RUCKER v. STATE (2026)

Appellant Corey Maurice Rucker appeals his convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Destyn Alexander.¹ On appeal, Rucker argues that the State violated his federal due process rights when it failed to correct false or misleading testimony from one of its witnesses, that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the law of accident, that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury on the defense of justification, that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence related to the victim's habit or routine of carrying a weapon, and that Rucker received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following. About three days before his death, Alexander sought to rent a motel room with Trampus Freize, Caroline Wikholm, and Victoria Estefan. Short on funds, the group called Rucker, who they hoped could help provide them with money for lodging and access to drugs. Rucker agreed, and they obtained a room where they “part[ied]” with methamphetamine, at least some of which was supplied by Rucker, as well as other drugs.

On the third morning, the group discussed how they would divide the cost to stay another night. Rucker agreed to front the money, and Wikholm and Estefan agreed to supply about half the cost of the room with money they planned to obtain later that afternoon by selling videos of themselves online. Freize contributed to the group by allowing Rucker and others to use his car, but Alexander — who had previously paid for lodging using money sent by his mother — was short. Alexander had access to about $30 on a gambling app on his phone but was unwilling to put these funds towards the room, which angered Rucker.

While Rucker and Wikholm were booking the room for another night, Rucker complained to Wikholm that Alexander had “no hustle.” After they returned, Rucker stepped out to run an errand using Freize's car, and when he got back, he was a “little aggravated,” and “a little hot,” according to Wikholm.

Rucker then told Alexander that he had to leave, but Alexander refused. According to Freize, Alexander stood up from his chair by the door and said, “I'm not going to go anywhere.” Freize heard Rucker say, “If you cross this line, I'm going to shoot you.” Freize then heard (but did not see) the sound of “feet moving,” a scuffle, and a gunshot.

Wikholm testified that Rucker and Alexander were about three feet apart when Rucker pulled out a gun, aimed it at Alexander, and said, “I'm going to shoot you.” Alexander responded, “You're going to shoot me?” Wikholm then told everyone to calm down, but after a few seconds, Rucker shot Alexander.

Estefan also testified that Rucker and Alexander were about three feet apart and recalled Rucker saying, “I'm going to shoot you,” and Alexander responding, “Are you serious[?] [Y]ou're going to shoot me[?]” According to Estefan, Rucker then pulled a gun out of “a bag on his left arm,” put it to Alexander's chest, and pulled the trigger.

Freize, Wikholm, and Estefan each testified that Alexander did not have a firearm or any other type of weapon. Freize did not see the shooting, but both Wikholm and Estefan testified that Alexander did not attack Rucker. And Estefan confirmed that Alexander did not make any threats, his hands were open, and he did not touch Rucker or try to grab him or his gun in any way.

After Rucker shot Alexander, Rucker left the room with Freize in Freize's car. Wikholm then called 911, but first responders and medical providers were unable to save Alexander. Several days later, officers located Rucker at a different motel and obtained an arrest warrant. Because Rucker blocked the door of his room with a dresser, a SWAT team forced entry using a battering ram and arrested him.

Rucker testified in his own defense. According to Rucker, he and Alexander were having a verbal argument when Alexander rose from his chair and “stepped to” Rucker. Alexander “grabbed [Rucker's] shirt,” and Rucker hit Alexander's hand. Rucker said, “bro, you tripping, man,” and Alexander responded, “man, I don't care nothing about that.”

Rucker provided different accounts of how his gun discharged. First, he testified that he “never pulled the gun out and pointed it at” Alexander. Rucker claimed that he had his gun in a fanny pack and that when Alexander grabbed his shirt, “the gun went off.” According to Rucker, “it got shot through the fanny pack.” Rucker explained that he had a revolver with a long barrel and that he “wasn't able to pull the gun all the way out of the bag.” But under continued questioning from his own counsel, Rucker confirmed that he was scared, that he felt the need to defend himself, that he intended to defend himself, and that he did pull out the gun, even though he did not intend to kill Alexander. Under still more questioning from his counsel, Rucker confirmed that he shot Alexander because he was in fear for his safety.

