J.S., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

This eight-year-old child was removed from his mother's custody twice due to her methamphetamine addiction. A previous juvenile case closed in 2023 after the mother achieved several months of negative test results and promised to “set a stronger boundary” with problematic romantic partners. But by 2025, her sobriety had faltered, and her boundaries had dissolved. When another year of services failed to produce lasting change, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights.  ¹ She appeals. Our review is de novo. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019).

I. Statutory Ground

The juvenile court found grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) and (l) (2026). Either is enough to affirm, see In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012), and so we focus on paragraph (f ). The mother disputes only the fourth element of that paragraph—whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be safely returned to her custody “at the present time.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(4); see also In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018) (interpreting “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).

These proceedings began in February 2025, when the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services received a report that the mother and the child's father were using methamphetamine in the family home. During an interview with a protective worker, the child described finding “crystals” in stowed-away places and playing with his parents’ “dust toy.” A sample of his hair tested positive for methamphetamine. The child was removed in March and adjudicated in need of assistance the next month. Both parents were later convicted of child endangerment for exposing him to methamphetamine.

Over the next year, the department urged the mother to address her substance use, but she was slow to comply. She refused drug tests, reporting that she was “not ready yet.” And she put off a substance-use evaluation until December 2025—completing one only after it was required by her criminal probation. The mother did not provide a negative drug test until February 2026. By then, she was living with a new boyfriend, who had a history of drug use and domestic-abuse convictions. At a termination hearing in May, the mother conceded that her boyfriend's “hoarded” home was not fit for the child and that she would need to find a different place to live before she could be reunited with her son.

Despite that concession—and her acknowledgment on appeal “that a deferral of permanency and additional time for transition would be better” for the child—the mother argues that the child could have been returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. She emphasizes her negative drug tests in February and March and her participation in treatment. We commend that progress—but sobriety was not the only obstacle to reunification. At the time of the hearing, the department remained concerned about the mother's boyfriend, whose own substance use and violent history raised safety concerns for the child. And the mother herself recognized that she could not care for the child until she secured independent housing. Although she contends that she was “actively looking” for a new place to live, our “legislature has established a limited time frame for parents to demonstrate their ability to be parents.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). The mother's twelve-month deadline to remedy the issues requiring her son's removal expired well before the hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(3). We agree with the juvenile court that the State proved a statutory ground for termination.

II. Best Interests

The mother next challenges the juvenile court's best-interests determination. She argues that the child's court-appointed attorney failed to represent the child's true wishes when he advocated for termination at the hearing.² She also contends the court's termination order lacks “detailed analysis” of the statutory factors. Neither argument provides a basis for reversal. Because our review is de novo, we must decide from our own examination of the record whether the State met its burden, giving “primary consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); accord In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010).

With a juvenile court history stretching back to 2021, this child has spent most of his young life waiting for a safe and stable home. Statements from his therapist, teachers, and foster caregiver show the dysfunction he experienced while living with his mother, as well as the emotional and educational progress he made after his most recent removal. The guardian ad litem believed that termination was the best path toward permanency. We agree. Although the child was in a short-term foster placement at the time of the hearing, the department's caseworker testified that she expected no difficulty finding him an adoptive home. That environment—free of substance use, dangerous caretakers, and unsuitable living conditions—will better serve the child's best interests.³

III. Denial of an Extension

Finally, the mother argues the juvenile court should have granted her six more months to work toward reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). However, that permanency option is only available where the parent shows the need for removal “will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). The mother failed to carry her burden here. She was slow to engage with substance-use services despite her history with the department and her ten-year addiction to methamphetamine. And she took no meaningful steps to address concerns about her living situation after reporting in March that she planned to end her relationship and find new housing. On these facts, the juvenile court appropriately declined to extend the child's time in limbo. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41 (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency ․ by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.”).

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The juvenile court also terminated the rights of the child's father, who does not appeal.

2.   At a permanency hearing in February 2026, the child's attorney and guardian ad litem recommended that the court appoint separate counsel for the child, noting he had “always expressed an interest in returning home.” The court agreed to bifurcate the roles and later continued the termination hearing so that the newly appointed attorney could meet with the child. That meeting did not occur until forty-five minutes before the rescheduled hearing—which the mother contends was too late to gain an accurate understanding of the child's wishes. But, to avoid any doubt, our decision would be the same regardless of the child's position at the hearing. A child's preference is only one factor in the best-interests analysis. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b)(2). And we find it is not determinative here.

3.   As part of her best-interests challenge, the mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred by declining to apply a permissive exception under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c). But she does not explain why severing her bond with the child would be harmful enough to tilt the balance against termination. See A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 169 (explaining the bond exception “requires clear and convincing evidence that termination would be detrimental to the child” (cleaned up)). Given the foster caregiver's testimony regarding the stress the boy experienced with visits, we agree with the juvenile court that the exception does not apply.

Opinion by Badding, J.