IN RE: the Marriage of Caroline Fitzgerald Monson and Robert Dean Monson (2026)

After many months of contentious litigation, Caroline Monson appeals the decree dissolving her marriage with Robert Monson for a third time. Among other claims, she challenges the district court's decision to place the parties’ two minor children in Robert's sole legal custody and physical care. And she attempts to challenge the decree's financial provisions.

On our de novo review, we affirm. Giving appropriate deference to the district court's factual findings—especially considering the parties’ high degree of conflict and difficulty in communicating—we agree that it is in the children's best interests to be placed in Robert's sole legal custody and physical care. We find nothing inequitable in the decree's financial provisions. And after considering Caroline's other claims of error that we can discern from her briefing, we find none properly before us in this appeal that have merit or warrant further discussion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Caroline and Robert most recently married in May 2014. They were married to each other and divorced twice before, with their second marriage ending in 2007. They have three adult biological children—two sons and one daughter—from their prior marriages. During this marriage, they adopted two minor daughters—born in 2009 and 2017—through the foster care system.

As the district court aptly observed, it “is clear that this marriage [was] plagued by discord and animosity for several years.” The parties’ relationship appears to have reached a breaking point again in the spring of 2024. That April, Caroline petitioned for a temporary protective order against Robert after she alleged that he shoved her during an argument while the family was on vacation in the Dominican Republic.¹ The court entered a protective order by consent agreement of the parties the next month.  ² That order gave Caroline exclusive possession of the family home and custody of the parties’ youngest daughter, with limited visitation for Robert.³

While the protective-order case was pending, the parties’ two adult sons filed to have Caroline involuntarily committed for what they alleged to be a serious mental impairment. Although she was involuntarily hospitalized for one day—and the protective-order hearing was postponed because of the hospitalization—the involuntary-commitment case was ultimately dismissed.

Caroline also petitioned to dissolve the marriage around this time. The parties’ three adult children provided sworn affidavits in support of Robert's request for physical care of the two minor daughters for a May 2024 hearing on temporary matters. The court's temporary-matters order awarded the parties joint legal custody of the two minor daughters and placed them in Robert's physical care, with visitation for Caroline. That order also awarded Robert temporary possession of the family home and suspended Caroline's child-support obligation.

At the time of the March 2025 dissolution trial, Caroline was about to start a new job as a leasing specialist for a property company, where she would earn a salary of $20,000 per year with “unlimited opportunities for commission.” She believed that her earning capacity was $25,000 per year.⁴ Robert was employed as a firefighter captain. The parties filed a joint pretrial stipulation stating that he earned $108,167 per year. Both parties sought sole legal custody and physical care of their two minor daughters.

The district court entered its thorough decree dissolving the parties’ marriage in May 2025. After carefully considering the evidence—including the sharply conflicting testimony of the parties and their adult children—the court awarded sole legal custody and physical care of the two minor daughters to Robert, with liberal visitation for Caroline.

As for the marital assets and debts, the district court awarded the marital home with all of the indebtedness against the home to Robert. It ordered that Robert's pension should be divided proportionately between the parties based on the formula set forth in In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1996). And it ordered that Caroline should be responsible for debts from a Veridian credit card, a GreenState judgment, and her own student loans, while Robert should be responsible for debts from a Lowe's credit card, a Nebraska Furniture Mart credit card, a Capital One credit card, a Preferred Credit loan, a Clear Lake Bank & Trust loan, and his own student loans including parent PLUS loans for the parties’ adult daughter.

The court also ordered Robert to pay transitional spousal support to Caroline in the amount of $1,500 per month for twelve months. And it ordered Caroline to pay child support to Robert in the amount of $464.87 per month for both minor children, then reduced to $327.12 per month when there is only one minor child to support.

After unsuccessfully asking the district court to amend or enlarge the decree under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904, Caroline now appeals.

II. Custody and Physical Care

Caroline first challenges the district court's placement of the parties’ two minor daughters in Robert's sole legal custody and physical care. We review custody and physical care decisions de novo. See In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). “De novo review means we review the entire record and decide anew the issues properly preserved for appellate review.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). But we do not “decide the case in a vacuum or approach it as though the trial court had never been involved.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, we give the district court's fact findings “weight and defer especially where the credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). This is “pragmatic because the district court has a front-row seat to the live testimony, viewing the demeanor of both the witness as she testifies and the parties while they listen, whereas our review is limited to reading black words on a white page of a sterile transcript.” Id. And this advantage “greatly help[s]” the district court “in making a wise decision about the parties” and their children. In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984) (cleaned up).

Our overriding consideration is the best interests of the children—not the “perceived fairness to the spouses.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695. The factors in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2024) and those identified by our supreme court in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974) guide us in discerning the children's best interests. And our goal “is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695.

