Dale Allen Miner, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. GreenState Credit Union, f/k/a University of Iowa Community Credit Union, Defendant–Appellee. (2026)

Dale and Janice Miner enrolled in an optional plan that would cancel their home equity loan balance if either of them died. Eligibility required each applicant to be under age seventy at the time of application and the decedent to be under age seventy at the time of death. Janice was seventy-three when they applied and also died after her seventieth birthday. After the claim was denied, Dale sued for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and bad faith. The district court granted GreenState Credit Union summary judgment, resting on equitable rescission and, alternatively, on the plan's age exclusion. Because Dale's equity and right-to-a-jury-trial arguments that he now raises on appeal were never presented below, and because the age exclusion resolves the case on undisputed facts, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On July 12, 2019, Dale and Janice closed a $45,000 revolving credit mortgage—a home equity line of credit—with GreenState Credit Union, secured by their long-time residence in Springville, Iowa. As part of the same closing, they signed an application for GreenState's Paybreak Debt Protection Plan, an optional credit life product that cancels the outstanding loan balance if a protected borrower dies. They elected joint coverage under the plan's “Silver” tier at a monthly fee of $1.35 per $1,000 of the outstanding balance—a rate that was the same whether Dale enrolled alone or the couple enrolled jointly. Dale acknowledged that he understood there was no difference in cost between single and joint coverage.

The application conditioned plan eligibility on applicant age. Immediately above the signature lines, the application provides that, by signing, the applicant states: “I am under age 70.” Both Dale and Janice signed. Janice was born in October 1945 and was seventy-three years old that day; she was over seventy on every date the record supplies for the transaction. Dale, born in July 1957, was well under seventy and remains so.

The plan document elaborates on the age condition in three ways relevant to Dale's claims. It excludes benefits for covered events—including death—occurring on or after a protected borrower's seventieth birthday. It permits the insurer to contest coverage “if, within the first 2 years of this plan, we find that you did not meet the eligibility requirements at the time of your application,” in which event “your protection under the Plan will be removed, you will receive a refund of fees paid, and an otherwise valid claim will be denied.” And it provides that the plan cancels without notice when a borrower “reach[es] age 70 or die[s],” with joint protection converting automatically to single protection for the younger borrower. A separate document executed at the closing, the Iowa Oral Modification Disclosure, advised in capital letters that only written terms are enforceable and that no oral promise outside the written contract may be legally enforced. No one contends that anyone at GreenState discussed the Miners’ ages at the closing. Neither spouse's date of birth appears in any loan document, and the only reference to age is the “under age 70” statement in the plan application.

Janice died in November 2020, roughly sixteen months after the application was signed. Dale notified GreenState and expected the plan to retire the mortgage. By letter dated December 18, 2020, Minnesota Life Insurance Company—the Securian Financial entity that administers claims under GreenState's payment protection program—declined the death claim. Janice, the letter explained, had to be under seventy when she applied and was not. The letter went on to instruct GreenState “to rescind her protection and change the Plan from ( Joint protection) to (Single protection on Dale only) and to refund the difference in Plan fees.” No refund was ever issued. GreenState's position is that none was owed because no additional fee had ever been charged on account of Janice's participation. Dale continued to pay the monthly fee for some time after the denial and stopped after filing suit; GreenState does not dispute that his own coverage remains in force until he turns seventy.

Dale filed a petition at law with a jury demand in August 2024, pleading breach of contract, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, first-party bad faith, and punitive damages. He sought the unpaid mortgage balance and the fees collected after Janice's death. GreenState answered with general denials and ten affirmative defenses, including waiver, estoppel, reliance on Dale's representations, and failure of a condition precedent. Neither pleading used the word “rescission.” The case was set for a three-day jury trial that October. Both sides moved for summary judgment in July. Dale twice asked for a hearing with a certified court reporter. GreenState first raised rescission in the brief supporting its motion. Dale conceded that summary judgment should be entered against him on the fiduciary duty claim. The trial was continued in early September for reasons unrelated to the motions, and the court ruled without a hearing.

The parties’ disputes were narrow and largely definitional. Dale maintained that the documents were not furnished in advance, that some were presented on an electronic device, that the appointment lasted about forty-five minutes, and that he had no real chance to read the paperwork. GreenState replied that no time limit was imposed. Dale maintained that he and Janice disclosed their ages by producing their drivers’ licenses, which GreenState copied. GreenState answered that it collects identification only to satisfy federal lending requirements, does not use it to verify age for coverage purposes, and that the only license in its loan file is Dale's. Dale maintained that signing a preprinted form is not a “certification” and that neither he nor Janice ever made a false representation—though he admitted under oath that the application's statement that Janice was under seventy was false and he knew it was false when it was made. Finally, he argued that GreenState's continued collection of the monthly fee, without cancellation, showed the coverage was treated as in force.

