In the Interest of A.B., Minor Child, L.W., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A.B. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. The juvenile court confirmed the infant's removal from her mother's care in April 2025. Thirteen months later, the court terminated the mother's parental rights. The mother appeals, primarily asking for more time to resume custody of A.B.¹ But the mother also contests the grounds for termination, argues that preserving her parental rights would be in A.B.’s best interests, and contends that the closeness of the parent-child bond should preclude termination.

In its termination order, the juvenile court aptly summarized the case:

Although [the mother] expressed love for her child and requested additional time, her recent steps toward engagement occurred only after the filing of the termination petition and after nearly a year of minimal compliance. The Court gives greater weight to [her] historical pattern of non-engagement, instability, and unresolved safety concerns than to last-minute efforts that have not yet resulted in demonstrable change.

After our independent review of the record,  ² we reach the same conclusion as the juvenile court. Given the mother's long-standing difficulties with substance use, mental health, and domestic violence, we find clear and convincing evidence that she cannot safely parent A.B.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

A.B. has been out of parental custody since she was three days old. Her urine and cord tissue tested positive for methamphetamine at the Wayne County Hospital. After giving birth, A.B.’s mother was transported by helicopter to an intensive care unit in Des Moines. Because the mother was unable to consent to a safety plan with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services, the infant was placed with her maternal grandfather and then with her mother's cousin.³ The juvenile court adjudicated A.B. as a child in need of assistance (CINA) in May 2025.

During the CINA case, the mother did little to address her sobriety. Although she completed a substance-use evaluation while incarcerated on charges of criminal mischief in May 2025, she did not follow through with recommended treatment. The department repeatedly asked for an updated evaluation, but the mother did not comply with that request until March 2026, just days before the termination hearing, and nearly one year after removal. That evaluation recommended extended outpatient treatment, which the mother had not started at the time of the hearing. The department also asked the mother to participate in drug testing on six occasions, but she did not submit to any drug screens.

The mother's mental health and her violent relationship with a paramour also cast shadows over the case. The mother secured a mental-health evaluation in May 2025 but did not participate in the recommended treatment. As for domestic abuse, the mother has been both the victim and the aggressor in multiple incidents with her paramour. At the time of the hearing, she had a pending domestic abuse charge and a no-contact order still in effect.

In January 2026, the State petitioned to terminate the mother's parental rights, citing Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (b), (e), (h), and (l) (2026). The department recommended termination, noting that services had been offered to the mother to address her substance use, mental health, domestic violence, and parenting abilities. But she did not consistently engage in those services. The child's guardian ad litem (GAL), Audra Saunders, agreed with the department's recommendation for termination in a thorough and thoughtful report filed with the court.

At a hearing in March 2026, the juvenile court heard from the department's social work case manager and the mother. When asked if “going forward” she could be a good placement for A.B., the mother answered: “I know it's possible.” She added that she was committed to making a change in her life. The mother also acknowledged that she would benefit from a course in parenting skills.

Skeptical of the mother's eleventh-hour efforts to comply with services, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights. She appeals.

II. Analysis

Our analysis focuses on three questions (1) did the State prove a statutory ground for termination from Iowa Code section 232.116(1)? (2) was termination in the child's best interest under the framework in section 232.116(2)? and (3) did the parent prove a permissive exception under section 232.116(3)? L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 532. If the issue is preserved, we also consider a parent's request to delay permanency for six months to facilitate reunification.

A. Statutory Ground

The juvenile court found that the State proved the grounds for termination under paragraphs (b), (e), (h), and (l). When the court orders termination under more than one statutory provision, we need only find clear and convincing evidence to support one ground to affirm. In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).

We focus today on paragraph (h). Under that paragraph, a juvenile court may terminate parental rights if:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a [CINA] pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h).⁴ “[A]t the present time” means the date of the termination hearing. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017).

The mother only contests the fourth element. She points to her testimony that “she had stable and safe housing and would be able to immediately have A.B. placed in her physical care at this residence.”

