IN RE: the Marriage of Mark Hulsing and Kathy Bradshaw-Hulsing n/k/a Kathy Bradshaw (2026)

Kathy Bradshaw appeals the economic provisions of the decree dissolving her marriage to Mark Hulsing. She challenges the district court's property division, including its award of $66,000 to Mark for his “sweat equity” in maintaining her separate property under a premarital agreement. She also challenges the court's award of $180,000 in spousal support to Mark, payable in six annual installments, and its order requiring her to pay his trial attorney fees.

On our de novo review of the record, we modify the decree to vacate the $66,000 payment to Mark. We also vacate the court's lump-sum spousal support award and modify the decree to instead award Mark one year of transitional spousal support. We affirm the remaining provisions of the decree.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Kathy and Mark were in their early fifties when they married in 2006. It was Kathy's second marriage and Mark's fourth. Kathy owned her home and three rental properties and had a net worth just shy of $1.5 million. Mark's net worth was roughly $390,000,¹ which included his home and a rental property. To protect these assets, the parties executed a premarital agreement that sought to maintain their separate property. Mark moved into Kathy's home after their marriage and started renting out his former home. He later deeded that home and his other rental property to Kathy as a joint tenant. Kathy kept her home and rental properties titled in her name only.

For most of his working life, Mark was employed as a handyman. He continued that occupation after the couple's marriage, devoting most of his time to helping Kathy maintain her rental properties. Mark testified that he was responsible for “anything and everything” that needed to be fixed. That included painting apartments, repairing minor plumbing issues, replacing appliances and fixtures, installing drywall, maintaining sidewalks, and collecting rent. Kathy described Mark as a “jack-of-all-trades,” although she also employed on-site managers at two of her properties and hired contractors for larger jobs that Mark couldn't handle.

Kathy made all the business decisions for her rental properties. She was also in charge of the couple's finances during the marriage. Although Mark never received a paycheck for his maintenance work, Kathy “paid for everything out of the business.” Those expenses included Mark's health insurance, credit cards, and trips to Canada, as well as the mortgage on Kathy's home, utilities, food, gas, and trips the couple took to their timeshare in Mexico. Mark kept the income from his rental properties, along with his social security and pension benefits, for himself. The only expenses that he paid for during the marriage were his cell phone and truck.

Mark petitioned for divorce in January 2024. When the case was tried the next year, both parties were seventy-one years old with some serious health issues. Because of his health conditions, Mark doubted that he would be able to find full-time employment. But Kathy intended to continue operating her rental business, which she testified was her retirement plan. Aside from their social security benefits and small pensions, neither party had any other retirement accounts.

While Kathy and Mark stipulated that their premarital agreement was enforceable, Mark argued that he was entitled to “a lump sum payment for having raised the value” of Kathy's rental properties. The parties agreed that those properties were worth $3,188,680 and that they should be awarded to Kathy. With her other assets, and despite her more than $100,000 in credit card debt, Kathy's net worth exceeded $5 million at trial. Her annual income from the rental properties, social security benefits, and pension totaled $117,000. The parties valued the two properties that Mark had placed into joint tenancy at $433,913. Although Kathy initially asked for those properties to be included in the property division, she agreed at trial that they could be awarded to Mark. Because Mark was living in one of the properties rather than leasing it out, his annual income—which had been closer to $50,000 during the marriage—was around $33,000. Given his limited income, Mark asked the district court to order Kathy to pay him “a reasonable amount of alimony over the next 17 years,” plus his trial attorney fees.

The district court granted each of Mark's requests. Labeling his property-related claim as “something akin to sweat equity or quantum meruit for the work he put in,” the court found:

It would be manifestly inequitable to award Kathy the full value of her properties without providing Mark anything for the 17-years of labor he contributed to those properties. Mark has asserted a claim for $75,000.00. This is amply justified by the evidence in the record that he spent 17 years on those properties as something approximating a full-time job.

