GARDEI v. TAYLOR (2026)

In the second appearance of this case before our Court, Appellant Carl Gardei contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing his fourth amended petition for declaratory relief. In that petition, Gardei alleged that the continued enforcement of the statutory requirements regarding sex offender registration, OCGA § 42-1-12 et seq. (“the Registry Act”), violated his constitutional rights and that he should no longer be required to register as a sex offender. The trial court dismissed on the ground that the issue presented by the declaratory judgment action was moot because recent revisions to the Registry Act provided Gardei with the ability to request removal from the registration requirements of the act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on different grounds, concluding that Gardei sought an impermissible advisory opinion. We granted certiorari and, for the reasons that follow, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Because the Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the basis for the trial court's ruling, choosing instead to affirm that ruling on an alternative right-for-any reason basis that we reject, it should now on remand address the enumerations of error Gardei raised. If, after doing so, it concludes that the trial court's basis for dismissing the declaratory judgment action was in error, it should vacate the trial court's dismissal order and direct the trial court to adjudicate on the merits Gardei's claim for declaratory judgment.

1. Factual Background and Procedural History

Gardei, who was convicted out of state for several sexual offenses, sought a declaratory judgment concerning his continuing registration obligations after he moved to Georgia. Despite the uncertainty that he alleged concerning his future obligation, the trial court dismissed his declaratory judgment action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

As summarized by the Court of Appeals:

In 1992, Gardei pleaded guilty to a number of offenses in Arizona, including multiple counts each of kidnapping, attempted sexual assault, and sexual abuse. After his release from prison in 2003, Gardei moved to New Mexico, where he was required to register as a sex offender for a period of ten years. In 2009, Gardei moved to Georgia. According to Gardei, he contacted the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office and an unnamed deputy advised Gardei that he would be required to register as a sex offender in Georgia. On August 12, 2009, Gardei registered as a sex offender in Gwinnett County.

In 2018, Gardei sent a letter to the Gwinnett County sheriff's department and the GBI, requesting his removal from the sex offender registry. The GBI responded that he would not be removed from the registry, alleging that Gardei remained subject to the requirements of the Registry Act because the crime of sexual abuse in Arizona has the same or similar elements as the crime of aggravated assault with the intent to rape in Georgia, and the crime of sexual assault in Arizona has the same or similar elements as attempted rape in Georgia.1 The letter further explained that although Gardei's Arizona convictions predated the effective date of Georgia's sex offender registry on July 1, 1996, Gardei was released from prison in Arizona in 2003, when the registry already was in existence. The GBI, however, advised Gardei that he could petition a Georgia court for relief pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-19, and if granted such relief, the GBI would comply with the court order.

In October 2018, Gardei filed a petition for declaratory relief in the Superior Court of DeKalb County against R. L. “Butch” Conway, in his official and individual capacities as the then sheriff of Gwinnett County; Vernon M. Keenan, in his official and individual capacities as the then director of the GBI; and Attorney General Christopher Carr. In his petition, Gardei alleged that the respondents’ continued enforcement against him of the statutory requirements governing the Registry Act violated his constitutional rights as: (1) he has never been convicted of a crime in Georgia; (2) he is no longer required to register as a sex offender in any other state; (3) he “does not currently fit any of the definitions of an individual who is required to register [as a sex offender] under OCGA § 42-1-12 (e)”; (4) he would not have been required to register as a sex offender if his offenses of conviction had occurred in Georgia; and (5) a Georgia resident convicted of the same crimes as Gardei's 1992 Arizona convictions would not be required to register as a sex offender in Georgia. Gardei sought a declaration that OCGA § 42-1-12 et seq. is unconstitutional, and that he is not subject to the obligations imposed on sex offenders under the Registry Act. Gardei also sought injunctive relief enjoining further enforcement of the requirements of the Registry Act against him, as well as an award of attorney fees and costs.

