STATE OF HAWAI v. JERAMY TRONSON (2022)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai‘i (State) filed a timely application for a writ of certiorari from the July 31, 2020 judgment on appeal of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) entered pursuant to the ICA's June 30, 2020 Memorandum Opinion, which affirmed the May 9, 2019 judgment of the District Court of the First Circuit.¹ The district court's judgment granted Respondent/Defendant-Appellee Jeramy M. Tronson's Motion to Suppress Statements after finding that Tronson was subject to custodial interrogation without being given Miranda warnings.

We hold that under our decision in State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 151 Hawai‘i 283, 511 P.3d 782 (2022), Tronson was not in custody at the time he was asked the medical rule-out questions as the record does not support the conclusion that the circumstances of his stop rose to that of a formal arrest. The ICA erred to the extent it held otherwise.

II. BACKGROUND

Tronson was pulled over at around 3:30 a.m. by a Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officer after almost hitting the officer's car. After being informed why he was stopped, Tronson apologized to the officer for almost hitting his car. The officer noticed that Tronson's eyes were red and glassy, his speech was slurred, and his breath smelled like alcohol. The officer asked Tronson if he was willing to participate in a Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST), and Tronson agreed. Prior to administering the test, the officer asked, and Tronson answered in the negative, the medical rule-out questions.

Tronson was arrested and charged with Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII) in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1) (Supp. 2018)² and Reckless Driving in violation of HRS § 291-2 (2007).³ As relevant here, Tronson moved to suppress his answers to the medical rule-out questions.⁴ The district court ruled that Tronson was in custody at the time these questions were asked, and the ICA affirmed that finding. The ICA acknowledged that the test for determining whether a suspect is in custody requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, but emphasized the existence of probable cause to arrest Tronson for Reckless Driving. State v. Tronson, 147 Hawai‘i 628, 465 P.3d 1075, 2020 WL 3542147, at *4-5 (App. June 30, 2020) (mem. op.). The ICA also held that the medical rule-out questions constituted interrogation. Id. at *7.

A. District Court Suppression Proceedings

The district court held a hearing on Tronson's motion to suppress on May 9, 2019. After hearing testimony from the State's sole witness, HPD Officer Tyler Maalo, the district court found that Tronson “was in custody for Miranda purposes at the time of the stop ․ because ․ clearly the officer had probable cause to arrest [ ] Tronson even before he approached the vehicle based on his observations of defendant's driving.” The district court granted Tronson's motion to suppress. Its written conclusions of law (COLs) state in relevant part as follows:

5. To determine whether “interrogation” is “custodial,” [the court] look[s] to the totality of the circumstances, focusing on ‘the place and time of the interrogation, the length of the interrogation, the nature of the questions asked, the conduct of the police, and [any] other relevant circumstances.’ ” [State v. ]Ketchum, [97 Hawai‘i 107,] 122[, 34 P.3d 1006, 1021 (2001) (citations omitted).] Among the “other relevant circumstances” to be considered are whether the investigation has focused on the suspect and whether the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect. (First, second, and third alterations in original).

6. At the time when Officer Maalo first approached Defendant while he was seated in his vehicle, there existed probable cause to arrest Defendant for the offense of Reckless Driving; and Defendant was not free to leave. Accordingly, at this time, Defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.

The State appealed.

B. ICA Proceedings

On appeal, the State challenged the district court's conclusion that Tronson was subject to custodial interrogation. In essence, the State claimed that “Miranda warnings were not required, because Tronson was not in custody or interrogated before the SFST had been administered and [he] was arrested for OVUII.”