Although it found an “equitable payment” of $75,000 was justified, the court decreased that amount to $66,000 to compensate Kathy for Mark's “personal use of the business credit cards during the pendency of this action.”

As for Mark's spousal support claim, the district court reasoned:

This was a relatively long marriage (17 years at the time of separation). Both parties are in their seventies ․ Both parties suffer from various health conditions, limiting their ability to work. Even accounting for the court's awarding Mark two rental properties, thereby providing him with some income, and accounting for his larger social security ($1,886 vs. $633), the fact remains that Kathy has both substantially more income and property than Mark. Kathy does have the ability to pay spousal support due to her substantial net worth and to the extent, as she claims, her present lifestyle expenses exceed her cash flow, she can make adjustments. That said, the court does give some weight to Kathy's argument that she should receive some credit for the fact that her financial support gave Mark the ability to save money and benefit from the income from his own properties. The court also considers her own age and infirmities.

In light of all of the above, and having considered all of the 598.21A(1) factors, the court finds it appropriate to award spousal support in the amount of $180,000.00. The court finds Mark's suggestion of a six-year distribution to be reasonable and adopts the same as equitable.

The court also awarded Mark $35,975 in attorney fees.

Kathy appeals these economic provisions of the dissolution decree. She claims the district court erred in ordering her to pay Mark $66,000 and in failing to require him to pay the full balance of the credit cards that he used for his personal expenses. She also claims the court erred in awarding Mark spousal support and ordering her to pay his trial attorney fees. Mark seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal.

II. Standard of Review

Because we are in equity, we review the district court's construction of the parties’ premarital agreement, property division, and spousal support award de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Owen, 29 N.W.3d 6, 10 (Iowa 2025); In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Iowa 2008). We review the court's award of attorney fees, however, for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006).

III. Analysis

A. Property Division

In divorce cases, “marital property is to be divided equitably, considering the factors outlined in Iowa Code section 598.21(5).” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned up). One of those factors is “[t]he provisions of an antenuptial agreement.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(l) (2024). In general, premarital “agreements are favored and should be construed liberally to carry out the intention of the parties.” In re Marriage of Gonzales, 561 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Although their purpose “is to fix the interests of the respective parties in the property of the other,” premarital agreements “differ in no other way from other normal contracts.” In re Marriage of Van Brocklin, 468 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). We accordingly “construe, consider and treat them the same as we do ordinary contracts.” Id.; accord Shanks, 758 N.W.2d at 510–11.

The parties’ premarital agreement provided:

Each party agrees that he or she will not have or claim to have any right, title or interest as spouse, surviving spouse, heir or otherwise in or to the property, of whatever nature, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever located ․ which is now owned or possessed by the other party as set forth in Schedules A and B attached hereto, or which may be derived therefrom, including, without limitation, appreciation thereon and proceeds, replacements or substitutions thereof, either prior to or during the contemplated marriage.

․

In the event of the dissolution or other termination of the contemplated marriage (other than by death), each party shall retain his or her own separate income or property ․ free and clear of any claim of the other. Jointly acquired property ․ shall be divided equally.

At trial, Mark made an equitable argument that Kathy's rental properties should not be subject to the premarital agreement because his unpaid labor “[i]mmensely” increased their value. Although the district court found the rental properties were Kathy's separate property under the premarital agreement, it concluded the scope of the agreement did “not foreclose Mark's equitable claim to receive some financial compensation for the work he put into the properties.” We disagree.

As Kathy argues on appeal, the premarital agreement expressly provides that neither party has “any right, title or interest” in the other's separate property “including, without limitation, appreciation thereon and proceeds, replacements or substitutions thereof.” Mark's claim for the value that his labor added to Kathy's rental properties falls squarely within that broadly-worded provision. See In re Marriage of Wieland, No. 22-0541, 2022 WL 17826932, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2022) (finding a wife's claim for the increased equity of property subject to a premarital agreement was “a claim to a right or interest in” that property and foreclosed by the agreement); see also In re Marriage of Barten, No. 22-0084, 2023 WL 2395324, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2023) (rejecting a husband's request to recoup the contributions he made to his wife's property because their premarital agreement provided “that he is not entitled to any credit for contribution to the increase in equity” of that property).

