STATE v. MCGRIFF (2026)

The State appeals the trial court's grant of Jalen McGriff's motion to suppress three statements he made to Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) agents following the death of his infant daughter Ja'Layna Meriweather in March 2020.¹ On appeal, the State argues that (1) McGriff waived his right to a Jackson-Denno ² hearing; (2) the trial court erred in suppressing McGriff's March 5 and 6 statements because he was not in custody; and (3) the trial court erred in suppressing McGriff's March 11 statement because he was not in custody, but even if he were, he voluntarily waived his rights as set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). For the following reasons, we reverse in part and vacate in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The limited pre-trial record shows that on March 4, 2020, 16-year-old McGriff was with Ja'Layna and Ja'Layna’s mother, Juliann Meriweather, at Juliann's home in Clinch County. At approximately 4:00 a.m., police officers arrived in response to a call about an infant who was not breathing and unresponsive.³ After administering CPR to Ja'Layna, the officers took her to a local hospital. Ja'Layna was eventually transferred to Wolfson Children's Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. McGriff, Ja'Layna’s mother, and several family members traveled to the hospital in Florida. On March 6, 2020, Ja'Layna was removed from life support and pronounced dead.⁴

On March 5, 2020, McGriff was questioned by GBI Special Agent Seth Hullander at the hospital in Florida; this interview was not recorded. The next day, McGriff was questioned by GBI Special Agent Taylor Hundley at the hospital in Florida; part of this interview was audio-recorded. McGriff stated in this interview that Juliann's family was blaming him for Ja'Layna’s injuries and alleging that he threw Ja'Layna on a bed. On March 11, 2020, McGriff was questioned by GBI Special Agents Hullander and Jason Nipper at the Clinch County Sheriff's Office; this interview was audio-recorded.⁵ During this interview, McGriff admitted hitting Ja'Layna on her head the day she went to the hospital.

In September 2025,⁶ McGriff was indicted on charges of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated battery, and cruelty to children in the first degree. On October 27, 2025, McGriff filed an omnibus motion that included a request for a Jackson-Denno hearing, which he later refiled on November 24, 2025. At a hearing held in April 2026, the trial court heard testimony from two of the GBI agents and reviewed the available audio and video recordings of McGriff's various statements.⁷

(a) March 5 Statement

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State presented the testimony of Agent Hullander in connection with the interview McGriff gave on March 5. Agent Hullander testified that he and Agent Hundley traveled to the Florida hospital because Clinch County law enforcement had requested assistance from the GBI to investigate a suspected crime involving an infant.⁸ The GBI interviewed “[a]pproximately four or five” people at the hospital, including Juliann and McGriff. No one was under arrest at the time. At the hospital, he “asked [McGriff] if he would be willing to interview with [him],” and McGriff agreed. He did not give McGriff any Miranda warnings during the interview. He was in uniform and armed, and he conducted McGriff's interview in a “vacant room” where they “could shut the door and have ․ privacy.” The door was unlocked for the interview, and McGriff was sitting unrestrained “in a chair with his back to the door.” When asked whether he had “gained anything of evidentiary value that would cause [McGriff] to be a suspect at that point,” Agent Hullander testified that “[i]t was just a general interview with him to figure out the facts of what occurred at that time.”

Agent Hullander also testified that he was aware that McGriff was under the age of 18. During this interview, McGriff did not ask for his parents or guardian, and calling a legal guardian “never came up.” Agent Hullander testified that he was unsure if he asked about McGriff's education level. McGriff appeared to understand everything that he was telling him and did not appear afraid, scared, or angry. He did not promise McGriff anything. He did not believe McGriff was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The interview lasted less than two hours.

The trial court orally granted the motion to suppress all statements made in the March 5 interview, reasoning that “when two uniformed officers with firearms come and take a minor child, a 16-year-old[,] to a different room and sit them down and question them, I would think his perception was he was in custody.” Also, the trial court noted that McGriff's March 5 statement was not admitted into evidence and that “[Agent Hullander], when asked what of evidentiary value was done, gave at best a non-responsive answer.” The trial court also noted that “I personally think this is a good thing that children submit to adults to a degree” and that “it's very reasonable to think that as a child, when uniformed officers put you in a room, you're not free to leave. You're supposed to answer their questions.”