In September, the district court denied the request for a hearing, found no genuine issue of material fact, and concluded that “the dispute can be boiled down to the Court's interpretation of the agreements that were entered into by the parties.” Applying the five elements of equitable rescission, the court found each satisfied: Janice represented she was eligible, the representation as to her age was false, it was material because the plan conditioned benefits on eligibility, the Miners intended GreenState to act on the application, and GreenState justifiably relied. Even if Janice's license had been produced—which the court found unclear from the record—it would have been collected for federal lending compliance, not to verify the plan representation. The court added an alternative holding: “Regardless of whether rescission applies, Janice died after her 70th birthday, and Plaintiff would not have had any claim under the Plan, in any event.”

The court rejected Dale's reliance on Iowa Administrative Code rule 191–28.3(3)(h)—which makes coverage effective notwithstanding an age limitation where the insurer accepts premiums after the debtor “has correctly stated the debtor's age” absent a refund within thirty days—on the ground that Janice did not correctly state her age. It found no waiver, reasoning that GreenState learned of the ineligibility only after Janice died and that the fees collected would have been identical had Dale been the sole enrollee. And while acknowledging that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, it held that adhesion principles cannot create coverage where the terms are clear. The court granted GreenState's motion, denied Dale's, dismissed the claims, and assessed costs to Dale. No Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion followed.

Dale now appeals. Dale raises three issues: whether the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial by transforming an action at law into an action in equity without notice or a hearing; whether it erred in doing so in order to apply the equitable doctrine of rescission; and whether summary judgment was improper because the record contained genuine issues of material fact. GreenState responds that the first two arguments were never presented below and are therefore not preserved, that equitable defenses may be raised in an action at law without converting the case to equity, and that the judgment rests on independent grounds Dale has not challenged.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC v. Retterath, 938 N.W.2d 664, 683 (Iowa 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hedlund v. State, 930 N.W.2d 707, 715 (Iowa 2019); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981. We review the summary-judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, considering on that party's behalf every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the record. Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 2001).

An inference is legitimate only if it is rational, reasonable, and permissible under the governing law; an inference resting on speculation or conjecture is not legitimate. Id. at 718. A factual issue is “material” only if the dispute is over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. An issue is “genuine” if reasonable minds may differ on its resolution. Id. Even where the facts are undisputed, summary judgment is improper if reasonable minds could draw different inferences from them and thereby reach different conclusions. Hedlund, 930 N.W.2d at 715. The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a material fact question; once it does so, the nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Wermerskirchen v. Canadian Nat'l R.R., 955 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2021); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981. A nonmovant's arguments, hypotheses, and speculation do not generate a genuine issue of material fact. Wermerskirchen, 955 N.W.2d at 827.

DISCUSSION

Our review only reaches issues preserved for appeal. It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised in and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). That requirement applies with full force to constitutional claims; even issues implicating constitutional rights must be presented to and ruled upon by the district court. O'Hara v. State, 642 N.W.2d 303, 314 (Iowa 2002). When an issue is presented to but not resolved by the district court—or emerges only from the court's ruling—the aggrieved party must file a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) requesting a ruling on that issue in order to preserve it for appeal. Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 540. That a party could not have anticipated the ruling does not excuse the omission; a rule 1.904(2) motion remains essential when the district court fails to resolve an issue, and a party must still request a ruling even where the motion is unavailable to challenge a decision already made. Id.

The first two challenges Dale makes on appeal—whether the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial by transforming an action at law into one in equity without notice or a hearing and whether it erred in doing so in order to apply the equitable doctrine of rescission—are not preserved for our review. Dale concedes the constitutional issue “was never raised” in the district court. He characterizes the issue as one the district court “created” by issuing an unforeseen ruling grounded in equitable rescission—a theory neither party had pleaded or sought. GreenState had, however, expressly invoked equitable rescission in its brief supporting its motion for summary judgment, and Dale filed a resistance without objecting that consideration of that defense would convert the action to equity or impair his jury-trial right. The time to raise those objections was in the district court. Our error-preservation rules are not satisfied by presenting a claim in the abstract; the record must reveal that the district court was aware of the issue and passed upon it. Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 540.

