N.Q., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

The juvenile court terminated a mother's parental rights to three of her children: S.O. (born in 2016), A.Q. (born in 2020), and A.S. (born in 2024). The court found that the mother “demonstrated significant mental health needs which are an ongoing safety factor for the children.” The mother, Natalie, challenges the termination order, insisting that she could provide the children with “stability something the children had not experienced since their removal.” Because her testimony that she was “willing to still take counseling” is not enough to assure us that she can be a safe parent, we affirm the termination order.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

When A.S. was less than two months old, Natalie texted her mother saying that she left him “in the woods and now could not find the baby.” The grandmother called police. Officers checked Natalie's residence, discovering six-year-old S.O. and three-year-old A.Q. home alone. After police eventually located Natalie and A.S., Natalie denied any intent to abandon A.S. in the woods. She said her partner, Bennett, was supposed to be watching the older children. But Natalie's statements were contradicted by the texts she sent to the children's grandmother. Concerned about Natalie's mental health, the police took her to Broadlawns Medical Center. Broadlawns transferred Natalie to a behavioral health center, where she was hospitalized for a week to treat her symptoms of psychosis.

The children remained with their grandmother, and the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services sought an order to remove the children from parental custody. At a removal hearing in late September 2024, Natalie denied that she had been hospitalized for mental-health reasons. The juvenile court approved removal on November 1 and adjudicated S.O., A.Q., and A.S. as children in need of assistance in February 2025. The court found that Natalie's “unresolved mental health issues, combined with her unwillingness to access services creates a risk of imminent harm for the children.”

Through the spring of 2025, Natalie's supervised interactions with the children went well. She showed them affection, could redirect errant behaviors, and provided snacks and drinks. But Natalie made troubling comments to the family centered service providers. For example, Natalie asked, “[I]f I give up my kids to the state, will that mean I do not have to work with you anymore?” She also said she was “on vacation” since she did not have the children in her care. Natalie also stated that “she [did] not want the children back until June, that way the children are out of school for the summer.” She also had concerning interactions with the service providers including making inappropriate gestures and touching or speaking to them inappropriately.

In April 2025, Natalie complied with the court's order to undergo a psychological evaluation. The evaluator identified risks to returning the children to the mother's custody:

Natalie demonstrates limited insight into her mental health needs and resists engagement with therapeutic interventions, including missing court-ordered psychological evaluation[ ] appointments and failing to provide verifiable information about her reported therapist. This resistance to treatment, coupled with ongoing concerns about her judgment and social awareness, evidenced by grandiose communication, boundary-crossing behaviors, and inappropriate comments—raises substantial risk for both her own well-being and the safety of her children.

The evaluator recommended continued supervised interactions:

Before considering unsupervised contact with her children, it is essential that Natalie demonstrate sustained improvement in several key areas of functioning. First and foremost, Natalie should engage consistently in trauma-informed individual therapy with a licensed mental health professional who can address her longstanding difficulties with emotional regulation, insight, and interpersonal relationships. Regular attendance, active participation, and openness to feedback in therapy should be documented and verified by her provider.

But Natalie did not follow those recommendations. She told a case worker in June 2025 that “she has not been engaged in therapy due to being busy.”¹ When the department urged Natalie to address her mental-health needs, she denied needing therapy, saying that she was “handling life well.” By late summer, Natalie had gone for three sessions of individual therapy.

Then in August 2025, the grandmother contacted the department to say she could no longer be a placement for the children. The department moved them to foster care before placing them with a maternal cousin in Texas. At first, the children did well in the relative placement.

Meanwhile, Natalie's contact with them was sporadic. The department arranged weekly supervised video visits from October 2025 to February 2026. But Natalie often failed to participate. When she missed visits, the children were very disappointed, “impacting them both at school and at home.” Their behavior stabilized when the scheduled visits stopped. To maintain some contact, the relative placement allowed the mother to call when she wanted to see the children.

In March 2026, the State petitioned to terminate Natalie's parental rights. At the late March termination hearing, the department case worker testified: “Throughout this whole case, Natalie has been off and on in therapy.” The worker explained that Natalie engaged in September and October 2025, disengaged in November, and reengaged in February 2026.

