State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brandon Matthew Dye, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Brandon Dye appeals his convictions and sentence for attempted burglary in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.2 and 713.4 (2024), and assault in violation of section 708.2(7). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentence imposed by the district court. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Following an incident in Keokuk during which Brandon Dye—wearing a mask and wielding a gun—threatened the occupants of a vehicle and pointed the gun at them, while another vehicle attempted to “box them in,” the State filed a trial information charging Dye with attempted burglary in the first degree, intimidation with a dangerous weapon, going armed with intent, and assault while using or displaying a dangerous weapon. Dye entered a plea of not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the jury was presented the following evidence.

On the evening of November 29, 2024, teenagers G.K. and W.B. met some friends at the riverfront in Keokuk before they planned to go bowling. As G.K. and W.B. were in their car getting ready to leave the riverfront, they saw “two guys run over from ․ across the grass area” toward their car, wearing “[d]ark clothes with masks on.” G.K. and W.B. thought “it was some kind of joke,” but then one of the men “got to the window and pointed a gun at [them].” G.K. and W.B. heard the men “screaming cuss words at [them],” ordering them to “[g]et out” of their car. One of the men yelled, “Box them in.” G.K. and W.B. feared for their safety; G.K. heard a gunshot and believed the men wanted to hurt them. As G.K., who was driving his car, “stepped on the gas” to leave, a black Jeep Cherokee hit them on the driver's side. The tail end of G.K.’s car “whip[ped] around,” and G.K. was able to maneuver his car to exit the riverfront area. The teenagers called police and drove to the police station, worried the men would follow them.

Meanwhile, P.L. watched the encounter from outside his car at the riverfront. He heard someone yell at W.B. and then “saw a male get out, put a ski mask on and grab something, which [he later realized was] a gun.” As the man approached G.K.’s car and P.L. saw the gun, P.L. started recording the incident on his phone. P.L.’s video recording was introduced at trial and played for the jury. The video shows a man wearing a hat, black coat with fur hood, blue jeans, and black shoes run toward G.K.’s car with a gun, approach the car, and fire the gun.

The jury also saw another video from the same evening, recorded less than thirty minutes earlier from a gas station where Keokuk Police Officer Mason Schau was investigating a separate incident. Officer Schau's body camera recorded Dye entering the store. Dye was “wearing a fuzzy hat, coat, blue jeans, and black shoes.” Officer Schau left the gas station while Dye was still inside. Officer Schau's body camera showed a black Jeep Cherokee parked in front of the store. Investigators later determined the license plate matched the plate of the Jeep involved in the riverfront incident.

The following week, on December 6, Keokuk Police Captain Adam Murphy had an unrelated interaction with Dye. At the time, Captain Murphy was still investigating the riverfront incident. As he interacted with Dye on December 6, Captain Murphy noticed Dye was wearing “the same” distinctive black coat with fur hood which was depicted in P.L.’s and Officer Schau's video recordings. Captain Murphy interacted with Dye again on December 22. He observed “Dye was wearing the same coat that he was wearing in the incident on December 6th as well as the incident on November 29th.” Screenshots from Captain Murphy's body camera showing Dye on December 6 and December 22 were introduced at trial and shown to the jury.

Dye testified in his defense. He admitted he was riding in the Jeep Cherokee the same evening. He further admitted he was at the gas station on the evening of November 29, but he maintained after he left the gas station, he “went back to [his] cousin's grandpa's house in Elvaston, where [he] stayed the night.” Dye testified he had no knowledge about “who was involved” in the riverfront incident. When questioned about the photographs and evidence in the record, Dye maintained it was “a very big coincidence” the person depicted at the gas station (which he admitted was him) and the person shown at the riverfront (which he denied was him) were “wearing almost identical clothing to one another” on the same evening.

The jury found Dye guilty of attempted burglary in the first degree and assault on two counts, which the district court later merged at sentencing. The jury found Dye not guilty of going armed with intent.