Subsequently, in a written order, the trial court found that:

the purpose of the interrogation was for a criminal investigation; the agent brought the Defendant into a room by himself with a recording; the agent did not ask if he wished to have a parent or legal guardian present even though he was a minor; the agent was in uniform and armed; and the agent drove across State lines to speak with him about the investigation. Based on this, the Court finds that a reasonable person in this situation with the same age would have reasonably concluded he was not free to leave.

(b) March 6 Statement

At the motion to suppress hearing, the State presented the testimony of Agent Hundley in connection with McGriff's March 6 interview. Agent Hundley testified that she asked to speak to McGriff at the Florida hospital,⁹ and after he agreed, she interviewed him in a waiting room; a portion of that interview was audio recorded. She did not give him Miranda warnings because she was originally there “just to ask him if [she] could obtain ․ his cell phone.” She was in uniform but was unsure if she was armed during the interview. She was also unsure whether she asked McGriff about his educational background. She knew that he was 16 years old, and she did not ask him if he wanted his legal guardian present because he was not under arrest and she was “just there ․ to obtain his cell phone” with his permission and “was not there to conduct the interview.” She was aware that he was living with Juliann and Ja'Layna, that Juliann's mother was also possibly living with them, and that McGriff was not living with his parents or guardians at the time. They talked about what information may have been on his cell phone browsing history, including his “reading up on autopsies” and that he wanted an autopsy conducted on his daughter. He signed a consent form allowing her to take his cell phone. Agent Hundley did not tell him or imply to him that he was under arrest or that he had to speak with her. She did not threaten him or imply that he was a suspect at the time, and she did not observe symptoms that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or was otherwise impaired. The audio-recorded interview lasted approximately 30 minutes.

The trial court also orally granted the motion to suppress the statements made in the March 6 interview, finding that Agent Hundley “drove to another state to get the cell phone of the Defendant in a hospital, took him to a room, had a conversation that lasted almost 30 minutes that she deemed fit to record. There w[ere] conversations not on recording. She was in uniform. I'm going to deem it a custodial interrogation.”

Subsequently, in a written order, the trial court found that “a reasonable person in this situation with the same age would have reasonably concluded he was not free to leave” because:

the purpose of the interrogation was for a criminal investigation; the agent brought the Defendant into a room by himself with a recording; the agent did not ask if he wished to have a parent or legal guardian present even though he was a minor; the agent was in uniform and possibly armed; and the agent drove across State lines to speak with him about the investigation.

(c) March 11 Statement

At the motion to suppress hearing, the State again presented the testimony of Agent Hullander in connection with McGriff's March 11 interview. Agent Hullander testified that on March 11, he and Agent Nipper picked up McGriff in Homerville at the local library and brought him to the Clinch County Sheriff's Office. Agent Hullander, who was in uniform and armed, and Agent Nipper ¹⁰ both interviewed McGriff in an office there; the entire interview was audio-recorded. Between March 4 and 11, the GBI had gained additional information that suggested McGriff was a suspect in the death of his infant daughter. As a result, at the beginning of the interview, the agents gave McGriff Miranda warnings, which they went over both verbally and in writing. McGriff subsequently signed a Miranda waiver form, which was introduced into evidence as State's Exhibit 1.¹¹

The agents were aware from previous interviews that McGriff was living with Juliann and Juliann's mother “three to four nights a week” and that he was not living with either of his parents at the time. The agents did not notify McGriff's parents because they “didn't know where they were or what his involvement was with them.” In particular, the agents did not believe McGriff's “mother to be very involved in his life” and because McGriff “had children of his own,” they “did not see it necessary to contact his mother.” No parent or other adult was present at McGriff's interview, and he did not ask for his parents or an adult during the interview. He was not handcuffed or searched at the time. He was offered a restroom break and food. McGriff told the agents he had an eighth-grade education. The interview lasted approximately 90 minutes.

The trial court reserved ruling on the March 11 statement at the hearing, but noted it was “troubling” that McGriff was “a child under the law with an eighth grade education,” yet the agents “made no effort to contact, inform or include an adult in any of this.” The trial court also expressed concern that “these two GBI spent less than two minutes explaining Miranda and verifying this child understood his rights before they proceeded to question him for this length of time.” (Italics supplied).

In the written order granting McGriff's motion to suppress, the trial court determined that McGriff's March 11 statement was inadmissible because he was in custody and that although the GBI agents informed him of his Miranda rights, “he did not voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently waive his rights ․ base[d] ․ on the totality of the circumstances.” The trial court explained that:

the agents spent a very small amount of time reviewing his Miranda rights; he was 16 years old with an 8th grade education; he was not asked if he wished to review [them] with a parent or legal guardian; and the Defendant did not have access to family or friends. Further, some statements from the agents could be confusing to a person of the same age and education of the Defendant as to the consequences of his statements. Therefore, the statements are found to be involuntarily given.

