State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Anna Marie Bryant, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Anna Bryant appeals her conviction for operating while under the influence, challenging the denial of her motion to suppress evidence flowing from a traffic stop. She argues that her constitutional rights were violated because the traffic stop was impermissibly extended beyond the original objective of the stop.

Because Bryant conceded the point she attempts to make on appeal at the trial level, we affirm her conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

During the late-night hours of October 23, 2024, Iowa State Trooper Dalton Grell initiated a traffic stop on a passing vehicle when he noticed it was missing a front license plate. The stop was recorded by the trooper's in-car camera in his patrol vehicle, and audio was captured by the trooper's body-worn microphone.

Upon approaching the vehicle from the passenger side,¹ Trooper Grell advised Bryant that he had stopped her because her vehicle lacked a front license plate. Bryant responded that she struck a deer earlier that week, which dislodged the front plate and she had not had time to replace it yet. When asked for registration and insurance, Bryant stated that she did not have the documents in the vehicle but did have insurance. Trooper Grell later testified that he detected the odor of alcohol emanating from within the cabin of the vehicle while speaking with Bryant through the vehicle's window, making him suspicious that she might be operating the vehicle while under the influence (OWI). Trooper Grell then asked Bryant to “jump back” into the front passenger seat of his patrol car, and Bryant complied.

Now seated within his patrol vehicle, Trooper Grell again detected the odor of alcohol, but now also noticed that Bryant's eyes were bloodshot and her speech was mumbled. Approximately three minutes after initiating the stop, Trooper Grell asked Bryant how much she had to drink that night. Bryant responded that she “had a drink and [she] left half of it on the ․ picnic table.” Trooper Grell then asked if Bryant would be willing to conduct field sobriety tests with him because “I can smell the odor of alcohol coming off of you and you said you had ․ a drink.” Though not thrilled, Bryant agreed to his request.

Bryant showed signs of impairment during the tests, and Trooper Grell called for another officer to respond to the scene. While waiting, Bryant became increasingly agitated and ultimately stated, “Can I just breathalyzer? Let's do this. Because I have everything to prove and nothing to lose.” Bryant blew a sample registering a 0.026 BAC—well below the legal limit— but Trooper Grell continued to investigate a possible OWI, believing Bryant may have been impaired due to the combined effects of prescription medication and alcohol. Bryant was detained and transported to the nearest hospital. Blood samples were collected pursuant to a warrant; testing returned positive results for methamphetamine and phentermine. She was charged with OWI, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a) (2024).

Bryant moved to suppress evidence, namely her blood test results. In support of her motion, counsel argued that the test results should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule as evidence stemming from an unconstitutional “blended” stop under the reasoning of Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and its Iowa progeny. Because the trooper prolonged this routine traffic stop by asking her back to his car and conducting sobriety tests, argued Bryant, the warrant was based on illegal evidence and was thus defective. Trial counsel clarified:

I think that the evidence here isn't sufficient to sustain the warrant. There's—I think there's been some contradictory testimony about the odor of alcohol and the bloodshot eyes and there was questions about the light being shined in her face, but the essence is I just want to clarify here because I think [opposing counsel], you know is—I'm not challenging the initial point of her being brought back to the vehicle because there was—you know, there was a degree of, you know, reasonable suspicion to do that. But the problem is what happened afterwards, which is first in the field sobriety tests that she refuses to do them and he still insists on explaining them to her anyways, that's adding time to the stop.

He should have brought her back and just offered a [preliminary breath test (PBT)] then, but he still explained those to her and I think that after the PBT was given and she blew under the legal limit, then that should have dispelled all reasonable suspicion to further investigate the traffic stop and yet he continued to do so.

The State resisted, arguing that the trooper had reasonable grounds to believe Bryant was intoxicated within the first few moments of the encounter and, if anything, expedited the stop by moving her into his patrol car. The district court found the stop was constitutionally valid and the trooper had reasonable grounds to suspect additional criminal activity and denied Bryant's motion to suppress.

Following her suppression loss, Bryant waived her right to a jury trial and submitted her case to the court. The court found her guilty on May 19, 2025. At sentencing, Bryant requested the court not enter a deferred judgment so she could preserve her right to appeal. Following her request, Bryant was sentenced to two days in jail and a $1,250 fine.

On that appeal, Bryant argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the scope of the traffic stop exceeded constitutional bounds when Trooper Grell asked Bryant to sit in his patrol vehicle and then investigated a possible OWI. The State resists, arguing that Bryant waived her argument at the suppression hearing and, in any event, the investigation was valid because Trooper Grell developed reasonable suspicion that Bryant was impaired when he first spoke with her in her vehicle.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the district court's denial of a motion to suppress based on a constitutional violation de novo. In re Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015). This requires “an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.” State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). “In doing so, ‘[w]e give deference to the district court's fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings.’ ” State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Brown, 890 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Iowa 2017)).

III. Analysis.

At issue in this case is at what point Trooper Grell had reasonable suspicion that a potential OWI was in progress. Bryant argues on appeal that Trooper Grell only became suspicious of possible criminal activity after turning the traffic stop into a “blended” stop—a dual-purpose investigation that unconstitutionally prolonged the stop beyond the time necessary to address the traffic violation without independent reasonable suspicion of another offense developing during that time. If Trooper Grell's suspicion arose only from that unlawful extension, then Bryant's continued detention was unconstitutional and any evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed.

But Bryant waived her claim on this issue at the trial level. At her suppression hearing, trial counsel said that he was “not challenging the initial point of her being brought back to the vehicle” because Trooper Grell had “a degree of ․ reasonable suspicion” to do so. This effectively concedes that independent reasonable suspicion of an ongoing OWI arose while Bryant was still within her vehicle. That concession triggers the invited error doctrine: “A party to a criminal proceeding cannot assume inconsistent positions in the trial and appellate courts and, as a general rule, will not be permitted to allege an error in which [s]he [her]self acquiesced.” State v. Sage, 162 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1968) (citation omitted); State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 1975); see also State v. Duncan, 710 N.W.2d 34, 43–44 (Iowa 2006) (outlining the preclusion of inconsistent positions on appeal).

In fairness to appellate counsel, we recognize that she did not represent the defendant at trial and was constrained to advance an argument that was inconsistent with the position taken by trial counsel. But we cannot examine the merits of Bryant's claim because she remains bound by the position that she took below.

IV. Conclusion.

We affirm Bryant's conviction for operating while under the influence, first offense.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Contrary to Trooper Grell's suppression hearing testimony that he approached from the driver's side, the video clearly shows the trooper approaching from the passenger side.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.