In a memorandum opinion, the ICA agreed with the district court that Tronson was in custody and subject to interrogation when asked the medical rule-out questions. Citing State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai‘i 207, 211, 10 P.3d 728, 732 (2000), the ICA acknowledged that Tronson was not in custody simply because he was seized. Tronson, 2020 WL 3542147, at *4. But the ICA still concluded that Tronson was in custody, based primarily on the existence of probable cause to arrest for Reckless Driving:

As we further noted in Sagapolutele-Silva, there is no requirement for the police to arrest a suspect once probable cause is established. Sagapolutele-Silva, 2020 WL 1699907 at *6 (citation omitted). The police need not halt an investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause because it may fall short of evidence necessary to support a criminal conviction. Id. Nevertheless, “[a]n individual in police custody may not be subjected to interrogation without first being advised of his Miranda rights.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Tronson was in custody for Reckless Driving. Officer Maalo had probable cause to arrest him for Reckless Driving when he stopped him. In addition, as discussed below, upon his initial conversation with Tronson, Officer Maalo had a reasonable suspicion that he was driving while intoxicated. Officer Maalo testified that Tronson was not free to leave from the time he was stopped. Under the totality of the circumstances, the District Court did not err in COL 6 in concluding that Tronson was in custody and that Tronson should have been given Miranda warnings prior to any interrogation.

Id. at *5.

Finally, the ICA held that the medical rule-out questions were interrogation. Accordingly, the ICA affirmed the district court's suppression of Tronson's responses to the medical rule-out questions.

The State filed a timely application for writ of certiorari.

C. Application for Writ of Certiorari

The State raises three questions in its application:

1. Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that Respondent-Defendant-Appellee, Jeramy M. Tronson (Tronson) was in custody as soon as Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Tyler Maalo pulled him over.

2. Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the medical rule-out questions asked as part of the Standard Field Sobriety Test (SFST) are interrogation.

3. Whether the ICA gravely erred in suppressing Tronson's answers to the medical rule-out questions.

Tronson did not file a response.

III. DISCUSSION

As we recently held in Sagapolutele-Silva, 151 Hawai‘i at 287, 511 P.3d at 786, the test to determine whether a person is in custody is one of the totality of the circumstances, objectively appraised from the perspective of a reasonable person in the suspect's position.

Applied here, Tronson was not in custody. The circumstances of Tronson's detention amounted to no more than a routine traffic stop, not the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Tronson was stopped briefly in public. Although Officer Maalo believed he had probable cause to arrest Tronson for Reckless Driving, Officer Maalo did not tell Tronson that he was not free to go or otherwise restrain him from leaving. As we explained in Sagapolutele-Silva, 151 Hawai‘i at 296, 511 P.3d at 795, “[w]hile ‘[a]n officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned,’ they ‘are relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her “freedom of action.” ’ ” (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994)) (second alteration in original). Officer Maalo informed Tronson why he stopped him, and Tronson apologized to Officer Maalo for almost hitting his car, but there is nothing to indicate that Tronson understood that he had implicated himself in a crime that could lead to his arrest. The point of arrest had not arrived, and Miranda warnings were not required.⁵

Accordingly, we hold that the ICA erred in affirming the district court's suppression of Tronson's answers to the medical rule-out questions.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the ICA erred in affirming the district court's suppression of Tronson's responses to the medical rule-out questions. The ICA's July 31, 2020 judgment on appeal and the district court's May 9, 2019 judgment are vacated as to the suppression of those responses.

In all other respects, the judgment of the ICA is affirmed. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Mark E. Recktenwald

Paula A. Nakayama

Paul B.K. Wong

I respectfully dissent to the Majority's holding that Jeramy M. Tronson (“Tronson”) was not in custody at the time he was asked the medical rule-out questions.

I. Tronson was in custody at the time of the medical rule-out questions because the officer had probable cause to arrest him for reckless driving

As stated in my omnibus dissent to State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, SCWC-19-0000491, 151 Hawai‘i 283, 511 P.3d 782 (2022), State v. Skapinok, SCWC-19-0000476, 511 Hawai‘i 170, 510 P.3d 599 (2022) and State v. Manion, SCWC-19-0000476, 151 Hawai‘i 267, 511 P.3d 766 (2022), I respectfully but strongly disagree with the Majority's rejection of settled precedent supporting the precept that people in Hawai‘i who are subject to arrest are necessarily in custody and are protected by the right against self-incrimination. Rather than depart from heretofore unquestioned precedent, I would affirm the common-sense ruling of the District Court of the First Circuit (“district court”) that a person is in custody, and thus constitutionally entitled to be free from police interrogation, when the police have probable cause to arrest. See, e.g., State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i 107, 34 P.3d 1006 (2001).