By signing the agreement, Mark “entered a contract by which he forfeited property he may otherwise have been entitled to.” Barten, 2023 WL 2395324, at *5. Because Mark does not challenge the enforceability of that agreement, “we apply its terms when considering the division of property.” In re Marriage of Jenn, No. 18-1458, 2019 WL 5424938, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019) (concluding a wife had no claim to the appreciation in her husband's farm under the language of their premarital agreement). Those terms foreclose Mark's request to be compensated for his “labor-based contributions” to Kathy's separate properties. While the district court found that result “manifestly inequitable,” we cannot allow “a premarital agreement to be defeated because it is inequitable.” In re Marriage of Snyder, No. 21-0438, 2022 WL 610322, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2022) (noting that such a result would be contrary to Iowa's Uniform Premarital Property Act); see also Wieland, 2022 WL 17826932, at *7 (“Because the district court's allocation of [the husband's] interest in the farm was pursuant to the binding [premarital] agreement, we do not consider whether that specific allocation was equitable.”). Doing so “would minimize to a great extent the purpose of prenuptial agreements.” In re Marriage of Applegate, 567 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). For these reasons, we vacate the district court's order for Kathy to pay Mark an “equitable payment” of $66,000.

Kathy also claims that the district court erred by requiring her “to pay credit card balances that Mark used for his personal benefit.” The balances on those cards—an American Express and a United Mileage—totaled $22,269.76. The court found that Mark charged $9,000 in personal expenses on the cards while the divorce was pending and ordered him to be responsible for that amount, with the rest assigned to Kathy. While Kathy does not claim that this debt is covered by the parties’ premarital agreement, she argues the full credit card balances should have been assigned to Mark because the cards were in his name, and he routinely used them for his personal expenses. We reject this argument because the “[d]ebts of the parties normally become debts of the marriage, for which either party may be required to assume the responsibility to pay.” Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 251. Considering Kathy's greater earning capacity and assets, we conclude the court's allocation of this debt was equitable. See Iowa Code § 598.21(f ), (i).

B. Spousal Support

Kathy next contends the district court erred in awarding Mark $180,000 in spousal support, payable in annual installments over the next six years. She argues that the court's award was untethered to any of the recognized categories of spousal support and that “[c]onsidering the property Mark received, both parties’ ages, and both parties’ health conditions,” she should not have been ordered to pay Mark any support. Citing some of the same factors, Mark argues the court properly “fashioned a limited, transitional spousal support award tailored to the parties’ circumstances,” which was “reasonable and rehabilitative in nature.”

Despite our de novo review of dissolution proceedings, we give the district court deference in determining support awards. In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023). And that determination should not be disturbed unless “there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. (citation omitted); accord Owen, 29 N.W.3d at 10. We find that is the case here.

“A spousal support award turns on the ten factors identified in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1).” Owen, 29 N.W.3d at 10 (footnote omitted). “In applying these statutory criteria, our precedents have recognized four forms of spousal support deemed equitable: traditional, reimbursement, rehabilitative, and transitional.” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185. Each type has a different goal, and the “amount and duration of a spousal support award should be tailored to achieve the underlying equitable purpose of the spousal support award.” Id. While these categories are not mutually exclusive, and hybrid awards are permitted, courts are not “free to award spousal support not corresponding to any recognized category of support.” Id. at 186.

Starting with traditional spousal support, we find the district court's lump-sum award does not fit within that category. “Traditional spousal support is ordinarily of unlimited or indefinite duration.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015). That's because the purpose of traditional support “is to provide the receiving spouse ․ what he or she would receive if the marriage continued.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the court's six-year award does not serve that goal. Nothing suggests the lifestyle Mark enjoyed in marriage would have changed after six more years with Kathy. And despite the length of their matrimony, the parties’ life patterns and earning capacities were largely set before the marriage began. See id. at 411. Tellingly, Mark does not attempt to characterize the court's award as traditional support on appeal.

