D.A., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

The mother of a child born in 2024 appeals the termination of her parental rights. The father's parental rights were also terminated, but he does not appeal. The mother challenges the grounds for termination. We affirm.

In July 2024, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) discovered both parents and a third familial caretaker were all using methamphetamine and knew the others were using while caring for the infant. The mother was also arrested for domestic violence after hitting and scratching the father in the presence of the child. The mother was on probation for an unrelated drug offense.

The child was removed from both parents’ custody and placed with a maternal aunt. Two months later, the child was adjudicated in need of assistance.

HHS worked with the father's and child's tribe, complying with requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act. Qualified expert witnesses from the tribe submitted affidavits supporting continued removal from the parents and agreeing to the child's placement with the maternal aunt. The aunt brought the child to visit the tribe and made efforts to follow and support his Native American heritage.

The mother initially began attending substance-abuse and mental-health treatment, but she continued to test positive for methamphetamine until successfully completing inpatient treatment in early 2025. Unfortunately, by mid-2025, the mother relapsed, her probation was revoked, and she was sentenced to prison. The mother worked on her education and skills while incarcerated and participated in visitation as allowed, but substance-abuse and mental-health treatment were not available. She was eligible for parole starting in April 2026. For a time, she planned to seek placement at the residential correctional facility (RCF) closer to her significant other (who was not participating in drug screens or services, but whom the mother had married just before entering prison), but after they “were no longer together” she changed her plan to the facility closest to the child. By the termination trial, the mother was waiting for a spot at the RCF closest to the child, and she transferred before the court's order was filed. She had plans for mental-health and substance-abuse treatment and employment in the community.

The county attorney, HHS, the qualified expert witness from the child's tribe, and the child's guardian ad litem all recommended termination of parental rights. The mother requested additional time in the form of a continuance. The Tribe's representative requested a six-month extension for the parents or a guardianship. The juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2025). The mother appeals, challenging whether the State proved either ground for termination. Our review is de novo. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).

“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court's order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We find termination was proper under section 232.116(1)(h).

The first three elements of termination under section 232.116(1)(h) are undisputed—the child's age, adjudication, and length of removal. The mother nominally argues the State failed to prove the final element, that the child could not be safely returned to her custody at the time. But she was in prison at the time of the termination hearing—where the child could not stay with her—and awaited a spot in the RCF—again where the child could not stay with her. Because the parent must be able to safely resume custody at the time of the trial to avoid termination, see In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014), and the mother could not do so due to her incarceration, we affirm.

We note the substance of the mother's argument for both grounds implies she should have been granted additional time to resume custody of the child based on her recent progress. To the extent she discusses events occurring after the termination hearing and order, we cannot consider them on appeal. E.g., State v. Kucharo, No. 22-1881, 2024 WL 2842307, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2024) (“Ordinarily, we do not consider matters that are not part of the record, which includes those items filed after notice of appeal.”).

In the interests of completeness, we observe that the mother's recent progress would not warrant a different outcome, even if we could consider it. While we applaud the mother's work on herself in prison, she is a long way from providing a safe and sober home in the community. The child had been removed from her custody for nearly two years by the time of termination—all but six months of his young life. And the mother has struggled to prioritize the child over her relationships and drug use. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 777 (citation omitted).

AFFIRMED.

Opinion by Buller, J.