D.M., Father, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two infant daughters, challenging one of the two statutory grounds for termination relied on by the juvenile court and arguing that termination was not in the daughters’ best interests.¹ On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court. The father waived any challenge to one of the statutory grounds for termination, so we affirm on that ground. And given the father's continued struggles with substance use, mental health, and domestic violence, the daughters’ best interests are served by termination. We thus affirm the juvenile court's termination of the father's parental rights.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

When the father's first daughter was born in November 2022 with marijuana compounds in her umbilical cord, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) began engaging with the young family. HHS then moved to protect the daughter after two incidents of domestic violence by the father against the mother. The daughter was present for both incidents. Law-enforcement officers also found illegal substances in the home. So the juvenile court adjudicated the daughter as a child in need of assistance in 2023 and temporarily removed her from the father's custody. The father was also limited to preapproved contact with the mother following his conviction for domestic abuse.

Under intense scrutiny, the father started to turn his life around. He slowly weaned himself off marijuana. He underwent psychological analysis, acknowledged his “severe” mental-health concerns—including anger and severe substance-use disorder—and went to therapy. He completed substance-use treatment. And, under supervision, he began to interact with his daughter in a more positive way. In short, as the guardian ad litem put it around that time, he “put a lot of work and effort” into improving as a parent.

But then the father violated the protective order limiting contact with the mother. He secretly moved back in with the mother, who became pregnant with their younger daughter. He concealed those facts from the juvenile court and HHS. He relapsed into substance use. And he struggled to understand how the domestic violence had affected the mother and the older daughter.

The younger daughter was born in June 2025. HHS immediately petitioned to adjudicate her as a child in need of assistance too. Because of the father's “unresolved mental health and substance abuse issues,” the younger daughter was also removed from his custody. Both children were placed with their grandparents, where they thrived, and the daughters continued to have a “strong, significant relationship” with the mother.

But “the mother and father were yet again deceptive about their relationship.” The father had not dispelled concerns about substance use, mental health, and domestic violence, and so was still limited to supervised visits. Yet he and the mother secretly circumvented those restrictions. The father also flared his anger against HHS staff repeatedly. He again domestically abused the mother. And his substance use continued to impact the children, as even unopened plastic-wrapped diapers “smelled [so] strongly of marijuana” that daycare reported it to authorities. These events culminated in the State petitioning to terminate the father's parental rights to both daughters. It did not seek to terminate the mother's parental rights.

At the termination hearing, the father agreed that he was “not in the position to take care of [his] children” and they could not be returned to him. The State stressed that the father still had substance-use, mental-health, and “significant unresolved domestic violence concerns.” And so, the juvenile court terminated the father's parental rights on two grounds: parental consent and the inability to return custody of a child of three years of age or younger. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(a), (h) (2025). The father now appeals.

II. Statutory Grounds for Termination

The termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 proceeds in three steps. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must prove a statutory ground for termination. See id. Second, the State must prove termination is in the best interests of the children. See id. And third, the parent has the burden to show that a discretionary exception applies and precludes termination. See id.; In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). We need not address any steps not challenged by a parent. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). And our review of a termination decision is de novo, giving “respectful consideration” to the juvenile court's factual findings, particularly those based on credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).

The juvenile court terminated the father's parental rights under paragraphs “a” and “h” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1). “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court's order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). On appeal, the father challenges only one of those grounds for termination—arguing that the State failed to prove that his consent to termination was voluntary and intelligent under paragraph “a.” But he makes no argument against the other ground under paragraph “h,” thus waiving any challenge to that ground on appeal.

When a parent fails to challenge every statutory ground for termination relied on by the juvenile court, we can summarily affirm based on an unchallenged ground without discussing it further. See In re G.N., No. 20-1128, 2020 WL 7022388, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (affirming based on an unchallenged statutory ground and collecting cases doing the same); see also P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (reasoning that the appellate court did not have to analyze an unchallenged statutory ground); In re Est. of White, No. 23-1009, 2024 WL 3887438, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2024) (“The appellate court will not reverse a ruling of the trial court that rests on independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges only one of those grounds.” (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 839 (May 2024 update))). Because the father does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that the State proved a statutory ground for termination under paragraph “h,” we affirm based on that ground.

III. The Children's Best Interests

The best interests of the children are the “paramount concern[s] in a termination proceeding.” L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. We consider both the long-range and immediate interests of the daughters. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). And we must “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016).

Although the children's best interests may be served by a relationship with a parent on the road to sobriety, see In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 684 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016), relapse and unresolved chronic substance use may render a parent unable to provide a safe and stable home. See In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Likewise, even a parent who makes a genuine effort to improve only has limited time to overcome the issues preventing the children's return. In re G.P., No. 03-1312, 2003 WL 22346361, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2003) (affirming termination, despite the father taking required steps and making “substantial effort” to improve, because the father's anger, violence towards mother, deception, and possible substance use precluded a safe environment for the children). What matters is that the parent's issues are sufficiently resolved when the child needs them to be. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41.

The father was not ready to be a stable parent at the time of termination. He had relapsed into substance use and exposed his daughters to significant amounts of illegal substances. He still struggled with his mental health and anger and had lashed out at those trying to help him. He showed that the threat of domestic violence was not over. He repeatedly deceived the juvenile court to circumvent barriers erected to protect his children. And as his attorney told the court at the termination hearing:

[The father] has been debating with himself whether—what's the best way to go today. Eventually, he decided he was gonna give consent, that's the best thing for his children, even though it's extremely difficult for him.

․ [H]e really made some discovery about himself and came to the realization of how his conduct impacted the Court proceeding․ I see significant personal growth.

Unfortunately, he realize[d] it's really the 11th hour. It's a little late. Right now, if we continue the case, it's just going to continue to do the kids—basically further harm to keep the case open for his—for his benefit.

What's more, the daughters are doing well in the care of their grandparents and have a healthy relationship with them. So on our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that termination is in best interests of the daughters. We thus affirm the juvenile court's order terminating the father's parental rights to the daughters.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—unlike the juvenile court's orders—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25.

Opinion by Langholz, J.