IN RE: the Marriage of Brittany Louise Clark and Jason Gabriel Clark Upon the Petition of Brittany Louise Clark (2026)

Jason Clark challenges the custody and property provisions in the decree dissolving his marriage to Brittany Clark. He argues joint physical care would be in the best interests of their three children. And he contends that the division of their property was inequitable. In her responsive brief, Brittany asks for Jason to pay her appellate attorney fees.

Because placing physical care with Brittany served the children's best interests, we affirm that grant. We also find that the district court fairly divided the Clarks’ marital property. Lastly, we order Jason to pay Brittany's appellate attorney fees. We remand for the district court to determine a reasonable amount based on counsel's fee affidavit.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Jason and Brittany married in 2013. They have three children: thirteen-year-old twin sons (Q.C. and C.C.) and an eleven-year-old daughter (P.C.). After the twins were born, Brittany was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS). About ten years ago, she was prescribed methylphenidate, the generic name for Ritalin, to help with the fatigue.

Brittany is a long-time employee of a private school in Fort Dodge. She started working part-time in the after-school program. And after completing her bachelor's degree in 2019, she took a full-time position as a teacher. Her annual salary now is $58,889. The children attend the same school. Jason worked a few different jobs during the marriage. For the past seven years, he has worked as a laborer for a Fort Dodge construction company. He earned about $57,237 in 2025. Adding on his typical bonus of $3,800, Jason's annual income is just over $61,000.

As far as the Clarks’ home life, Brittany testified that she provided most of the children's care, including preparing meals, getting them bathed and dressed, signing them up for school and sports, arranging medical visits, and providing transportation. It helped that Brittany and the children went to the same place for work and school and that her parents could provide occasional assistance. Brittany testified that Jason was not involved with the children's routine care and stepped in for her on very few occasions.

The Clarks’ children have experienced some developmental challenges. When they were in first grade, the boys were diagnosed with ADHD and prescribed methylphenidate, the same drug that Brittany takes for her MS symptoms. Brittany testified that without the medication, Q.C. and C.C. “really struggle to focus” and experience “behaviors like blurting and not being able to calm their bodies.” She also described scheduling frequent doctor visits for the twins. Jason rarely attended those appointments. The twins also receive special assistance for their disabilities at school. Brittany testified that the boys, especially C.C., thrive on routine and become upset when their schedules change. And while P.C. does not have an identified disability, she struggles with reading and receives remedial help at school.

On the positive side, the children participate in sports. The boys are on baseball and wrestling teams. And P.C. is trying volleyball. Jason supports these activities, taking the boys to practice and attending games when his work schedule allows.

In the summer of 2024, Jason left the family home in Moorland. He moved to Dakota City, where he still lives with his new partner and her children. According to Brittany, within a month of moving, Jason took their children for a weekend visit in his girlfriend's home. Brittany recalled that the children were very emotional and upset at the abrupt transition.

In August 2024, Brittany petitioned for divorce. She and Jason agreed that joint legal custody would be best for the children. Jason also sought joint physical care, while Brittany asked that physical care be placed with her. The district court heard from both parties at the dissolution trial in July 2025. The court found that Brittany “credibly described Jason's anger issues with her and the children, his drinking and getting an [operating-while-intoxicated conviction], and loud yelling and swearing when he was upset during the marriage.” In response, Jason testified that Brittany also yelled when they had disputes and that, since leaving the marital home, he drinks only “socially.”

The trial record also revealed Jason's disturbing history of medication diversion. For at least two, and as many as five years, Jason clandestinely dipped into the household supply of methylphenidate prescribed to Brittany and their sons. Brittany suspected missing medications “[b]ecause it was too early to renew and I would notice that we weren't going to have enough to get to the fill date.” When she confronted Jason about the missing pills, he gaslit her, saying: “I don't know. Who do you think's taking it or where do you think it's going?” Brittany recalled how the situation made her feel: “Crazy. Like I was constantly calling the pharmacy, calling the doctor. I'd start writing out who I gave what, how many pills, how many were left in the bottle, write it down on the calendar. And still it wouldn't come out right.” She also stopped taking her prescription so that the boys would have enough.

The situation resolved when Jason moved out, and he later admitted taking the pills. When asked at trial why he stole the medications for years, Jason replied: “I don't know.” But he also testified that he believed that he needed to take his wife and sons’ methylphenidate because he was unhappy in his marriage.

In the decree, the district court granted physical care to Brittany with liberal visitation for Jason. On the property side, the court valued the marital home at $92,000 and awarded it to Brittany, subject to a mortgage debt of $49,813. The court also awarded Brittany her 401(k) retirement account valued at $43,745. And the court held Brittany responsible for her student loan debt incurred during the marriage. Jason appeals.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Because dissolutions are equitable proceedings, our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). We give weight to the factual findings of the district court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Id. For custody questions, our “first and governing consideration” is the best interests of the children. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n).

III. Analysis

A. Physical Care of the Children

Jason disputes the district court's determination that it was in the children's best interests to be in Brittany's physical care. He argues that by relying on Brittany's historical caregiving, the court gave “disproportionate weight to past circumstances rather than present capacities.” In his view, the children's current developmental stages favor joint physical care.

