State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Florence Lindsay Belger, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

“It was the only thing left to take away from her that she cared anything about.” So Florence Belger shaved her teenage stepdaughter's head. The young girl says Belger added that if she was going to act “retarded,” she should look like it. Belger pled guilty to child endangerment and assault. The district court placed Belger on probation but denied her request for a deferred judgement. Belger appeals her sentence. She contends the district court relied on an improper factor by crediting unproven allegations aired in the victim impact statement, and that the court abused its discretion in denying her a deferred judgment. Finding no reliance on an improper factor and no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Florence Lindsay Belger is the stepmother of H.B., a teenager. Belger married H.B.’s father and had lived in the household for about four years when the events at issue occurred. Belger's son and H.B.’s younger brother also lived in the home. Statements made at sentencing describe a long-running conflict between Belger and H.B. over H.B.’s use of cell phones and leaving the home at night. Belger and H.B.’s father responded by taking phones away, removing privileges, and installing security cameras. Belger told the court the phone at issue was estimated to be the ninth phone H.B. had obtained.

In August 2024, H.B.’s father found a phone in her room and asked to see what was on it. H.B. refused, and an attempt to unlock the phone with her fingerprint failed. Belger then got clippers and shaved H.B.’s head. Belger told the sentencing court that H.B.’s hair was “the only thing left to take away from her that she cared anything about,” that she was not held down, and that she sat while it was done. H.B. told the court that Belger held her down, that she did not move or leave the house because her younger brother was there, and that the experience left her “terrified, humiliated, and powerless.” H.B. also said Belger told her that if she was going to act “retarded,” she should look like it. Belger denied making that statement.

The State charged Belger with child endangerment creating a substantial risk in count I and assault causing bodily injury in count II. Count I identified the child as “D.S.” The State moved to amend on August 19, 2025, and an amended trial information filed August 27, 2025, identified the child in count I as “L.B.” H.B. remained the named victim of count II. Belger filed a written guilty plea pleading to both counts as charged: count I, child endangerment—substantial risk, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6(1)(a), 726.6(4), and 726.6(8) (2024); and count II, assault causing bodily injury or mental illness, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of sections 708.1(2) and 708.2(2). The factual basis for count I recited the initials “D.S.,” carrying forward the initials used in the original trial information. Under the agreement, the parties would recommend suspended sentences of two years on count I and one year on count II, run concurrently, with two years of probation and the minimum fines. Belger was free to request a deferred judgment, and the State was free to resist.

H.B. attended the sentencing hearing with her guardian ad litem. After confirming the terms of the agreement with counsel, the court asked Belger what prompted her actions. Belger described the conflict in the household, said cutting H.B.’s hair was wrong, and said she felt bad about it. Asked whether the decision had been calm and rational, she said it was not, and that she had been angry and hurt. Defense counsel asked for a deferred judgment describing the head shaving as an act of desperation by a stepparent who had exhausted other forms of discipline and noting that Belger had no criminal history. Counsel also told the court that trust in the household had been destroyed long before the incident. The State resisted, arguing the conduct was particularly egregious for an assault, that the harm to H.B. would be lasting, and that Belger had shown no remorse because she continued to blame H.B.

Before H.B. read her victim impact statement, the court told her it anticipated she had things to say beyond the events charged and would allow her to address them because the court would be taking up the no-contact order, but that for sentencing its focus was “on what happened in the specific charges here.” H.B.’s statement described four years of verbal abuse, isolation from friends and family, excessive chores, and favoritism toward Belger's son. It described the head shaving as one of the most traumatic events of her life. It asked the court to impose the punishment most appropriate for the harm caused and to protect H.B. and her younger brother. In allocution, Belger did not address the head shaving. She described H.B.’s conduct online and sneaking out at night, and explained that phones were taken away to keep H.B. from harm.

In pronouncing sentence, the court spoke about the difficulty of stepparenting, drawing on its own experience. It observed that the justification defense available to a parent extends to a stepparent, along with the same limits: the discipline must be reasonable and cannot be administered out of anger. The court found that what it had heard was not a reasonable and thoughtful response, and that “maybe it wasn't malice, but it was certainly anger.” The court also said it had heard from more than one person that the comment about looking like a “retard” was made. It then denied the request for a deferred judgment: “And while I acknowledge that, you know, you don't have a prior criminal history, and I—I acknowledge that clearly there was a serious lack of trust in this household, the—this was pushed past the limit, and I can't justify deferring judgment at this time.”