Rucker claimed that Alexander had a habit of making metal “fidget spinners” and stated that in prison, similar devices are called “ice pick[s]” and are “actually ․ weapon[s].” And he further testified that when Alexander came toward him, “[h]is hands wasn't wide open[ ]. He grabbed me with one hand and had this thing in the other hand. That's why I pushed him and told him ․ like, [‘]man, back off.[’]” Rucker testified that after spending time in prison, he generally tried to avoid violent situations and that if Alexander “wouldn't have came at me,” Rucker “would have walked out that door.”

2. In his first claim of error, Rucker argues that the State violated his due process rights by knowingly soliciting and failing to correct false testimony from its witness, Freize. Specifically, Rucker contends that the State knowingly solicited false testimony when the prosecutor asked Freize, “Have I offered you anything in exchange for your testimony?” and that the State knowingly failed to correct false testimony after Freize responded, “No, sir.” In support of his claim that Freize's testimony was false (and that the State knew it was false), Rucker points to a summary order terminating Freize's probation that was entered shortly after Rucker's trial. But this order does not establish that the State offered Freize anything prior to Rucker's trial in exchange for his testimony; rather, a review of the record shows that, at best, Freize had a hope or expectation that his probation would be terminated if he testified on behalf of the State. As explained further below, because Rucker has not shown that Freize's testimony was false, Rucker's claim that the State knowingly solicited and failed to correct false testimony lacks merit.

(a) As recognized in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), “conviction of a crime following a trial in which perjured testimony on a material point is knowingly used by the prosecution is an infringement on the accused's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law.” Wimes v. State, 293 Ga. 361, 363, 744 S.E.2d 787 (2013) (cleaned up) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173). “To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it to go uncorrected when it appeared.” Ellison v. State, 324 Ga. 342, 348, 929 S.E.2d 135 (2026) (citing Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 246, 145 S.Ct. 612, 221 L.Ed.2d 90 (2025)). And “[e]ven if a defendant makes this showing, a new trial is warranted only if the false testimony may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial[.]” Id. (citation omitted). But “[i]t is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’[s] credibility rather than directly upon [the] defendant's guilt.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. On review of a Napue claim, the trial court's findings of fact on a motion for new trial are upheld unless clearly erroneous. Ellison, 324 Ga. at 348, 929 S.E.2d 135.

A review of the appellate record shows the following. During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that Freize was being held in jail and explained:

[Freize] wants me to let him out. Common sense is going to tell you that. We haven't offered anything to [Freize]. I don't ever offer anything to folks who testify, but make no mistake, ladies and gentlemen, [Freize] wants to get out of jail and wants us to do it. That being the case[,] we haven't promised him anything.

Later, during the State's direct examination of Freize, Freize confirmed that he was currently incarcerated for a probation violation, and the following exchange occurred:

PROSECUTOR: What were you on probation for?

FREIZE: Fleeing and eluding.

PROSECUTOR: Dope?

FREIZE: Methamphetamine and one more charge. Speeding.

PROSECUTOR: And I told the jury that you knocked off the sprinkler head in the jail and they gave you a misdemeanor for that?

FREIZE: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: When are you supposed to be getting out?

FREIZE: I have no idea.

PROSECUTOR: Earlier today[,] did you ask if you're getting out?

FREIZE: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: I want you to be really clear. Have I offered you anything in exchange for your testimony?

FREIZE: No, sir.

PROSECUTOR: You really want me to get you out though?

FREIZE: Yes.

After this colloquy, Freize testified that Rucker told Alexander that Alexander had to leave the hotel room; that Freize then heard “feet moving” and a gunshot; that Rucker had a revolver; and that Alexander did not have a gun or other weapon, as described above.

On March 11, 2025 — less than a month after Rucker's trial — Freize's probation was terminated pursuant to a summary order that stated in full, “The defendant having come before this Court to address his probationary sentence, and both sides being represented and having come to an agreement, and for good cause shown: it is so ordered that the defendant's probation be terminated.” (Capitalization altered). The order was prepared by the same prosecutor who examined Freize at Rucker's trial.

In Rucker's subsequent motion for new trial, Rucker asserted that the order terminating Freize's probation “conclusively establishe[d] that a benefit was conferred after [Freize's] cooperation,” and that Napue had required the State to correct any false or misleading impression regarding Freize's benefit or motivation. At the hearing on Rucker's motion, both the prosecutor and Rucker's trial counsel testified concerning this issue.

