W.W., Father, Appellant. v. << (2026)

Four-year-old K.H. came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services in the summer of 2024 due to concerns about the conditions of his home and suspected drug use by the caretakers who lived there. The child's mother denied any substance use, but she soon tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. A child-in-need-of-assistance case was opened, and the juvenile court appointed counsel for the man whom the mother identified as K.H.’s biological father. Both parents stipulated to the boy's adjudication.

Eighteen months later, K.H. remained in an out-of-home placement, the mother continued to dispute the results of positive drug tests, and the father had been absent from the child's life for more than two years. After a hearing in February 2026, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights. Both now appeal. Our review is de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022).

I. Mother's Appeal

We review the termination of parental rights using a familiar three-step analysis, asking first whether a statutory ground has been established by the State. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc); Iowa Code § 232.116(1) (2026). Here, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate the mother's rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ). The mother contests only the last element of that ground—whether the child could be safely returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(4); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018). The record shows that he could not.

Throughout the juvenile court proceedings, the mother denied responsibility for the positive drug test that triggered the child's June 2024 removal. She maintained that position even after testing positive for cocaine on each of six drug tests she took between October 2024 and October 2025. At the termination hearing, the mother claimed these positive results came from “being around” other users and that she “never did drugs in [her] life.” The juvenile court found her steadfast denial to lack credibility. We do too. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021) (noting that even on de novo review, the juvenile court's credibility determinations are entitled to weight).

Our court has often said that a parent's drug use “in itself” creates a dangerous environment for the children in their care. In re C.B., No. 26-0606, 2026 WL 1678529, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 10, 2026) (quoting In re B.K., No. 25-1767, 2026 WL 380831, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2026)). This danger is heightened when coupled with a lack of accountability. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776–77 (Iowa 2012) (affirming termination where, contrary to the evidence, a father continued to deny his unresolved, chronic drug addiction). Here, the mother's refusal to acknowledge her substance use and its impact on her ability to safely parent K.H. convinces us that she could not be reunited with him at the time of the termination hearing.

We recognize that the mother complied with some services meant to address her drug use.¹ She obtained a substance-use evaluation and substantially completed outpatient treatment in April 2025. But those interventions did not change her behavior. It was not until the following December—after the juvenile court directed the State to file a termination petition—that the mother submitted her first clean hair sample. Given her record of positive tests, the mother's eleventh-hour progress does not tip the balance. In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (finding a “short period of sobriety preceding the termination hearing” did not demonstrate a mother's ability to resume custody of her child). The mother's long-term sobriety was still unproven at the time of the hearing, and so the child could not be returned to her custody.

That leaves us with the mother's best-interests argument. See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 776 (“Even after we have determined that statutory grounds for termination exist, we must still determine whether termination is in the children's best interests.”). The mother cites K.H.’s bond with her and with his siblings in contending that termination would “subject him to intolerable and irreparable harm.” The emotional toll of family separation is “a relevant consideration in the best-interests analysis.” L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 535; see also In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 734 (Iowa 1988) (“[S]iblings should not be separated without good and compelling reasons.”). But when we consider this child's physical, mental, and emotional needs, see Iowa Code § 232.116(2), we find that factor is not determinative here.

Because of her criminal background, the mother has had trouble finding employment and housing. She continues to live with her twin sister— an active cocaine user whose care for the child was among the original reasons for the department's involvement. When questioned about her sister's fitness to be around K.H., the mother denied any “concern about her whatsoever.” She also struggled to explain why one month before the hearing a man with a handgun had been photographed in the family's kitchen. In addition to these safety concerns, the mother's visitation with the child was inconsistent, as was her participation in parenting services. In short, the mother cannot provide K.H. with the safe and stable environment he needs. See In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (describing a child's “safety and need for a permanent home” as “paramount concerns” in the best-interests analysis). Although the department was still searching for a long-term placement at time of the hearing, the path to permanency in this case starts with termination. We find that outcome is in the child's best interests.

II. Father's Appeal

The juvenile court terminated the father's rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (b), (e), and (f ). He does not challenge those grounds on appeal, nor does he argue that termination is against the child's best interests. Instead, his only argument is that the State failed to show he “was the father, or putative father, of K.H. by clear and convincing evidence.” The father contends that because he was never married to the mother, because he never completed genetic testing,² and because the juvenile court questioned the mother's credibility, the evidence is insufficient to prove his actual or putative paternity under the applicable statutory definitions. See Iowa Code § 232.2(48), (57). He asks that we reverse and remand for a six-month extension—presumably so he can establish the parental rights that he does not dispute were terminable under the cited statutory grounds.

