State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Willie Bob Walker, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

“Did I hurt somebody?” Willie Walker kept asking that question at the hospital after a head-on collision between his vehicle and a pickup truck in May 2021. Police officers investigating the accident determined that Walker—who was drunk and had cocaine in his system—was the driver of the vehicle that hit the truck. One of Walker's passengers died, and another suffered serious injuries. The truck driver was also seriously injured.

Walker was charged with vehicular homicide and two counts of serious injury by vehicle. At the jury trial, Walker claimed that his then-girlfriend, Necmarie Cruz, was driving when the accident happened. Cruz denied that claim. Trooper Benedict Miller, a technical collision investigator, testified that based on his examination of the scene and vehicles, Cruz could not have been the driver. The jury found Walker guilty as charged on March 28, 2025.

On the morning of his sentencing hearing on May 19, Walker moved for a new trial, arguing the “verdict was contrary to the evidence presented.” The district court denied the motion as untimely and without merit before sentencing Walker to prison. Walker appeals, claiming the court abused its discretion in denying the motion because “the more credible evidence supports the fact that [he] was not the driver.” We reject this claim for two reasons.

First, the district court correctly concluded that Walker's motion was untimely. Our rules of criminal procedure require new-trial motions to be filed “no later than forty-five days after a guilty verdict and at least five days before sentencing.” State v. Sundall, No. 24-0198, 2025 WL 2408466, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2025) (citing Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(a)). Walker's sentencing-day motion did not meet either of those deadlines. While Walker now claims in his reply brief that there was good cause for the delay, see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(4)(a), he did not ask the district court to extend the time for filing the motion. So that question is not properly before us. See Sundall, 2025 WL 2408466, at *7 (affirming the denial of a new-trial motion as untimely where the defendant did not ask for an extension before the court ruled on the motion). Even if it was, raising the issue for the first time in a reply brief is too late. See Villa Magana v. State, 908 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 2018) (“Generally, we will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

Second, Walker's arguments on the merits do not entitle him to any relief. In denying Walker's motion, the district court found that testimony from Cruz and Trooper Miller was credible. The court also found the physical evidence supported the jury's determination that Walker was driving at the time of the accident. We review that ruling for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d 231, 246 (Iowa 2022). “This is a deferential standard, and we will not reverse the district court's ruling absent a ‘clear and manifest abuse of discretion.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

Walker does not contend that the district court applied the wrong legal standard, overlooked critical evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion in denying his motion. See id. Instead, he asserts the court reached a “clearly unreasonable and untenable conclusion” in finding Cruz's and Trooper Miller's testimony credible. “On appellate review, however, we do not reweigh the evidence and make an independent determination on whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Id. “That determination was left to the discretion of the district court in the first instance.” Id. Our task on appeal “is simply to determine whether the district court manifestly abused its discretion.” Id. We find no such abuse.

Cruz testified that on the day of the accident, Walker drove her and two of their friends—Azra Ponjevic and Ponjevic's boyfriend, Eric Bickerstaff Jr.—to the casino. Cruz said that Walker was “super upset” on the way there and that he “was driving fast and swerving all over the place.” Walker later admitted that he had been drinking and using cocaine, and his blood tested positive for both substances after the accident. Despite Walker's reckless driving, the group made it to the casino. They stayed there for a few hours before heading home.

Cruz testified that Walker's driving was worse on the return trip. She said they “were just all scared” and were “begging” Walker to let her drive. Walker finally stopped the car and left Cruz, Ponjevic, and Bickerstaff on the side of the road. He came back fifteen or twenty minutes later as the group was walking back to the casino. Cruz testified that Walker got into the passenger seat and let her drive. Ponjevic was sitting behind the driver's seat, and Bickerstaff was in the rear passenger seat. Cruz testified that while Walker “was kind of clumped over” next to her, she texted Ponjevic to ask if she still felt scared. Then Walker woke up. Cruz said that he started yelling at her—“Bitch, pull the car over, I'll take us all out, I'll take you guys out, you'll see what I can really do”—and grabbed her arm. Cruz pulled the car over, and Walker started driving again. She testified that he was “still swerving,” yelling, and “driving super fast and reckless.” Cruz's last message to Ponjevic before the accident was, “Mannn I should have just not stopped. I should have just kept going.”

Walker argues that Cruz's testimony was contradicted by his testimony and by testimony from Bickerstaff. Walker testified that he and Cruz never switched places after she started driving. And Bickerstaff, who had been smoking marijuana that day, testified that he fell asleep after Cruz started driving. His next memory was waking up in the hospital. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Cruz's testimony was credible despite these competing accounts. In ruling on Walker's new-trial motion, the court was obligated to “weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted). The court did just that. And it also found the physical evidence supported the jury's determination that Walker was driving. See State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1990) (noting that in weighing the credibility of witnesses, the district court “may consider whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence”).

That physical evidence included testimony from first responders at the scene, who found Walker lying in a ditch about thirty feet from the car. His pants were pulled down to his ankles, and he was not wearing shoes. The rest of the group was in the back seat of Walker's vehicle. Trooper Miller later found Walker's shoes wedged between the driver's seat and pedals. And Walker's cell phone was on the driver's side floor. Trooper Miller testified that “because of the post-collision path” of Walker's vehicle, and Walker's ejection from it, “[h]e was the only one that could have been the driver.” Trooper Miller also testified that his examination of the vehicle showed the driver's side seatbelt was not engaged when the accident happened, while the front passenger's seatbelt was. Cruz testified that she had bruising from the seatbelt “going from [her] right shoulder all the way across” her chest. Her medical records noted the bruising as a “positive seatbelt mark.”

This is not “the extraordinary case where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006) (cautioning that trial courts “should not disturb the jury's findings where the evidence they considered is nearly balanced or is such that different minds could fairly arrive at different conclusions”). Walker's arguments essentially ask us to reweigh the evidence ourselves. But that is not our role on appeal. See Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d at 246. The district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in rejecting Walker's weight-of-the-evidence challenge to the verdict.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion by Badding, J.