On appeal, Dye challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether the jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

Dye challenges the proof of his identity for the offenses. “Identity is an element of a criminal offense which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1974). Dye claims because he denied being at the riverfront and not “a single witness” identified him “as being there or as the individual who ran up to [G.K.’s] vehicle,” “the evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Dye was the individual who committed these offenses.”

But we do not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on witness credibility, or weigh the evidence; those matters are for the jury. State v. Brown, 5 N.W.3d 611, 616 (Iowa 2024); State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1984) (“[T]he jury is at liberty to believe or disbelieve the testimony of witnesses as it chooses and give such weight to the evidence as in its judgment the evidence was entitled to receive.” (internal citations omitted)).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding of Dye's involvement in the riverfront incident on November 29. Dye's distinctive coat is visible in P.L.’s video from the riverfront and matches Officer Schau's video from the gas station recorded shortly before. Dye admitted he was the person in the gas station video wearing the coat. Captain Murphy observed Dye wearing the same coat twice in the following weeks. Dye also admitted he was riding in the Jeep Cherokee that hit G.K.’s car, and the Jeep was also depicted in the gas station video. Given the magnitude of this circumstantial evidence, the jury was free to reject Dye's testimony he had left Keokuk before the incident occurred. See State v. Maring, 619 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 2000).

Dye also claims the evidence was insufficient to prove he “attempted to enter [G.K.’s] vehicle.” This claim implicates Dye's charge for attempted burglary in the first degree, for which the jury was instructed the State was required to prove:

1. On or about November 29, 2024, the defendant attempted to enter a motor vehicle in Keokuk, Lee County, Iowa.

2. The motor vehicle was an occupied structure.

3. One or more persons were present in the motor vehicle.

4. The defendant did not have permission or authority to enter the motor vehicle.

5. The motor vehicle was not open to the public.

6. The defendant did so with the specific intent to commit an assault.

7. During the incident, the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon.

See Iowa Code §§ 713.2, .4.

Upon our review, we find the evidence supports the jury's verdict on the challenged element. The video evidence establishes Dye ran toward G.K.’s car with a gun in hand. W.B. testified the passenger window was “cracked about half an inch to an inch” as the man was attempting to point the gun at him through the window, and G.K. testified he believed Dye was trying to enter the car. See State v. Dotson, No. 24-0180, 2025 WL 1066427, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2025) (finding the victim's “testimony established [the defendant] attempted to enter the apartment because she described him doing exactly that”).

Because Dye's convictions were supported by substantial evidence, we affirm on this issue.

II. Sentencing

At sentencing, the district court declined Dye's request for a deferred judgment and imposed a suspended ten-year indeterminate sentence on Dye's attempted-burglary conviction, with five years of probation, and thirty days in jail on the merged assault conviction, with credit for time served. On appeal, Dye claims the court abused its sentencing discretion by relying on an impermissible factor and a “fixed sentencing policy.” We review sentencing decisions for correction of errors at law. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). A sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption of validity and will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of an impermissible factor. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103, 105–06 (Iowa 2020).

Turning to the first claim, Dye maintains the district court relied on unproven and unprosecuted conduct—his alleged involvement in “a riot” and his unspecified “cases dismissed”—in fashioning his sentence. Indeed, the court may not rely on unproven or unprosecuted offenses unless the defendant admits them or the State proves them at the sentencing hearing. State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Iowa 2021). But mere mention of an improper matter is not enough to warrant resentencing; “it is reversible error only if the district court relied on it.” State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 619 (Iowa 2024).

Here, at the outset of the hearing, the district court evaluated the sentencing options and considered relevant sentencing factors, including the circumstances of the offense, the absence of drugs or alcohol, Dye's lack of a significant criminal history, and his age and living situation. The court then determined it would not order a deferred judgment, based on the gravity of the offense and because it was “the type of crime that is a crime against a person.”