Caroline's arguments on appeal focus on the district court's finding that she did not show there was a “history of domestic abuse” weighing against an award of sole legal custody and physical care to Robert. See Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(b) (“[I]f the court finds that a history of domestic abuse exists, a rebuttable presumption against the awarding of joint custody exists.”); id. § 598.41(2)(c) (“A finding by the court that a history of domestic abuse exists, as specified in subsection 3, paragraph ‘j’, which is not rebutted, shall outweigh consideration of any other factor specified in subsection 3 in the determination of the awarding of custody under this subsection.”); Hines-Miller v. Teter, 35 N.W.3d 321, 331 (Iowa 2026) (“Even though the rebuttable presumption in Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(b) does not apply to physical care determinations, ․ the factors listed in that statute—including whether there is a history of domestic abuse—are relevant in determining which physical care arrangement is best for the child.”); see also Iowa Code § 236.2(2) (defining “domestic abuse”).

Caroline and her adult children made many allegations of abuse by Robert in their trial and deposition testimony. Caroline now renews those allegations. But as the district court found, Caroline's “claims of persistent abuse at the hands of [Robert], often expressed in the presence of the [minor] children, have not been corroborated and appear to have only become an issue as the present case proceeded through the courts.”⁵ The court also discredited the testimony of the parties’ adult children on this issue because “all three adult children ․ admitted to playing fast and loose with the truth in their prior affidavits which favored [Robert] in the temporary matters hearing,” and in the court's view, their “testimony appear[ed] to be nothing more than an extension of [Caroline's] campaign to malign [Robert] in a manner that is uncorroborated by any current circumstance.”

On our de novo review of the record—and giving appropriate deference to the district court's credibility determinations—we agree with the district court that the evidence did not show there was a “history of domestic abuse” weighing against an award of sole legal custody and physical care to Robert. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(j); In re Marriage of Forbes, 570 N.W.2d 757, 759–60 (Iowa 1997) (explaining that in deciding whether there is a “history of domestic abuse” under section 598.41, it “is for the court to weigh the evidence of domestic abuse, its nature, severity, repetition, and to whom directed, not just to be a counter of numbers”).

We also agree with the district court that awarding Robert sole legal custody and physical care of the children serves the children's best interests. As the court observed, “it is clear that the level of toxicity that has been generated between the parties prevents them from operating as coparents of the children.” See In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 705, 715 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“The overriding factor weighing against joint legal custody is the parties’ utter inability to communicate with each other, which is a result of their toxic relationship.”); Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 698 (“[A] stormy marriage and divorce presents a significant risk factor that must be considered in determining whether joint physical care is in the best interest of the children.”). And both parties sought sole legal custody and physical care at trial. So the key question before the court, as the court acknowledged, was not whether one parent should serve as the children's sole legal custodian and physical caretaker “but who should serve in that capacity.”

After carefully considering and weighing all the evidence—including the parties’ sharply conflicting testimony—the court concluded that Robert “is the better candidate to provide for the children's physical needs, along with being their sole legal custodian.” In reaching this conclusion, the court found that “[w]hatever the patterns of parenting may have looked like when the children were younger, in more recent years [Caroline] has shown a troublesome tendency to needlessly escalate the tensions between the parties, which has affected the well-being of the children.” The court also found that “[w]hile both parties have been critical of the other over the years, the record supports the conclusion that [Robert] is in a position to provide a more stable environment in which to raise the children and to provide appropriate support for the children's ongoing relationship with [Caroline].”

The court considered all the appropriate factors in making an award of sole legal custody and physical care.⁶ See Iowa Code § 598.41(3); Winter, 223 N.W.2d at 166–67; Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 696–700. Again, we defer to that court's credibility determinations. And we conclude that its factual findings concerning the children's best interests are supported by the record. We thus affirm the district court's placement of the parties’ two minor daughters in Robert's sole legal custody and physical care.

III. Property Division and Support

Caroline also attempts to challenge the decree's financial provisions. We also review these provisions de novo. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 690.

Property Division. In a dissolution decree, the “court shall divide all property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party, equitably between the parties.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5). “The legislature's choice of the word ‘all’ creates an expansive marital pot.” In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 2021). This pot subject to division also includes the marital debts. See In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 251 (Iowa 2006) (“Debts of the parties normally become debts of the marriage, for which either party may be required to assume the responsibility to pay.”). And so, the court must decide on an equitable division of the marital assets and debts “in light of the particular circumstances of the parties” and considering the factors in Iowa Code section 598.21(5). Id. at 247 (cleaned up). While equity “does not require an equal division,” our supreme court has “repeatedly insisted upon the equal or nearly equal division” because “[e]quality is ․ often most equitable.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 682 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned up).

The district court's division of the parties’ marital assets and debts resulted in a net distribution of $34,109 to Caroline and $15,243 to Robert. The court explained that “[w]hile the net distribution to each party is not exactly equal, it is equitable taking into account all of the circumstances, especially [Caroline's] current inability to make an equalization payment that would otherwise balance the scales.” Further, the court reasoned that while Robert “is receiving less in net assets, he is receiving the major asset (the marital home) which should continue to appreciate in value. As a result, no equalization payment will be ordered.”