At the hearing, the prosecutor acknowledged that he “anticipated” that Freize wanted leniency but testified that he made it “very clear” to Freize that he was not going to offer him “anything on the front end.” The prosecutor asserted that he did not decide to propose leniency until after Freize testified and that he did so because he believed Freize had endangered himself by testifying. The prosecutor recounted how, after trial, he contacted Freize's counsel about terminating Freize's probation and told him that Freize had “done the State of Georgia a solid.” The prosecutor further testified that the word “agreement” in the order terminating Freize's probation referred to the agreement between the State and Freize's counsel reached after Rucker's trial, rather than any agreement regarding Freize's testimony.

Rucker's trial counsel, on the other hand, testified that if he had known that Freize would be released early, he would have “[a]bsolutely” explored that fact on cross-examination and in his closing. But trial counsel also admitted that he did not have any evidence of an agreement in exchange for Freize's testimony, stating:

I'm going to be candid. ․ [O]bviously I don't have anything — The only thing I know is after our trial[,] [the prosecutor] appeared before Judge Brakefield and ․ made a recommendation that [Freize's] probation be terminated for any and all purposes that was discussed in chambers. And personally[,] that's why I think that part was a lie just because to me it's very suspicious. Now, do I have any concrete proof that's the case, I do not.

On January 28, 2026, the trial court denied Rucker's motion for new trial. In its written order, it found that “no offer was made to Freize in exchange for his testimony.”

(b) As stated above, to establish a violation of his due process rights as expressed in Napue, Rucker “must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it to go uncorrected when it appeared.” Ellison, 324 Ga. at 348, 929 S.E.2d 135. Because the trial court found that “no offer was made to Freize in exchange for his testimony,” Rucker must show that this finding was clearly erroneous to meet his burden on appeal. Id. Rucker points to the court order subsequently terminating Freize's probation as evidence that the State knew Freize's testimony was false, but the order fails to establish Rucker's claim.

Though the order references “an agreement” without specificity and therefore could refer to a pre-trial agreement between Freize and the State, the prosecutor testified unequivocally at the motion for new trial hearing that “[a]t no point was there an agreement with either [Freize's counsel] or Mr. Freize that he testify in exchange for anything.” When finding that “no offer was made to Freize in exchange for his testimony,” the trial court appears to have credited this testimony and the prosecutor's explanation that when the prosecutor referred to an “agreement,” he was referencing his post-trial recommendation to terminate Freize's probation. Rucker's contention on appeal that the order terminating Freize's probation evinces an implied arrangement made pre-trial is unsubstantiated by any evidence and therefore speculative. Accordingly, Rucker has not demonstrated that the trial court clearly erred when finding that the State had not offered Freize any benefit in exchange for his testimony. See Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 850–51, 828 S.E.2d 327 (2019) (“To the extent that [the witness] and her counsel hoped or expected that her testifying at Appellant's trial would later benefit her, that does not ․ establish the prosecution's knowing use of false testimony.” (citation omitted)). Rucker's Napue claim therefore fails. See Ellison, 324 Ga. at 349, 929 S.E.2d 135 (holding that the trial court did not clearly err when finding that the defendant had failed to establish the existence of false testimony and ruling that his Napue claim was therefore without merit).²

3. In his next claim, Rucker contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the law of accident, as provided in OCGA § 16-2-2. That statute provides a “person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.” OCGA § 16-2-2. Rucker argues that because he testified he accidentally discharged his pistol during his struggle with Alexander, the trial court was obligated to instruct the jury on the law of accident as provided in OCGA § 16-2-2 and that its failure to do so was error.

To begin, because Rucker did not request an instruction on the law of accident and did not object to its omission after the final charge, we review his claim on appeal for plain error only. See Bodie v. State, 323 Ga. 891, 894, 928 S.E.2d 92 (2026) (applying plain error review to an unpreserved claim that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the law of accident). To establish plain error, an appellant must show

(1) an error that was not affirmatively waived, (2) that the error was clear and obvious, and (3) that the error affected h[is] substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means [ ]he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. If [ ]he makes such a showing, we would have discretion to remedy the error, but only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Id. If the appellant fails to establish one prong of the plain error test, we need not address the other prongs. Id.