Dale's own explanation of his theory defeats preservation. If, as he contends, the equity and jury-trial issues surfaced only when the district court issued its ruling, the mechanism to preserve them was a motion under rule 1.904(2) asking the court to address the newly emergent issues. O'Hara, 642 N.W.2d at 314. Dale filed no rule 1.904(2) motion at all. His constitutional and equity arguments are therefore not preserved.¹

Dale's third argument on appeal contends that summary judgment was improper because the record contains substantial factual disputes that a jury should resolve. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Dale, we disagree. The material facts are undisputed, and GreenState is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Paybreak Debt Protection Plan excludes death benefits where death occurs on or after the insured's seventieth birthday, and it terminates coverage without notice when the insured reaches age seventy or dies. Janice was born in October 1945, and died in November 2020—well after her seventieth birthday. Those facts are not disputed. As the district court recognized, “[r]egardless of whether rescission applies, Janice died after her 70th birthday, and Plaintiff would not have had any claim under the Plan, in any event.” That exclusion is an independent and sufficient basis for judgment, and it turns on no contested fact and no equitable doctrine.

The record independently establishes that Janice was never eligible for coverage. To apply for the plan, each applicant had to certify, “By signing this Application, I am stating that: 1. I am under age 70.” It is undisputed that Janice was seventy-three when she signed the application on July 12, 2019— three years beyond the eligibility threshold. Dale admitted under oath that the certification that Janice was under seventy was false and that he knew she was over seventy when the application was signed. GreenState denied the claim by letter dated December 18, 2020, within two years of the application, as the plan permits when an insured is found to have been ineligible at the time of application.

The disputes Dale identifies are not material—they do not bear on facts that might affect the outcome. Phillips, 625 N.W.2d at 717. Rather, he argues that the signing meeting lasted only about forty-five minutes, that the documents were not furnished in advance, and that he and Janice lacked time to read the plan's twenty-three pages. But whether the Miners read the plan does not alter its terms; Janice was seventy-three regardless of how long the meeting lasted, and the age-based exclusion applies on undisputed facts. Dale also urges that no one discussed any age requirement orally and that the driver's licenses the Miners produced displayed their true ages. The Iowa Oral Modification Disclosure the Miners signed forecloses reliance on the absence of oral discussion: it states that “ONLY THOSE TERMS IN WRITING ARE ENFORCEABLE” and that oral promises not contained in the written contract are unenforceable. And the licenses do not generate a genuine issue: eligibility under the plan was governed by the applicants’ written certification, and the undisputed record establishes that GreenState collected identification only to comply with federal lending regulations, not to verify plan eligibility. Dale's contrary understanding of why the licenses were collected is not evidence that GreenState relied on them to determine eligibility; speculation of that kind does not defeat summary judgment. Wermerskirchen, 955 N.W.2d at 827.

Dale's remaining theories fail for the same reason. He invokes Iowa Administrative Code rule 191-28.3(3)(h), under which coverage is effective “regardless of age limitations or age exclusions” when “the debtor has correctly stated the debtor's age” absent a premium refund within thirty days. By its terms, the rule applies only where the debtor “correctly stated” her age; Janice did not, so the rule does not apply. His waiver theory fails because the record contains no evidence that GreenState knew of Janice's ineligibility before her death, and the premiums collected—which were identical whether Dale enrolled alone or jointly with Janice—were based on the age Janice represented. For the same reason, no refund was owed because no additional premium was charged for Janice's participation. Finally, principles governing contracts of adhesion do not manufacture coverage where the plan's terms are clear and unambiguous; those terms required certification that each applicant was under seventy, and Janice was not.

On this record, reasonable minds could not differ: the undisputed facts establish that Janice was ineligible when she applied and that she died after her seventieth birthday, either of which precludes recovery under the plan. No genuine issue of material fact remained for trial, and GreenState was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We find Dale's argument unpersuasive that, because he repeatedly requested a hearing before a certified court reporter (all of which the district court denied), he preserved error. A request for a hearing is not the equivalent of raising—and obtaining a ruling on—a constitutional objection or an objection to the consideration of an equitable defense. See Hildreth v. City of Des Moines, No. 15-0961, 2016 WL 7403705, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). He was not entitled to a hearing as of right; rule 1.981(3) contemplates disposition on “hearing or nonoral submission,” and the district court expressly found a hearing unnecessary. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981. Dale also contends he preserved error by filing his notice of appeal, but a notice of appeal does not preserve an issue for review. Merely raising an issue—without a ruling—does not preserve it. Hildreth, 2016 WL 7403705, at *1–2.

Opinion by Sandy, J.