Charles Earl Jones, Applicant–Appellant, v. State of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee. (2026)

Charles Jones appeals the district court order denying his postconviction-relief (PCR) application. On appeal, Jones argues he established claims of ineffective assistance of counsel entitling him to a new trial. On our review, we conclude Jones has failed to establish his counsel was ineffective. We therefore affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On November 18, 2015, a hooded man with a gun entered a supermarket in Waterloo and demanded money. During an exchange of gunfire with the store manager, the man was shot in the right armpit. He then fled the scene, leaving behind a palm print on a glass door in the process. The incident was captured on the store's surveillance cameras.

Approximately fifteen minutes later, a 911 caller reported shots fired near the intersection of Eighth and Leavitt Streets in Waterloo, a five- to ten-minute drive from the supermarket. There, officers discovered Jones on the ground, shot in the right armpit. Jones claimed he had been robbed of his cell phone, headphones, and coat, and he had been shot during a struggle over the coat. Jones was taken to the hospital; he was the only gunshot-wound victim treated in Waterloo that day.

While investigating both incidents, officers became suspicious that Jones was the armed robber from the supermarket. Officers were unable to find any evidence of a robbery or shooting in the area of Eighth and Leavitt Streets. No witnesses reported seeing a robbery or shooting, but witnesses did report hearing gunshots, seeing a vehicle leaving the area, and observing Jones laying on the ground.

Jones spoke with officers at the hospital and again at the police station two days later. According to Jones, he had been with friends and family earlier in the evening and then left to walk around a nearby school to get Wi-Fi access on his phone. While he was out walking, a man approached him and robbed him. He told officers that the headphones were red and a gift from his girlfriend. Jones told at least one officer that his coat was black, but later claimed the coat was red. He denied being at the supermarket at the time of the robbery.

Police collected Jones's clothing at the hospital and determined that the belt, jeans, and underwear were consistent with those worn by the armed robber in the surveillance footage from the supermarket. Review of the school's surveillance footage did not show Jones walking around the night of the robbery. Forensic analysis matched Jones's palm print to the palm print collected from the glass door at the supermarket.

In January 2016, Jones was charged with first-degree robbery, going armed with intent, carrying weapons, and making a false report to law enforcement. After an August 2016 jury trial, Jones was found guilty as charged.

Defense counsel did not file any post-trial motions, but at sentencing, Jones made what the court deemed “a pro se motion in arrest of judgment or a motion for a new trial” based on a perceived lack of fairness in the process, lack of evidence, and insufficient preparation by defense counsel. The court denied the motion, concluding the verdicts were consistent with the evidence. The court then sentenced Jones. Jones appealed.

On direct appeal, Jones raised sufficiency-of-the-evidence and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. A panel of our court affirmed Jones's convictions but preserved one of his ineffectiveness claims regarding hearsay statements for PCR. See State v. Jones, No. 16-1828, 2018 WL 1858296, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2018) (determining there was substantial evidence supporting the convictions).

In August 2018, Jones filed this PCR application raising a variety of claims. The PCR court dismissed some of the claims, leaving only Jones's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and prosecutorial-misconduct claims for trial.

After trial, the district court denied Jones's PCR application in its entirety. Relevant to this appeal, in a detailed ruling, the court discussed Jones's sixteen allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, concluding Jones failed to establish a right to relief on any of the claims. Jones appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

Generally, we review denials of PCR applications for correction of errors at law. Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018). We review an applicant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. Id.

III. Analysis.

On appeal, Jones's only argument is that his underlying criminal trial counsel was ineffective. To prove an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Jones “must show (1) that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) that prejudice resulted.” State v. Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Iowa 2020). “However, both elements do not always need to be addressed. If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001).

Counsel fails to perform an essential duty when their “performance was deficient, meaning counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d at 628 (cleaned up). We consider the totality of the circumstances to “determine[ ] whether counsel's assistance was reasonable.” Id. (cleaned up).

To show prejudice, Jones must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Jones argues his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: (1) seek to exclude hearsay statements at trial; (2) file a motion to suppress the statements he made to police; (3) introduce evidence of the 911 call for the Eighth and Leavitt shots-fired call; and (4) file a motion for a new trial. Finally, Jones argues that the cumulative effect of these allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel meets the Strickland prejudice standard. We consider Jones's claims in turn.

A. Hearsay Statements. Jones first argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to seek to exclude hearsay statements from Investigator Nicholas Sadd and Investigator Brice Lippert of the Waterloo Police Department about the headphones and a coat Jones alleged were stolen from him. In Jones's view, he was prejudiced by this failure because this testimony challenged his claim that he was robbed. The State asserts the ownership of the headphones was “largely a collateral non-issue” and the questioning only established the investigative process, which only provided inconclusive results on the ownership question. The challenged testimony addressed two topics: (1) whether the headphones were a gift from Jones's girlfriend and (2) whether Jones owned a pair of red headphones along with a coat.

