J.N., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, J.W., born in 2025.¹ She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grounds for termination, claims the State failed to make reasonable efforts regarding her visitation, and argues the district court should have afforded her additional time to work toward reunification. Upon our review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

This family was involved with the Department of Health and Human Services prior to J.W.’s birth. The mother gave birth to two older children ( J.W.’s half-sibling and full sibling) in 2022 and 2024, and those children tested positive for drugs at birth.  ² The parents continued to use illegal substances in the family home, including methamphetamine, cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana. In September 2024, those two children tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine, resulting in a founded child abuse assessment. The children were removed from the mother's custody and adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA).

J.W. was born in January 2025. The mother was residing at House of Mercy after J.W.’s birth, and J.W. was allowed to remain with the mother. In April, the mother was discharged from House of Mercy after obtaining maximum benefits. However, by May, the mother was arrested for operating while intoxicated, third offense. The mother also allowed the father around J.W., despite knowing he was using drugs and not engaged in services.³ The mother did not contest J.W.’s removal from her custody. J.W. was adjudicated CINA following an uncontested hearing and placed in a foster home with her two older siblings.

A dispositional hearing took place in August. At the time of the hearing, the mother was in jail following her arrest on criminal matters. The father testified there was no need for further court involvement. The court disagreed, noting concerns about the father's total lack of engagement in services and failure to show himself as a safe caregiver, the parents’ secrecy with their relationship, and the mother's prioritization of her relationship with the father over her children's needs.

In October, the district court entered an order terminating the mother's parental rights to J.W.’s older siblings.⁴

A permanency hearing for J.W. took place in December. The mother was still in jail awaiting sentencing on her criminal matters. Meanwhile, J.W. was doing well in foster care, where she resided with two of her siblings. The court directed the State to initiate termination proceedings, noting in part:

[The mother] agrees she cannot take custody of [ J.W.] at this time and that she has not been able to engage in services other than visitation. It's obvious she loves [ J.W.], but the situations that resulted in the termination of her rights to other children still exist. She is further away from reunification now than after [ J.W.]’s removal. [ J.W.] is very young and establishing permanency for her is important.

The mother was released from jail in early January 2026, and she was ordered to complete residential treatment as a condition of her release. The mother later admitted to drinking twice and using cocaine once in the two weeks between her release from jail and the beginning of her inpatient stay at House of Mercy.

The termination hearing took place over two days in February and March 2026. On the second day of the hearing, the mother maintained that she was limiting contact with the father and not “focus[ing] on a relationship right now.” Although the court “view[ed] those claims with skepticism” given the parents’ relationship history, the court found it even more concerning that the mother had tested positive for cocaine again in February. The mother acknowledged she “started using again after [ J.W.] was removed from [her],” but she maintained she had not used since her relapse in January. The mother claimed the positive test in February must have been a result of her use in January. However, a caseworker testified, “Based on her singular stated relapse in January, there would be no reason that she would still test positive for cocaine in February.” The caseworker also noted “concern” that the mother “delayed getting her sweat patch on for March” and took the patch off before she was instructed to do so. The department had not received the results of the March test.

Following the hearing, the court denied the mother's request for additional time and terminated her parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2026). The mother appeals.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

We employ the familiar statutory-framework analysis on our de novo review of this case. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). But if the mother has not challenged a step in our analysis, then “we need not address it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

I. Grounds for Termination

The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(h), but she does not challenge the termination under section 232.116(1)(g).⁵ We therefore affirm the termination under that section. See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (noting when the court “terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm”).

II. Reasonable Efforts

The mother next claims the court “erred in excusing the State's failure to make reasonable efforts by permitting [the department] to restrict visitation on an improper basis.” Specifically, the mother argues the department “refus[ed] to expand visitation after the permanency goal was changed from reunification to termination.”

Iowa Code section 232.102(6) requires the department to “make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child's home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child.” As the mother and the district court point out, the department's reasonable-efforts obligation continues after permanency. See In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 530 (Iowa 2019). “[B]ut the nature of that obligation depends on the best interests of the child[ ].” Id.

