S.J., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A mother and a father separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to their two children, born in 2014 and 2024. Both parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination, argue that termination is not in the children's best interests, and contend that a permissive exception should have precluded it. The father separately argues that the juvenile court should have established a guardianship rather than terminate his rights. On our de novo review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The mother and father are the parents of two children, born in 2014 and 2024.¹ The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services became involved with the family in March 2024, when the younger child was born testing positive for amphetamines and his umbilical cord tested positive for methamphetamine. The mother also tested positive for amphetamines but denied any substance use. The father was arrested for possession of marijuana the day the child was born.

The department put a safety plan in place under which the maternal grandmother would care for the children and the children would not be left unsupervised with the mother. The mother agreed to voluntary services but did not respond to the department's efforts to reach her, and in April 2024, she returned home with the older child following a hospitalization, contrary to the department plan. The juvenile court entered an ex parte removal order in May and confirmed the removal after a hearing later that month. The children were placed with their maternal grandmother, and they have remained in her care ever since. No trial period with either parent in their residence has occurred.

The court adjudicated both children in need of assistance in July under Iowa Code section 232.96A, subsections (3)(b), (14), and (15) (2024). The dispositional order entered that September continued custody with the department for relative placement, and the court continued the disposition without modification after a review hearing in December. The department offered the family child abuse assessments, safety planning, supervised interactions, family focused meetings, family centered services, substance-use and mental-health evaluations, drug testing, relative placement, court-ordered funding, and ongoing case management.

The father completed a substance-use evaluation in July 2024 and was found to meet the diagnostic criteria for cannabis-use disorder and stimulant-use disorder. He engaged in the recommended extended outpatient treatment and was successfully discharged in March 2026. His treatment provider reported that the tests she administered were negative except for one positive result in August 2024, which she attributed to medication prescribed after surgery. Testing arranged through the department produced different results. The father tested positive for methamphetamine five times between November 2024 and September 2025, most recently about eight months before the termination hearing. He maintained throughout the case that his sobriety date was May 24, 2024, and that the department's positive tests were inaccurate. In November 2025, his counselor arranged inpatient treatment; the father denied using, said he would go only if he could bring his youngest child, and cut off communication with the department for a period after learning he could not.

The father completed a court-ordered psychological evaluation in February 2025. The evaluator described him as irritable and angry about the department's involvement, and the father reported that he did not believe he needed psychiatric treatment. He completed a four-hour domestic violence course in March. In August, he obtained a mental health evaluation and was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder; the identified treatment targets included a rigid, defensive, and intimidating tone. A lapse in insurance delayed the start of therapy, and he attended weekly individual sessions beginning in January 2026, along with couples sessions with the mother. The juvenile court found his testimony about the benefits of therapy genuine and found that he showed deeper insight into his anger, while also finding that the provider reports showed continuing difficulty managing his emotions in the context of this case.

The record reflects a history of domestic violence between the parents, with reports to the department as early as 2022 and no-contact orders entered in Iowa and Illinois. The father was charged with domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury and pled guilty to assault causing bodily injury; the parents violated the resulting no-contact order until it was lifted. The older child disclosed that she saw the father grab the mother by the neck and strangle her, that she screamed to make him let go, and that it happened more than once. At the final permanency hearing the father denied domestic violence and testified that the child had misunderstood what she saw. At the termination hearing, he testified that the child did not see him put his hand on the mother's throat and that he considered her account false, although he did not dispute that she is afraid of him because of what she witnessed. The parents’ relationship was a continuing concern of the department. At the final permanency hearing, the father testified that he was not in a relationship with the mother and that he would put the children ahead of her. The juvenile court did not find that testimony credible. At the termination hearing, both parents testified that they were in a relationship, and the mother was living in the father's home.

