WALKER v. STATE (2026)

Otis Walker was found guilty of the malice murder of his girlfriend Aleka Simmons, the aggravated assault of three law enforcement officers, and related crimes.¹ Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Walker appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in two respects: by admitting evidence of Walker's prior acts of violence and by denying his motion to introduce evidence of Simmons's previous convictions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. The evidence at trial showed the following. On the night of the crimes, Walker and Simmons were at the home of Walker's mother. The couple got into an argument, and Simmons cut Walker with a box cutter. Walker's mother asked Simmons to leave, and Simmons responded that Walker would not allow her to leave. Walker's mother insisted that Simmons leave and offered to give her a ride. While Simmons gathered her belongings, Walker's mother fell asleep. Walker's mother was awakened by the sound of a “pop,” followed by Walker entering the room and telling her that Simmons was “gone.” Walker's mother then went to a neighbor's home and called 911.

Two officers from the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office arrived at the scene and began approaching Walker's mother's house on foot as a third officer drove up and parked his vehicle. As the third officer exited his vehicle, he heard gunfire erupt and saw the first two officers trying to take cover. The officers returned fire, and by the time the shooting stopped, 19 rounds had been fired at the officers. One officer sustained multiple nonfatal gunshot wounds. Walker fled the scene after the shootout. Officers found Simmons's body in an upstairs bedroom of Walker's mother's home. She had suffered a fatal shotgun wound to her chest. In another bedroom, officers found the shotgun, which contained one spent casing and one live round. A closed, folding “knife, possibly a boxcutter” was photographed on a table in the bedroom where Simmons's body was found, on the opposite side of the room from her body. Walker was arrested a week later. At the time of his arrest, officers found in Walker's pocket a note from Walker to the officer who was wounded in the shootout in which Walker apologized for his actions.

At trial, Walker testified in his own defense. According to Walker, Simmons “came at” him with a box cutter, cutting his shoulder, so he retrieved his shotgun and told her to leave the house immediately. Simmons begged Walker to let her stay and began hitting him when he refused. Walker called a friend and reported that Simmons had just cut him and that she was “going to mess around and [he was] going to kill her.” The friend testified at trial that, during their conversation, Walker said, “I'm going to kill this b**h.” Eventually, Simmons threatened to report Walker for violating the conditions of his bond at the time, and Walker responded that he would put Simmons out of the house the next morning. Then, according to Walker, Simmons “came with her box cutter and, you know, [he] shot her.” Walker acknowledged that he did not believe the boxcutter could “stand a chance against a shotgun.” Walker claimed that, after shooting Simmons, he took the boxcutter from her and put it on a table in the bedroom. Walker did not attempt to render aid to Simmons but instead smoked some of her marijuana, explaining that Simmons was “already dead by then. She died fast.” Walker acknowledged firing an “AR-style pistol” at responding officers but claimed he fired at the ground.

2. In his first enumeration of error, Walker argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State, over Walker's objection, to cross-examine him about his 2007 arrest for threatening to kill his mother, his 2019 guilty plea to the simple battery of his child's mother, and an allegation, which Walker denied, that in 2015 he shot his neighbor in the leg. In denying Walker's motion for new trial, the trial court found that it had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of specific instances of Walker's violent conduct but that Walker was not harmed by that error. We agree that the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless.

It is well settled that nonconstitutional “[e]videntiary errors require reversal only if they harm a defendant's substantial rights, and the test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Bowman v. State, 319 Ga. 573, 584, 905 S.E.2d 605 (2024) (cleaned up). See also Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 261, 869 S.E.2d 447 (2022) (“It is fundamental that harm as well as error must be shown for reversal.”). “In determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record de novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so.” Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 713, 854 S.E.2d 523 (2021) (cleaned up).

As a general matter, we have deemed the admission of other-acts evidence harmless “where the properly admitted evidence was so strong that the prejudicial effect of the other acts evidence had no significant influence on the guilty verdicts.” Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 6, 885 S.E.2d 790 (2023) (cleaned up). See also Wilson v. State, 322 Ga. 76, 93, 917 S.E.2d 726 (2025) (“[T]he harmless-error question turns on how much the wrongly admitted evidence likely mattered to the jury's decision to convict.”). And so it is here.