Contrary to the finding of the Majority, both the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) and the district court correctly held that Tronson was in custody at the time he was asked the medical-rule out questions. The uncontradicted testimony of Officer Tyler Maalo (“Officer Maalo”) was that he had probable cause to arrest Tronson and he was in custody. Officer Maalo pulled Tronson over at approximately 3:30 A.M. after observing Tronson speeding, swerving around and almost hitting Officer Maalo's patrol car. Upon pulling Tronson over, Officer Maalo informed Tronson that he stopped him for “almost hitting [Officer Maalo's] vehicle.” In response, Tronson apologized for almost hitting Officer Maalo's vehicle. From the point at which Officer Maalo approached Tronson—at 3:30 A.M., after witnessing Tronson commit a crime—Officer Maalo testified that Tronson was not free to leave the scene. Officer Maalo testified that from the time he began engaging with Tronson, he had probable cause to arrest Tronson for reckless driving, a petty misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment.

While speaking with Tronson, Officer Maalo noted that Tronson's eyes were red and glassy, his speech was slurred, and his breath smelled like alcohol. Thereafter, Officer Maalo asked Tronson to step out of his vehicle and Tronson complied. Officer Maalo asked Tronson if he was willing to participate in a standardized field sobriety test (“SFST”) and Tronson agreed. Prior to administering the SFST, Officer Maalo asked Tronson the following medical rule-out questions:

i. Do you have any physical defects or speech impediments?

ii. Are you taking any medications?

iii. Are you under the care of a doctor or dentist for anything?

iv. Are you under the care of an eye doctor?

v. Do you have an artificial or glass eye?

vi. Are you epileptic or diabetic?

vii. Are you blind in either eye?

viii. Do you wear corrective lenses?

Tronson answered no to all of the questions.

Tronson was in custody at the time of the medical rule-out questions. The circumstances of this stop were such that a reasonable person would believe “that he or she was not free to go[,]” as evidenced by the sensible sworn testimony of Officer Maalo at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Tronson was indeed, not free to leave. Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i at 125, 34 P.3d at 1024. Tronson was pulled over by Officer Maalo at 3:30 A.M. and immediately told that the reason for the stop was because he nearly hit a police car. Moreover, Officer Maalo testified to having probable cause to arrest Tronson for reckless driving from the moment he initiated the stop. As this court stated in in State v. Ah Loo, “if the detained person's responses to a police officer's questions provide the officer with probable cause to arrest ․ the officer is—at that time—required to inform the detained person of his or her constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to counsel, as mandated by Miranda and its progeny.” 94 Hawai‘i 207, 212, 10 P.3d 728, 733 (2000) (citations omitted). Here, Tronson's actions (speeding, swerving, almost hitting a police car, and later apologizing for almost hitting the police car) supported Officer Maalo's conclusion that he had probable cause to arrest Tronson for reckless driving.

In sum, Tronson was in custody because (1) Officer Maalo had probable cause to arrest Tronson for reckless driving, see Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i at 126, 34 P.3d at 1025 (“a person is in custody ․ if an objective assessment of the totality of the circumstances reflects that ․ probable cause to arrest has developed”) (citations omitted); and (2) a reasonable person in Tronson's situation—after being pulled over at 3:30 A.M., being told that they almost collided with a police car, and being asked to step out of their vehicle and participate in a SFST—would believe that they implicated themselves in reckless driving and OVUII crimes, and were therefore, not free to leave. State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai‘i 195, 203, 948 P.2d 1036, 1044 (1997) (“Generally, a person is ‘seized’ if, ‘from an objective standpoint and given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.’ ”) (citations and quotations omitted).¹

II. The medical-rule out questions constitute interrogation because they are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response

