State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. IV (2026)

A jury found Arthur Snipes guilty of two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree. Count I related to the abuse of child A, who testified in front of Snipes in the courtroom, while Count II related to the abuse of child B, who testified by one-way closed-circuit television (CCTV).

Between the time of trial and sentencing, the Iowa Supreme Court decided State v. White, 9 N.W.3d 1, 9 (Iowa 2024), holding that one-way CCTV testimony by a child witness violates the guarantee of face-to-face confrontation found in article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. The district court found that B's testimony violated Snipes's rights under the state constitution and granted him a new trial on Count II. The court denied Snipes a new trial on Count I.

On appeal, Snipes contends that he should receive a new trial on Count I because B's CCTV testimony bolstered A's allegations of abuse. He also contends there is insufficient evidence that a sex act occurred. On cross-appeal, the State challenges the grant of a new trial on Count II, arguing that Snipes did not preserve error on the confrontation claim. It also contends that any error in admitting B's testimony was harmless because there is overwhelming evidence of Snipes's guilt.

We agree that Snipes did not preserve error on his confrontation challenge because he raised it for the first time in his motion for new trial, so we affirm the denial of his motion for new trial on Count I and reverse the grant of a new trial on Count II. Because substantial evidence supports Snipes's conviction on Count I, we affirm his conviction and sentence. We remand to the district court to enter judgment and sentence on Count II.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The State charged Snipes with two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree. Count I alleged that Snipes sexually abused child A, and Count II alleged that Snipes sexually abused child B.

Before trial, the State moved the court to allow B to testify by CCTV. At the hearing on the motion, a licensed mental health counselor testified that B would suffer trauma that would impair her ability to communicate if she testified in the same room as Snipes. See Iowa Code § 915.38 (2023) (providing that the court may allow a minor to testify by CCTV from a different room from the defendant to protect the minor “from trauma caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant where it would impair the minor's ability to communicate”). Snipes resisted the motion, challenging the evidence showing his physical presence would cause trauma that would impair B's ability to communicate. He did not claim that the CCTV testimony violated his constitutional right to confrontation under the federal or state constitutions.

The district court granted the State's motion after finding that B would suffer trauma impeding her ability to communicate if forced to testify in front of Snipes. Although no constitutional questions were raised, the court noted that the Supreme Court held in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990), that allowing child sexual assault victims to testify by one-way CCTV does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution. It also cited an unpublished decision of this court that found section 915.38 satisfied Confrontation Clause requirements. See State v. Paulson, No. 06-0141, 2007 WL 461323, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2007).

A jury found Snipes guilty on both counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Two weeks after trial but before sentencing, the Iowa Supreme Court decided White. Snipes moved for a new trial on both counts based on White, arguing that B's CCTV testimony about the abuse alleged in Count II violated his right to confrontation. Snipes also claimed that B's testimony bolstered A's claims, tainting his conviction on Count I. In its resistance, the State argued that Snipes waived error by failing to object to the CCTV testimony at trial and any error was harmless.

The district court rejected the State's error-preservation argument, noting that the parties acted in good faith under the law as it stood at the time of trial. The court then granted Snipes a new trial on Count II based on White but denied a new trial on Count I because it found that B's testimony did not impermissibly bolster or taint A's testimony. Snipes appeals and the State cross-appeals the ruling on Snipes's motion for new trial.

RULING ON SNIPES'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Snipes first contends he is entitled to a new trial on Count I because B's testimony violated state constitutional protections and impermissibly bolstered A's testimony. On cross-appeal, the State contends that Snipes is not entitled to a new trial on either count because he raised his constitutional claim for the first time in his motion for new trial.

I. Scope of Review.

We review rulings on motions for new trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Linderman, 958 N.W.2d 211, 218 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021). The district court abuses its discretion by exercising that discretion “on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted).

II. Error Preservation.

Before reaching the substance of Snipes's motion for a new trial, we must address the error-preservation concerns. Our well-established rules require that “issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). That is because the appellate court is a court of review, not a court of first view. State v. McClain, 20 N.W.3d 488, 496 (Iowa 2025). Constitutional claims are no exception. Id. at 495–96.