The mother maintained contact with the department and participated in services during the first part of 2025. She completed a psychological evaluation, obtained employment, and tested negative for substance use. Her participation then fell off. She stopped attending the recommended early intervention program in April with one session remaining, had no contact with the case manager after September and told him she was finished working with the State, and did not attend interactions with the children between midSeptember and late December. She tested positive for methamphetamine by urinalysis in September 2024, by hair test in February, May, and September 2025, and again in January 2026. She began mental-health counseling in April 2026, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and her counselor reported she was making progress.

In August 2025 the department learned that the mother had given birth to another child in Illinois in April of that year. Neither parent had disclosed the pregnancy or the birth. The father testified that he knew the mother was pregnant but told no one. That child was later adjudicated a child in need of assistance in another county.

The court held a permanency hearing in April 2025 and granted a six-month extension under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b), finding substantial progress toward reunification and a reasonable likelihood that the children could safely return home within the extension period. The final permanency hearing was held in December 2025. The parents contested the department's recommendation and asked the court to establish a guardianship instead. The court declined. It found that the children could not safely be returned because of ongoing substance use, the lack of long-term sobriety, and concerns about the parents’ ability to supervise and protect them; changed the permanency goal from reunification to adoption; relieved the department of reunification efforts; and directed the State to petition for termination.

The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in February 2026 and amended the petition later that month. The termination hearing was held in May. The case manager, the mother, and the father testified, and the court received the department's termination report, family centered service reports, drug test results, and exhibits offered by each parent. The guardian ad litem supported termination.

Interactions between the parents and the children remained fully supervised throughout the case and never progressed to semi-supervised or unsupervised visits. Service reports described attentive engagement at some visits alongside recurring conflict with providers. In December 2025, both parents became verbally combative with the family support worker in front of the children. Providers repeatedly redirected the parents away from discussing case details and allegations about the department in the older child's presence. After the parents declined a proposed visitation structure in January 2026, the mother did not respond to further outreach, and the father agreed to weekly supervised visits at a public library. In March 2026, the father told the older child to tell her grandmother and the case manager that she wanted to come home and to pray that she could; the child became upset. At the hearing the father acknowledged that some of his statements had been excessive or out of place and apologized for them.

At the time of the termination hearing, the older child was eleven and the younger child was two. The older child was attending school regularly, progressing under her individualized education program, and receiving consistent care for a medical condition that had not been fully addressed before the department's involvement. The younger child was meeting his developmental milestones. The children are closely bonded to one another and to their grandmother, who is willing to adopt them. The older child has consistently said that she wants to remain with her grandmother, be adopted by her, and take her surname. The case manager testified that no strong bond exists between the younger child and either parent and that, while the older child is bonded to her parents, the bond is not strong enough to overcome termination.

The juvenile court terminated the mother's and the father's parental rights to the older child under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) (2026) and to the younger child under section 232.116(1)(h). The court found that termination is in the children's best interests and that no permissive exception under section 232.116(3) precluded termination. Both parents appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). Although the juvenile court's findings of fact do not bind us, we give them respectful consideration, particularly on determinations of witness credibility. Id. The State must prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence—a standard met when we harbor no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. In re S.O., 967 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021).

Termination follows a three-step analysis: we first determine whether a statutory ground under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) has been established; if so, we consider whether termination is in the children's best interests under section 232.116(2); and finally, whether any permissive exception under section 232.116(3) should preclude termination. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 472.

DISCUSSION

I. Statutory Grounds

The juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights to the older child under section 232.116(1)(f ) and to the younger child under section 232.116(1)(h). The parents do not seriously dispute the first three elements of either ground, and the record establishes them.

The contested element, common to both grounds, is whether clear and convincing evidence shows the children could not be returned to either parent “at the present time”—meaning at the time of the termination hearing. In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 624–25 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Returning a child is barred when doing so would expose the child to the adjudicatory harms underlying the child-in-need-of-assistance adjudication. Iowa Code § 232.102(4)(a)(2). The children were adjudicated under section 232.96A(3)(b), (14), and (15) based on the parents’ substance use and failure to provide adequate supervision, and the younger child's positive test for methamphetamine at birth.