1. The State first asserts that the trial court erred by proceeding with a Jackson-Denno hearing instead of summarily denying the motion to suppress because McGriff waived his right to a hearing by filing a “boilerplate” motion and failing to specify which statements he contended should be suppressed. This aspect of the State's claim fails because the State ultimately consented to proceeding with the Jackson-Denno hearing.

At the outset of the Jackson-Denno hearing, the prosecutor objected on the grounds that McGriff had requested a hearing on all of McGriff's statements “without being specific about any of these statements.” In response, McGriff's counsel explained she was asking for a “Jackson-Denno hearing on any statements that the State is seeking to admit.” After further colloquy, the prosecutor asked the trial court to “let all the statements come in” because McGriff's counsel “has not pled her motion with specificity.” In response, the trial court ruled: “If you're asking me to not have a Jackson-Denno hearing because [McGriff's counsel] has failed to plead with specificity, then I'm going to continue the case and allow [McGriff's counsel] to amend her motions.” The prosecutor replied, “Oh, no, sir. I don't want you to do that. Out of an abundance of caution, we went ahead and subpoenaed all of the officers involved that spoke with Mr. McGriff. We didn't know what else to do, frankly, and they're here.” The trial court then proceeded with the hearing.

On appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred by presenting the State with “the impossible dilemma of moving forward on a boilerplate motion for a Jackson-Denno hearing or continue a murder case in which the alleged crime occurred in the year 2020” instead of denying the motion to suppress without a hearing and proceeding with trial. However, the State did not object on this basis in the trial court, so we review for plain error. See Ross v. State, 296 Ga. 636, 639 n.6, 769 S.E.2d 43 (2015) (“For cases tried after January 1, 2013, with regard to rulings on evidence, a court is allowed to consider plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.” (cleaned up)); OCGA § 24-1-103(d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”).

To show plain error,

first, there must be an error or defect – some sort of deviation from a legal rule – that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error – discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Gonzalez v. State, 319 Ga. 787, 791–92, 906 S.E.2d 705 (2024) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).

Because the State ultimately agreed to move forward with the hearing instead of insisting that the trial court deny the motion to suppress without a hearing, the State has affirmatively waived this issue on appeal. See Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 671, 911 S.E.2d 554 (2025) (defendant affirmatively waived objection to medical examiner testifying by videoconference when the defendant “actually agreed to the procedure about which he complains on appeal”). See generally Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 684, 724 S.E.2d 366 (2012) (“Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (cleaned up)). The State's claim therefore fails under the first prong of the plain error standard.

2. The State asserts that the trial court erred in suppressing the March 5 and 6 statements because the interviews were not custodial and therefore Miranda warnings were not required to be given to McGriff before speaking with him. As explained below, the trial court made express factual findings, but because those findings are insufficient for us to meaningfully review the trial court's rulings suppressing McGriff's statements, we vacate those rulings and remand the case to the trial court to make additional factual findings.

We begin with a review of the applicable legal principles. When an accused “is in custody and subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent,” State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 617, 797 S.E.2d 72 (2017), the accused “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. “This requirement arises when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389, 390, 858 S.E.2d 42 (2021) (quotation marks omitted).

“In determining whether a suspect is in custody, we must consider the totality of the circumstances without regard for the subjective views of the suspect or the interrogating officer.” Walden, 311 Ga. at 390, 858 S.E.2d 42 (citing Licata v. State, 305 Ga. 498, 501, 826 S.E.2d 94 (2019)). Thus, “the relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in [defendant]’s position would perceive his situation.” McAllister v. State, 270 Ga. 224, 228, 507 S.E.2d 448 (1998). “Although there is no one dispositive factor, important considerations include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Walden, 311 Ga. at 390, 858 S.E.2d 42 (quotation marks omitted).

“To use [an accused's] custodial statements in its case-in-chief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the [accused] was advised of these [Miranda] rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived them.” State v. Lopez-Cardona, 319 Ga. 222, 226, 903 S.E.2d 18 (2024). See Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99, 102, 868 S.E.2d 219 (2022) (“The State has the burden of proving that evidence challenged in a motion to suppress is admissible.”). “[W]hether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waives his constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 433, 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). The “test requires trial courts to consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding a juvenile's interview with law enforcement officials to determine whether the State has met its burden of showing that the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.” Id. at 437, 883 S.E.2d 317. This totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry is the same for juveniles as it is for adults.¹² “[W]aiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and “it must be made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Hill v. State, 322 Ga. 700, 702, 921 S.E.2d 339 (2025) (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–83, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (quotation marks omitted)).