The court proceeded, “So the question is: Do you go to prison or do you get probation?” Ultimately, the court was swayed in favor of probation because Dye had taken responsibility for his acts. As the court explained:

In your case I didn't know what I was going to do [between probation and prison] because in my mind I thought a person of your age, lack of criminal record ought to be given some kind of chance on probation.

But the fact that you denied that you participated in this crime— you had every right to have a trial, you have the right to plead not guilty, you have the right to force the State of Iowa to prove each and every element against you. But the fact that you never took responsibility for your actions in a very dangerous crime was leaving me to believe that you constitute a danger to society because if you can't accept responsibility for what you did, in my mind that means you're going to do it the minute you get out of prison or jail because you didn't see anything wrong with it, or you can't go through counseling and treatment with a probation officer to rehabilitate you because you don't think you did anything wrong. So I'm going to tell you, you saved yourself from going to prison today by coming in here and taking responsibility.

․

If you had not come in here and told me that you accept responsibility, that you made a bad choice, that you were with no good people and cutting ties with them, you were going to prison. But since you came in here and acknowledged responsibility for this crime—and I think you ought to. I'm not going to put this in the order, but I think as a part of your rehabilitation you need to tell the county attorney who else was involved in this crime as part of your rehabilitation probation. And I'm going to give you probation․

The court also discussed the possibility of a halfway house but declined “make that as a requirement in [his] case.” The court then addressed Dye as follows:

COURT: But I'm going to tell you, Mr. Dye, you are on the narrow line here. You have to change your life.

DYE: I want to.

COURT: And I'm going to tell you, I know that you were involved in an incident a few days before this one, involved in a riot, you've had cases dismissed. And I'm only talking to you now as a person who's done this for a long time. You got to cut your ways of what you're doing right now. You have got to stop that kind of behavior. You can't—As [the State] talked about people escalate, they do little things or big things. You did that. You have a little thing and it escalated. You can't be doing that—

DYE: I understand.

COURT: —or you're going to go to prison. But more importantly, you could seriously hurt somebody or you could get seriously hurt in the process because of retaliation.

“To overcome the presumption the district court properly exercised its discretion,” Dye must make an “affirmative showing the court relied on improper evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). Dye failed to meet this “heavy burden.” Id. Considered in context and given the timing of the court's statements in the hearing, we cannot find the court relied on the challenged matters in fashioning Dye's sentence. See State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Iowa 2018) (observing the “fact that the sentencing judge was merely aware of the uncharged offense is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that his discretion was properly exercised” (citation omitted)).

Dye next claims the court employed “a fixed sentencing policy when it rejected a deferred judgment on the attempted burglary charge.” He points to the following emphasized statement by the court to support his claim:

All that information about you in the presentence investigation could lend itself to you getting a deferred judgment. You don't have a criminal record. You are a youthful offender. But I think the circumstances of this case and the gravity of this case mitigate against a deferred judgment being granted. It's a terrible crime. It's the type of crime that is a crime against a person, and I don't think a deferred judgment is appropriate.

(Emphasis added).

A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it applies an inflexible personal policy in place of individualized judgment. See State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396–97 (Iowa 1979). Dye's claim points to the court's final thoughts before reaching its decision, after the court weighed other relevant sentencing factors which contributed to its decision. We do not find the court employed a fixed sentencing policy. See State v. Clements, No. 25-0523, 2026 WL 521384, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026) (rejecting the defendant's attempt to “seize[ ] on three specific portions of the court's nine-paragraph explanation, arguing they evince a fixed sentencing policy”). “Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact [Dye] did not receive the prison sentence recommended by the State or ․ by the [presentence investigation report], which suggests some mitigating factors outweighed some aggravating factors.” State v. Voshell, 12 N.W.3d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).

Although Dye disagrees with the court's decision not to grant him a deferred judgment, such a decision is the nature of discretionary sentencing and “does not mean the choice of one particular sentencing option over another constitutes error.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. Because the court weighed the factors and exercised its discretion to impose a particular sentence without considering an improper factor, we affirm Dye's sentence. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 103.

We affirm Dye's convictions and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion by Bower, S.J.