IN RE: the Marriage of James Lee Langerman and Stacie Lynn Langerman (2026)

James Langerman and Stacie Neusch married in 1993. They started a manure pumping business with Stacie's parents and eventually bought them out, leaving James as the sole shareholder of the business. Stacie was involved in the business's bookkeeping. She also worked in an administrative role for an accounting firm for many years.

The couple separated in 2024. Stacie and James stipulated to the division of their property before trial. That stipulation gave James the familial home and all of the business. In exchange, he had to pay Stacie a property equalization payment of $550,000. That left Stacie's request for traditional spousal support as the only unresolved issue for trial.

The district court denied Stacie's request for traditional spousal support, citing James's inability to pay, Stacie's ability to work, and the property equalization payment. Stacie appeals that determination.

We review dissolution of marriage cases de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). And we give weight to the district court's fact findings even though they are not binding on us. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 106. Likewise, we defer to the district court's credibility findings, although we are also not bound by those determinations. McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). We will only disturb the district court's findings if it failed to do equity. See Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 106. Because we base our decision on the unique facts of each case, precedent is of little value. See In re Marriage of Brown, 776 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Iowa 2009).

The district court may award a requesting party spousal support of limited or indefinite duration upon consideration of the following factors:

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.

c. The distribution of property made pursuant to section 598.21.

d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced.

e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.

f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.

g. The tax consequences to each party.

h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning financial or service contributions by one party with the expectation of future reciprocation or compensation by the other party.

i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.

j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual case.

Iowa Code § 598.21A(1) (2024).

Here, Stacie contends that the district court's refusal to award her indefinite, traditional spousal support was inequitable and requires this court's intervention. “An award of traditional spousal support is equitable in marriages of long duration to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the lifestyle to which he or she became accustomed.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2023). It is typically reserved for marriages lasting at least twenty years. Id. And the court looks primarily to the needs of the requesting party and the other party's ability to pay when determining whether traditional support is equitable. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 411 (Iowa 2015).

Stacie has a need for spousal support to maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed during the marriage. Stacie lost her employment after the couple separated and had to live in her friends’ basement. But even if we impute Stacie with the same income she made at the accounting firm, see id. (recognizing we will impute income to a non-working spouse), and account for the property equalization payment she will receive, she still cannot provide herself with a comparable lifestyle.¹ The issue is discerning whether James has the ability to pay spousal support.

James receives a modest salary from the business as his source of income. For example, in 2024 the business paid James $22,164.00. Complicating the matter is the fact that James and Stacie consistently used the business's accounts to directly pay significant portions of their personal living expenses, and James continued to spend business funds on personal expenses following the couple's split.² And Stacie argues that we should consider that fact when determining James's ability to pay given that he remains the sole shareholder of the business. Essentially, she contends that James could stop paying personal expenses out of the business accounts and instead add that money to his salary so he would be able to afford spousal support payments.

While we agree that the business accounts should not be used for personal expenses, we do not think it would be appropriate for these dissolution-of-marriage proceedings to mandate how the business allocates its funds within the business. That is particularly true considering the evidence presented that the business's operating equipment needs costly service and repairs. Reinvestment of the business's profits back into itself is likely needed to maintain the business's operations. Moreover, should the business increase James's salary rather than paying his personal expenses, he will still need those expenses to be paid. So we question whether his ability to pay an award of spousal support would actually be meaningfully impacted, particularly because he will be paying off a loan for the property equalization payment for many years to come.

In short, on the record before us we cannot say that James has the financial ability to pay Stacie traditional spousal support. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Stacie's request.

James seeks an award of appellate attorney fees. This court has discretion to award appellate attorney fees in dissolution proceedings. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013). When deciding “whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). After considering these factors, we decline to award James appellate attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While the couple has not lived an extravagant lifestyle, they have lived a relatively comfortable one. They lived on an acreage, Stacie drove a luxury vehicle, they sent their now-adult children to private schools, and they bought into a vacation time-share.

2.   For example, an exhibit shows that James paid his attorney in this action from the business's account rather than his personal account. When the parties were still together, they used business funds to pay for utilities, groceries, travel, entertainment, their mortgage, and car payments.

Opinion by Doyle, S.J.