K.L., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children, born in 2014 and 2017, arguing that the State failed to prove grounds for termination, termination was not in the children's best interests, and an exception applies to prevent termination.¹ The mother also argues she should have been given an additional six months to work toward reunification. On our de novo review, we affirm the termination of her parental rights to both children.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This family has a long history of involvement with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) due to the parents’ substance use and allegations of domestic violence. In 2015 and 2021, HHS issued founded child abuse assessments based primarily on the parents’ substance use. In the first case, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine; in the second, she admitted to using methamphetamine.

Both investigations prompted the State to initiate child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings. In the first CINA case, the parents participated in services and the case closed in January 2016. The second CINA case closed with the entry of a bridge order in June 2023, with the parents splitting legal custody of the children, the father having primary physical care, and the mother having visitation. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine in February 2023, a few months before the second CINA case closed. The bridge order required the parents to participate in drug testing when requested.

Most recently, in late September 2024, HHS received a report that the father was abusing the older child and not providing the children with mental healthcare. HHS investigated these allegations, but neither child reported abuse or neglect from the father. The father also provided a negative drug test.

During the investigation into these allegations, HHS learned that the mother had violated the bridge order on several occasions and was refusing to drug test. HHS became concerned that the mother was again using methamphetamine. On October 2, the mother agreed to do a drug test but stated she did not want “to do a hair or [sweat] patch test due to her having three false positive patch tests for methamphetamine in the past.” She eventually agreed to a sweat patch test, which came back positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. HHS issued a founded child abuse assessment against the mother for denial of critical care, failure to provide proper supervision.

On October 8, after the mother refused to participate in safety planning, the State filed CINA petitions for the children. On October 15, the State filed an ex parte removal request, which the court ordered the same day. The children were removed from the mother's care but remained placed with the father. The children have not returned to the mother's care at any point during this case.

The juvenile court held a removal hearing over two days on October 22 and November 14. During the hearing, the mother maintained that she last used methamphetamine in July 2021 and she had been sober since then. She claimed that her last two positive tests for methamphetamine were caused by external factors. In the mother's view, the February 2023 positive test was due to the father dosing her food or drink with methamphetamine without her knowledge, and the October 2024 positive test was due to methamphetamine contamination in her home from a prior tenant. As to the second positive test, the mother claimed that she was exposed to methamphetamine after a contaminated ceiling tile fell on her while she was using the bathroom. The mother claimed the positive test for amphetamines was due to a valid prescription for Adderall, although the record is unclear whether the mother has ever been formally diagnosed with ADHD. At the close of the removal hearing, the State requested the mother complete a hair stat drug screen, which she refused.

In the court's December 3 removal order, the court noted that the mother's “testimony was difficult to follow at times,” “often bordered on absurd[,] and [wa]s reflective of both unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues.” The court found that continued removal of the children was necessary. The court confirmed placement of the children with the father and gave the father temporary legal custody under HHS supervision.

On December 19, the children were adjudicated in need of assistance. Among other services, the court ordered the mother to undergo mental-health and substance-use evaluations, comply with any recommendations, and provide at least two random drug screens per month upon request.

Despite the order requiring random drug testing, throughout this case the mother consistently refused to participate in testing. HHS requested she participate in drug testing at least once every month for the duration of this case, but the mother has not participated in any testing since the initial October 2024 sweat patch test. In total, HHS requested the mother participate in eighteen drug tests, but she only participated in one, which came back positive for methamphetamine. Her refusal to participate in testing was based on her stated belief that she had “a trauma response and PTSD-triggered avoidance” to sweat patch testing, and that her tests result in false positives. Even so, the mother also refused alternative forms of testing.

During this case, the mother has participated in two substance-use evaluations. During the first evaluation, in January 2025, the mother repeated her contention that she had not used methamphetamine since July 2021. The court later opined that the mother's reporting during the first evaluation was “simply inconsistent with evidence and prior court findings.” During the second evaluation, in June 2025, she reported methamphetamine use ending two weeks before the evaluation, but she later backtracked on that claim, alleging she lied about her methamphetamine use to get access to services. After that, she continued to maintain that she had not used methamphetamine since July 2021.