When the facts material to a motion to suppress are disputed, “it generally is for the trial judge to resolve those disputes and determine the material facts.” Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746, 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015). “[T]his Court has identified three corollaries of this principle, which limit the scope of review in appeals from a grant or denial of a motion to suppress in which the trial court has made express findings of disputed facts.” Id.

First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support it. Second, the trial court's decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment.

Scott v. State, 323 Ga. 312, 314–15, 925 S.E.2d 124 (2026) (citation omitted).

Whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda and whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights are mixed questions of law and fact. See Walden, 311 Ga. at 390, 858 S.E.2d 42 (“Whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda is a mixed question of fact and law.”); Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 54, 709 S.E.2d 223 (2011) (explaining that the issue of whether a defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights “presents a mixed question of law and fact”). “We apply de novo the relevant legal principles to the facts, and we accept the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility of witnesses unless clearly erroneous, and construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court.” Walden, 311 Ga. at 390, 858 S.E.2d 42. See Dickey v. State, 324 Ga. 245, 247, 929 S.E.2d 736 (2026) (“When reviewing whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we generally review a trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error and apply the law de novo.”) (quotation marks omitted).

“The clearly erroneous standard is equivalent to the highly deferential ‘any evidence’ standard, which means we will not reverse a trial court's factual findings if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 251, 869 S.E.2d 447 (2022). And in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider the factual findings in the trial court's written order, and we may also consider factual findings made in the court's oral pronouncements at the hearing on the motion to suppress. See, e.g., Lopez-Cardona, 319 Ga. at 228, 903 S.E.2d 18 (considering the trial court's written orders on the motions to suppress and the additional factual findings the trial court made when it pronounced that ruling at the end of the hearing on the motions, which “the parties d[id] not dispute that the trial court's orders were based on those findings”); Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335 n.4, 745 S.E.2d 630 (2013) (“the written order, together with the court's oral pronouncement before trial, indicated that the proper standard was applied as to the matters in controversy”). “We note, however, that if there had been any discrepancies between the trial court's oral pronouncement and its written ruling, such discrepancies would be resolved in favor of the written judgment.” Lopez-Cardona, 319 Ga. at 228 n.10, 903 S.E.2d 18.

(a) Turning to the March 5 interview, the State makes two primary arguments for reversing the trial court's order. First, the State argues that in determining whether McGriff was in custody, the trial court erroneously applied the four factors set out in State v. Wilson, 257 Ga. App. 120, 570 S.E.2d 409 (2002), and State v. Hendrix, 221 Ga. App. 331, 471 S.E.2d 277 (1996), that were disapproved of in State v. Folsom, 285 Ga. 11, 673 S.E.2d 210 (2009), instead of determining how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would perceive his situation.¹³ The State then argues that because Agent Hullander testified that McGriff voluntarily spoke with him, was not told he could not leave, was not restrained, was not promised or threatened, did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and left after the interview, McGriff was not in custody.

Although the State claims that the trial court erroneously applied the “Wilson/Hendrix test” for the custody analysis, nothing in the trial court's order or findings at the motion to suppress hearing indicates that the trial court was applying the Wilson/Hendrix test. Neither case was cited or referred to at the hearing or in the order. And the trial court referenced the reasonable person standard when it concluded in its order that the March 5 and 6 statements were made while McGriff was in custody because “the Court finds that a reasonable person in this situation with the same age would have reasonably concluded he was not free to leave” and that the March 11 statement was also made in custody because “[a] reasonable person with the same age and education as the Defendant would have reasonably concluded he was not free to leave.”

As for the State's argument that the trial court erred in concluding that McGriff was in custody, we conclude that the trial court's explicit factual findings alone do not support that a reasonable person in McGriff's situation would have believed he was in custody. Although the court found “that the purpose of the interrogation was for a criminal investigation,” that “the agent brought the Defendant into a room by himself with a recording,” that “the agent was in uniform and armed,” that “the agent did not ask if he wished to have a parent or legal guardian present even though he was a minor,” and that “the agent drove across State lines to speak with him about the investigation,” we have held that these factors alone are insufficient to support that a reasonable person would perceive he was in custody. See Walden, 311 Ga. at 395, 858 S.E.2d 42 (defendant was “interviewed in an interrogation room [ ] by an investigator” who “was in uniform, armed, and seated next to the door ․ without any family members present” are “factors by themselves [that] would not support a finding that [the defendant] was in custody.”)

