State of Iowa, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. v. << (2026)

Our “legislature has established a limited time frame for parents to demonstrate their ability to be parents.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). “Once the limitation period lapses, termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency.” Id. (citation omitted). Here we face another sad case in which a mother struggling with addiction waited too long to begin the difficult work of parenting. Reviewing the record de novo, see In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021), we affirm the termination of her parental rights.

The child at issue—born in November 2024—was removed from the mother's custody in April 2025 after her arrest for possession of methamphetamine and failure to follow a safety plan. Over the next ten months, the mother failed to participate in services to address her substance use. She skipped numerous court-ordered drug tests. She refused to attend inpatient treatment. And she was discharged from two outpatient programs for excessive absences. By the termination hearing in February 2026, the mother was still using methamphetamine. The juvenile court terminated her parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2026).

Days after the termination order, the mother filed a motion urging the court to reconsider whether the strength of her bond with the child justified an exception to termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). She also asked the court to reopen the record so that she could present evidence of her efforts toward sobriety since the termination hearing. At a second evidentiary hearing in June, the mother testified that she had been participating in an intensive outpatient drug treatment program and had abstained from methamphetamine for fifty days. She had also enrolled in college classes, gotten a job, and moved in with her father—a ten-years-sober recovering addict who described his “tough love” approach to accountability. Despite these new facts, the juvenile court found that “deadlines are deadlines” and declined to disturb its termination decision.

The mother now appeals, arguing the State failed to prove that termination was authorized by statute and that termination was in the best interests of the child.¹ Yet, even when we account for the mother's new evidence, we cannot agree. In the months after the termination hearing, she made two attempts at residential drug treatment, but she did not complete either program. And while she had shown some early success in an outpatient setting, she had only been enrolled for two weeks. With her long-term sobriety untested, the mother remained unprepared for reunification. See In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (finding that where “concerns remained for the father's substance use, the child could not have been returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing”), abrogated on other grounds by In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025); In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (finding that a “short period of sobriety preceding the termination hearing” did not show the mother could resume custody of her child).

Make no mistake: we applaud the mother's recent efforts to address her drug problem. But when a young child's removal has stretched past six months and reunification remains out of reach, our law permits the State to proceed with termination of parental rights. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). Considering the short- and long-term needs of this child, see id. § 232.116(2), we agree that outcome is in his best interests. He has been placed with his maternal grandmother since the time of his removal, and he is thriving in her care.

The mother also contends the juvenile court should have given her six more months to work toward reunification based on evidence that she had “completely turned her life around.” It is true that the court may avoid termination where a parent shows the need for removal “will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 323 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)); see also Iowa Code § 232.117(5). But we agree with the court that the mother's still-fragile sobriety was not enough to carry that burden. While we are hopeful her recovery is long-lasting, hope alone is not a reason to delay this child's permanency. See R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d at 626.

Based on our review of the entire record, we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights. And because of that disposition, we find the State's cross-appeal challenging the juvenile court's authority to reopen the record is moot. See In re D.H., 902 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“Ordinarily, an appeal is moot if the issue becomes nonexistent or academic and, consequently, no longer involves a justiciable controversy.” (cleaned up)). We therefore dismiss the cross-appeal.

AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We address the issues in a different order than the mother presents them in her petition on appeal, following the familiar framework for review of termination proceedings. See W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 322 (reciting the three-step termination analysis).

Opinion by Badding, J.