IN RE: the Marriage of Rachel J. Stone and Patrick O. Stone (2026)

Claiming that he “is not concerned with the title” placed on the physical care arrangement for his three children, Patrick Stone appeals a district court ruling that denied his request to modify a dissolution decree to grant him “shared visitation.” He contends the court should have applied the lower burden for visitation modifications to his request for equal time with the children instead of the heavier burden for custody modifications. He also contends the court erred in declining to modify his child support obligation without calculating the parties’ incomes.

Because Patrick's request for “shared visitation” is simply a request for joint physical care by another name, we affirm the district court's ruling on that issue. But we reverse the denial of Patrick's requested child support modification and remand for entry of an order on that issue after findings are made on the parties’ incomes.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Patrick and Rachel Stone have been in court every year since their marriage was dissolved by stipulated decree in January 2019. One of the judges involved with their case wrote, “This court has seen very few parents who hate and distrust each other as much as these two do.” Caught in the middle of the parents’ toxic relationship are their three children, born in 2011, 2014, and 2019. When they divorced, the parties agreed to place the children in their joint legal custody and Rachel's physical care, with visitation for Patrick. They also agreed that Patrick would pay $550 per month in child support and contribute to the children's medical, daycare, and school expenses.

In 2020, after Rachel sought to have Patrick held in contempt for failing to pay some of those expenses, Patrick petitioned to modify the caretaking arrangement. He sought joint physical care of the children, alleging that Rachel “changed jobs, has a different work schedule, and different income” and that there “has been a lack of flexibility and cooperation” and “unreasonable denials of requested changes to visitation.”

While the modification was pending, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services found that Patrick had physically abused one of the minor children through his use of corporal punishment. A juvenile court case was opened, and the modification was stayed until concurrent jurisdiction was granted in May 2023. Once the case was reset for trial, both parties updated their pleadings. In further support of his request for joint physical care, Patrick alleged that during the year-long juvenile court proceeding the parties “shared physical care of the minor children on a 50/50 basis by alternating weeks.” Rachel, however, counterclaimed for sole legal custody “due to the parties’ documented inability to communicate and effectively coparent.” She also asked for child support to be modified to reflect the current guidelines.

The competing modifications came before the district court for trial in August 2023. The court denied Rachel's request for sole legal custody, finding that while the parents “have disagreed about child-related decisions like counseling and discipline, there is no evidence that Pat having an equal right and responsibility to make decisions affecting his children has ever, or will ever, harm the children.” Yet those same disagreements led the court to deny Patrick's request for joint physical care, finding “the toxic relationship between these parents makes joint physical care doomed to fail in the long run.” The court reasoned:

To say that the post-divorce period for the Stones has been “stormy” with charges and countercharges would be putting it too mildly. While Rachel and Pat may have survived one year of joint physical care— under intense supervision by the juvenile court, [the department], and service providers—it's obvious that Rachel and Pat have not put aside their past, strong differences with each other. Those differences were on full display during the two-day trial. The distrust and hatred these parents have for each other was easy to see for anyone who was there to observe two full days of it.

Because of changes to both parties’ work schedules, along with their poor communication and failure to effectively coparent, the district court modified Patrick's visitation during the school year to every other Friday evening until Tuesday morning and an overnight on the Monday after Rachel's weekend. “From June to August,” the court ordered that Patrick “shall have the children every other week that the children are not in school,” with exchanges on Fridays at 5:00 p.m. The court calculated that under its schedule, Patrick would receive 142 overnights per year—a roughly “60/40 time split.” Finally, the court granted Rachel's request to modify Patrick's child support obligation. The court found there was little dispute about Rachel's income as a nurse at a veterans’ hospital, where she grossed $69,139.20 per year. But Patrick's income as a self-employed carpenter and mason was more difficult to determine. The court imputed an income of $100,000 to Patrick and ordered him to pay $1,550.20 per month in child support for the three children.