We also note that the trial court appeared to place undue weight on age as a factor when it stated during the hearing for the March 5 statement “when two uniformed officers with firearms come and take a minor child, a 16-year-old to a different room and sit them down and question them, I would think his perception was he was in custody” and for the March 5 and 6 statements “for the reasonableness of a child, I do think our society is predicated on the idea of children do what adults tell them to do. To respect authority, submit to authority․. I think it's very reasonable to think that as a child, when uniformed officers put you in a room, you're not free to leave.” While a child's age can be included in the custody analysis, “[t]his is not to say that a child's age will be determinative, or even a significant factor in every case.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011).

Notably, the trial court did not make factual findings that courts typically consider for determining custody, such as whether McGriff voluntarily spoke with the agent, whether he was expressly told that he was free or not free to leave, whether he was actually free to leave, and whether he was restrained. See, e.g., Walden, 311 Ga. at 395, 858 S.E.2d 42 (concluding that the trial court erred in determining that defendant was not in custody partly because she was “not handcuffed or otherwise restrained”); Ward v. State, 313 Ga. 265, 274–75, 869 S.E.2d 470 (2022) (concluding that the trial court did not err in holding that a defendant was not in custody when “he was unrestrained in an unlocked room” and “was not custodial until [the officer] told him that he was no longer free to leave”); Troutman, 300 Ga. at 617, 797 S.E.2d 72 (concluding that the trial court did not err in determining that a defendant was in custody in part because “investigators never advised [the defendant] that he was free to leave” and that defendant “was explicitly told that he was not allowed to leave”); Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 289–90, 766 S.E.2d 447 (2014) (concluding that the trial court did not err in finding that a defendant was not in custody during an initial interview when he “agreed voluntarily” to speak with investigators, “was never physically restrained,” and “would have been free to leave if he had so requested”); State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 108, 686 S.E.2d 239 (2009) (concluding that the trial court did not err in finding that a reasonable person would believe he was in custody in part when he “was, in essence, required to come to the police station for questioning” and “was never given any indication that he was free to leave or terminate the interview”).

However, even though we have concluded that the trial court's explicit factual findings do not support its ultimate conclusion, it remains the State's burden to prove that McGriff was not in custody. Although the trial court did not expressly indicate in its written order what credibility determinations it made as to Agent Hullander's testimony, it was authorized to believe or disbelieve any portion of his testimony. See Williams v. State, 301 Ga. 60, 61–62, 799 S.E.2d 779 (2017) (trial court could have disbelieved the testimony of the detective at the motion to suppress hearing); Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 56, 440 S.E.2d 646 (1994) (“The trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony.”). The trial court could have assigned no weight to Agent Hullander's testimony to the extent that it found that his testimony was not credible. See Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746–47, 770 S.E.2d 636 (reasoning that the trial court was permitted to assign no weight to the testimony of the officers to find that their testimony was not credible).

But, given that the trial court made no factual findings on the factors that courts typically consider to determine custody, such as whether McGriff was told he was free to leave and was actually free to leave, it is unclear whether the trial court relied solely on the inadequate factual findings from its order to conclude that McGriff was in custody or whether the trial court also rejected all of or parts of the testimony of Agent Hullander and implicitly made factual findings to support custody. Because the trial court's explicit factual findings would not support that McGriff was in custody and we cannot determine from the record whether the trial court implicitly made other factual findings based on its assessment of the witness's credibility, we cannot meaningfully review the trial court's ruling. Thus, we remand for further findings on McGriff's March 5 interview, consistent with this opinion. See Lopez-Cardona, 319 Ga. at 222–23, 903 S.E.2d 18 (vacating and remanding when the factual findings were not sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful review of trial court's suppression ruling).

(b) As for the March 6 interview, which is based on the testimony of Agent Hundley and a partial audio-recording of the interview, we also conclude that the trial court's explicit factual findings do not support that a reasonable person in McGriff's situation would have believed he was in custody and that we cannot determine from the record whether the trial court implicitly made other factual findings based on its assessment of the Agent Hundley's credibility to meaningfully review the trial court's ruling. Thus, we also remand for further fact finding on McGriff's March 6 interview.