Caroline attempts to challenge the court's assignment of the Clear Lake loan, the Preferred Credit loan, and the parent PLUS loans for the parties’ adult daughter to Robert as marital debts in calculating the net property distribution. She also claims that the court's decision to give no weight to an exhibit purportedly showing that she owed over $155,000 in student loans “result[ed] in clear error and understatement of [Caroline's] verified debt” and that the court “failed to enforce” a provision of the parties’ prior dissolution decree which “established joint liability for student loans and ordered each [party] to pay one-half.” Caroline thus requests that we “[r]eallocate the Clear Lake loan and other post-separation consumer debts to [Robert]; credit [Caroline's] verified student-loan balances consistent with marital purpose and the prior decree; and adjust the division to reflect equitable contributions under § 598.21(5).”

Besides mentioning the property-division statute, Caroline cites no legal authority in support of these arguments, so she has arguably waived these challenges. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). But in any event, we cannot say that the district court's division of the marital assets and debts is inequitable to Caroline—indeed, it favors her. Nor does Caroline specify which additional assets should be assigned to her if we were to adjust the property division to “reflect equal contribution and debt allocation.” And we cannot engage in advocacy on Caroline's behalf in attempting to fashion the relief she seeks. See Ronnfeldt v. Shelby Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue Mem'l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Iowa 2023) (“We generally will not do a party's work for them, particularly if that requires us to assume a partisan role and undertake the party's research and advocacy.” (cleaned up)); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996). Thus, we do not disturb the district court's property division.

Spousal and Child Support. Caroline also attempts to challenge the district court's transitional-spousal-support award and her child-support obligation. But she has failed to adequately present her “contentions and the reasons for them with citations to the authorities relied on and references to the pertinent parts of the record” in her briefing. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3). So we find these issues waived. See id.

IV. A Final Concern

We now turn to a final concern. During our review of Caroline's appellate briefing, we discovered that she repeatedly cited an Iowa case that does not exist. And she cited other cases and statutes that do exist but do not stand for the propositions for which she cited them. It thus appears likely that she misused an artificial intelligence tool when preparing her briefs.

We recognize that Caroline is representing herself. “But we do not have a double standard for those represented by counsel and those who are unrepresented—we expect all to follow our procedures.” Locher & Davis, PLC v. Ruth F. Woller Revocable Tr., No. 23-0944, 2024 WL 4761531, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2024). And we have repeatedly “stress[ed] that self-represented litigants and attorneys alike have a duty to independently verify the authenticity and veracity of all sources and assertions when relying on artificial intelligence tools to prepare trial or appellate court filings.” Luke v. Iowa Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 29 N.W.3d 635, 636 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025); see also Nisland Asset Inv., LLC v. Gericke, No. 25-0659, 2026 WL 1162553, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2026); In re W.G., No. 25-1916, 2026 WL 892837, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2026); Goma v. Hundley, No. 25-0619, 2026 WL 892643, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2026); In re R.A., 24-1629, 2025 WL 2793560, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025). Submitting inaccurate appellate filings wastes party and judicial resources, hinders the filer's ability to successfully advocate, and ultimately slows down the process of resolving the appeal.

That said, we have considered all Caroline's other claims of error that we can discern from her briefing. And we find none properly before us in this appeal that have merit or warrant further discussion. We thus deny her pending motion to expedite this opinion as moot and affirm the district court's dissolution decree.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Robert disputed Caroline's account of this incident in his dissolution-trial testimony.

2.   With the agreement of both parties, the district court took judicial notice of the adjudicative facts from the protective-order case at the dissolution trial.

3.   The parties’ older minor daughter was not living in the family home at that time.

4.   Caroline described herself as “a stay-at-home mom” during this marriage, but her Social Security statement showed that she earned wages every year since 2014. She worked part-time as a flight attendant from November 2021 to 2024. Before that, she worked for an insurance company. She also obtained a bachelor's degree in psychology and held a real estate license during this marriage.

5.   After the entry of the protective order, and while this dissolution case was pending, Caroline reported many allegations of abuse by Robert to local law enforcement. A police detective investigated the allegations, and the Polk County Attorney's Office declined to file any criminal charges. The detective's investigation report was admitted as an exhibit at the dissolution trial.

6.   In her appellate brief, Caroline lists two of the “legal issues presented” as “[w]hether the court failed to make the specific findings required by Iowa Code § 598.41(5) regarding the children's best interests” and “[w]hether the district court erred in awarding physical care to [Robert] despite undisputed evidence that [Caroline] was the children's primary caregiver throughout the marriage, contrary to ․ the best-interests factors in Iowa Code § 598.41(3).” But she does not adequately advance any argument on these issues, so we decline to consider them further. See In re J.H., No. 25-2099, 2026 WL 519684, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026) (reiterating that “sprinkled mentions of an issue are insufficient to raise legal claims for our consideration” (cleaned up)).

Opinion by Langholz, J.