State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Cody Michael Schmidt, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Cody Schmidt appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty pleas and convictions for sexual abuse in the third degree and harboring a runaway. His two complaints on appeal are that the sentencing court referred to the child victim as “vulnerable” and to his “prior record.” We affirm.

At a reported plea hearing, Schmidt agreed that the expected witnesses whose testimony was set forth in the minutes of testimony were “telling the truth” as to the relevant counts. He also specifically admitted to performing sex acts on a fifteen-year-old child and harboring her as a runaway with the intent to commit sex abuse on her. He was twenty-seven years old at the time.

“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). To show an abuse of discretion, a defendant bears the burden to affirmatively show that the district court relied on improper factors or clearly untenable grounds. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 759, 762 (Iowa 1998).

First, as to the description of the victim as “vulnerable,” we discern no error. Even limiting our review solely to the oral plea admissions—sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old girl, harbored as a runaway with intent to commit that sexual abuse—we find there was nothing improper about describing the victim as “vulnerable.” To the extent the oral statements were not enough, the minutes and the unobjected to presentence investigation report reflect that Schmidt arranged for the girl to run away and he paid her for sex with $100 and alcohol. She was, in fact, vulnerable.

Second, the only reference to Schmidt's “prior record” is on the sentencing form, which lists it among the other statutory sentencing factors. Contrary to Schmidt's assertions on appeal, we have no reason to think the sentencing court believed Schmidt had a criminal history when everyone agrees he didn't. For example, his attorney said: “As the [presentence investigation report] indicates, these are the only charges that Mr. Schmidt has ever received.” A sentencing court is required to consider criminal history. E.g., State v. Schlachter, 884 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016); see also Iowa Code § 907.5(1)(b) (2024). And the best reading of the sentencing order is that the court considered Schmidt's lack of criminal history. In any event, Schmidt has not carried his burden to affirmatively show any improper consideration affected his sentence. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762.

Last, some language in Schmidt's brief could be construed as a broader abuse-of-discretion challenge to the court's sentencing decision. But “[o]ur task on appeal is not to second-guess the sentencing court's decision.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020). Yet that is what Schmidt seems to ask us to do. To the extent Schmidt wishes the court had more specifically addressed certain factors, a sentencing court is not obligated to list off every possible claim of mitigation. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We also discern no abuse of discretion in the sentencing court determining that the nature of the offense outweighed other arguably mitigating factors.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion by Buller, J.