As explained above, when material facts are disputed, we typically defer to the trial court's credibility and factual determinations on appeal. But, “where some or all of the material facts are undisputed, we properly may take notice of the undisputed facts – even if the trial court did not – without interfering with the prerogative of the trial court to resolve disputes of material fact.” State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 39, 897 S.E.2d 432 (2024) (cleaned up). Those undisputed facts may include audio recordings when, as here, the facts “definitely can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility.” Daniels v. State, 313 Ga. 400, 407, 870 S.E.2d 409 (2022) (cleaned up), disapproved of in part on other grounds by Clark, 315 Ga. 423, 883 S.E.2d 317. See also Hughes, 296 Ga. at 747 n.5, 770 S.E.2d 636 (“We have held that less deference to the trial court is owed to the extent that material facts definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility.”).¹⁴

The State argues that the trial court erred in determining that McGriff was in custody on March 6 because McGriff had been interviewed three times previously and had been allowed to leave at the end of each interview; Agent Hundley asked McGriff at the hospital to speak to her and he voluntarily agreed; Agent Hundley testified that McGriff was not promised anything or threatened and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol; and McGriff appeared to understand all of the questions asked of him.

Like the trial court's factual findings for the March 5 interview, its factual findings for the March 6 interview “that the purpose of the interrogation was for a criminal investigation,” that “the agent brought the Defendant into a room by himself with a recording,” that “the agent was in uniform and possibly armed,” that “the agent did not ask if he wished to have a parent or legal guardian present even though he was a minor,” and that “the agent drove across State lines to speak with him about the investigation,” are insufficient to support that a reasonable person would perceive he was in custody.¹⁵ Also like the March 5 interview, the trial court did not make factual findings for the March 6 interview that courts typically consider for determining custody, such as whether McGriff voluntarily spoke with the agent, whether he was expressly told that he was free or not free to leave, whether he was actually free to leave, and whether he was restrained. And again, the trial court appeared to place undue weight on age as a factor when it stated in the hearing for the March 6 statement that given McGriff's age “[p]arents should be contacted with this stuff” and for both the March 5 and 6 statements that “for the reasonableness of a child, I do think our society is predicated on the idea of children do what adults tell them to do. To respect authority, submit to authority․. I think it's very reasonable to think that as a child, when uniformed officers put you in a room, you're not free to leave.” See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277, 131 S.Ct. 2394.

Additionally, our review of the audio recording supports that Agent Hundley did not threaten or promise McGriff and did not tell him that he was not free to leave, but no audio recording exists of the conversation that led to the interview. As found by the trial court at the hearing, Agent Hundley “had a conversation that lasted almost 30 minutes that she deemed fit to record. There [were] conversations not on [the] recording.” The trial court was authorized to reject Agent Hundley's account of what occurred during the conversation that was not recorded, and the State has not pointed to any evidence other than Agent Hundley's testimony to support the circumstances of the unrecorded conversation. But as explained above, given that the trial court made no factual findings on the circumstances that courts typically consider to determine custody, it is unclear whether the trial court relied solely on the inadequate factual findings from its order to conclude that McGriff was in custody or whether the trial court also rejected some or all of the testimony of Agent Hundley about the unrecorded conversation and implicitly made factual findings to support custody. Because we cannot determine from the record whether the trial court implicitly made other factual findings based on its assessment of Agent Hundley's credibility and cannot meaningfully review the trial court's ruling, we remand for further fact finding on the March 6 interview. See Lopez-Cardona, 319 Ga. at 222–23, 903 S.E.2d 18.

3. Finally, the State asserts that the trial court erred in suppressing the March 11 statements. In particular, the State contends that McGriff voluntarily waived his Miranda rights ¹⁶ and that the trial court erroneously concluded that “a juvenile is not just entitled to, but required to have a guardian present for an interview with law enforcement” to determine whether McGriff voluntarily waived his Miranda rights instead of reviewing the totality of the circumstances. See Clark, 315 Ga. at 431, 883 S.E.2d 317. The State also argues that because McGriff was given Miranda warnings verbally and in writing, which he seemed to understand, was not threatened or promised anything, was offered a restroom break and food, and was not handcuffed, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.