1. Whether the headphones were a gift. During the prosecution's casein-chief, the State asked Investigator Sadd about Jones's initial report that he was robbed of headphones his girlfriend had purchased for him:

Q. And were you able to ever confirm with [his girlfriend] that she had ever given [ Jones] any Beats by Dre headphones? A. Later on in the investigation, I asked her if she had ever given him the headphones and she stated no.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I'm going to object, Your Honor, calling for hearsay.

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that objection.

Defense counsel did not move to strike the testimony from the record. Later, when the State cross-examined Jones in his case-in-chief, he admitted he told officers that the headphones were a gift from his girlfriend. He then testified that his girlfriend had bought him earbuds, not headphones. Jones stated that he got the headphones when he was with his girlfriend, but they were not a gift from her.

After that, the State called Investigator Lippert in rebuttal, asking him:

Q. Were you ever able to confirm that the Beats by Dre that [ Jones] claimed were stolen were given to him by [his girlfriend]? A. I was not.

Regarding Investigator Sadd's testimony, even if Jones could establish his counsel was ineffective by failing to strike the hearsay statement, Jones cannot show prejudice. See State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 623 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (“[W]e will not find prejudice if the admitted hearsay is merely cumulative.” (citation omitted)). Jones admitted in his own testimony that he initially told investigators the headphones were a gift from his girlfriend. Based on that, Jones cannot show that there is a reasonable probability of a different result had the hearsay testimony been stricken from the record.

Additionally, regarding Investigator Lippert's rebuttal testimony, Jones cannot show that his counsel was ineffective by failing to object because the statement was not hearsay. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c) (defining hearsay). Nor was this statement “backdoor hearsay” because it did not “impliedly introduc[e] hearsay into the record.” State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 495 (Iowa 2017). Instead, as the PCR court noted, this testimony “merely describe[d] a step that Officer Lippert took during the investigation.”

For the above-stated reasons, Jones's ineffectiveness claim regarding this testimony fails as a matter of law.

2. Whether Jones owned the headphones and coat. During Investigator Lippert's direct examination, the following exchange occurred, to which defense counsel did not object:

Q. Were you ever able to confirm or find any confirmation that [ Jones] owned any Beats by Dre or any Pelle Pelle coat? A. Yes.

Q. And specifically were you able to confirm whether he actually owned Beats by Dre? A. I was not able to.

Q. And did you attempt to speak to his girlfriend and other people? A. Yes.

Q. And did you, in fact, speak to his girlfriend? A. Yes.

Q. And did you ever—were you ever able to confirm whether [ Jones] ever owned a Pelle Pelle coat or find any evidence that he ever owned a Pelle Pelle coat? And I may be butchering the name. A. I was not able to.

Q. And did you speak to the girlfriend about that? A. Yes.

Jones alleges this testimony was improper backdoor hearsay, and his counsel was deficient by failing to object. He further alleges he was prejudiced by this testimony because it challenged his defense that he was across town at the time of the store robbery.

We conclude that Jones's counsel was not ineffective by failing to object to this testimony, nor was Jones prejudiced. This testimony was not hearsay. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c). Nor was this testimony backdoor hearsay. See Huser, 894 N.W.2d at 495. Instead, like Investigator Lippert's rebuttal testimony, he was “describ[ing] a step that [he] took during the investigation.” The investigator may properly testify about his investigation and the personal knowledge he gained about the facts of the case from that investigation. State v. Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Iowa 2011) (“Generally, an investigating officer may explain his or her actions by testifying as to what information he or she had, including its source, regarding the crime and the criminal.”). Jones has failed to show either prong of his ineffectiveness claim on this ground, and the PCR court properly denied his application on this ground.

B. Motion to Suppress. Jones next alleges that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion to suppress the statements Jones made to law enforcement at the hospital. In Jones's view, these statements were made involuntarily because he had been shot, was in shock, and was on painkillers.¹ Jones argues that had these statements been suppressed, the jury would not have heard about various inconsistencies in his statements to police, and for that reason he was prejudiced.

Statements are voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, it “appear[s] the statements were the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, made by the defendant whose will was not overborne or whose capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired.” State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997) (cleaned up). In Countryman, our supreme court concluded the defendant's statements were voluntary because “the evidence d[id] not show that [the defendant's] mental state was so disabling as to render her unable to make a voluntary statement, or that she was unduly susceptible to manipulation by [law enforcement].” Id. at 559.

On this issue, other than Jones's general testimony that he was on painkillers and in shock at the time he spoke with police at the hospital, he did not present evidence that his will was overborne or his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired. In short, the evidence does not show that Jones was unable to give voluntary statements to police at the hospital.