In November 2018, Gardei filed an amended petition, dropping Carr as a party-defendant. Conway and Keenan moved to dismiss Gardei's petition. In February 2019, Gardei moved to substitute D. Victor Reynolds in his official and individual capacities as director of the GBI after Keenan retired from that position. In March 2019, Gardei filed a second amended petition for declaratory relief against Conway and Reynolds in their individual capacities only, which Conway and Reynolds moved to dismiss. In May 2019, Gardei filed a third amended petition, adding allegations concerning injuries sustained from being listed on the registry of sex offenders, which Conway and Reynolds also moved to dismiss.

In an order dated June 20, 2019, the trial court dismissed Gardei's petition on the ground that his claims for relief were time-barred under OCGA § 9-3-33, the two-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims, because Gardei had initially registered under the Registry Act in 2009. Th[e] Court [of Appeals] affirmed in a divided panel opinion. See Gardei v. Conway, 357 Ga. App. 539, 851 S.E.2d 170 (2020) (“Gardei I”). The Supreme Court granted Gardei's petition for certiorari and reversed th[e] Court[ of Appeal]’s judgment. Gardei v. Conway, 313 Ga. 132, 141, 868 S.E.2d 775 (2022) (“Gardei II”). Specifically, the Gardei II Court held that (1) actions brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act were subject to statutes of limitation, even though the Act did not include any limitation period; (2) Gardei's action for declaratory judgment — arguing that enforcement of the Registry Act violated his federal and state constitutional rights — was governed by the two-year limitation period applicable to actions for personal injury; and (3) his claims seeking prospective declaratory relief had not accrued, and thus, the two-year limitation period governing the action had not begun to run. Id. at 135-141, 868 S.E.2d 775. On remand, th[e] Court [of Appeals] adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. See Gardei v. Conway, 365 Ga. App. 142, 142, 877 S.E.2d 699 (2022) (“Gardei III”).

Upon remand, Gardei filed a “motion to amend parties and then to dismiss former parties.” Gardei sought to add Michael Register, who replaced Reynolds as Director of the GBI and to dismiss Reynolds from the suit. The motion likewise sought to dismiss Conway from the action and add Keybo Taylor, who had assumed the role of sheriff of Gwinnett County. The court granted Gardei's motion. On February 3, 2023, Gardei filed an amended petition (his fourth) for declaratory relief against Taylor and Register in their individual capacities, again raising constitutional grounds related to the enforcement of the Registry Act. Taylor and Register filed separate answers to the petition. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In August 2023, Gardei sought to substitute Chris Hosey for Register as the director of the GBI.2

Prior to ruling on the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court sua sponte dismissed Gardei's petition for declaratory and injunctive relief on July 2, 2024 as moot.3 The court highlighted that the revised Registry Act (effective July 1, 2024) now provides that a person required to register under the Registry Act may petition a superior court for release from registration requirements if the person

[w]as convicted of a sexual offense and required to register under the laws of another state or territory, under the laws of the United States, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or in a tribal court and: [h]as completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 and meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (c) (1) (A) through (c) (1) (F) of Code Section 17-10-6.2; and [h]as been removed from the registry in the other state or territory and can provide the court with documentation supporting the same.

OCGA § 42-1-19(a)(5)(A)-(B). From this statutory language, the court reasoned that Gardei now possesses a statutory vehicle to request removal from the registration requirements of the Registry Act. Gardei filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, but the record on appeal does not contain a ruling on this motion. Gardei filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's July 2, 2024 dismissal order.

Gardei v. Taylor, 375 Ga. App. 402, 403–06, 916 S.E.2d 212 (2025) (“Gardei IV”).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Gardei's petition under the right-for-any reason rule, declining to accept the trial court's reliance on the revised Registry Act as a basis for dismissal but nonetheless concluding that the action was properly dismissed because any ruling by the trial court would constitute an improper advisory opinion. As the basis for its holding, the Court of Appeals relied on the fact that Gardei's most recent amended petition only sought “prospective relief”—that he does not have to comply with the Registry Act's registry requirements—and does not “assert claims based on past renewals of his registration.” See Gardei IV, 375 Ga. App. at 408, 916 S.E.2d 212. For the reasons discussed below, the analysis of the Court of Appeals was flawed, requiring us to vacate its decision and remand the case to it for further proceedings.