Although the State claims that the trial court erroneously based its ruling solely on whether a juvenile is required to have a guardian present during an interview, the trial court's order and findings at the motion to suppress hearing contradict that argument. At the hearing, the trial court acknowledged that “the Court[ ]s do say sometimes that an adult ․ doesn't have to be there ․. That was removed from the statute” but did note that “even though that's removed from the statute, it doesn't mean that constitutional rights of that child are no longer protected or needed to be protected.” The trial court also explained that it “do[es] see there's cases that says the parents are not supposed to be there,” but also stated “in the voluntariness of it, I am supposed to look at the totality of the circumstances.” The trial court further explained other circumstances it would consider including “that these two GBI spent less than two minutes explaining Miranda and verifying this child understood his rights before they proceeded to question him for this length of time” and that “there are also statements made by the GBI that to a child's perspective, gets close to ․ implied promise of leniency.” (Italics supplied.)

The trial court's written order also demonstrates that it did not base its ruling solely on whether a juvenile's parent or legal guardian must be present at the interview. The trial court stated that it “base[d] its decision on the totality of the circumstances” which included findings that “the agents spent a very small amount of time reviewing his Miranda rights,” that “he was 16 years old with an 8th grade education,” and that “some of the statements from the agents could be confusing to a person of the same age and education of the Defendant as to the consequences of his statements” in addition to the findings that McGriff “was not asked if he wished to review [the Miranda warnings] with a parent or legal guardian” and “did not have access to family or friends. Further, some statements from the agents could be confusing to a person of the same age and education of the Defendant as to the consequences of his statements.” Thus, contrary to the State's argument, the trial court did not solely rely on whether McGriff was required to have a parent present and instead applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether McGriff voluntarily waived his rights. See Pindling v. State, 321 Ga. 231, 237–38, 913 S.E.2d 659 (2025).

Turning to the question of whether McGriff knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because McGriff voluntarily waived his rights. Although the trial court questioned the amount of time that the GBI agents took to review his Miranda rights, the record shows that the GBI agents intelligibly went over the rights and McGriff verbally acknowledged that he understood each of his rights as they were read and presented in writing to him. He then signed the Miranda waiver form. Compare Daniels, 313 Ga. 400, 870 S.E.2d 409 (trial court correctly found that a 15-year-old with a ninth grade education who signed a waiver had waived his rights); Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 838, 848 S.E.2d 882 (2020) (trial court properly found that a 16-year-old with a ninth grade education who signed a waiver had waived his rights); Dickey, 324 Ga. at 249, 929 S.E.2d 736 (trial court correctly determined that a 16-year-old with a tenth grade education who was read “his Miranda rights verbatim from a GBI card” voluntarily waived his rights).

Also, despite the trial court's reliance on the fact that McGriff's parents were not present during the interview, “this factor is not determinative on the issue of voluntariness.” Love, 309 Ga. at 838, 848 S.E.2d 882. See also Daniels, 313 Ga. at 413–14, 870 S.E.2d 409 (trial court properly found voluntary waiver even when defendant was not advised that a parent could be present); Heard v. State, 287 Ga. 554, 557, 697 S.E.2d 811 (2010) (“The fact that [the defendant's] mother was not present was a factor for the trial court to consider, but it was not determinative on the issue of voluntariness.” (cleaned up)). Analyzed collectively, the trial court's factual findings do not support as a matter of law that McGriff did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Instead, our review of the audio recording of this interview and the waiver form demonstrate that at the outset of the interview, the GBI agents reviewed, verbally and in writing, each of the rights listed on the waiver of rights form with McGriff and that he appeared to understand the rights that he would be waiving. McGriff signed his name under a portion of the waiver-of-rights form indicating that he understood his rights and was willing to talk to law enforcement and that he had not been threatened, promised anything, or been forced in any way to answer any questions or make any statements.

We note that although the trial court found in its order that “some statements from the agents could be confusing to a person of the same age and education of [McGriff] as to the consequences of his statements,” it failed to identify in its order the statements that could be confusing. At the hearing, the trial court referenced some of the “statements made by the GBI that to a child's perspective, gets close to ․ implied promise of leniency” like “you're not a bad person, your situation was impossible ․ I can promise you you're not going to leave here until the truth is told and that's going to be better for you.” Assuming that the trial court was referring to these statements in the written order, the GBI agents made these comments after McGriff waived his Miranda rights, so these comments have no bearing on whether McGriff knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, and our review of the audio recording does not show that the agents threatened or promised McGriff anything in exchange for the waiver of rights. Compare State v. Rodriguez, 274 Ga. 728, 729, 559 S.E.2d 435 (2002) (holding that defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights partly because “the police induced the waiver [of the defendant's Miranda rights] by promising [him] and his mother during a “preliminary discussion that was not recorded” “that the charges would be dropped or the sentence would be reduced later” if he gave a statement), disapproved of in part on other grounds by Clark, 315 Ga. at 433, 883 S.E.2d 317.