Pretermitting whether it was clear error for the trial court to forgo an instruction on the law of accident, Rucker's claim fails because he does not argue, let alone establish, that the alleged error affected the outcome of this trial. Here, the evidence of malice was very strong. Freize, Wikholm, and Estefan each testified that Alexander was unarmed when Rucker threatened to shoot him. And Wikholm and Estefan testified that Alexander was not attacking Rucker when Rucker shot him. By contrast, the evidence that Rucker's firearm discharged by accident was weak and self-serving. The only evidence of an accidental discharge came from Rucker's own testimony, and his account of how his gun discharged appeared to change during his examination. Initially, Rucker claimed that his gun was either fully or partially in his fanny pack when Alexander grabbed him and the gun went off. But under continued questioning from his own counsel, Rucker responded affirmatively when asked if he intentionally shot Alexander. As such, Rucker has failed to show that the lack of an instruction on the law of accident likely affected the outcome of his trial. See Bodie, 323 Ga. at 895, 928 S.E.2d 92 (holding that the appellant failed to show that the lack of an instruction on the law of accident likely affected the outcome of her trial where the evidence of accident was weak and the appellant focused on developing her claim of self-defense at trial). And because Rucker has failed to satisfy at least one of the prongs of the plain error test, his claim fails. Id. at 894, 928 S.E.2d 92.

4. In his third enumeration of error, Rucker claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the law of self-defense. As relevant here, the Georgia Code provides that “a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death ․ only if he ․ reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself ․ or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” OCGA § 16-3-21(a). Rucker contends on appeal that the trial court improperly struck the phrase “to prevent the commission of a forcible felony” from its charge to the jury and that this was prejudicial because, in Rucker's view, Alexander was committing or attempting to commit the crime of false imprisonment, a felony. The record does not support Rucker's claim, however. Though the record shows that the trial court did not adopt all of Rucker's requests with respect to its instruction on the law of self-defense, it shows that the court did not omit the phrase “to prevent the commission of a forcible felony” as Rucker contends. Because the trial court retained that language, Rucker's claim that the court erred by omitting it fails. To the extent there were other discrepancies between Rucker's requests regarding the law of self-defense and the charge actually given, those discrepancies are not raised as error on appeal.

5. Rucker next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony regarding whether Alexander “usually carr[ied] a weapon[.]” But this claim, like the one before it, is based on a misreading of the record. The transcript of Rucker's trial shows that though the trial court initially sustained the State's objection, it later reversed its ruling and permitted defense counsel to question Wikholm about Alexander's gun-carrying habits, but defense counsel chose to withdraw his question. Accordingly, this enumeration presents nothing for us to review. Cf. Williams v. State, 314 Ga. 671, 674, 878 S.E.2d 553 (2022) (“We cannot review the admission of evidence for error if it was never admitted.”).

6. Lastly, Rucker contends that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in five ways: counsel (1) failed to adequately investigate an accident defense and to present related expert testimony; (2) failed to request and obtain an instruction on the law of accident; (3) failed to preserve for ordinary appellate review his objection that the trial court omitted statutory language authorizing deadly force to prevent the commission of a forcible felony; (4) engaged in only limited impeachment of Freize; and (5) failed to request a limiting instruction after copies of Rucker's prior convictions were admitted into evidence. Upon review, Rucker has not established that his counsel was ineffective, as explained below.

(a) “To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show deficient performance by trial counsel and resulting prejudice.” Bryant v. State, 324 Ga. 273, 287, 929 S.E.2d 802 (2026). See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish that his trial counsel performed deficiently, “a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Rosenau v. State, 321 Ga. 299, 307, 914 S.E.2d 300 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “The law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Overcoming this presumption requires “a defendant [to] show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did[ ] or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id. “To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Evans v. State, 322 Ga. 652, 662–63, 921 S.E.2d 348 (2025). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627, 634, 916 S.E.2d 406 (2025) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quotation marks omitted)). Because an appellant must establish both his counsel's deficient performance and prejudice resulting therefrom, “[i]f a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, we need not address the other part of the Strickland test.” Cooper v. State, 321 Ga. 349, 351–52, 914 S.E.2d 800 (2025).