As detailed above, Walker's sole defense at trial was that he acted in self-defense when he shot Simmons. But based on our review of the record, it is clear that Walker's self-defense claim was weak, generally resting on his own self-serving testimony. Besides the presence of a closed, folding knife or boxcutter in the same bedroom where Simmons was killed, there was no evidence besides Walker's testimony that Simmons was armed at the time of the shooting. And the jury had plenty of reason to be skeptical of Walker's testimony that he acted in self-defense given that his actions after the shooting — namely, failing to render aid or seek emergency assistance and instead smoking marijuana, engaging in a shootout with responding police officers, and fleeing the crime scene — were wholly inconsistent with that claim. See Senior v. State, 323 Ga. 793, 797, 927 S.E.2d 218 (2026) (noting that the fact of an accused's flight or resistance to arrest is evidence of consciousness of guilt and thus guilt itself); Lowe v. State, 298 Ga. 810, 811, 783 S.E.2d 111 (2016) (“Though [appellant] maintained that [the victim] pointed a gun at him, the jury was authorized to disbelieve this testimony, particularly given his failure to render aid and refusal to summon emergency assistance after the shooting.”). Moreover, the jury heard testimony that, shortly before the shooting, Walker told a friend he was going to kill Simmons, further undermining Walker's self-defense claim.

In the face of this evidence, it is difficult to see how the other-acts evidence at issue would have had a “significant influence” on the jury. See Nundra, 316 Ga. at 6, 885 S.E.2d 790. The State asked Walker a single question about his 2007 arrest for threatening to kill his mother, and Walker flatly denied the 2015 shooting of his neighbor, a denial the State did not challenge. See Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. 277, 283, 830 S.E.2d 90 (2019) (holding that any error in the admission of other-acts evidence was harmless and noting that “the State spent a minimal amount of time eliciting evidence concerning the [other act], presenting just two witnesses who took the stand briefly, and there is no contention that the State mentioned or relied upon the incident during its closing argument to the jury”). And though the jury heard testimony about Walker's 2019 guilty plea to simple battery against the mother of his child, any harm arising from that testimony would have been marginal in light of the substantial other testimony, unchallenged on appeal, of Walker's violence toward, and acrimonious relationship with, Simmons and his shooting her. See Bowman, 319 Ga. at 584–85, 905 S.E.2d 605 (admission of evidence that appellant used violence against his ex-wife was harmless because the “marginal harm” of the other-acts evidence “was unlikely to have significantly altered the jury's perception of [appellant], given that the jury heard substantial other evidence, unchallenged on appeal, of [appellant's] violence and jealousy against [the victim]”). In sum, we conclude that it is highly probable that any error in admitting the other-acts evidence did not contribute to the jury's verdicts, and this claim fails.

3. In his remaining claim of error, Walker contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to introduce evidence that, in 2011, Simmons was convicted of three misdemeanor counts of giving false information to law enforcement officers. Walker sought to admit the prior convictions as impeachment evidence under OCGA § 24-6-609(a)(2) (“Rule 609”) on the belief that the State would introduce Simmons's hearsay statements about her prior difficulties with Walker that were made to a police officer and captured on body-camera footage. As with other evidentiary rulings, we review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 609 for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. State, 307 Ga. 79, 84, 834 S.E.2d 830 (2019).

Under Rule 609, “[e]vidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime” is admissible “[f]or the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness” “if it readily can be determined that establishing the elements of such crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or making a false statement.” The problem with Walker's theory of admissibility, however, is that it does not appear from the record, nor does Walker contend that Simmons's hearsay statements were actually admitted at trial. Indeed, the record shows, and Walker acknowledges, that the State disclaimed any intent to introduce the body camera footage showing Simmons's statements before the trial court ruled on Walker's motion to admit her prior convictions. In the absence of such evidence, Simmons's credibility was not at issue and was not subject to impeachment. See Redding v. State, 320 Ga. 107, 112, 907 S.E.2d 258 (2024) (“Rule 609 applies when a witness's character for truthfulness can be impeached[.]”). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Walker's motion, and this claim fails.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The crimes occurred on August 1, 2019. On July 20, 2022, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Walker for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), three counts of aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer engaged in official duty (Counts 4–6), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7). At a September 2023 trial, a jury found Walker guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Walker to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive 20-year term on each of Counts 4–6, and a consecutive 5-year term on Count 7, for an aggregate sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole plus 65 years. The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Walker timely filed a motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Walker's motion, as amended, on November 24, 2025. Walker timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

Bethel, Justice.

All the Justices concur.