2. Legal Analysis

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act (the “Act”), courts “are authorized to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration in cases of actual controversy and in any civil case in which the ends of justice so require.” Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 96, 901 S.E.2d 512 (2024) (cleaned up) (quoting OCGA § 9-4-2(a)–(b)). The Act is to be “liberally construed and administered[,]” and its stated purpose “is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” OCGA § 9-4-1. See also Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Eternal Vigilance Action, Inc., 321 Ga. 771, 791, 917 S.E.2d 125 (2025) (explaining that the “purpose” of the Act is to “remove the cloud of uncertainty with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which is properly incident to [a plaintiff's] alleged rights and which if taken without direction might reasonably jeopardize his interest” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

A party is entitled to a declaratory judgment if there are

circumstances showing [a] necessity for a determination of the dispute to guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which is properly incident to his alleged rights and which if taken without direction might reasonably jeopardize his interest.

Morgan v. Guar. Nat'l Cos., 268 Ga. 343, 344, 489 S.E.2d 803 (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Thus, to state a claim for declaratory judgment, a party need only allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in which future conduct depends on resolution of uncertain legal relations.” City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 285 Ga. 231, 234–35, 674 S.E.2d 898 (2009).

Actions for declaratory and injunctive relief necessarily seek future relief, and that is precisely what Gardei sought in his petition for declaratory judgment. See Floam, 319 Ga. at 89, 99, 901 S.E.2d 512 (“A request for declaratory relief is a request for prospective relief—relief from the threat of wrongful acts and injuries yet to come.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). By contrast, “[w]hen a declaration of rights would not direct the plaintiff's future conduct or would merely determine rights that had already accrued, relief under the Act is unavailable.” Eternal Vigilance, 321 Ga. at 791, 917 S.E.2d 125 (emphasis supplied). See also Floam, 319 Ga. at 97, 901 S.E.2d 512 (collecting cases). In other words, “[w]here the rights of the parties have already accrued and the party seeking the declaratory judgment does not risk taking future undirected action, a declaratory judgment would be ‘advisory.’ ” Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 214, 518 S.E.2d 879 (1999) (“no declaratory judgment may be obtained which is merely advisory, or fruitless, or which merely answers a moot or abstract question” (cleaned up)).

Here, Gardei's fourth amended petition sought relief from uncertainty concerning his future obligation to register as a convicted sex offender. Rather than defeating his claim for declaratory relief, the fact that he sought prospective relief concerning his future obligation supported that claim. Because Gardei's claims show “a necessity for a determination of the dispute to guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which is properly incident to his alleged rights and which if taken without direction might reasonably jeopardize his interest,” he has properly stated a claim for declaratory judgment as to the applicability of the Registry Act. See Baker, 271 Ga. at 214, 518 S.E.2d 879. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of Gardei's petition on this basis. Accordingly, we vacate that decision and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.⁴ See Hotels.com, 285 Ga. at 237, 674 S.E.2d 898.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   There is no indication in the record that anyone from the Gwinnett County Sheriff's Office responded to Gardei's letter.

2.   Both Gardei and Register agree that Register should not be a party in this case.

3.   The record contains no indication that the trial court ruled on Gardei's request to substitute Hosey for Register prior to dismissing the action.

4.   We recognize that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal under the right-for-any reason rule and therefore did not rule on the reason given by the trial court for its dismissal of Gardei's declaratory judgment action. Specifically, the Court of Appeals expressed no opinion concerning whether the revisions to the Registry Act that were adopted the day before the trial court's ruling somehow mooted his claim for declaratory relief. We are skeptical that the trial court's dismissal can be upheld on this basis, but we leave that issue for resolution by the Court of Appeals on remand. If the Court of Appeals concludes that dismissal was not authorized by these revisions, it should vacate the trial court's dismissal order and remand the case to the trial court with direction that it adjudicate Gardei's claim for declaratory relief on the merits. We express no opinion on the merits of Gardei's underlying declaratory judgment action.

Land, Justice.

All the Justices concur except Pinson, J., disqualified.