REYNOLDS v. STATE (2026)

Charles Reynolds appeals from his conviction for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Kenya Living.¹ Reynolds asserts that (1) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about certain bad acts committed by Reynolds against her and (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (a) failing to move to suppress the State's seizure of Reynolds's cell phone password and the subsequent search of Reynolds's cell phone, (b) failing to object to the State's soliciting testimony from a non-expert witness concerning domestic abuse and its effects on victims, (c) not impeaching three witnesses’ testimony about the victim's good character with his violent felony convictions, and (d) waiving an objection to the court's comment on the evidence to the jury. Reynolds also argues that the cumulative prejudice from these errors requires the grant of a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The evidence presented at trial showed that, in the early morning hours of July 6, 2020, Reynolds fatally stabbed Living inside the apartment where Reynolds's girlfriend, Jessica Peralta, lived with her stepbrother, Marcos Sandavol. Reynolds eventually admitted that he stabbed Living but claimed that he did so in self-defense.

At trial, Peralta testified that she and Reynolds began dating around February 2020. Their relationship became “rocky” when Reynolds grew jealous of Peralta's male friends and accused her of “sleeping around.” When Sandavol moved in with Peralta and Sandavol's friend, Living, began to visit their apartment, it “became a huge issue” for Reynolds. Although Peralta denied having a romantic relationship with Living, Reynolds thought that Living was purposefully trying to upset him by spending time around Peralta. Toward the end of their relationship, Reynolds became “violent,” and Peralta described several incidents in which Reynolds “came into [her] bedroom window” while she was sleeping because he thought she was with someone else. On other occasions, Reynolds “slashed the tires to [her] van so [she] wouldn't leave,” “tried to keep [her] dog from [her],” and broke the window in her rental car. Peralta stated that Reynolds had “a collection of knives that he carried around in his backpack.”

On July 5, 2020, Peralta hosted a group of friends at her apartment for brunch. Sandavol arrived unexpectedly at the apartment with Living, prompting Reynolds to become upset. Sandoval and Living later left the apartment. That evening, while Reynolds was running an errand, Sandavol and Living returned to Peralta's apartment. Sandavol took a shower, and Living fell asleep on the couch. When Sandoval decided to leave, he asked Peralta if she wanted him to wake Living up or if he could keep sleeping on the couch. Peralta agreed to let Living continue to sleep on the couch.

When Reynolds returned to the apartment and found Living asleep on the couch, he became upset. Peralta explained that Sandavol and Living were both supposed to go back out together, but because Living had fallen asleep on the couch, she thought it would be fine to leave him undisturbed. Believing the argument was over, Peralta returned to sorting the laundry. However, she and Reynolds began arguing again, and Peralta told Reynolds to get out of the apartment because she did not want the neighbors to hear them “screaming” and call the police given the late hour. Reynolds refused to leave and pushed Peralta, causing her to fall to the tile floor.

When Living was awakened by the commotion, he stood up and told Reynolds that he needed to leave, and Reynolds responded that Living should mind his own business. Both men continued yelling at each other, and Peralta told them to take it outside before the neighbors called the police. Living told Peralta that she should go ahead and leave, but she did not want to go anywhere in the middle of the night, so she went to her bedroom and closed the door. At trial, Peralta testified that she stayed in her bedroom for a few minutes until she heard the front door slam, at which point she came out of her room and found that Living had been stabbed in the neck and that Reynolds had left the apartment. Peralta claimed that she did not “see [Living] get stabbed” but that it was “obvious that ․ Reynolds was being violent.”

Peralta dialed 911 and attempted to stop the bleeding. A recording of her 911 call was played for the jury at trial. Shortly after the stabbing, Reynolds texted Peralta, “Because you couldn't let me have my clothes, now I have to hide. I know you'll give 12 everything.”² Peralta responded, “F**k you.” Reynolds texted back, “F**k you too. Is he okay?” Reynolds followed up by texting Peralta, “[N]ot like I should really give a f**k about your side piece.”³

When officers and first responders arrived at the scene, they observed a large amount of blood “all over the apartment” and discovered Living, deceased, on the floor. The medical examiner who performed Living's autopsy testified that Living's cause of death was a stab wound, at least three inches deep, of the neck. The direction of the injury was from the back, right to left, and downward.

Peralta admitted at trial that she initially lied to the responding officers because she was scared that they were going to blame her for his murder. She did not say anything about Reynolds because he had been violent with her and she was “just terrified.” She also explained that while she was sitting in a detective's car outside her apartment after the stabbing, Reynolds walked up and told her not to say anything and to ask for an attorney. At the police station, Peralta told a story that was materially different from what she eventually testified to at trial. Peralta told detectives that she had been sleeping and woke up to a loud noise outside her apartment. When she opened the front door, she claimed to have found Living with a stab wound. The detectives told Peralta that they knew she was lying because it was obvious that Living had been stabbed inside of the apartment. She responded that she was scared but denied that she was protecting anyone.

