State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brandon James Rowell, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Brandon Rowell appeals following his conviction and sentence for strangling his girlfriend. The district court sentenced him to prison and entered a no-contact order (NCO) between Rowell and the victim. Rowell challenges his sentence and the NCO on appeal, and we affirm.

Rowell assaulted his on-and-off girlfriend, with whom he resided and shared children, in May 2025. The girlfriend told police she and Rowell got in a fight after she added the mother of one of Rowell's other children as a Facebook friend. Rowell pushed and strangled her, to the point she had trouble breathing. She called 911, and police found dried blood on her face from a nosebleed, as well as “reddish bruising” on her neck. The assault happened while the children and Rowell's mother were in the home, and they all saw or heard the attack. At least one of the children tried to get Rowell to stop, and another ran away because she was scared.

The county attorney charged Rowell by trial information with two counts: (1) domestic abuse assault—third or subsequent offense, an enhanced class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(4) (2025), and (2) domestic abuse assault—strangulation causing bodily injury, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(5). Rowell pled guilty to the latter charge in exchange for the State dismissing the enhanced count.

At a contested sentencing hearing, the county attorney recommended incarceration based on “the violent nature of the crime” and Rowell's “extensive” criminal history—going back nearly twenty years and including convictions for willful injury, burglary, harassment, child endangerment, criminal contempt, multiple Iowa and Illinois domestic-violence convictions, and multiple NCO violations. The county attorney also requested a permanent NCO be entered between Rowell and the victim. The victim told the court she understood “that Brandon Rowell does have a really bad history of being in and out of jail” and had “multiple chances” to stop being violent, but she opposed Rowell's incarceration so he could continue having contact with their children and help his mother. Rowell's defense attorney opposed incarceration because Rowell's mother relied on him as a caretaker and Rowell regretted his crimes. In allocution, Rowell made the same points, describing his actions as “wrong.” The presentence investigation report (PSI) writer recommended incarceration.

The court sentenced Rowell to prison. In explaining its reasons, the court first acknowledged the victim's statements and explained why they were outweighed by other considerations. The court expressly cited the PSI, describing Rowell as a “dangerous man” unable to control his temper based on his “criminal history.” The court also emphasized that at least some of Rowell's offenses were committed while he was already on probation for other crimes. The court concluded by observing: “[T]his sentence is needed to protect the public and any woman that you might date in the future.”

Rowell's challenges on appeal separately concern the prison sentence and the NCO. We consider each.

SENTENCING DISCRETION

“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). To show an abuse of discretion, a defendant bears the burden to affirmatively show that the district court relied on improper factors or clearly untenable grounds. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 759, 762 (Iowa 1998).

Rowell argues the sentencing court “allow[ed his] criminal history to overwhelm its sentencing decision and fail[ed] to give proper consideration to the victim's request for probation and Rowell's need to be present in his children's and mother's lives.” We summarily reject this claim because Rowell is asking us to second-guess or re-weigh the factors that went into the sentencing decision. The case law forbids exactly that kind of second-guessing. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020). And “[t]he right of an individual judge to balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretionary standard.” State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983). Even if we were in the second-guessing business, we wouldn't do it on this record: sentencing an offender to prison based on his lengthy history of domestic violence, NCO violations, and failure to rehabilitate is neither untenable nor unreasonable.

NO-CONTACT ORDER

Rowell also challenges imposition of the permanent NCO. He admits in his brief that he did not object to the NCO below and that the plea agreement included a statement that an NCO “shall” be imposed. He nonetheless argues the district court “failed to exercise its discretion” or alternatively “exercised its discretion in an untenable and clearly unreasonable fashion.” His specific criticism is apparently that the victim did not believe the NCO was necessary and “[t]he court heard no evidence indicating the [NCO] was ․ necessary for her protection.” We bypass our concerns about preservation of error because, under controlling case law, neither of Rowell's criticisms establish reversible error.

First, we recognize there may be divergent viewpoints on the appropriateness of a particular NCO among prosecutors, crime victims, defendants, and courts. See generally Ostergren v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 863 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 2015). Rowell cites no authority, and there is none, requiring a district court to dissolve an NCO upon a victim's request. Here, the court expressly invited the victim to share her position and considered her statements. That the court ultimately disagreed does not reflect an abuse of discretion.

Second, case law that post-dates Rowell's appellate brief negates the legal basis for his claims. In April of this year, we expressly rejected a similar NCO challenge in one of our unpublished decisions. See State v. Hunter, No. 24-1999, 2026 WL 892487, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2026). The supreme court adopted our exact reasoning in May. See State v. Hall, 35 N.W.3d 538, 545 (Iowa 2026) (citing Hunter, 2026 WL 892487, at *2). The “only condition precedent” for entering an NCO on a qualifying offense is “a conviction, deferred judgment, or guilty plea.” Id. (cleaned up). So long as the condition is fulfilled, the district court is authorized to enter an NCO or continue one. Id. at 545–46. “The court is not required to consider additional proof, make additional findings, or offer additional explanations.” Id. at 546. Hall controls and defeats Rowell's second challenge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion by Buller, J.