The mother's last positive methamphetamine test was January 16, 2026—less than four months before the hearing. She stopped attending interactions with the children from September 13, 2025, through December 22, 2025, and had no contact with the caseworker after September 2025. She engaged in mental-health counseling only beginning in April 2026, and the department had no documentation that she followed through on substance-use treatment or medication management. Her recent, eleventh-hour engagement does not overcome a lengthy record of inconsistent participation and continued use. See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1994). A short period of asserted sobriety on the eve of a hearing does not demonstrate the ability to resume custody where the parent has a history of relapse following periods of sobriety. See R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d at 626. Clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that the children could not be returned to the mother.

The father's progress is more substantial—his last positive test was September 11, 2025. He completed substance-abuse treatment, a domestic-violence course, and a psychological evaluation, and he engaged in therapy for anger and anxiety. We commend that effort. But the record establishes continuing adjudicatory concerns at the time of the hearing: the father persisted in denying his documented methamphetamine use; his anger remained unresolved and continued to surface during supervised contact, including in front of the children; and he prioritized his relationship with the mother, who was still using illegal substances and living with him. The domestic-violence history further underscores the risk—the father pled guilty to assault causing bodily injury with the mother as the victim, and the older child reported witnessing him strangle her mother and remains afraid of him. Given the recency and short duration of his progress against these unresolved concerns, clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that the children could not be safely returned to the father at the time of the hearing.

II. Best Interests

In assessing best interests, we give primary consideration to the children's safety, to the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth, and to their physical, mental, and emotional needs. In re A.B., 956 N.W2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). Those considerations favor termination. The children have been out of parental custody for over two years and have never progressed beyond fully supervised visitation. They are placed with their maternal grandmother where they are safe, thriving, and strongly bonded. The oldest child has made significant medical and educational progress in her care, and the grandmother is willing to adopt both children.

The parents urge that their recent gains warrant additional time. But we cannot deprive children of permanency by hoping that a parent will someday become able to provide a stable home. R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d at 626. The legislature has set a limited timeframe for parents to demonstrate that ability, and children cannot wait indefinitely for responsible parenting. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d 474. Termination is in the best interests of both children.

III. Permissive Exception

Once a ground for termination is established, the section-232.116(3) exceptions are permissive and discretionary, and the parent resisting termination bears the burden to prove that an exception should preclude termination. R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d at 627. None applies here.

The parent-child bond exception, section 232.116(3)(c), does not preclude termination. The existence of a bond is not enough; the exception requires clear and convincing evidence that termination would be detrimental to the child because of the closeness of the relationship. A.B., 956 N.W2d at 169. The caseworker testified there is no strong bond between the youngest child and either parent, and that the oldest child's bond, though real, is not strong enough to overcome termination. The parents did not carry their burden.

The relative-custody exception, section 232.116(3)(a), does not apply. Although the children are placed with their maternal grandmother, legal custody rests with the department—and the exception applies only where the relative has legal custody. A.B., 956 N.W2d at 170. Nor does the exception for a child over ten who objects to termination, section 232.116(3)(b): the older child, though eleven, does not object—she wants to remain with and be adopted by her grandmother.

IV. Guardianship as an Alternative

The father argues that a guardianship, rather than termination, should have been ordered as the least restrictive disposition. A guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination. A.S., 906 N.W.2d 477. Because termination is in the children's best interests, guardianship is not warranted. That conclusion is reinforced by the circumstances: the youngest child is very young and both children have lived in their grandmother's care for the entirety of the case who intends to adopt them. A guardianship would substitute ongoing court supervision and uncertainty for the permanency and stability that adoption provides. The juvenile court did not err in rejecting it.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because the children share the same initials, we refer to them as the older child and the younger child.

Opinion by Sandy, J.