Natalie also testified at the termination hearing, discounting the worker's testimony about her mental health. Natalie told the court: “Some of the information's false.” According to Natalie, nothing about her mental health posed a danger to her children.² She continued to decline medications for her mental health. But she did testify that she intended to continue her individual therapy.

At the close of the hearing, the juvenile court ruled from the bench, telling the mother:

My job for purposes of this termination trial is to look at the history of services and to look at what is in the children's best interest, not only today, but also in the future. I am going to grant the termination petition for you as it relates to the three children.

After the hearing, but before the court issued its written ruling, the department reported that the children had been returned to foster care in Iowa because of abuse allegations against the relative placement in Texas.

In late May, the juvenile court filed its written ruling confirming the termination of Natalie's parental rights.³ Natalie appeals.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Our review is de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). Under this standard, “we examine the whole record, find our own facts, and adjudicate rights anew on issues properly before us.” In re M.H., 12 N.W.3d 159, 160 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (citation omitted). We extend respectful consideration to the juvenile court's findings of fact, especially on witness credibility issues. Id.

III. Analysis

Termination of parental rights follows a three-step process. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). First, the State must prove a statutory ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2026). Id. Second, the State must show termination is in the children's best interests under section 232.116(2). Id. Third, parents may rely on exceptions to termination under section 232.116(3). Id. We address only the issues that a parent disputes. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). Natalie challenges the first and second steps.

A. Statutory Grounds

The juvenile court terminated Natalie's rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraph (f ) as to S.O. and A.Q., the older children, and paragraph (h) as to A.S., the younger child. In her petition on appeal, Natalie argues that the children could be returned to her custody.⁴ Her argument goes to the common final element of paragraphs (f ) and (h), requiring clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to parental custody at the time of the termination hearing as provided in section 232.102. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(4), (h)(4); In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (finding “at the present time” means the date of the termination hearing).

In our de novo review, we find clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to Natalie's custody in March 2026. As Natalie notes, she had “independent housing and was gainfully employed.” But the looming impediment to reunification was Natalie's history of mental-health struggles, compounded by her lack of insight into the risk her untreated condition would pose to young children in her care. True, Natalie testified at the termination hearing that she was “willing to still take counseling” if she did “have a mental health issue” as the department indicated. But that half-hearted commitment cannot overcome her months of failing to follow recommendations for sustained mental-health treatment. Termination was proper under paragraphs (f ) and (h).

B. Best Interests

Natalie next argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that termination was in the children's best interests. She claims that she has demonstrated stability while “[t]he children have experienced multiple placements” since the department's intervention with the family. The petition on appeal asserts: “Terminating Natalie's parental rights is far more detrimental to the children than any danger perceived by not terminating and returning them to their mother.” But the petition does not track the framework of section 232.116(2).

Under that framework, we give “primary consideration” to the children's safety; to the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth; and to their physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 37 (discussing section 232.116(2)). Natalie is right that the children have not found stability in the department's custody—bouncing from relative placement to foster care to a different relative placement in Texas then back to foster care in Iowa. But that unfortunate upheaval does not mean that returning to Natalie's custody is safe or that it would advance their long-term nurturing and growth. In her petition on appeal, Natalie argues, “Any danger perceived by not terminating could be addressed through continued individual therapy and counseling.” But the mother's history of ignoring her mental health leads us to believe that she cannot provide a safe environment. See id. at 41. These children cannot be deprived of permanency while their mother continues to minimize her mental-health challenges. See generally In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012). Despite their traumatic journey during the CINA case, termination remains in the children's best interests.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Natalie was a post office worker. She testified at trial that she used most of her vacation time on court dates.

2.   At the time of the termination hearing, A.S was twenty-months old, A.Q. was five years, and S.O. was nine.

3.   The order also terminated parental rights of the putative father of S.O. and A.Q. He did not appeal. As to the putative father of A.S., the court found good cause to continue the trial on the petition to terminate his parental rights so that he could obtain court-appointed counsel.

4.   Although the mother's counsel cites section 232.116(1)(e), we take from the context that she is challenging the State's proof for paragraph (f ).

Opinion by Tabor, C.J.