S.E., Father, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A father appeals the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to two girls—born in 2020 and 2023—under Iowa Code section 232.116 (2026). He claims the court abused its discretion by declining to continue his termination hearing because of a delay in his criminal case. He also challenges the court's finding that termination is in the children's best interests and its refusal to apply a permissive exception. Our review is de novo. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019).

BACKGROUND

This case began in December 2024, when the older daughter told her mother that “Daddy's pee pee touched my pee pee.” The father denied any misconduct, but an assessment by the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services deemed the child's allegations credible and was founded for sexual abuse. Both girls were adjudicated as children in need of assistance, and the father was criminally charged with sexual abuse and other offenses. The children were ultimately placed in their mother's custody. Although he was later released on bond, the father concedes that visitation was “impossible” due to a criminal no-contact order. His last contact with either child was in April 2025.

At the department's recommendation, the juvenile court ordered the father to participate in mental-health therapy and obtain a psychosexual evaluation. He met with a therapist for a few months,¹ but he refused the psychosexual evaluation on advice of counsel. Throughout the juvenile case, the father consistently denied the abuse and declined to participate in services that might prejudice his criminal defense, severing contact with the department altogether in December 2025. According to the case manager in response to questioning by the State, these decisions prevented the father from meeting her expectations for reunification:

Q: Without [the father] acknowledging the concerns of sexual abuse and making any progress in therapy or treatment, do you think he would be an appropriate caretaker for his daughters? A: No.

Q: Would he need to show some participation and growth in that treatment before you would recommend him having contact with them? A: Yes.

The State petitioned to terminate the father's parental rights in February 2026. A hearing was set for mid-April—shortly after the father's sexual-abuse charges were expected to reach trial. But when the criminal trial was moved to June, the father asked to continue the termination proceedings as well, arguing he would “be unable to properly assist in his defense” at an April hearing because “he would likely be unable to testify on his own behalf.” The court denied the father's motion, and the hearing proceeded as scheduled. The father did not testify.

In a subsequent order, the juvenile court found grounds for termination under paragraphs (d), (e), (f ), (h), and (i) of Iowa Code section 232.116(1), reasoning the “danger of sexual abuse posed by [the father] ․ ha[d] not been mitigated.” It also agreed with the State that termination was in the children's best interest, explaining that outcome would “enable [the mother] to keep her daughters safe and free from the serious and legitimate threat of sexual abuse by [the father].” The court declined to apply a permissive exception under section 232.116(3).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the father contends that proceeding to termination was both unfair and unnecessary when his participation was hamstrung by a pending criminal case and when the children remained in their mother's care. We detect a Fifth Amendment worry lurking behind these arguments. As the father's attorney put it at the hearing:

[The father] has not been proven guilty of anything. He has adamantly denied that he has done anything sexually to either one of these girls and intends on fighting his criminal charges through the trial process ․ The Department's only concern here is [the father] not admitting that he did something that, as far as we know, he didn't do. We can't ask somebody to admit to an offense ․ that they didn't do.

Although the grounds for termination are not challenged in this appeal, we begin by addressing the father's concerns about his barrier to reunification because it informs our analysis of his other claims.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the State from demanding an admission of guilt as a condition of reunification. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2002) (“The court may not compel [a father] to admit his guilt in order to be eligible to regain custody of his daughter.”). That same protection applies “within the context of court-ordered therapy.” Id. at 149; see also In re E.H., 578 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Iowa 1998). But “this is as far as the Fifth Amendment privilege extends.” C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 150. The State is allowed to require therapeutic treatment for alleged sexual abuse, even in the face of a parent's claim that intervention is unnecessary. Id.; In re H.R.K., 433 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). And when the parent's denial interferes with effective treatment, the potential consequences “lie outside the protective ambit of the Fifth Amendment.” C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 150 (citation omitted).

This case falls into the latter category. The juvenile court found grounds for termination based on the father's “refus[al] to participate” in court-ordered services, not just his denial of abuse. The father gave up on mental health therapy just a few months into the case, and he declined repeated requests for a psychosexual evaluation. According to the case manager, the evaluation would have covered the father's history, behaviors, past traumas, and likelihood of re-offense—information that could have helped the department assess the father's risk to the children. It might have also led to beneficial treatment for the father, whose short stint in therapy was limited to the subject of “how to cope with stress.” Nothing in the record before us suggests that participating in these services would have required the father to make admissions as a condition of success. See E.H., 578 N.W.2d at 250. Instead, he chose to abstain out of caution for his criminal defense. That was a strategic decision. But it was not a Hobson's choice.

Having made that important distinction, we turn to the issues on appeal. The father first challenges the juvenile court's denial of his motion to delay the termination hearing. Generally speaking, whether to grant a continuance is for the juvenile court to decide, and we will reverse only if necessary to prevent an injustice. In re R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). The father argues that awaiting the outcome of his criminal charges would have clarified the facts in this case and that “there was no reason to not grant a continuance as the children were already placed with their mother.” But he fails to explain how the available evidence would have changed with more time. And as the State points out, continuances delay permanency, contrary to the best interests of a child. In re M.D., 921 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 2018). The ultimate timeline for the father's criminal case was (and still is) unknown to all parties. We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's decision to prioritize the children's permanency interests over the father's strategic preferences.² See In re M.W., No. 24-0585, 2024 WL 3050529, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 19, 2024) (finding a father's pending charges for sexual abuse were “not a sufficient reason to grant a request for a continuance” of the termination proceedings).

The father next disputes the juvenile court's conclusion that termination was in the children's best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). He argues that so long as his criminal case was pending, the girls would remain in their mother's custody, and so severing his parental rights was “far more detrimental ․ than any danger perceived” from leaving them intact. Trouble is, the father does not dispute that the State proved its grounds for termination, including under paragraphs (f ) and (h). And where those statutory deadlines for reunification have been exhausted, “termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). These children have not seen their father for more than a year. Considering their need for permanency, the father's failure to participate in services, and the credible—if yet criminally unproven—allegations of abuse, we find termination is in the children's best interests.

Finally, the father challenges the court's decision not to apply a permissive exception under section 232.116(3)(a). That provision allows the juvenile court to avoid termination despite a statutory basis to do so if it finds “[a] relative has legal custody of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a). It is true that the children were placed in their mother's legal custody at the time of the termination hearing. But even when this requirement is met, the exception remains “permissive, not mandatory.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). For the same reasons that support our best-interests finding, we agree with the juvenile court that the section 232.116(3)(a) exception should not be applied here.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The father sought mental-health services through an employee assistance program. When a case manager later inquired about the scope of these services, the provider explained their focus was “how to cope with stress.” The provider recommended that the father seek mental-health therapy elsewhere to address the allegations of sexual abuse, but the father did not follow through.

2.   We are mindful that when a continuance ruling is challenged on constitutional grounds, our review is de novo, and we owe no deference to the juvenile court's discretion. See R.B., 832 N.W.2d at 378. The father does not expressly assert a Fifth Amendment claim here. But even if he did, our disposition would be the same. As we have explained, the father's failure to participate in services was a strategic choice, not his only alternative to self-incrimination. And nothing about the timing of the hearing infringed on his right to remain silent. Whether to tell his version of the facts or avoid the risk of taking the stand is the same decision that every defendant must make. That tough choice has “[n]ever been held to violate the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 379 (quoting Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 286 (1998)).

Opinion by Badding, J.