Reimbursement spousal support is also inapplicable because the marriage was not devoted to the educational advancement of one spouse. See In re Marriage of Gutcher, No. 17-0593, 2018 WL 5292082, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2018) (noting reimbursement support “cannot be applied so broadly” as to compensate a spouse for financial contributions to the marriage outside the professional-degree context). And rehabilitative spousal support does not apply because Mark, at age seventy-one, did not intend to pursue any reeducation or retraining after the divorce to increase his earning capacity and become self-sufficient. See Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 186 (“Without a showing that the recipient spouse seeks reeducation, retraining, or some discrete period of time to increase earning capacity to become self-supporting, rehabilitative spousal support is inappropriate.”).

This leaves transitional spousal support, which “is warranted where the recipient spouse may already have the capacity for self-support at the time of dissolution but needs short-term assistance in transitioning to single life.” Id. Although Kathy claims that no support should be awarded, she alternatively recognizes that some transitional support may be appropriate. We agree with that alternative argument.

Given the lack of liquid assets awarded to Mark, along with his fixed income, he needed some financial help to bridge the gap between marriage and single life. See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 542 (Iowa 2022) (“There may be a need for short-term support in some cases to help ‘transition from married life to single life.’ ”(citation omitted)). Because Kathy was better equipped for that adjustment, and Mark would face hardship without it, an award of transitional spousal support is equitable. See id. (“Transitional alimony can ameliorate inequity unaddressed by the other recognized categories of support.”). We accordingly modify the dissolution decree to award Mark one year of transitional spousal support totaling $30,000, which the record shows that Kathy has already paid.² See Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 187 (“Because transitional spousal support is focused on solving a short-term liquidity issue, a transitional spousal support award generally should not exceed one year in duration.”).

C. Attorney Fees

Kathy's last challenge to the dissolution decree focuses on the district court's award of $35,975 in attorney fees to Mark. She argues that $5,000 of that award was for Mark's first attorney, who did not file an attorney fee affidavit. And she contends the remainder should be vacated because “both parties have the means to pay their own attorney fees.” We disagree on both counts.

Although Mark's first attorney did not file an attorney fee affidavit, the $5,000 that Mark paid to that attorney was included in his trial attorney's fee affidavit, which stated: “I further state that in addition to my attorney fees [Mark] paid his initial counsel the sum of $5,000.00.” Kathy did not raise any challenge to that affidavit until this appeal. As for her second argument, we agree with the district court that given “the substantial discrepancy between the parties’ income and resources,” Kathy had a greater ability to pay those fees than Mark. See Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 255 (“Whether attorney fees should be awarded depends on the respective abilities of the parties to pay.” (citation omitted)). We accordingly find no abuse of the court's discretion.

As for Mark's request for $10,840 in appellate attorney fees, we award him $5,000 after considering his needs, Kathy's ability to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal. See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687.

IV. Conclusion

We modify the dissolution decree to vacate the district court's order requiring Kathy to pay Mark an equitable payment of $66,000. Mark shall remain responsible for the $9,000 in personal expenses that he charged to the American Express and United Mileage credit cards, with Kathy responsible for the rest of those cards’ balances at the time of trial. We further modify the decree to award Mark one year of transitional spousal support totaling $30,000. We affirm the court's order requiring Kathy to pay Mark's trial attorney fees and award him $5,000 in appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal are assessed equally to each party.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

This case is another example of the difficulty with our state's multifactored statutory approach to spousal support, which “can lead to indiscriminate results” and make it hard for “practitioners to advise their clients and judges to decide their cases.” In re Marriage of Bainbridge, No. 22-1299, 2023 WL 2908648, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2023) (Badding, J., concurring specially); see also In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (noting “a multifactored legal test in which all factors are relevant and none are dispositive can be extraordinarily difficult to consistently apply”). The parties rely on many of the same factors in arguing their positions: Kathy cites “the property Mark received, both parties’ ages, and both parties’ health conditions” in asserting that no spousal support should have been awarded, while Mark cites Kathy's earnings, his age and “poor health,” his “loss of seventeen years of employment,” and the minor property settlement in defending the court's award. Because the district court “was in the best position to balance the parties’ needs,” I would defer to its decision and affirm the award. Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 416 (stating the district court should be afforded “considerable latitude” in determining spousal support).