Peralta continued her relationship with Reynolds, seeing him a couple of times a week and communicating with him on the phone daily. However, they “fought a lot,” and Peralta was occasionally “scared of” Reynolds because he had “outbursts.” In September 2020, Reynolds, Peralta, and Sandavol were arrested in connection with Living's death. In February 2021, Peralta admitted to detectives that she had initially lied in her first statement and explained why.

At trial, Sandoval testified that Living was asleep on the couch when he left for the evening and that, as far as he knew, Living did not have any weapons on him. He had, however, seen Reynolds with a knife that “he was using ․ for protection and always carried it around with him.” In the early morning hours of July 6, Reynolds called to tell him that “there was a situation that happened at the apartment” and that he should not come back because “[t]here were a lot of cops there.” Sandoval asked him what happened, and Reynolds said that he and Peralta had gotten into an argument. Reynolds claimed that Peralta was “being so dramatic and screaming so much” that she “had woken up the security, and the security was trying to be security.”⁴ When Sandoval asked Reynolds what happened, Reynolds told him that “he couldn't say” and hung up the phone.

When Sandoval spoke with Peralta a few days later, she told him that she and Reynolds had been arguing and that Living had woken up and tried to diffuse the “altercation.” She told Sandoval that at first Reynolds and Living were facing each other but then Living reached for Reynolds, who “quickly” moved behind Living and stabbed him in the neck. She later told him a different version of what happened, including that Living had “put[ ] a hand on [Reynolds's] back ․ and was trying to lead him out” of the apartment when Reynolds “somehow slipped away from him and stabbed him in the neck.” She never described Living as the aggressor.

Reynolds elected to testify in his own defense. According to Reynolds, he went to Peralta's apartment around 11:30 a.m. on July 5, 2020, to get his belongings and “end” their relationship. However, Peralta invited him in for a meal, and they ended up reconciling. Later that day, a mutual friend came by the apartment and gave Reynolds a “sword” with a rusted blade in a wooden sheath because he knew that Reynolds liked to refurbish swords and blades. Reynolds admitted that “at any given point,” including that day, he had “at least one blade on [him].” Reynolds claimed he spent most of the night working on his new sword, trying to remove the rust using aluminum foil.

When Sandoval and Living arrived at the apartment, Reynolds decided that he “had some issues that” he “needed to hash out” with Living, so they went outside to talk. Reynolds asked him whether there was “something going on with [Peralta]” and him, and Living responded that he had no romantic intentions with Peralta. At that point, Reynolds claimed that “everything was fine.” Shortly after 4:00 a.m., he and Peralta began arguing, and Peralta told him to leave. Reynolds asked if he could get his clothes first, but Peralta grabbed his clothes and refused to return them. Instead, Peralta grabbed a broom, hit it on the floor, and called out to Living to wake up.

Living woke up and got up from the couch. Reynolds tried to physically take his clothes from Peralta, but when he stepped towards her, Living “c[ame] at [him], arms outstretched.” Reynolds claimed that Living “scared the s**t out of [him]” and caused him to backpedal. Reynolds then tripped and fell over the couch, breaking the wooden sheath for the blade he had just been working on. While Reynolds was on all four on the grounds, Living got behind him and put him in a chokehold. Reynolds “tapped,” but Living did not let go. Reynolds panicked, grabbed the nearby blade and “drop[ped] it behind [him].” Reynold testified that the blade “hit[ ] something,” and Living “loosen[ed] up.” Reynolds admitted that he took the blade with him when he left the apartment.

As part of the State's rebuttal, the lead detective testified that their investigation did not uncover evidence of any fragmented blade or broken sheath at the scene. Likewise, no broom was seen or recovered from the scene. In addition, Reynolds's claims about where and how the stabbing occurred were inconsistent with the blood spatter on the walls of the apartment and the medical examiner's findings.

1. Reynolds first asserts that the trial court erred by allowing Peralta to testify during direct examination about certain bad acts committed by Reynolds against her, which were inadmissible under OCGA §§ 24-6-622 (“Rule 622”) and 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”).

The record shows that after certain references in the prosecutor's opening statement, Reynolds moved in limine to exclude evidence that Reynolds had allegedly slashed Peralta's tires and burglarized her home, which had not been noticed under Rule 404(b).⁵ The State responded that it was evidence of prior difficulties “toward a victim” offered to “buttress her credibility or validate her incredibility ․ or explain her fear” of Reynolds. See Rule 622 (“The state of a witness's feelings towards the parties and the witness's relationship to the parties may always be proved for the consideration of the jury.”). The trial court denied the motion, ruling the State could use the evidence “to assist the jury in trying to deal with or consider her two statements which are contrary to one another.” In addition, the trial court stated:

I'm going to let it in for now. Make the appropriate objection at the time. Let me see how it rolls in; all right? I'm going to let you do it, but I just -- I have to see how it comes in; okay?