The Stones returned to court in June 2024 because they could not agree on when the summer visitation schedule should begin. Rachel thought that it should start on Friday, May 31 to avoid disrupting the alternating weekend schedule she had relied on to plan her work schedule and summer vacations. Even though it meant that he would have one less week with the children, Patrick insisted the alternating weeks did not start until June 7— the subsequent Friday—because the court's order said, “From June to August.” Initially, Rachel filed a “Motion for Clarification,” which the district court denied. The court found that it had “no authority to resolve disputes between divorced parents absent a petition to modify” under the supreme court's decision in In re Marriage of Frazier, 1 N.W.3d 775, 788 (Iowa 2024).

Because the parties remained at an impasse after her motion was denied, Rachel filed a modification petition in September “to clarify specific terms of summer visitation as to start/end date.”¹ Patrick's answer contended that he “merely followed” the court's modification decree “word for word.” And he contended “that it would be in the best interest of the minor children ․ if the parties would share custody/visitation on an alternating weekly basis,” with child support to “be adjusted accordingly.” Patrick later amended his answer to expressly assert a counterclaim for joint physical care. The amendment alleged that soon after the last modification, Rachel “changed her employment, resulting in a change of work schedule” that required her to “work evenings, weekends, and overnights,” leaving the children “unattended without adult supervision.” He also alleged that Rachel was earning more at her new job and his “child support obligation should be recalculated.”

Two days before the trial in May 2025, Patrick moved to amend his counterclaim to alternatively request a change in the visitation schedule “to allow him visitation with the minor children on an every other week basis, such that [the parties] share visitation.” In a trial brief, Patrick asserted that he was “not concerned with the title ‘primary physical custodian.’ He simply wants equal time with his children. He would concede the designation to Rachel of primary custodian in exchange for a 50/50 shared placement plan.” His brief also asserted that Rachel's gross annual income had increased to $139,157 and that his child support obligation should be reduced to $1,235.55 per month.

On the morning of trial, the parties reached an agreement about summer visitation. But they could not agree on Patrick's counterclaim. Their testimony at trial focused on Rachel's new employment. During the last modification, Rachel worked at a veterans’ hospital in Waukon and at a clinic in LaCrosse, Wisconsin—an hour commute from her home in Waukon. Sometime around the modification trial in August 2023, Rachel quit her job at the clinic. In February 2025, she began working at Mayo Clinic in LaCrosse, while still picking up shifts at the veterans’ hospital. By the trial in May, Rachel was working thirty-six-hour shifts at Mayo each week, some of which were overnight. And she was picking up a twelve-hour shift every six weeks at the veterans’ hospital. When the district court asked how her work schedule had changed from the last modification, Rachel answered, “There's nothing different.” Rachel testified that the children were responsible for getting themselves to school “one to two days every other week.” And she insisted that, with the help of her mother, they were never left alone overnight.

Patrick agreed that during the last modification, Rachel had worked in LaCrosse. And he agreed that she had worked overnights after their divorce. He also agreed that the children could stay by themselves sometimes. But Patrick insisted an alternating week schedule would be better for the children because “it will be more consistent for them” and require “less interaction” with Rachel. He also maintained that all he was “trying to do this whole time is prove that I'm a good dad ․ and I don't understand why they can't have equal amount of time with me.”

After trial, the district court entered a ruling that denied Patrick's requested modification. The court found:

Patrick has failed to establish that any substantial change of circumstances has occurred or that a change to shared placement would be in the best interest of the children and that such an arrangement would allow the parties to better minister to their needs. The parties do not have the ability to communicate about the most basic details of coparenting. Even after a detailed modification ruling, they could not even come to a consensus on when a visit would start. The children are doing well in their current placement. Patrick gets extraordinary time with the children but a primary parent is necessary and has been established in Rachel.

It is noted that Rachel switched jobs and her schedule has changed. However, that change has not substantially impacted the children. This modification action is more about Patrick wanting more time with the children and shared care status. It is not factually based on any meaningful change in circumstances.

The court also declined to modify child support, finding that “[n]either party has requested a modification of child support unless custody is changed.”