The court imposed the sentence the parties had recommended: two years on count I and 365 days on count II, both suspended, run concurrently, with two years of probation, fines of $855 and $430 plus surcharges. It entered a no-contact order for five years, to which Belger did not object, and recommended that any future contact be therapeutic. The written judgment and sentence, filed the same day, states that the sentence was imposed for the reasons stated on the record. Belger appeals, contending that the district court relied on improper factors drawn from H.B.’s victim impact statement, and it abused its discretion in denying a deferred judgment—particularly as to count I, for which she says the court gave no reasons.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a sentence imposed in a criminal case for correction of errors at law, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). A sentence that falls within the statutory limits is “cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,” and will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters. Id. An abuse of discretion will not be found “unless we are able to discern that the decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id. Our task on appeal “is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

DISCUSSION

I. The district court did not rely on an improper sentencing factor.

A sentencing court may not rely on “additional, unproven, and unprosecuted charges” unless the defendant admits them or the facts before the court show the defendant committed them. Id. at 725. But a court is entitled to consider a victim impact statement, and Iowa has long entrusted district courts to separate the permissible from the impermissible in weighing such statements. See State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998). Because a victim impact statement necessarily conveys the full impact of the crime, it “may at times result in the airing of allegations which are unproven,” yet “we trust that our district courts, when weighing such statements as part of the sentencing determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence.” Id. Absent “clear evidence to the contrary, we assume the district court did so.” Id. To overcome the presumption that the court properly exercised its discretion, a defendant must make “an affirmative showing the court relied on improper evidence.” Id. at 762 (cleaned up).

Belger cannot make that showing. She rests her entire argument on a single phrase—the court's observation that “clearly there was a serious lack of trust in this household.” She reads that remark as evidence that the court adopted H.B.’s account of years of uncharged abuse. The record does not support the inference. The subject of trust was introduced by Belger herself, who told the court that the incident “hurt because [H.B.] ․ didn't trust us enough to talk to us.” Her counsel returned to the theme, arguing that “trust had been destroyed a long time ago” between Belger and her stepdaughter. The court's passing reference to a lack of trust responded to such framing, not to any unproven allegation. “We will not draw an inference of improper sentencing considerations which are not apparent from the record.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.

The remainder of the record confirms the court confined itself to proper factors. Before H.B. spoke, the court told her that although it would hear her out, “in terms of sentencing, my focus is on what happened in the specific charges here.” The court's stated reasons for its sentence tracked the charged conduct: shaving the child's head as a form of punishment done “out of anger” rather than as a “reasonable and thoughtful response,” together with Belger's absence of a prior criminal history. There is no clear evidence the court relied on anything improper.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a deferred judgment.

The choice among authorized sentencing options is committed to the district court's discretion. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. In exercising it, the court weighs the societal goals of rehabilitation and protection of the community, see Iowa Code § 901.5, along with “the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform,” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. That “[t]he application of these goals and factors ․ will not always lead to the same sentence” does not make “the choice of one particular sentencing option over another” an error; it reflects “the discretionary nature” of sentencing. Id.

The court's denial of a deferred judgment rested on tenable grounds. It explained that shaving a child's head as punishment was not a reasonable exercise of a stepparent's authority but a response driven by anger, and that the conduct “was pushed past the limit.” It acknowledged the mitigating fact Belger emphasized—her lack of any criminal history—and weighed it against the nature and circumstances of the offense before concluding it could not “justify deferring judgment at this time.” The court stated those reasons on the record, affording a basis for review. The fact that the court weighed the seriousness of Belger's conduct more heavily than her acceptance of responsibility is precisely the balancing the discretionary standard commits to the sentencing judge. See State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983).

Belger's contention that the court gave no reason for denying a deferred judgment on the child-endangerment count fares no better. Both counts arose from the single incident of August 24, 2024, and both concerned Belger's conduct toward H.B. The court's explanation of why that conduct warranted a judgment of conviction applied to the incident as a whole; it was not required to parse its reasoning count by count where the counts sprang from the same facts. See State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 458 (Iowa 2024). On this record, the decision to deny a deferred judgment was neither unreasonable nor based on untenable grounds.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion by Sandy, J.