State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Kencade Lee Godfrey, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Kencade Godfrey pleaded guilty to twelve counts in two criminal cases, the first involving various acts of lewd contact with nine-year-old girls and the second involving the possession of child pornography. At sentencing, Godfrey told the district court that he took “full responsibility” for his actions and expressed “sincere remorse” for the pain he caused his young victims. The judge imposed a prison term not to exceed sixteen years but said he had planned to impose an even longer sentence before hearing Godfrey's earnest allocution.

When I look at everything, as I said, I do believe that incarceration is warranted by your conduct, particularly by the magnitude of the different charges. I will tell you that I make notes before I come in here but I'm always open-minded, and I am, I guess, downgrading from where I thought I was going to go. So the sentence I'm imposing is lighter than what I thought based just off of reading the PSI [presentence investigation report], and that's in light of your comments that you have made.

On appeal, Godfrey argues that the court abused its discretion by “improperly balancing” the sentencing factors and imposing a prison term when community supervision would have adequately protected the public.

Finding no error in the sentencing court's rationale, we affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

When he was nineteen, Godfrey committed sexual offenses against three girls who were under ten years of age. According to the State's minutes of testimony, he grabbed the girls’ breasts and buttocks over their clothing and took them on his lap so that he could rub his clothed penis against them. He also sent the girls sexually explicit Snapchat messages. During their inquiries, police learned that Godfrey also had exposed his penis to a seven-year-old girl. Those offenses prompted the State to file an eight-count trial information charging Godfrey with four counts of lascivious acts, three counts of indecent contact with a child, and indecent exposure.

While investigating Godfrey's lewd contact with children, police seized his electronic devices, discovering thousands of images and videos depicting minors in prohibited sexual acts. After that discovery, the State filed a second trial information charging Godfrey with fourteen felony counts of possession of child pornography.

In an agreement encompassing both cases, Godfrey pleaded guilty to five counts from the first trial information and seven counts from the second trial information. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State dismissed the remaining charges. The plea agreement was not binding on the district court, which was free to sentence Godfrey up to the maximum penalties provided by statute.¹ At the sentencing hearing, the State advocated for incarceration with some of the counts to be served consecutively—for a total term not to exceed seventeen years. By contrast, Godfrey asked for his sentences to be suspended, citing his young age when committing these crimes.

The district court imposed a five-year sentence for lascivious acts and two-year terms for his three convictions for indecent contact. Those four sentences were run consecutively for an indeterminate term of eleven years. The court ran the one-year term for indecent exposure concurrent to those sentences. As for the pornography counts, the court ran the five-year terms for those seven convictions concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the counts from the first trial information. The bottom line was a sentence not to exceed sixteen years. Godfrey appeals that sentencing decision.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

We review Godfrey's sentencing claim for the correction of legal error. See State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616 (Iowa 2024). We will not vacate a sentence unless the district court abuses its discretion or there is a defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002) (“[O]ur task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.”). A district court's consideration of impermissible factors is an abuse of discretion that “entitles the defendant to a new sentencing hearing.” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022).

III. Analysis

Godfrey focuses on three aspects of the sentencing hearing. First, he objects to the judge's statement that his “first and foremost” duty was to “remember the public must be protected.” Second, Godfrey alleges that the court did not acknowledge his “rehabilitative potential.” And third, Godfrey asserts that it was improper for the court to mention the “countless victims” who would be “doing better” if nobody possessed or produced child pornography. We consider each of those complaints in turn.

First, Godfrey contends that it was error for the sentencing court “to place an inflated priority on protecting the community, especially when it failed to consider Mr. Godfrey's age as a mitigating factor in sentencing.”

When viewed in context, the court's reference to public protection was permissible. Indeed, in determining which authorized sentences to impose, the court must exercise its discretion to “provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5 (2023); West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d at 355 (“The sentencing court has broad discretion to impose the sentence it determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.”). Perhaps the court's reference to public protection as its “foremost” duty was overstated, but we excuse “unfortunate phraseology” when it is clear from the overall framework that the court properly weighed permissible sentencing factors. See State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).

The court discussed its duty to determine what community resources were available and what would be the “appropriate rehabilitative plan” for Godfrey. The court also described its thought process as first looking at the least restrictive alternatives before moving to harsher sentences. From there, the court listed some mitigating factors:

There's several things that go in your favor. You did your programming in jail. That means you used your time wisely. You have no prior adult record that I'm aware of. You have mental health issues that I will consider mitigating in nature. And you have a desire—or at least as stated remorse in this case for the actions you've taken.

In noting his lack of adult offenses, the court must have considered Godfrey's relatively young age when committing these crimes. But the court also was entitled to consider the impact of Godfrey's actions on his victims:

[W]hen I talk about protecting the community, I can't think of any segment of our community that is more worthy or in need of the protection of the Court than children, particularly from this type of activity and action, which you yourself have acknowledged how serious it is by the fact that you're going to carry it with you for the rest of your life what you did, as they are, also.

We find no abuse of discretion in the court's balancing of the mitigating factors against the gravity of Godfrey's offenses.

Contrary to Godfrey's second point, the court did acknowledge his potential for rehabilitation. The court advised that it had read the PSI, which recommended incarceration. But the PSI also featured Godfrey's willingness to participate in programming, which the court highlighted as a mitigating factor. The court also told Godfrey that “just off of reading the PSI” it intended to impose an even harsher sentence, but his comments taking responsibility for his crimes convinced the court to downgrade “from where [it] thought [it] was going to go.” This overall record shows that the court considered the “appropriate rehabilitative plan” for Godfrey.

Finally, we consider the court's reference to “countless victims” when discussing Godfrey's child pornography convictions. Godfrey claims the court's statement was improper because there was no evidence that he produced child pornography. We again look at the whole sentencing hearing to give context to the court's remark. True, in seeking incarceration, the prosecutor referred to a “staggering amount of child pornography” recovered from Godfrey's devices. But even if the prosecutor offered an improper basis for Godfrey's sentence, the court did not take “the State's bait.” See West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d at 355. The court assured Godfrey that it was not considering uncharged offenses:

I don't think there was anything intentionally done wrong by the State in their allocution, but I think they delved into some uncharged counts with the massive number of photos and other things. I want you to know that for purposes of sentencing I'm only considering those things that you have made an admission to.

Against that backdrop, we are confident that when the court mentioned “countless victims,” it was not holding Godfrey accountable for those child pornography offenses dismissed by the State. Nor was the court under the misimpression that Godfrey produced child pornography. Rather, the sentencing court was articulating the accepted premise that “[a]s a consumer of prohibited content, [Godfrey] is a market participant driving demand for the creation of prohibited content. See State v. Osborn, No. 16-1066, 2018 WL 4922938, at *8(Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2018) (“These crimes are not victimless.”).

All in all, we find no abuse of sentencing discretion. So we decline Godfrey's request to remand for resentencing.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   If the sentencing court had run all twelve counts consecutively, Godfrey would have faced up to forty-seven years in prison.

Opinion by Tabor, C.J.