State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Aumarie Shanda Taylor, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Aumarie Taylor pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery—a crime she committed when she was sixteen years old. The district court sentenced her to an indeterminate ten-year term of incarceration, which it ran consecutively to several concurrent one-year sentences relating to separate offenses.¹ The court did not impose a mandatory minimum, making Taylor immediately eligible for parole. Taylor appeals her sentence.²

As the district court imposed a sentence within the statutory limits, see Iowa Code §§ 711.3, 902.9(1)(d), we review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385 (Iowa 2020). A sentencing decision may be an abuse of discretion if the court fails to consider a relevant and weighty factor, “gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor,” or imposes a sentence “outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. (quoting State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 138 (Iowa 2017)). The defendant has the burden to show the court abused its discretion. State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 171 (Iowa 2018).

Although Taylor was a minor at the time of the offense, the court was not required to hold a hearing on the Miller/Lyle factors because it did not impose a mandatory minimum. See id. at 173. While a Miller/Lyle hearing was not required, the court was still obligated to consider any mitigating circumstances, including applicable Miller/Lyle factors. Id. Those factors are:

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular “family and home environment” that surround the youth; (3) the circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.

State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012)).

While the sentencing record in this case makes clear that the district court considered the applicable Miller/Lyle factors, Taylor points out that how the district court considered these factors is problematic. Of particular concern is the second Miller/Lyle factor, which relates to the child's family and home environment. Id. The presentence investigation report revealed that Taylor had been sex trafficked beginning at age twelve, forcefully injected with methamphetamine, and sexually abused while housed at a juvenile facility. At the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged Taylor's difficult childhood. But then it went on to state:

However, we also just know and have ingrained in us that there are certain things that are wrong. And your assaultive behavior is wrong. I understand that you're still a minor, but kids learn very young that we don't hit and we don't assault and we don't hurt other people.

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And somebody who has been hurt should even be more aware—

DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: —that you don't hurt somebody else. So I am balancing your upbringing and your background with the behavior that you have exhibited in these cases.

(Emphasis added).

We agree with Taylor that the emphasized statement above reveals that the district court considered Taylor's past as a victim of violent offenses not as a mitigating factor as required by Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at 173, but as an aggravating factor. And doing so runs afoul of the supreme court's mandate that Miller/Lyle factors “must be considered as mitigating factors in the sentencing process.” State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 849 (Iowa 2018). So, the district court's consideration of Taylor's history of victimization as an aggravating factor amounts to an improper sentencing factor and an abuse of discretion.

Because the district court considered an improper sentencing factor and we cannot speculate as to how the court weighed that factor, we must remand for resentencing. See State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 136 (Iowa 2021); State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 2014). We vacate Taylor's sentence in case number FECR257554 and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 304 (Iowa 2025) (requiring resentencing before a different judge when “the sentencing process was tainted against the defendant”); Lovell, 857 N.W.2d at 243 (finding consideration of improper factors requires resentencing before a different judge “to protect the integrity of our judicial system from the appearance of impropriety”); State v. Sundall, No. 24-0982, 2025 WL 1322623, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 7, 2025) (requiring resentencing before a different judge when the court considered an improper sentencing factor).

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Taylor's various convictions stem from several separate cases. This appeal relates only to Taylor's conviction for robbery in case number FECR257554.

2.   We have jurisdiction over Taylor's appeal despite her guilty plea because she has established good cause to appeal by challenging her sentence, which was neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of the parties’ plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025) (limiting when a defendant may appeal as a matter of right following a guilty plea); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).

Opinion by Ahlers, J.