Based on the relevant undisputed facts as discerned from the audio recording, we conclude that McGriff knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances, and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. See Dickey, 324 Ga. at 249–50, 929 S.E.2d 736 (trial court properly held that a 16-year-old who was read his Miranda rights, affirmed that he understood each right, and was not threatened or promised anything voluntarily waived his rights); Hill, 322 Ga. at 705–06, 921 S.E.2d 339 (trial court properly determined voluntariness despite the defendant's “youth and inexperience” because “his responses were consistently coherent [ ] and he did not appear to be impaired”); Love, 309 Ga. at 838, 848 S.E.2d 882 (trial court properly concluded that a 16-year-old who signed a waiver voluntarily waived his rights). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's ruling as to the March 11 statement.

Judgment reversed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4).

2.   See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).

3.   McGriff was questioned by a Clinch County police officer at Juliann's home, which was recorded on the officer's body camera. Later that same day, McGriff was questioned by another Clinch County police officer, which was also recorded on his body camera. Although McGriff moved to suppress his statement to the second officer, the trial court did not rule on that statement. Neither of these statements are at issue on appeal.

4.   According to a March 11 audio recording, GBI agents claimed that Ja'Layna’s death was the result of “a bump on her head” that occurred a few hours before going to the hospital, likely from “intentional force to the head.”

5.   In addition, the agents recorded several videos of McGriff performing re-enactments of what may have caused the injuries to Ja'Layna when she was with McGriff in the days leading up to and on the night of her becoming unresponsive.

6.   There is no indication in the record as to why McGriff was not indicted until five years after Ja'Layna’s death.

7.   McGriff did not testify at the hearing.

8.   The trial court asked Agent Hullander during his direct examination about why the GBI had been asked to participate in the investigation, and Agent Hullander responded that it is “very common for GBI to work the death of children.” But on cross-examination Agent Hullander conceded that Ja'Layna had not died until the next day.

9.   Agent Hundley testified that she “made contact” with McGriff in the room where Ja'Layna was and that he mentioned at that time “Googling autopsies.” «V2. 40-41» That conversation was not recorded.

10.   Agent Hullander testified that he did not remember if Agent Nipper was in uniform or was armed. Agent Nipper did not testify at the hearing.

11.   Agent Hullander testified that at the time of this interview, the GBI did not have a separate waiver-of-rights form for juveniles.

12.   For many years, Georgia courts – following Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976) – applied a nine-factor test to evaluate whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights under Miranda. In 2023, this Court disapproved of certain language in Riley and clarified that there is one standard for evaluating the voluntary waiver of rights set out in Miranda. See Clark, 315 Ga. at 435 n.16, 883 S.E.2d 317. Specifically, this Court held “trial courts are to use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights ․ and we therefore disapprove language in Riley and later cases suggesting that the nine-factor framework is required or exclusive.” Id. at 429, 883 S.E.2d 317.

13.   The State correctly notes that Wilson and Hendrix were disapproved in Folsom, 285 Ga. at 13, 673 S.E.2d 210 (“Therefore, Shy v. State [234 Ga. 816, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975)] and its progeny, including State v. Wilson and State v. Hendrix, are hereby disapproved insofar as they consider irrelevant factors in lieu of applying the objective inquiry.”).

14.   We have typically “taken notice” of video recordings as one potential source of undisputed facts, and we have occasionally applied this principle to an audio recording. However, at least some of us have recognized that there are “potentially relevant and material differences between video and audio recordings” that may include “being able to visually identify a person's body language, and being able to visually identify overt acts of coercion than an audio tape might not reveal.” Franklin, 318 Ga. at 46–47, 897 S.E.2d 432 (Warren, J., concurring). Neither party contends that the audio recordings fail to accurately capture what happened during the interviews.

15.   The trial court's findings were virtually identical for suppressing the March 5 and 6 statements except the trial court noted that on March 6 the agent was “possibly armed.”

16.   Although the State argues that McGriff was not in custody, it is undisputed that McGriff was advised of his Miranda rights. Thus, we will assume that McGriff was in custody for purposes of this analysis and will focus our analysis on whether he voluntarily waived his rights.

McMillian, Justice.

All the Justices concur.