(b) In two related claims of ineffective assistance, Rucker contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony supporting an accident defense and for failing to request a jury instruction on the law of accident. We address these claims together and conclude that Rucker's counsel did not perform deficiently in this regard.

Rucker's counsel testified during the motion for new trial hearing that he had discussed raising a justification defense with his client and that that was their plan. Rucker's testimony that his gun went off by accident surprised his counsel, but, because he had already told the jury in his opening statement that Rucker had acted in self-defense, he maintained that strategy, to the exclusion of an inconsistent accident defense.

Counsel's choice was not unreasonable. Given Rucker's equivocal testimony, a defense of accident was not obviously stronger than a defense of justification. And because an accident defense is inconsistent with a justification defense, we have held that it is “not patently unreasonable” for a counsel to avoid presenting an accident defense where, as here, counsel believed it would have “undermined the all-or-nothing justification defense.” Fox v. State, 321 Ga. 411, 415, 915 S.E.2d 592 (2025). As such, counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to present expert testimony regarding the likelihood that Rucker's firearm discharged accidentally and by failing to request an accident instruction.

(c) In his next ineffective-assistance claim, Rucker once again contends that the trial court failed to charge the jury that Georgia law authorizes the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of a forcible felony and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve this issue for ordinary appellate review by renewing his objections after the charge was given. See OCGA § 17-8-58(a) (“Any party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”). But, as we explained above, the trial court did charge the jury using the phrase Rucker claims it omitted. Because Rucker's claim is based on a faulty premise about the facts and procedure below, it lacks merit.

(d) Rucker also faults his counsel for engaging in a limited cross-examination of Freize that failed to “fully develop the extent of his exposure or the potential for benefit” as well as “the full context of Freize's incentive to testify favorably for the State.” We disagree.

As noted above, Freize responded affirmatively on direct examination when asked if he was in custody and if he wanted the State to let him out. During cross-examination, Rucker's trial counsel questioned Freize at length about the events leading to Alexander's death and confirmed that Freize was currently in jail for a probation violation, fleeing and eluding, and DUI.

We have explained that the “extent of cross-examination is a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and such strategic and tactical decisions do not amount to deficient performance unless they are so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made them under similar circumstances.” Monroe v. State, 324 Ga. 323, 334, 929 S.E.2d 182 (2026). And we have further explained that, as a general matter, the “decision whether to impeach a witness is a matter of trial strategy that typically will not support a claim of ineffective assistance.” Id.

On appeal, Rucker does not specify what additional information cross-examining Freize about his incentives to testify would have elicited. To the extent Rucker argues that his counsel failed to expose the existence of a pre-trial agreement between Freize and the State, we have already explained that Rucker has failed to establish on appeal the existence of any such agreement. Because the jury was informed of Freize's incentives to testify favorably for the State during his direct examination and Rucker does not identify any facts on appeal that further cross-examination would have revealed, we cannot say that his trial counsel's performance was deficient in this regard. See Monroe, 324 Ga. at 334, 929 S.E.2d 182 (holding that the appellant had not established that her trial counsel performed deficiently for failing to further cross-examine a witness where the appellant provided no evidence that additional cross-examination would have elicited further specific and helpful testimony). Accordingly, Rucker has not established that his counsel was ineffective.

(e) In his last ineffective-assistance claim, Rucker contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction from the trial court regarding the jury's consideration of Rucker's prior convictions. After review, we conclude that Rucker's claim fails because he has not established that his counsel's performance was deficient.

During Rucker's direct examination by his own counsel, Rucker told the jury that he grew up in Miami in the 1980s and was introduced to drugs at a young age. He admitted that he sold drugs and that he had spent 20 years in prison for armed robbery and aggravated assault.³ Rucker further testified that he was stabbed in prison and that as a result of this experience, he made a vow to “never go back.” Though he conceded that he still engaged in some criminal activity, he explained that his experience in prison led him to “avoid [violence] as much as [he] could.”

On cross-examination, the State questioned Rucker about his conviction for armed robbery and introduced into evidence certified copies of his prior convictions. These convictions included the armed robbery and aggravated assaults previously mentioned, as well as other convictions for possession of cocaine, possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and giving a false name to a law enforcement officer. Rucker's trial counsel did not object to the admission of Rucker's prior convictions and did not request any form of limiting instruction from the judge.