Patrick moved to enlarge and amend the district court's ruling. He claimed that the court erred by applying the standard for custody modifications rather than the standard for visitation modifications to his request for equal time with the children. He also claimed that his request to modify child support “was not limited or restricted to a change of custody.” The court denied the motion, ruling that it “properly address[ed] the issues presented at trial” and that it “calculated support based on current income and the amounts do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances.” Patrick appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Because modification petitions are heard in equity, our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015). “But when we say a case is reviewed de novo, this does not mean that we decide the case in a vacuum or approach it as though the trial court had never been involved.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). Instead, “while not bound by the district court's findings, we give them weight and defer especially where the credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up); accord Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32.

III. Analysis

A. “Shared Visitation”

In support of his request for “shared visitation” with the children, Patrick argues that he satisfied the lesser standard for visitation modifications and that the district court erred in requiring him to prove a substantial change in circumstances. In reply, Rachel asserts that Patrick's “trial strategy was to request a modification of ‘visitation’ ․ to circumvent his requirement to prove the heightened burden of proof for custody modification cases.” We agree with Rachel.

As both parties recognize, the custodial provisions of a dissolution decree may be modified “only when there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the time of the decree not contemplated by the court when the decree was entered, which is more or less permanent and relates to the welfare of the child.” In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Hambleton v. McWhortor, No. 17-0927, 2018 WL 1433616, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018) (“A change in the physical care arrangement is custodial ․”). This is a “heavy burden” that requires the petitioning parent to “prove an ability to minister more effectively to the children's well being.” Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32. “The burden is necessarily a heavy one” because “ ‘once custody of children has been fixed it should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

“A different, less demanding burden applies when a parent is seeking to change a visitation provision in a dissolution decree.” Brown, 778 N.W.2d at 51. “While most of the analysis is similar, ‘a much less extensive change of circumstances need be shown.’ ” In re Marriage of Johnston, 2024 WL 110282, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2024) (citation omitted). “A parent seeking to modify visitation must only establish ‘that there has been a material change in circumstances since the decree and that the requested change in visitation is in the best interests of the children.’ ” Brown, 778 N.W.2d at 51–52 (citation omitted).

One reason for the lower burden in visitation modifications is that “[u]nlike a change in custody, an alteration in a parenting or visitation schedule does not cause a disruption in ‘established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker.’ ” Id. at 52 (citation omitted). But here, that is exactly what Patrick's request for “50/50 visitation” would do. It would upset the caretaking arrangement that has been in place for the past seven years—with Rachel as the primary caregiver—and it would directly impact the parties’ roles and responsibilities for the children. See Hambleton, 2018 WL 1433616, at *2 (declining to use the visitation burden of proof after finding the requested change would disrupt the children's routine and alter the parents’ responsibilities).

Although Patrick contends that our appellate courts have not addressed this issue before, we have construed similar “expanded visitation” requests “to have the children one-half of the time” as requests for joint physical care. See Petersen v. Nielsen, No. 17-0135, 2017 WL 2876103, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 6, 2017) (declining to award a father “seven overnight visits over a fourteen-day period” because that request “essentially asks to have the children one-half of the time, which would be a joint physical care arrangement”); accord Courey v. Robinson, 20-0597, 2021 WL 1017133, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2021). We reach the same conclusion here and find that the district court correctly held Patrick to the heavier burden for custody modifications.

Because Patrick does not challenge the district court's determination that he failed to show a substantial change in circumstances,² our analysis could end here. But we find that regardless of which standard is applied, the court was right in concluding “that a change to shared placement” would not be in the children's best interests. See Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32 (“The children's best interest is the ‘controlling consideration.’ ” (citation omitted)).

On that question, Patrick contends that his availability “on a 50/50 basis is in the best interest of the minor children” and that the children's “time without a parent [would] be reduced with his request.” He also contends that an alternating week schedule “would be simple” and result in “less conflict.” However, the “critical question” in deciding whether joint physical care is appropriate is not Patrick's availability or the simplicity of the schedule but “whether the parties can communicate effectively on the myriad of issues that arise daily in the routine care of a child.” In re Marriage of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 2007); see also Randall v. Trier, 15 N.W.3d 809, 813 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (noting that the ability of the parents to communicate and show mutual respect and the degree of conflict between them are among the factors to be considered in determining whether joint physical care is in the children's best interest); accord In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007). The record shows they cannot.

