State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joseph Alexander Williams, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Following a bench trial, the district court found Joseph Williams guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(a) (2023), and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of no more than ten years in prison. Williams appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt, that the verdict should be vacated, and that a judgment of acquittal should be entered. The State argues that substantial evidence to support the trial court's verdict was presented and that the verdict should be affirmed.

We affirm because we find there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's guilty verdict.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In the late afternoon of July 17, 2023, A.B., a sixteen-year-old female, ran away from a youth residential center in Des Moines. A.B. left without any shoes on and was followed by a treatment counselor, but the counselor lost A.B. in a wooded area. As A.B. was unfamiliar with the area, she entered a nearby liquor store to use the phone to call 911. She intended to ask to be picked up and returned to the residential center. However, A.B. ended the call without sharing her location. A.B. went to the back of the liquor store to watch “casino gambling games.” This is where A.B. met Williams. Williams purchased alcohol at the store and initiated a conversation with her. He asked A.B. her age, which she answered truthfully, and pressured her to drink the alcohol he had purchased, which she did.

A.B. left the liquor store with Williams. Security footage from the liquor store showed that A.B. was unsteady on her feet and was using objects around her for balance and support as she was leaving the store. The security footage also showed that A.B. had oversized shoes on when she left the liquor store, although A.B. had no memory of when or how she got the shoes. A.B. testified that when she left the liquor store, she was under the influence of alcohol and felt “really numb.”

As A.B. described it, Williams “kept pulling” her to his apartment complex across the street from the liquor store, and, when A.B. said she had to use the restroom, he took her to his apartment on the ground floor. After using the bathroom, A.B. testified that Williams “put his hands” on her. A.B. next remembered waking up naked in the bedroom. Williams was on top of her with his penis in her vagina, and her hands were bound. A.B. testified that she bit him, and, in response, Williams strangled her until she lost consciousness because she couldn't breathe. A.B. woke again to Williams still having sex with her, and she bit him a second time. Williams then covered her mouth with his hand, and she testified “her vision went out.” When A.B. woke next, Williams was walking out of the bedroom. A.B. got dressed and escaped out of the bedroom window.

A.B. wandered around the area until the counselor located her and brought her back to the residential center. The counselor testified that she found A.B. in a distraught and emotionally unstable state, smelling like alcohol, and with bruising on her neck. After A.B. told the counselor she had been sexually assaulted, the counselor brought her to a hospital where the certified sexual assault nurse examiner performed a sexual assault examination. After the sexual assault kit was sent to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation Criminalistics Laboratory for testing, the criminalist found the presence of male DNA in samples from A.B.’s underwear, anus, and bilateral labia, but the sperm cell fraction of the underwear sample was too weak for conclusive interpretation. The police also collected samples of Williams's DNA. The screenings also confirmed that Williams's saliva was found on A.B.’s neck, shoulder, and breast. When the police arrived at the hospital, Officer Jacob Boekhoff interviewed A.B., observed the bruising around her neck and testified that she was “very traumatized” when describing what had happened.

After waiving his right to a jury trial and proceeding to a bench trial, the district court found Williams guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(a). After his motion for judgment of acquittal was denied, Williams appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review claims of insufficient evidence for correction of errors at law. State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). This standard applies to both jury trials and to bench trials. State v. Myers, 924 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Iowa 2019). “If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm.” State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797, 803 (Iowa 2000). In determining whether substantial evidence supports the verdict, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Cook, 996 N.W.2d at 708 (cleaned up).

III. Analysis.

To prove the charge of sexual abuse in the third degree, the State had to show: (1) Williams performed a sex act with A.B. and (2) he performed the sex act by force or against A.B.’s will. Iowa Code § 709.4(1). Williams concedes he committed a sex act upon A.B. Instead, Williams argues that the State did not have sufficient evidence to show that Williams performed the sex act “by force or against the will of the other person.” Id. § 709.4(1)(a). As an additional factor, Iowa Code section 709.1(1) explains that “if the act is done while the other is ․ in a state of unconsciousness, the act is done against the will of the other.”

Williams argues that there is no evidence that the sex act was “by force or against the will” of A.B., as there is no evidence that A.B. asked him to stop or that she refused at any time. Id. § 709.4(1)(a). Pointing to inconsistent testimony by A.B., Williams attacks her credibility and attempts to explain away the force she described as consensual, such as that biting is not necessarily a refusal and is not uncommon during sex.

A review of the record shows there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the sex act was against A.B.’s will. While evidence is not needed to corroborate a sexual abuse victim's testimony, there is corroborating evidence in this case. See State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). A.B. testified that she was under the influence of alcohol, causing her to lose consciousness, that she resisted Williams's sex act when she gained consciousness by biting him, and that Williams strangled her, again causing her to lose consciousness. There are physical marks on A.B.’s body that supported her version of events. On top of that, the counselor testified that A.B. was distraught and scared after returning to the residential center, corroborating that the sex act was unwanted. As the district court found A.B. to be credible and there is evidence that corroborates A.B.’s testimony that the sex act was against her will, we find that there is substantial evidence showing Williams performed the sex act with force and against A.B.’s will. See Weaver, 608 N.W.2d at 804 (explaining that “[d]eterminations of credibility are in most instances left for the trier of fact, who is in a better position to evaluate it.”).

Next, Williams contends A.B. was not in a state of unconsciousness, but, rather, lacks memory of the event. This argument also lacks merit, as the counselor's testimony that A.B. smelled of alcohol and the security footage from the liquor store showing A.B.’s unsteady gait are both consistent with A.B.’s testimony that she was in and out of consciousness due to being under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Mousa, No. 19-1748, 2022 WL 610315, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. March 2, 2022) (finding that the sex act was against the will of the victim, even when she could not remember the sexual assault, as “[w]hether [the victim] was so intoxicated that she could not apprise her own conduct or she was unconscious, the jury could determine [the victim] could not give meaningful consent to a sex act ․”).

Finally, Williams also argues that, while there is evidence that A.B. was strangled, there is no evidence that she was strangled to the point of unconsciousness. Even assuming A.B. was not strangled to the point of unconsciousness, by choking A.B. at all, Williams employed force to continue the sex act. The district court found that “[t]he Defendant first committed the sex act while A.B. was in a state of unconsciousness, and when she gained consciousness, the Defendant used force to continue the sex act.”

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all legitimate inferences and presumptions that we have deduced from the record, there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the district court's findings that the sex act was “done by force or against the will of the other person.” Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(a); see also State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021) (discussing sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard).

IV. Conclusion.

We find substantial evidence supports Williams's conviction of third-degree sexual abuse, and we affirm the conviction.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.