We decline to dwell on this perplexing argument. If the father believes that he never belonged in this case, it is far too late to say so. Whether we call it “waiver, forfeiture, estoppel, informal judicial admission, or something else,” we will not entertain an appellate claim that directly contradicts a parent's position in the juvenile proceedings. In re D.C., No. 24-1792, 2025 WL 401965, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025). From the beginning of this case, the mother identified the father as K.H.’s biological parent. He sought and received court-appointed counsel based on that allegation. He appeared at several hearings, where he held himself out as K.H.’s “father.” And he asked the court to grant him visitation with the child. After participating in these proceedings for more than eighteen months, the father cannot deny his parental status now.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

I concur with the decision on all points. My concern relates to the father's argument on appeal that he is not the putative father and his last-minute attempt to contort the language of the statute to support his theme. Having said that, I agree with the opinion that during the progression of the case W.W. maintained he was the father of K.H., even testifying at the termination trial: “I mean, I'm his father.”

I write only to highlight that the definition of putative father has a confusing subsection that needs to be modified, in my view. Found at Iowa Code section 232.2(57) (2026), the definition of putative father

means a person who has been identified by the mother of a child as the child's potential biological father or a person who claims to be the biological father of a child and who was not married to the child's mother at the time of the child's birth, when all of the following circumstances apply:

a. Biological testing has not excluded the person as the child's biological father.

b. No legal father has been established, biological testing excludes the previously identified father, or previous paternity has otherwise been disestablished.

c. Information sufficient to identify and find the person has been provided to the county attorney by the mother, the person, or a party to proceedings under this chapter.

d. The person has not been found by a court to be uncooperative with genetic testing.

(Emphasis added).

The italicized portion of the definition contains two negatives and is confusing. As applied to this case, W.W. now asserts that to be a putative father, the juvenile court was required to find that he was cooperative with genetic testing, or as he states, he “has not been uncooperative.” W.W. argues that in the absence of genetic testing, subsection (d) means that the status of putative father can only be determined if the father “agrees he is the biological father.”

W.W. asserted below that “[p]ossibly, the statute has been poorly drafted by the Legislature. It states its requirement in a sentence using a double-negative. That drafting leads to an unexpected result.” But not here, as while genetic testing was offered, the juvenile court noted that it was not completed “due to no location for the father.” W.W. testified that he has “moved around quite a bit.” As I read section 232.2 (57) as a whole with the other subsections, which we are required to do, if W.W. was cooperative with genetic testing under section (d), the rest of the sections are unnecessary. See Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020) (“In determining the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue, we take into consideration the language's relationship to other provisions of the same statute and other provisions of related statutes.”).

The juvenile court offered a reasonable analysis, and it makes sense, that

[t]he purpose of Iowa Code Section 232.2(53)(d) is to ensure that an individual is only considered a putative father when a court has found them to be uncooperative with genetic testing, thus ensuring that fathers who never had the opportunity to genetically test, would avoid the putative father net. This is important because putative fathers face loss of parental rights in Child in Need of Assistance actions and those individuals who have cooperated with testing, but have not been given the opportunity to so participate, should not face such heavy consequences. This interpretation is supported by [section] 232.2(53)(a), which provides that biological testing cannot have excluded the individual as the child's biological father to be considered a putative father. Thus, it is only the alleged father who wishes to cooperate with testing, but has not been given the means to so participate, that avoids this legal construct. Any other interpretation would reward a man who avoids genetic testing and punish a man who wishes to know the child's parentage. The Court cannot support such an absurd result.

Plus, we would not want an uncooperative father to sit out the process, only to return later to court and demand his rights because he avoided genetic testing.

But we need not worry about that here. First, W.W. admitted he was the father and exercised that status throughout the case, and second, on this record, he claimed to want to cooperate with genetic testing, he just did not provide a location for that to happen.

And as our supreme court has emphasized, “Efficient and timely resolution of juvenile proceedings serves the interests of the child and the state. Our statutes and court rules reflect this proposition.” In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 502 (Iowa 2014). “It is the public policy of the state of Iowa that proceedings involving ․ [children in need of assistance] be concluded at the earliest possible time consistent with a fair hearing to all parties.” Id. (citation omitted).

FOOTNOTES

1.   The mother's petition on appeal asserts in passing that the department “failed to provide reasonable efforts” to assist in reunification. It is unclear whether this is a reference to drug-related services or something else. Because the mother fails to elaborate her reasonable-efforts claim, we do not consider it. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 534 n.2 (explaining a parent's appellate arguments are waived in the absence of sufficient “identification, presentment, and development”).

2.   The father acknowledges that the department arranged genetic testing “on several occasions” but that he was unable to complete a test due to his frequent relocations and his failure to keep the department “apprised of his address.”

Opinion by Badding, J.

Sandy, J., concurs; Greer, P.J., specially concurs.