Contrary to Patrick's reasoning about the benefits of a “simple schedule,” establishing equal caretaking between these parties is unlikely to alleviate their conflict. See Spaulding v. Glenn, No. 20-0642, 2021 WL 811126, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2021). “Rather, it will take more concentrated cooperation, which appears out of reach” for Patrick and Rachel. Id. We accordingly affirm the district court's denial of Patrick's request for shared visitation with the children.

B. Child Support

Patrick next claims that even though both parties submitted child support guidelines showing that his child support obligation should be reduced, the district court failed to calculate their incomes before denying his requested modification. Rachel responds by asserting that Patrick “did not properly plead a modification of child support, nor did he properly assert the modification at trial.” We disagree.

Patrick's amended answer in February 2025 asserted that Rachel's “change in employment resulted in additional income” for her, “such that [his] child support obligation should be recalculated using [Rachel's] current income to determine support.” And in Patrick's trial brief, he contended that Rachel's gross annual income had doubled since the time of the prior modification. Based on her current alleged income of $139,157 and his previously imputed income of $100,000, Patrick argued that his “child support should be recalculated to show a monthly obligation of $1,235.55,” which was a “20% net change, therefore constituting a substantial change in circumstances.” See Iowa Code § 598.21C(2)(a) (2025) (stating “a substantial change of circumstances exists when the court order for child support varies by ten percent or more from the amount which would be due pursuant to the most current child support guidelines”).

After a somewhat confusing exchange with the district court at trial regarding whether Patrick was seeking a child support modification, his attorney told the court: “[M]y position is, she's making close to $140,000 a year compared to 67, and that's more than 10 percent, and the guidelines need to be recalculated and I pled that.” The court responded, “I understand that.” Yet its modification ruling stated, “Neither party has requested a modification of child support unless custody is changed.” Patrick brought this oversight to the court's attention in his motion to amend and enlarge. The court's order denying the motion stated that it “calculated support based on current income and the amounts do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances.”

Trouble is, the district court did not make any findings on the parties’ current incomes, and those incomes were disputed. While Patrick contended that Rachel was earning $139,157, she asserted that her gross income was only $95,004 per year. And she asserted that Patrick had the ability to earn $125,000, which he disputed. Because the court failed to determine the parents’ “current monthly income[s] from the most reliable evidence presented,” we cannot review whether it correctly denied Patrick's requested modification. In re Marriage of Powell, 474 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991); see also In re Marriage of Sisson, No. 24-0790, 2025 WL 2057907, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025) (finding the court's failure to determine the husband's income “leaves us with nothing to review”). We accordingly reverse the denial of Patrick's request for a child support modification and remand for the district court to make specific findings on the parties’ incomes based on the evidence already presented at trial and to apply the child support guidelines accordingly. No new evidence should be received or considered on remand.

C. Appellate Attorney Fees

Both parties request an award of appellate attorney fees. “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned up). After considering these factors, we deny the parties’ requests and conclude they should each be responsible for their own appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half to each party.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rachel also filed another contempt action for Patrick's failure to pay his share of the children's lunch accounts and medical expenses. The district court found Patrick's “failure to timely do anything about the medical bills and lunch account is due to [his] extreme hatred for Rachel,” which was “interfering with his ability to put his children first.”

2.   Patrick argues that he met the lesser change in circumstances needed for visitation modifications based on Rachel's change in employment and work hours, along with her “continual refusal to be flexible” with his requests for additional visitation. Even if that lower standard applied, those are the same changes in circumstances that Patrick alleged in the first modification proceeding. See Brown, 778 N.W.2d at 51–52 (requiring proof of a material change in circumstances “since the decree”).

Opinion by Badding, J.