B.D. and V.D., Intervenors-Appellants. v. << (2026)

The intervenor appellants in this appeal are maternal grandparents who serve as the current placement for the two children involved in dismissed termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. The grandparents challenge the juvenile court's decision to apply the permissive exceptions to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a) and (c) (2026). However, because the grandparents lack standing to bring their appeal, we must affirm the juvenile court and dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Two children, S.B. and M.B., have been removed from their parents’ care for two years after an incident of domestic violence occurred in their home. Custody was transferred to the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services, which placed the children with their maternal grandparents in March 2024. After the parents made little progress towards reunification, the State petitioned to terminate both the mother's and the father's parental rights.

Although the juvenile court found the statutory grounds for termination were met under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (f ), and (h), the court ultimately decided not to terminate the parents’ rights pursuant to the permissive exceptions under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a) and (c). The grandparents disagree with the court's application of the permissive exceptions and request this court terminate both parents’ rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). On de novo review, we give weight to the juvenile court's factual findings but are not bound by them. Id.

DISCUSSION

While the State waived briefing in this case and neither of the parents responded to the petition on appeal, we first address whether appellants have standing to appeal the dismissal of the termination petition. See Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 473 n.1 (Iowa 2004) (noting that the court may raise the issue of standing sua sponte). Standing is a “self-imposed rule of judicial restraint,” which requires parties “have a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of their controversy.” Kline v. SouthGate Prop. Mgmt, LLC, 895 N.W.2d 429, 437 (Iowa 2017) (cleaned up). For juvenile cases, Iowa Code section 232.133(1) states that “[a]n interested party aggrieved by an order or decree of the juvenile court may appeal from the court for review of questions of law or fact.”

The children are in the legal custody of the department. We cannot find any authority suggesting the appellants—the children's current placement and maternal grandparents—have standing to challenge the dismissed termination petition. In fact, our caselaw indicates the opposite. See In re A.B., No. 02-1966, 2003 WL 291388, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003) (finding a maternal grandmother who had been permitted to intervene at the termination hearing as a proposed placement did not have standing to appeal the court's termination order); In re T.N., No. 02-1633, 2002 WL 31641552, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2002) (“The State points out that no parent of T.N. or C.B. has appealed the termination of such parent's parental rights and asserts that C.N., as a maternal grandmother, has no standing to appeal the termination of a parent's parental rights․ We agree with the State that C.N. has no standing to appeal that part of the juvenile court's order terminating H.B.’s parental rights.”); see also In re V.F., 490 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (“Iowa does not recognize a protected interest in children by preadoptive or foster parents.”). While we do not doubt the grandparents’ care for the children, they lack the necessary legal interest to appeal the termination ruling. Without standing to bring the action, we have no choice but to affirm the juvenile court and dismiss the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Opinion by Sandy, J.