In early June 2025, the mother took a leave of absence from her job of nearly a decade. Her stated reason for taking leave was that she wanted to focus on substance-use treatment. While she did begin participating in substance-use treatment in mid-June, this treatment was outpatient. The mother acknowledged that her leave was not covered by short-term disability because “no medical provider will certify saying there is a valid medical reason for her leave.” The mother later changed her story and claimed that she took the leave of absence “to focus on the case,” although HHS never asked her to do that. The mother did not return from her leave of absence, and her employment was terminated on February 2, 2026.

As a result of not working, the mother was unable to pay the mortgage on her home, which went into foreclosure in January 2026. The mother claimed she reached an agreement with the mortgage company to pay the past-due amount with money from unemployment and her retirement savings.

The mother has also participated in several psychological evaluations while involved with HHS. Importantly, these evaluations did not conclude that the mother had ADHD. The mother maintained that she had been diagnosed with ADHD and prescribed Adderall in an earlier evaluation, but she did not submit documentation of that diagnosis to the court.

Throughout this case, the mother also participated in mental-health treatment with a provider she had been seeing off-and-on for almost a decade. Despite this lengthy therapeutic relationship, the mother's provider testified that most of their work focused on the mother as a victim and they had not done “a deep dive” on the mother taking accountability for her actions, especially regarding substance use, that led to the CINA cases. Her provider reported that the mother continued to insist that she was being framed and was testing positive for methamphetamine due to environmental factors. In an August 22, 2025, CINA review order, the court found that the mother's “unresolved mental health issues continue to impact her daily functioning and ability to safely parent,” and the court was “specifically concerned about [the mother] seeing the same provider for approximately 10 years without any notable improvement in [her] mental health.” The court concluded that the mother “continue[d] to lack accountability for the reasons her children continue to be involved in Juvenile Court.”

Additionally, while the mother participated in visits with the children, she did not progress beyond supervised visitation. Although visits generally went well, the mother sometimes struggled with disciplining the children and she often had inappropriate conversations with them, letting her negative feelings toward the father seep into their interactions. One Family-Centered Services (FCS) report noted that the children “seem torn between supporting both parents.” Another report indicated that the mother “struggle[d] with setting boundaries with the children” and providing adequate discipline. For example, at one visit, the mother had to be redirected after she allowed the children to run around a library screaming. At another visit, the mother gave the older child a pocketknife. During other visits, despite the requirement that her interactions with the children be supervised, she gave the older child her contact information and disguised her phone number inside a permanent marker tattoo she drew on the younger child.

As of late September 2025, HHS reported that the mother had made “little to no progress since the beginning of this case,” and was “in no better position today than [she was] at the beginning of the case.” On November 20, the guardian ad litem (GAL) submitted a report to the court noting, “Despite over a year of services during this case and the receipt of services in two prior [CINA] cases, [the mother] remains unsafe to have even semi supervised contact with her children.”

Both HHS and the GAL recommended termination of the mother's parental rights. The older child objected to termination, and he was appointed a separate lawyer to advocate for his preference. After a permanency hearing, the juvenile court agreed with HHS and the GAL, noting the mother “struggles to truthfully answer any question [that] may negatively reflect on her. Whenever someone questions her decisions or behaviors, she deflects those issues and blames others for her current situation.” In determining the State should move forward with terminating the mother's parental rights, the court concluded:

Given Mother's complete unwillingness to even acknowledge her substance use and her longstanding, unresolved mental health issues, Court finds the DHHS recommendations are appropriate. Court has tried all less restrictive long-term options, without success. Court has no doubt that any other permanency option will only result in the remainder of these children's lives being a constant roller coaster of litigation and disparaging Father, without any meaningful progress from Mother. Such behavior is harmful to these children's stability and mental health.

On December 22, the State filed petitions to terminate the mother's parental rights to both children. The juvenile court held the termination trial over five days on January 8, 9, 22, and 23, and March 31, 2026.

On May 30, the court terminated the mother's parental rights to both children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and (f ) (2025). In doing so, the court noted that the mother “is either genuinely unaware or patently refuses to acknowledge how her behaviors have and continue to negatively impact these children.” The mother had been offered “extensive services” but “failed to remedy” the issues that led to HHS involvement. The court concluded that termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests and no exception to termination applied. The mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court's findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

We apply a three-step analysis to termination-of-parental-rights cases. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). First, we determine whether the State proved grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2025). Id. If so, we then consider whether termination is in the children's best interests. Id. Finally, we consider whether any exceptions apply to prevent termination. Id.

The mother challenges all three steps in the analysis and also argues she should have been given an additional six months to work toward reunification. We address her arguments in turn.