Rucker's trial counsel was not questioned about these decisions at the motion-for-new-trial hearing. And in its order denying Rucker's motion, the trial court noted the absence of any questions about this issue and ruled that Rucker had failed to demonstrate that his counsel had performed deficiently.

“The decision of criminal defense counsel not to request limiting instructions is presumed to be strategic.” Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 222–23, 892 S.E.2d 744 (2023). Though the record lacks testimony from Rucker's trial counsel about his decision to forgo a request for a limiting instruction, our review of the trial transcript suggests an objectively reasonable strategy consistent with counsel's decision: counsel may have asked Rucker about his prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault to build Rucker's credibility with the jury by showing that he was candid about his past. And counsel may have questioned Rucker specifically about his experience in prison to establish that Rucker avoided violence where possible and to support Rucker's contention that he would not have shot Alexander unless in self-defense. See Scott, 317 Ga. at 223, 892 S.E.2d 744 (explaining that “[i]f a reasonable lawyer might have done what the actual lawyer did — whether for the same reasons given by the actual lawyer or for different reasons entirely — the actual lawyer cannot be said to have performed in an objectively unreasonable way”).

Rucker does not argue on appeal that his trial counsel's decision to solicit Rucker's testimony about his criminal history was deficient; he simply takes issue with his counsel's choice not to request an instruction that the jury should consider Rucker's prior convictions for “impeachment purposes only, and not as substantive evidence of guilt.” But we cannot say that counsel's decision to forgo requesting such an instruction was patently unreasonable, as a reasonable counsel could have determined such an instruction was unnecessary in light of Rucker's own testimony and would limit the jury's ability to consider Rucker's asserted disposition to avoid violence when determining whether Rucker acted in self-defense. See Scott, 317 Ga. at 224, 892 S.E.2d 744 (holding that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request an instruction that the jury's consideration of the defendant's prior convictions be limited to impeachment purposes only where the Court identified a possible strategy consistent with trial counsel's choice that was not objectively unreasonable). See also Jarvis v. State, 285 Ga. 787, 791, 683 S.E.2d 606 (2009) (explaining that trial counsel's decision not to request a limiting instructing concerning the appellant's prior convictions was presumed to be strategic and holding that the appellant had failed to carry his burden on appeal of demonstrating that his trial counsel was deficient). As such, Rucker has not established that his trial counsel was ineffective in this regard.

(f) Finally, Rucker asks that we consider cumulatively any prejudice resulting from his trial counsel's deficient performance. See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 n.1, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007) (explaining that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's alleged errors should be considered when determining whether counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020). But because we have not identified or assumed any instances of deficient performance, there is no prejudice to aggregate.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The crimes occurred on January 19, 2024. On April 9, 2024, a Hall County grand jury returned an indictment charging Rucker with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4), theft by taking (Count 5), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). At the conclusion of a jury trial from February 10, 2025, through February 13, 2025, Rucker was found guilty of Counts 1 through 4, but not guilty of Count 5, theft by taking. The State did not present Rucker's charge for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6) to the jury, and that charge was nol prossed. The trial court sentenced Rucker to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1) and a consecutive term of five years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Rucker's remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law.On February 13, 2025, Rucker timely filed a motion for new trial, which he subsequently amended through new counsel. Following a hearing on October 29, 2025, the trial court denied Rucker's motion by written order on January 28, 2026. Rucker then filed a timely notice of appeal, which was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term of court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   Rucker argues in passing that the State failed to “disclose ․ the truth regarding Freize's” agreement in violation of “Brady.” Though his brief includes no supporting citation, it appears Rucker is referring to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression of material evidence favorable to the accused by the prosecution violates the accused's right to due process. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. To the extent Rucker argues that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the existence of a pre-trial agreement between Freize and the State regarding Freize's testimony, that claim fails because Rucker has not established that there was any such agreement, as shown above.

3.   Rucker testified that he had “done the aggravated assault, but the armed robbery, it was like someone was trying to take drugs from me and I defended myself.”

Colvin, Justice.

All the Justices concur.