Because Tronson was in custody, it must be determined whether the medical rule-out questions constitute interrogation. State v. Joseph, 109 Hawai‘i 482, 493-94, 128 P.2d 795, 806-07 (2006); State v. Trinque, 140 Hawai‘i 269, 277, 400 P.3d 470, 478 (2017) (explaining that the two triggers for the Miranda requirement are “custody” and “interrogation”). The district court and the ICA correctly concluded that the medical rule-out questions constitute interrogation, and thus, suppressed Tronson's answers to the medical rule-out questions because the failure to provide him with Miranda warnings violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The touchstone of interrogation is “whether the police officer should have known that [their] words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the [d]efendant.” State v. Kazanas, 138 Hawai‘i 23, 37, 375 P.3d 1261, 1275 (2016) (citations omitted). An incriminating response refers to both inculpatory and exculpatory responses. State v. Eli, 126 Hawai‘i 510, 522, 273 P.3d 1196, 1208 (2012) (citing Joseph, 109 Hawai‘i at 495, 128 P.3d at 808)). Here, Officer Maalo should have—and did—know that the medical rule-out questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Tronson. Officer Maalo testified that the purpose of the medical rule-out questions is to determine if there are any “variables that might affect [the officer's] evaluation” of a suspect's performance on the SFST. That is, Officer Maalo testified that because Tronson answered no to all of the medical rule-out questions, he was able to “rule out any medical variables” that might have affected Tronson's performance on the SFST. Thus, Tronson's responses to the medical rule-out questions were inculpatory in that they allowed Officer Maalo to focus on the results of the SFST as caused by intoxication alone. Relatedly, one of the medical rule-out questions asks if the suspect is taking any medication. Officer Maalo testified that if a suspect responds that they are taking a medication that may cause impairment, that would contribute to his OVUII investigation. Accordingly, because the medical rule-out questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, they constitute interrogation. Therefore, if a suspect is in custody, as was Tronson, the medical rule-out questions must be preceded by Miranda warnings in order to be admissible.²

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent to the Majority's decision to vacate the ICA's July 31, 2020 judgment on appeal and the district court's May 9, 2019 judgment.

Sabrina S. McKenna

Michael D. Wilson

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Honorable Summer M.M. Kupau-Odo presided.

2.   HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) provides in relevant part:(a) A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if the person operates or assumes actual physical control of a vehicle:(1) While under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair the person's normal mental faculties or ability to care for the person and guard against casualty[.]

3.   HRS § 291-2 provides: “Whoever operates any vehicle ․ recklessly in disregard of the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving of vehicle ․ and shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.”

4.   Tronson's motion to suppress also sought to suppress all of his statements subsequent to the traffic stop. The district court granted this motion in full. On appeal, the ICA affirmed the district court's suppression of Tronson's answers to the medical rule-out questions, while vacating the court's suppression of Tronson's answers to whether he would participate in the SFST and understood the SFST instructions as well as the results of the SFST. Because the State's application for writ of certiorari only contests the ICA's decision as to the medical rule-out questions, and because Tronson did not file an application for writ of certiorari, the latter determinations are not at issue in this order.

5.   Because Tronson was not in custody at the time the medical rule-out questions were asked, we need not reach the issue of interrogation; Miranda warnings were not required.

1.   The fact that upon Tronson's apologizing for almost hitting Officer Maalo's car, Officer Maalo observed the odor of alcohol coming from Tronson, and that Tronson had red and glassy eyes compounds the fact that a reasonable person in Tronson's position would not have felt free to leave. At this point, not only did Officer Maalo have probable cause to arrest Tronson for reckless driving, but Officer Maalo also had reasonable suspicion that Tronson was driving while intoxicated. A reasonable person, after being informed they were pulled over for almost hitting a police car, and exhibiting signs of intoxication, would certainly not feel free to drive away from the officer.

2.   Because it was not raised on certiorari, this dissent does not address the validity of the ICA's decision to vacate the district court's suppression of Tronson's other statements (including Tronson's apology after being informed of the reason why he was stopped, Tronson's answers to whether he would participate in the SFST and whether he understood the SFST instructions as well as Tronson's performance on the SFST).