State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Randy Lynn Barnes, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Randy Barnes pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary in the third degree as a habitual offender, class “D” felonies, charged in two separate case files. On appeal, he argues his consecutive sentences were an abuse of discretion.

Before proceeding to the merits, we address a jurisdictional question. On its own motion, the supreme court asked the parties to brief whether it had jurisdiction to consider the sentence in case file FECR391009 because Barnes only filed his notice of appeal in case file FECR387790. Barnes argued the supreme court had jurisdiction or, in the alternative, requested a delayed appeal. The supreme court ordered both issues submitted with the appeal and transferred the case. The State doesn't contest jurisdiction.

We conclude we have jurisdiction. The district court “filed a single sentencing order covering both cases.” State v. Htoo, No. 22-0154, 2022 WL 10833423, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2022). The July 7, 2025 sentencing order lists both case files, and Barnes appeals “the final order entered in this case on July 7, 2025, [and] all adverse rulings and orders inhering therein.” Barnes's notice of appeal “sufficed to confer appellate jurisdiction over both sentences.” Id.

In case file FECR387790, the State charged Barnes with burglary in the second degree, theft in the second degree, and six counts of felon in possession of a firearm. In that case, he admitted breaking into a home in December 2024 while the homeowner was on vacation and stealing many items of personal property. He also admitted prying open the homeowner's gun safe and stealing six guns. In case file FECR391009, the State charged Barnes with burglary in the third degree. He admitted breaking into a Smoke Shack in November 2025 and stealing cash and cigarettes.

In a global deal involving an Alford plea,¹ Barnes agreed to plead guilty to two counts of burglary in the third degree as a habitual offender, and the State agreed to dismiss all other charges. The parties agreed to make a joint recommendation of concurrent indeterminate terms of fifteen years for each count with a mandatory three years, run concurrent to his sentence in a parole case. The court accepted the nonbinding plea and set the consolidated cases for sentencing. The court also ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).

At sentencing, the court rejected the terms of the deal and imposed indeterminate fifteen-year terms for each count with a mandatory six years and ran the terms consecutive to each other and concurrent to the parole sentence. The court also imposed a no-contact order protecting the homeowner.

Barnes appeals, contending that the court should have given more weight to mitigating circumstances. He points to his several mental-health diagnoses, his history of substance use, and the fact that he was under the influence during the burglaries. He also argues he has good family support and the State agreed to concurrent sentences.

When, as here, a sentence is within statutory limits, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 455 (Iowa 2024). “A district court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). So, “the decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

At sentencing, the court explained that it had considered the court file, the PSI report, the sentencing recommendation, and explanations from the parties. But the court determined that it would reject the joint sentencing recommendation because the PSI revealed a “lengthy criminal history dating back” over thirty years and because of the victim impact statement. In that statement, the homeowner explained the importance of the items Barnes stole, the psychological impact of the crime on him and his wife, and the “heavy moral burden” of knowing the stolen firearms could “end up in the wrong hands.” The court also stated it considered Barnes's age, the nature of his offenses, and the statutory requirements; but reiterated, “[M]ost importantly, for you, sir, I've considered your criminal history; as well as the victim impact statements.”

After considering all relevant factors, the sentencing court has the discretion to give them appropriate weight. See State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983). This record shows the court considered the relevant factors and placed greater weight on criminal history and victim impact. Barnes points to no reason why that exercise of discretion was untenable or unreasonable, and we find none. Nor is the court “required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).

The court must also bear in mind the dual goals of “rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community from further offenses.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. After the court pronounced sentence, Barnes complained that he had been expecting to receive the bargained-for sentence and felt “tricked” into forgoing trial for a crime he didn't commit, saying, “I would never invade somebody's home.” The court then explained that his criminal history showed “limited options for rehabilitation.” The court also pointed out that Barnes has multiple convictions for burglary, attempted burglary, and other crimes of dishonesty. The court summed up: “So when you sit here and you tell me you don't break into people's things, immediately, looking at your criminal history, I know that you are a person who is prone ․ to engage in dishonest behavior.” Pointing to several convictions for eluding and probation violations, the court concluded: “you don't do well on probation or parole. Why? Because you leave the places of supervision.” Given the dual goals of sentencing, these observations formed a reasonable basis for the court's decision to impose a longer prison term.

This record shows the court did everything required and determined a reasonable sentence. We affirm the sentence. We note that the homeowner's name is misspelled on the no-contact order but leave it for the district court and parties to correct.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   An Alford plea allows a defendant to “plead guilty while maintaining innocence.” State v. Steichen, 36 N.W.3d 393, 398 (Minn. 2026); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).

Opinion by Tabor, C.J.