarized the defaming statements as follows:

I was directed by Rod Earlywine to Dan Greenwell about the Unity Land. I called Mr. Greenwell on January 2, 2023. Immediately in the call, Mr. Greenwell got hostile and stated he would not be “muscled or bullied” by Bertrand and that he was “not drinking the Kool Aid.” Greenwell called Bertrand the “dirt devil” who stole the dirt from North High. Greenwell also stated it was common knowledge that he stole the dirt because on numerous occasions Brian Fahrendholtz had told the School Board that Bertrand took the dirt without paying for it. Greenwell also admitted to Bertrand that he had numerous conversations with board members and school officials about the dirt, and how Bertrand got it for free.

Greenwell denied Bertrand's characterization of the conversation. Additionally, the details offered by Bertrand do not include the dates of publication or any disclosure of the persons to whom the comments were made. In Bertrand's discovery responses, he indicated the alleged statements were made “at school board meetings,” but he produced no witness and no recordings or minutes of meetings to confirm the publication. Although he conceded he could not “prove” when the statements were made, Bertrand argued that he had to “assume” the alleged statements were made within the statute of limitations period. Lawsuits must survive on more than assumptions, and as the Defendants assert:

[Bertrand] claims “the statements made by Fahrendholz were published to so many third parties that it became ‘common knowledge’ that Bertrand stole dirt from North High.” These types of general statements do not provide adequate proof as to publication. Who are the third parties? When were the alleged statements made? Additionally, Bertrand did not identify any witnesses or individuals to support his contention that publication was made to third parties or otherwise prove the elements of his case. Rather, in discovery responses, he identified himself as the only individual to corroborate his allegations.

(Cleaned up).

What we do know from this record through undisputed facts is that the petition was filed more than two years after publication of any alleged statement, as conceded by Bertrand. In Fahrendholz's and Greenwell's affidavits supporting summary judgment, the two men asserted, without dispute, that they have had no conversations from January 1, 2021, until the lawsuit was filed. Likewise, Fahrendholz confirmed he was no longer employed with SCCSD after January 14, 2021, and would not have made any presentations to SCCSD after January 1, 2021. Further, Bertrand conceded he could not prove at the time of the summary judgment hearing that any statements defaming him had been made after January 9, 2021.

Having established that the range of dates of publication of the alleged defaming statements could only have occurred between 2018 through January 1, 2021, Bertrand's defamation claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Kiner, 463 N.W.2d at 13–14.

B. Vicarious Liability. We address one final issue not referenced in Bertrand's appellate briefing to clarify our decision as to all theories of liability against SCCSD. At the district court, Bertrand claimed that SCCSD is liable for the negligence of Fahrendholz. Under the doctrine of vicarious liability “the employer is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employees.” Dickens v. Associated Anesthesiologists, P.C., 709 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa 2006). A limitation of this “doctrine is that the employer has no liability unless the employee is liable.” Id. Because Bertrand's defamation claim fails against Fahrendholz, so does his claim of vicarious liability against SCCSD. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on that theory.

IV. Conclusion.

In sum, Bertrand's defamation claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, his vicarious liability claim also fails. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Bertrand did not appeal from the first summary judgment ruling, which dismissed the claims against Greenwell.

2.   After granting further review, the supreme court recently addressed a claim that the discovery rule saved a defamation claim in a case decided by our court. See Betz v. Mathisen, No. 23-1794, 2025 WL 706729, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2025), vacated, 30 N.W.3d 240, 242–43 (Iowa 2026). Although some members of our court opined that the discovery rule would apply to certain defamation claims, the supreme court vacated that decision, declining to decide if the discovery rule applies to defamation claims and instead finding the statute of limitations barred the defamation claim as the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the claim. Id.

3.   See Betz, 30 N.W.3d at 242–43 (declining to decide whether discovery rule applied to defamation claim against an employer).

Opinion by Greer, P.J.