In contrast, the officer who spoke with Jones at the hospital testified at the underlying criminal trial that Jones had no trouble communicating with him or tracking the conversation. When the officer first began speaking with Jones at the hospital, Jones “advised [the officer] he wanted the person who shot him arrested.” Additionally, Jones, who testified in his own defense at trial, confirmed and reiterated several statements he made during his conversation with officers at the hospital. We agree with the PCR court's well-reasoned conclusion on this issue:

The statements made by [ Jones] at the hospital appear purposeful and calculated to building an alibi and an explanation for any presence of gun powder residue on his hands. His statements do not appear to be the hazy statements of a person under the influence of extreme pain medication. The evidence is that [ Jones] engaged in fairly detailed conversations with the law enforcement during that time that included locations where he had been ․, why he was at those locations and the altercation he had with the man who allegedly shot him. He also had multiple answers for law enforcement as to why he would have gun powder residue on his hands. None of these multiple and detailed statements suggest that [ Jones] was under the influence of medication to the point of mental confusion or duress. Given the record as it stands, the Court finds that [ Jones] has not shown a failure to perform an essential duty and is not likely to have prejudiced the result. Therefore, the Court finds that [defense counsel] was not ineffective on this basis.

Like the PCR court, we conclude Jones did not establish his counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion to suppress his statements at the hospital. The court properly denied this claim.

C. 911 Call. Jones next argues his counsel was ineffective by failing to introduce into evidence the recording of the 911 call from the Eighth-andLeavitt incident. In Jones's view, this recording could have been “introduced by the recording, a transcript of the recording, through the dispatcher, the caller, [or] Officer Koontz or his camera recording.” Jones alleges the recording and its transcript fell under two exceptions to the hearsay rule: a present-sense impression under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(1) or an excited utterance under rule 5.803(2). Jones claims he was prejudiced by this failure because the caller “would have witnessed [him] get shot,” so their statements would have supported his defense.

The only evidence we have about this caller is a recording of dispatcher statements on “squad car video and audio and body mic audio, radio traffic back and forth between various officers and dispatch.” The dispatcher's statements about the 911 caller's report constitute hearsay within hearsay. Based on that, even if Jones could establish that the caller's initial statements fell under a hearsay exception, he has not alleged any exceptions apply to the dispatcher's statement such that the statement would be excepted from the hearsay rule. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.805.

In any event, Jones did not identify the 911 caller by name at any point during the underlying criminal case or during this PCR case. Further, the dispatcher did not report that the caller saw Jones get shot, only that the caller saw Jones “fall after they heard ․ shots fired.”

During the underlying trial, Jones presented testimony from three witnesses who heard gunshots in the area of Eighth and Leavitt Streets and saw Jones laying on the ground thereafter. Like the 911 caller, none of these witnesses saw the shooting. Two of these witnesses testified that after hearing the gunshots they saw a man running to a large SUV and driving away. It is unclear from the record whether any of these witnesses were the 911 caller referenced in the recording.

Based on the foregoing, the statements in the recording were cumulative to other evidence introduced at trial. Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to introduce the recording at trial, nor was Jones prejudiced by the absence of the recording. See Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d at 628. The district court did not err in denying Jones's PCR claim on this issue.

D. Motion for New Trial. Jones argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to file any posttrial motions, particularly a motion for new trial. In Jones's view, the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Specifically, Jones alleges that there was no evidence that he was the man the store manager shot at the supermarket, only speculation. In his view, a motion for new trial would have been successful.

A motion for new trial may be based on the allegation that “the verdict is ․ contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(7). In considering this motion, “[i]f the court reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted, the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted.” State v. Jackson, 35 N.W.3d 345, 349 (Iowa 2026) (quoting State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa 1998)). “[A] weight-of-the-evidence challenge requires the district court to make credibility calls and decide whether more credible evidence supports the verdict.” Id.

Considering all the evidence presented at trial, we cannot conclude the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Jones was found shot in the right armpit—the area in which it appeared the store robber was shot. He was found in an area that he could have gotten to within fifteen minutes of the store robbery. He was wearing a similar pair of pants, underwear, and belt as the store robber was wearing in the surveillance footage. Officers located a palm print on the store's glass door in the same area the surveillance footage showed the store robber touching while exiting the store, and this palm print matched Jones. Officers were unable to corroborate Jones's story about being robbed, including where he had been before the robbery and whether he owned the items that he alleged were stolen from him. Counsel is under no obligation to raise a meritless issue. See State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009). For that reason, defense counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial was not ineffective.

E. Cumulative Error. Finally, Jones argues the cumulative prejudice from his individual claims of ineffective assistance of counsel amounts to Strickland prejudice because he did not receive a fair trial. Because we conclude Jones has failed to prove any of his claims of ineffectiveness, we reject his cumulative prejudice claim. See State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2000) (“Having found each of the underlying claims to have no merit individually, we reject the claim of cumulative error.”).

IV. Conclusion.

Upon our review, Jones's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail as a matter of law, and the district court properly denied his PCR application. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jones also argues that his age, education, upbringing, use of marijuana the day before, and lack of familiarity with law enforcement weigh in favor of finding his statements to police were involuntary. Jones did not make that argument before the district court either at his underlying criminal trial or during the PCR proceedings. See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 141 (“Generally, a claim not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a postconviction relief proceeding unless the applicant can demonstrate a sufficient cause or reason for not properly raising the issue previously.”). In any event, even considering this information, our analysis would not change.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.