A. Statutory Grounds for Termination. The juvenile court terminated the mother's rights to the children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and (f ). “As termination was ordered on two grounds, we may affirm if either is supported by the record.” L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 532. We focus on subsection (f ), which establishes grounds for termination when the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f ).

The mother only challenges the final element of subsection (f ), that the children could not be returned to her custody at the present time. Our courts have held that “at the present time” means at the time of the termination trial. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010).

We conclude that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to the mother's custody at the time of the termination trial. The mother made little to no progress throughout this case despite her participation in services. The mother's participation in services was intended to address the issues that brought the children to HHS's attention, namely the mother's unresolved substance-use and mental-health issues. Throughout this case, however, the mother has been completely unwilling or unable to take accountability for her behavior and choices that led to the children being removed from her custody. The mother has not acknowledged her substance-use or mental-health problems, and importantly, she refused to participate in drug testing to prove her claimed sobriety. Because we presume that every missed drug test would have been positive, there have been eighteen positive tests in this case. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 533. Overall, the mother has not demonstrated she is a safe, stable, and sober caretaker for these children. Based on the foregoing, the State proved grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Best Interests. In determining whether termination is in the children's best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). “When making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).

The juvenile court determined that termination was in the children's best interests because the mother refused to demonstrate sobriety and was unable or unwilling to take accountability for her actions, meaningfully participate in services, or make necessary changes, which prevented her from understanding the harm she has caused to the children. We agree. The mother lacked insight into the ways she presents a danger to the children through her continued substance use and longstanding, unaddressed mental-health issues. As the juvenile court noted, termination was appropriate because “any other permanency option will only result in the remainder of these children's lives being a constant roller coaster of litigation and disparaging Father, without any meaningful progress from Mother. Such behavior is harmful to these children's stability and mental health.” We conclude termination of the mother's parental rights is in the children's best interests.

C. Exceptions to Termination. Once the State has proven grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interests, the burden is on the parent to prove whether any exceptions to termination apply. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. These exceptions “are permissive, not mandatory.” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). “The court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to apply the factors in section 232.116(3) to save the parent-child relationship based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the children.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019).

The only exception to termination the mother cites in her petition on appeal is Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(e), which may apply when a parent is absent due to institutional commitment or military service. That subsection is not applicable to these facts. From a generous reading of the mother's petition on appeal, we find the mother argues for “a strict and carefully created Bridge Order” and references the loving bond between the mother and children. From those arguments, it appears the mother is attempting to assert the exceptions in Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a), based on a relative having legal custody, and (c), based on the parent-child relationship.

We conclude the mother has failed to prove that either of these exceptions applies to prevent termination. Regarding subsection (a), while the father has legal custody of the children, the mother has made it clear that she cannot co-parent with the father, making any bridge order unworkable from the beginning. The mother believes that with the correct formulation of carefully curated terms, a bridge order could allow the parents to “parallel parent” effectively. However, the mother has already shown she is not willing to comply with the terms of a bridge order, particularly regarding important terms like submitting to drug tests to demonstrate sobriety. The mother's lack of compliance with the prior bridge order weighs against entering another bridge order in this case. We conclude the mother has failed to show that this exception to termination applies here.

Similarly, while it is clear the mother loves the children and the children love her, it is equally clear that the mother is not willing to admit she has mental-health and substance-use problems that place the children in danger while in her custody. For that reason, the exception in section 232.116(3)(c) does not apply to prevent termination in this case.

D. Extension of Time. Finally, the mother argues she should have been given a six-month extension of time to work toward reunification. Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) permits the juvenile court to grant extensions of time to work toward reunification, but the court must “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child's home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”

We find no basis for the juvenile court to extend permanency for another six months. This is the third CINA case the mother has been a part of, receiving services in each case. Even so, the mother has been unwilling or unable to take accountability for her choices and make the changes necessary to be able to parent these children safely. These children deserve a safe, stable, sober caretaker, and the mother has consistently shown she is unwilling to serve in that role. We decline to grant the mother an additional six months to work toward reunification.

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude the State proved grounds for termination and that termination was in the children's best interests, and the mother failed to prove that an exception to termination applied. We additionally conclude that a six-month extension of time for the mother to work toward reunification is not warranted on these facts. We affirm the juvenile court order terminating the mother's parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The father's parental rights are not at issue in this case.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.