“The visitation arrangement is a key ingredient in reintegrating children into the family, which must be balanced with protecting them from the harm responsible for their removal in the first place.” In re L.M., No. 19-0165, 2019 WL 1486618, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2019). “But visitation is not viewed in a vacuum—‘[i]t is only one element in what is often a comprehensive, interdependent approach to reunification.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)).

Here, the mother requested that her visits with the child take place in the afternoon rather than the morning so she would not miss the health and wellness programming at House of Mercy. The department considered the mother's request and denied it for several reasons. First, the caseworker explained that keeping the visitation schedule the same allowed the family's longtime family-centered services (FCS) provider to continue supervising the visits, which the caseworker opined was in J.W.’s best interests because J.W. “knows [the FCS provider] very well.” Next, the caseworker noted that J.W. takes naps every afternoon, so “it works best for [ J.W.] napwise ․ to do them the way they're being done now.” Further, the department did not believe that “advancing visits at this time” would be “appropriate” because the mother had “again relapsed on cocaine,” which was “especially” concerning “with her being in an inpatient facility.” Finally, the mother acknowledged that House of Mercy had given her permission to miss the programming.

On this issue, the court found:

[T]his court believes that [the department] had good reasons for moving slow on [ J.W.]’s visits and for not adjusting the visitation schedule. The testimony at the hearing showed that [the mother]’s treatment was not being substantially impacted by the visit schedule and that it was merely a matter of convenience for her. And this court believes, based on the numerous services offered to [the mother], that it makes sense to proceed with caution.

We concur with the court's reasoning. Although “reasonable efforts can, and often do, include efforts toward reunifying a family, ․ the child's health and safety are paramount and conditions precedent to these efforts.” L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 529. We affirm on this issue.

III. Additional Time for Reunification

The mother claims the court “erred in denying an additional six months for reunification despite evidence that reunification was reasonably likely.” In order to grant a six-month extension, the court must be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” providing a basis to determine the child will be able to return to the parent at the end of the additional six months. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b); see also id. § 232.117(5) (permitting the juvenile court to enter an order under section 232.104 in the event it does not terminate parental rights).

The caseworker opined that based on “the years of services that the mother has engaged in and where we sit today,” including “her current participation in services and her positive drugs screens and her not being fully honest,” it was not reasonably likely J.W. could be returned to her in six months. The district court found that a six-month extension would not change the outcome, stating in part:

When this case started, [ J.W.] was removed from her mother shortly after [the mother] left House of Mercy. Afterward, she relapsed and was involved in criminal activity that left her in custody for several months. After being released from jail and having her parental rights to other children terminated during her time in jail, and knowing the State had filed a termination petition regarding [ J.W.], [the mother] again relapsed on multiple substances and over multiple times in just a matter of weeks. She is now again in the House of Mercy, having been court-ordered by another court in her criminal proceedings. Now on the eve of termination, [the mother is] in a similar position to [the one] that she was in prior to [ J.W.]’s initial removal. This court cannot find that any true progress has been made by either parent towards reunification within a reasonable time period. We are essentially back where we started.

Under this record, we concur with the court's determination that an extension of time was not warranted. See In re K.G., No. 18-1187, 2019 WL 719047, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019) (concluding the evidence did not support a finding the parent was reasonably likely to be able to care for the child within six months).

We affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The father's parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.

2.   The mother's parental rights to an older child were terminated in 2020.

3.   In the older children's CINA case, the father's visits had been suspended due to his “severe” substance-use issues.

4.   The court's termination order was affirmed by a panel of this court. In re J.J., No. 25-1937, 2026 WL 1020922, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2026).

5.   Even if the mother did not waive her argument as to section 232.116(1)(g), we conclude on our careful review of the appellate record that the State provided clear and convincing evidence as to the challenged element of section 232.116(1)(h)—that J.W. could not be returned to her mother's custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4).

Opinion by Schumacher, J.