The record does not support Jason's argument. In rejecting Jason's request for joint physical care, the district court performed a thorough evaluation of the factors in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2024). See In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974) (holding that those statutory factors for custody are relevant to the physical-care determination). The court also found that Brittany testified more credibly than Jason on “a number of issues, including Brittany's role as primary caretaker of the children during the marriage, the children's needs for stability, Jason taking medications from her and the children during the marriage, in addition to Jason's anger issues and use of alcohol to excess.” We defer to those credibility findings here. In re Marriage of Meester, 32 N.W.3d 22, 27 (Iowa Ct. App. 2026).

Like the district court, we find that both parents “love and care a great deal for their children.” That said, like the district court, we find Brittany is the more suitable parent for providing their day-to-day care. When deciding whether joint physical care is in the children's best interests, we start with these four factors: (1) approximation, meaning the historical caregiving arrangement in the family; (2) the parents’ abilities to communicate and show mutual respect; (3) the degree of conflict between the parents; and (4) how much the parents agree in their approach to daily matters. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa 2007).

In this case, the approximation principle overshadows the other factors. Brittany's successful caregiving—with minimal assistance from Jason—is a strong predictor that she will continue to provide that quality of nurturing when she has primary physical care. Id. at 696–97. The record also shows continuing difficulty in the parents’ ability to communicate and show mutual respect—weighing against joint physical care. As Brittany argues on appeal, it would be difficult for her to trust Jason in a shared-care arrangement given the extended fraud he perpetrated on the family by stealing medications. The district court's grant of physical care to Brittany is in the best interests of the children.

B. Property Division

Jason next contends that the district court's property division was inequitable because the district court awarded Brittany the equity in their marital home and excused her from “refinancing the home, which leaves Jason contractually obligated to pay the existing $49,000 in debt.” Jason also complains that the court awarded Brittany “the entire balance of her retirement account valued at $40,000.”

Marital property is to be divided equitably considering the factors in Iowa Code section 598.21(5). An equitable distribution is not necessarily equal. In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 2021). In considering the relevant factors under section 598.21(5), the district court noted that the statute provides no precise formula for such division. See In re Marriage of Conley, 284 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Iowa 1979) (finding equality of property division need not be achieved with “mathematical exactness” (quoting In re Marriage of Andersen, 243 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 1976)).

After reviewing the Clarks’ financial circumstances as a whole, we find that the property division was equitable. Turning first to the house. In 2018, the Clarks bought the house where Brittany grew up from Brittany's parents for $70,000. Brittany testified that her parents gave her “a $10,000 gift of equity.” Brittany and Jason took out a $56,000 mortgage.

At trial, the parties agreed that the court should award the home to Brittany but differed on their valuation of the property. Brittany asserted that the real estate should be valued at its purchase price, less a $10,000 credit for the gift to her from her parents. Jason urged the court to use the house's assessed value of $92,480. And he opposed giving Brittany a credit of $10,000. In the decree, the court valued the house at $92,000 and declined to make the $10,000 offset requested by Brittany, citing “the absence of any record to support her claim in this regard as well as the fact that the parties equally shared the home and costs associated therewith since its purchase.”

After awarding the house to Brittany, the court ordered her to “assume all mortgages and obligations concerning the real estate and shall hold harmless and indemnify Jason concerning the same.” So contrary to his concern, Jason has no “contractual[ ] obligat[ion]” regarding the remaining debt. The court's treatment of this marital asset was fair to both parties.

Turning next to the retirement account. The decree provided that “Brittany shall receive her 401(k) free and clear of any claim Jason may have thereto.” Brittany testified that her account, a benefit of her employment, had a current value of $43,745. She asked the court to award her the entire value.

By contrast, Jason testified he did not have a retirement account of his own. He acknowledged having retirement accounts from two prior employers, one of which predated the marriage, but stated he cashed them out “to help pay bills.” Responding in her testimony, Brittany agreed that Jason cashed out his retirement accounts but she did not know what bills he paid with those savings. On appeal, Jason asks for one-half of Brittany's retirement account.

But “we decline to disturb a property settlement that we believe to be fair taken as a whole.” In re Marriage of Waters, No. 08-1807, 2009 WL 4069373, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2009). And the piece of the pie ignored by Jason is Brittany's $80,303 student loan debt incurred during the marriage. At trial, Brittany argued that Jason should pay a portion of that debt, alleging it was just as much his debt as hers “because he was there when I had to take out loans to live.” Brittany is correct that, “[a]s a general proposition, student loan debt incurred during the marriage is a marital liability.” In re Marriage of Deol, No. 09-0909, 2010 WL 2925147, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 28, 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 12 So.3d 288, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).

In the decree, the court held Brittany solely responsible for repaying her student loans. Considering that assignment of the marital liability, as Brittany contends on appeal, “it was equitable to award Brittany the marital home's equity and her retirement account to offset the student loan debt.” Finding the overall distribution of marital assets and debts to be equitable, we affirm the property provisions of the decree.

C. Appellate Attorney Fees

After defending the decree from Jason's appeal, Brittany asks us to award her appellate attorney fees. We have discretion to do so. See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013). When deciding “whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). Considering these factors, especially the marginal merits of Jason's appeal, we find Brittany is entitled to attorney fees.

But because Brittany's counsel did not file a fee affidavit with the appellate courts, we cannot determine the extent of the award here. So we remand for the district court to determine a reasonable award of appellate attorney fees based on counsel's affidavit. See In re Marriage of Samuels, 15 N.W.3d 801, 809 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Opinion by Tabor, C.J.