H.G., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A mother ¹ appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, A.M., born in 2024. On appeal, the mother argues the juvenile court erred when it concluded that the child could not be safely returned to the mother at the time of the TPR hearing. Upon our review, we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in November 2024 after allegations that the mother struck the father with an extension cord in the presence of the child. HHS was further concerned that the parents had recently been investigated by authorities in the State of Illinois for the death of another child. The Illinois investigation resulted in both parents being placed in the Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System for “Death by Neglect” due to the deceased child having fractures on the third to ninth ribs. Because of this, the juvenile court ordered the child's removal from the home.

The original November 2024 incident which resulted in HHS involvement also led to the mother being charged with domestic abuse assault and child endangerment. But the concerns over domestic violence in the family did not end there. Over the next several months, the police were called to the family's home on three occasions. Each occasion included allegations of domestic violence.

Further, the physical violence has escalated in the parents’ relationship. In July 2024, after an argument between the mother and father, the father was shot multiple times by the mother's alleged paramour. The father testified that the mother was in the vehicle with the man who shot him.

The father was arrested by authorities in Illinois in August 2025 because he had open warrants. The following month, Illinois authorities responded to a domestic-abuse incident while the parents were staying in Illinois. Once back in Iowa, police were called to the parents’ home on three occasions in October.

The juvenile court ordered the family to engage in services. Among these services was participation in the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program. The mother started the program but did not complete it, and the father never started the program. Mental health programming was also ordered. Both parents completed evaluations which recommended individual therapy. Neither parent consistently attended therapy.

Concerns also arose regarding the parents’ ability to parent the child. During visits, the mother was reported by providers as being more focused on her phone than the child. According to the providers that supervised visits, neither parent followed the Safe Care skills they were taught during visits. On one occasion, the mother allowed the child to put a balloon in his mouth, which the provider took away from the child shortly after.

Due to all of these concerns, the State filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. The State alleged grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(a), (d), (e), (f ), (g), (i), and (j). After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the termination petition as to paragraphs (d), (e), and (i). The mother now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). While not binding on us, we give weight to the juvenile court's fact findings, “particularly with respect to credibility determinations.” Id.

DISCUSSION

“Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 is a three-step analysis.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). First, we “determine whether any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established.” Id. If we conclude affirmatively, we next “determine whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights.” Id. at 219–20. If we conclude section 232.116(2) supports termination, “we consider whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 220. “However, if a parent does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not address it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

The mother's sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court erred when it found “that the child could not be safely returned to the mother at the time of the TPR hearing.” But the mother makes no substantive argument advancing this argument. Because of that, the mother has waived her argument on appeal. See L.N.S. v. S.W.S., 854 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Where a party has failed to present any substantive analysis or argument on an issue, the issue has been waived.”). Notwithstanding this waiver, we choose to briefly address the merits. First, the statutory grounds under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The child was adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance, was removed from the parents’ physical custody for over one year at the time of the termination trial, and we agree that the mother failed to maintain significant and meaningful contact with the child throughout the time the child was removed. Specifically, the mother failed to engage with services offered by HHS, including not complying with the mental health services that were ordered by the juvenile court and appearing uninterested during supervised visits with the child. Second, termination is in the child's best interests because the mother continues to have unresolved concerns related to domestic violence, and the child has been exposed to that violence. See In re J.D., No. 21-0391, 2021 WL 3379037, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2021) (recognizing exposure to domestic violence is harmful to children). Lastly, the mother bears the burden of proving she is entitled to a permissive exception, and she has not done so. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The father's parental rights were also terminated, but he is not party to this appeal.

Opinion by Chicchelly, J.