The record does not support the mother's assertion. When asked whether the mother had maintained stable housing during the CINA case, the department's case manager responded: “I know she's always had a place to live, but ․ the most recent one that she had reported to me, when she was—said she's living with [her mother's ex-boyfriend] and that that wasn't an appropriate place, though, for [A.B.] to be.” The mother also acknowledged she does not have a lease, pay rent, or have a defined right to remain in that individual's home.

And beyond her precarious living arrangement, the mother had not adequately addressed the department's concerns about her substance use, mental health, domestic violence, or parenting skills. Termination is proper under paragraph (h).

B. Best Interests

The mother also contends that terminating her parental rights is not in A.B.’s best interests. We disagree. In assessing a child's best interests, we give primary consideration to her safety, the best placement for furthering her long-term nurturing and growth, and to her physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). As part of that assessment, we consider the bond between the mother and child. L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 535. We also consider A.B.’s integration into her relative foster home. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b).

As directed by statute, the juvenile court prioritized A.B.’s safety and what placement could best support her needs. The court stressed that A.B. “has spent virtually her entire life in out-of-home placement due to unresolved concerns involving substance abuse, domestic violence, instability, and lack of engagement” by her mother. So concerns about breaking the parent-child bond are minimal. The court also found that A.B. is “thriving in her current kinship foster placement, where her medical, developmental, and emotional needs are being met, she has formed secure attachments, and her caregivers are willing and able to provide permanency through adoption.” For the same reasons articulated by the juvenile court, we conclude that termination of parental rights is “necessary to promote [A.B.’s] long-term nurturing and growth.”

C. Permissive Exception

Having decided termination is in A.B.’s best interests, we turn to section 232.116(3). The mother argues we should apply an exception because of her bond with her daughter. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018) (“[O]nce the State has proven a ground for termination, the parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an exception to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a).”).

But the record does not show that A.B.’s relationship with her mother is so close that “termination would be detrimental to the child.” See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). The mother testified that she loves A.B. and “can make her smile” when they're together. We don't doubt the mother's sincere affection for her child. But the mother has participated in only one supervised visit with A.B. since August 2025. As the department noted, the mother's limited interactions with A.B. have “hurt the process of forming a meaningful bond.” By contrast, A.B. has developed a strong bond with her relative placement. As the GAL reported, A.B. is “very happy and loved in her foster home.” Under these circumstances, we decline to apply this exception to termination.

D. Delayed Permanency

As the final issue, we consider whether the juvenile court should have granted the mother's request for another six months to move toward reunification with her daughter. To continue placement under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b), the court must be able to find “the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the extension.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). That finding is not possible here.

The mother's actions do not instill confidence that she could safely resume custody of A.B. after a few months of participation in substance-use treatment and mental-health counseling. Her overall lack of engagement in services for over a year while the CINA case was pending signals that the need for removal would not be resolved after six months.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.B.’s biological father was undetermined at the time of termination hearing, and neither the named putative father nor any unnamed putative fathers have appealed.

2.   We review termination proceedings de novo. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). We assess the facts and law and adjudicate a parent's rights anew. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). While the juvenile court's findings of fact do not bind us, we give them weight, especially in deciding witness credibility. Id.

3.   The department sent a relative letter to the family who adopted A.B.’s half-sister, but they were unable to be a placement for A.B. The mother's rights to that child were terminated about seven years earlier based on similar substance-use concerns.

4.   Our caselaw offers two formulations for what it means when a child “cannot be returned” to parental custody as provided in section 232.102, which discusses transferring the child's custody if staying in the home would be “contrary to the welfare of the child.” In In re M.M., the supreme court held that a child cannot be returned if it would expose him or her to “any harm amounting to a new child in need of assistance adjudication.” 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992). Alternately, it means the inability to “safely return” children to their parents’ care. See, e.g., In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (collecting cases). Under either formulation, the State met its burden of proof here.

Opinion by Tabor, C.J.