In awarding Mark spousal support, the district court considered the parties’ “relatively long marriage” of eighteen years, along with their ages and health conditions, which limit their ability to work. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(a), (b), (e). The court also considered Kathy's greater income and property, her “ability to pay spousal support due to her substantial net worth,” and Mark's need for that support. See id. § 598.21A(1)(c). These are all considerations justifying an award of traditional spousal support, which “is primarily predicated on need and ability.” In re Marriage of Owen, 29 N.W.3d 6, 11 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted).

As the district court found, because of the premarital agreement, Kathy is leaving the marriage with more than $5 million in assets, while Mark is leaving with less than $500,000. Kathy also earns close to four times what Mark brings home from his rental property, social security benefits, and pension. While Kathy claimed to be living above her means, the court found that assertion “questionable,” noting that she “is an intelligent sophisticated businesswoman who has prospered financially during the last 20 years” and is “clearly capable of budgeting as needed.” We should defer to that credibility finding. See In re Marriage of Meester, 32 N.W.3d 22, 27 (Iowa Ct. App. 2026). Considering these factors, I would find the district court's award of spousal support was equitable. See In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2023) (“An award of traditional spousal support is equitable in marriage of long duration to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the lifestyle to which he or she became accustomed.”); see also In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 486–87 (Iowa 2012) (affirming award of traditional spousal support after a sixteen-year marriage where the wife's earning capacity was negligible and the property division under a premarital agreement was lopsided).

I do not find the limited duration of the award dispositive, as the majority seems to. While traditional spousal support “is ordinarily of unlimited or indefinite duration,” Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 408, its duration “should correspond with need,” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185. Our supreme court has accordingly recognized that “[t]ermination of spousal support may be appropriate when the record shows that a payee spouse has or will at some point reach a position where self-support at a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed in the marriage is attainable.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, the district court determined that an award of $180,000 in spousal support payable over six years would get Mark to the point where he could become self-sustaining without impacting Kathy's standard of living. See Owen, 29 N.W.3d at 12 (“Ideally, the support should be fixed so the continuation of both parties’ standard of living can continue, if possible.” (citation omitted)). “Unless and until our state adopts formal alimony guidelines,” I do not believe that we should second-guess that judgment call, which was “within the range of reasonableness” under our statutory factors. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 188 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Given the limited duration of the award and the parties’ ages, I would also reject Kathy's claim that the district court erred in failing to “make the spousal support terminable upon Mark's remarriage or [her] death.” While that may be the “prevailing judicial practice,” as Kathy argues, it is not required. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Robert, No. 11-0876, 2012 WL 2122310, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. June 13, 2012) (“It is within the province of the district court to decide whether alimony will terminate upon remarriage.”); In re Marriage of Klinghammer, No. 02-0112, 2003 WL 21070599, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14, 2003) (noting the general rule “that periodic payments of alimony are presumed to terminate upon the payor's death ․ in the absence of a provision in the decree which requires payments to continue after such death” (emphasis added)).

For these reasons—and the “institutional and pragmatic” deference we afford the district court—I dissent from the majority's modification of the spousal support award. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 182 (citation omitted). I concur in all other respects.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties’ premarital agreement valued Mark's property at $335,000, but they agreed at trial that amount was incorrect because of a mathematical error and double-counting of an inheritance that Mark received.

2.   This resolution makes it unnecessary to address Kathy's claim that the court erred by failing to make her obligation terminate upon either party's death or remarriage.

Opinion Per Curiam.

Badding, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.