To preserve error, a party must object as soon as the error is clear. State v. Steltzer, 288 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Iowa 1980). Although the supreme court did not decide the constitutionality of section 915.38 on state constitution grounds until after trial, nothing prevented Snipes from making the argument before or during trial. In fact, the supreme court heard the arguments in White before the hearing on the State's motion to allow B to testify by CCTV. But Snipes did not make the argument during the hearing or object to the CCTV testimony at trial. Instead, he raised the argument for the first time in his motion for new trial, which is too late. See id. (“Motion for new trial ordinarily is not sufficient to preserve error where proper objections were not made at trial.”); State v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 1975) (“The grounds of a motion for new trial must stand or fall on exceptions taken at trial and a party cannot in a post verdict motion amplify or add new grounds as a basis for relief.”). Because Snipes did not preserve error on his challenge to B's CCTV testimony on state constitutional grounds, the district court properly denied a motion for new trial on Count I but abused its discretion by granting the motion on Count II.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Snipes also contends there is insufficient evidence of his guilt on Count I because the State did not show that he performed a sex act with A.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we are highly deferential to the jury's verdict. State v. Hall, 35 N.W.3d 538, 541 (Iowa 2026). We affirm the jury's verdict if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that can convince a rational factfinder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. That view extends to all reasonable inferences that can be fairly drawn from the evidence. Id. We will not find that evidence is insubstantial merely because one might draw different conclusions from it. Id. We do not ask whether the evidence could support a different finding but whether it supports the finding made. Id.

Snipes's argument is based solely on A's credibility as a witness. But the well-established law is that questions of witness credibility are solely for the jury to decide. See State v. Lindaman, 30 N.W.3d 547, 555 (Iowa 2025) (“The jury is the sole arbiter of witness credibility.”). “In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the province of the court to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.” Id. (cleaned up). We will not second-guess the jury's determination of A's credibility based on the cold record before us. See State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). Snipes “is not entitled to acquittal merely because he wishes the jury had believed him instead of the victim.” Id. at 507–08. Because the evidence could convince a rational factfinder that Snipes is guilty of Count I beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm his conviction and the sentence.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court's order denying Snipes's motion for new trial on Count I, and we reverse the grant of a new trial on Count II. We affirm Snipes's conviction and sentence on Count I, and we remand to the district court to enter judgment and sentence on Count II.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

The district court declined to treat Arthur Snipes's confrontation claim as waived because the parties had litigated in good faith under the law as it stood at trial. I write only to add to the argument I made while specially concurring in State v. Roberts. See No. 25-0412, 2026 WL 1970502, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 8, 2026) (Sandy, J., specially concurring). If Roberts made the case for plain error review in the abstract, this record makes it in practice.

When Snipes resisted the State's motion, no Iowa decision had held that Iowa Code section 915.38 (2023) offended article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. The district court said as much in its ruling, citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990), and an unpublished decision of this court applying it. See State v. Paulson, No. 06-0141, 2007 WL 461323, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2007). Two weeks after the verdict, the supreme court decided State v. White and held that one-way closed-circuit testimony violates the Iowa Constitution's guarantee of face-to-face confrontation. 9 N.W.3d 1, 9 (Iowa 2024). A claim no Iowa court had accepted when the jury was sworn in was settled law before Snipes was sentenced.

That sequence is why plain error review exists. The second Olano prong is measured at the time of appellate consideration rather than at the time of trial, precisely so that a defendant whose trial preceded a change in the law is not left without recourse. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467–68 (1997); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993). The State has argued the error was harmless. I would not prejudge it. My point is more narrow—we have no doctrine that lets us ask the question.

Postconviction relief is not an answer either. Strickland measures counsel's performance from counsel's perspective at the time of the conduct. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–90 (1984). My colleagues are right that nothing prevented Snipes from making the argument before or during trial. But the question under Strickland is not whether an argument was available. It is whether declining to press a state constitutional theory no Iowa court had yet adopted (and expressly rejected) fell below professional norms. I do not see how it could. The circumstance that makes this error plain today is the same one that likely defeats the ineffective-assistance claim tomorrow.

So we will direct entry of judgment on a count the district court set aside, following a trial we now know did not satisfy the Iowa Constitution, because no one anticipated a decision that had not yet been issued. I concur in judgment.

Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

Tabor, CJ., concurs; Sandy, J., specially concurs.