During Peralta's testimony, she stated that “there were a few incidents where [Reynolds] was violent with [her] or violent, period, towards the end.” She recounted several incidents of violence, including times he entered through her bedroom window, slashed her tires, broke the window in her rental car, and tried to keep her from retrieving her dog. Peralta explained that she had lied to investigators the night of the incident because she was “scared”:

I was also scared that I didn't know where Mr. Reynolds was or what had transpired between them or anything for that matter. I also know that he, you know, before, leading up until that moment, had had a few violent moments with me and I wasn't sure what was going on.

On appeal, Reynolds asserts that Peralta's testimony about Reynolds slashing Peralta's tires and burglarizing her home was not admissible under Rule 622 to show “any bias Peralta may have had in giving the first statement” or under Rule 404(b) as prior difficulties because Peralta was not an alleged victim. See Rule 622 (allowing evidence of the “state of a witness's feelings towards the parties”); Rule 404(b) (permitting “evidence of ․ prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged victim”). In addition, Reynolds argues that, even if admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court failed to conduct the required OCGA § 24-4-403 ⁶ (“Rule 403”) analysis. See Biggs v. State, 323 Ga. 546, 550, 926 S.E.2d 33 (2026) (regardless of whether evidence is addressed under Rule 404(b) or as intrinsic, it still must satisfy Rule 403).

(a) Pretermitting whether Reynolds preserved his claims under Rule 622 and Rule 404(b) for ordinary appellate review,⁷ we conclude that any error in the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless. “The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict. And in making that determination, we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so.” Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 778–79, 879 S.E.2d 436 (2022) (cleaned up).

Here, the evidence of Reynolds's specific bad acts was cumulative of other evidence showing Reynolds's violent acts toward Peralta generally. Most notably, Peralta herself testified, without objection, that she had lied to police because she was “scared” of Reynolds due to his violence towards her. Peralta explained that after the stabbing, she and Reynolds “fought a lot,” and Peralta was occasionally “scared of” Reynolds because he had “outbursts.” She also testified on cross-examination that Reynolds “was aware that he could in two seconds make [her] scared of him” and that he “knew that [she] was terrified of his reaction sometimes ․ and that he used that to his power.”

In addition, the lead detective testified, without objection,⁸ to a number of instances of violence between Peralta and Reynolds, including the incident where Reynolds slashed Peralta's tires, Peralta's claim that Reynolds “on multiple occasions forced [his] way in” and that she did not feel safe with him, and a police report for an incident that happened in March 2020.⁹ And Reynolds's own testimony showed that he and Peralta had previously had “pretty heavy” arguments, although there may not have been witnesses to their prior arguments. Reynolds explained that the night of the stabbing was “the first time ․ there ha[d] been an argument with [him] and Ms. Peralta that's pretty heavy where there's somebody else kind of there already.” Although he described a different version of events,¹⁰ Reynolds confirmed that officers became involved in a dispute he and Peralta had in March 2020.

And the evidence against Reynolds was strong. At trial, Reynolds admitted that he had stabbed Living, albeit in self-defense, but Reynolds's claim of self-defense relied on his own self-serving testimony, and the physical evidence was inconsistent with Reynolds's account of the altercation. Also, Reynolds's actions after the stabbing undercut his claim of self-defense when he left the apartment with the blade after the stabbing and then texted Peralta, “I know you'll give [the police] everything.” See Foots v. State, 322 Ga. 116, 120, 917 S.E.2d 619 (2025) (noting jury could infer appellant's actions after the shooting were inconsistent with his self-defense claim where “he immediately fled from the crime scene”). And even though Peralta's story of what happened that night to law enforcement changed over time, Sandoval testified that when he spoke with Peralta a few days after the stabbing, she told him about how Reynolds stabbed Living in the neck and never described Living as the aggressor.

Given the cumulative nature of the challenged evidence and the strong evidence of guilt, we conclude that it is highly probable that any error in admitting Peralta's testimony that Reynolds slashed Peralta's tires and burglarized her house did not contribute to the verdict. See Redding v. State, 320 Ga. 107, 117, 907 S.E.2d 258 (2024) (any error in admitting evidence of obstruction of a law enforcement officer was harmless where the evidence of guilt was strong and the “claim of self-defense was weak, relying only on his self-serving testimony”); Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 487, 819 S.E.2d 468 (2018) (admission of evidence of prior aggravated assault and armed robbery was harmless where the properly admitted evidence included evidence of another armed robbery, aggravated assault, and attempted rape and there was compelling evidence of guilt).

(b) To the extent that Reynolds is claiming that Peralta's testimony about their relationship generally should not have been admitted under Rule 403,¹¹ Reynolds did not object to this testimony on that basis, so his claim is not preserved for ordinary appellate review. See Jones v. State, 317 Ga. 466, 473, 893 S.E.2d 741 (2023) (“the absence of a timely objection limits our review of the admission of the evidence to plain error”). “To establish plain error, [the appellant] must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). “The Court need not analyze all of the element of the plain error test when the appellant fails to establish one of them.” Id.

It was not clear and obvious error under Rule 403 for the trial court to allow Peralta to testify about the state of the relationship between her and Reynolds because its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We have “explained that the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 737–38, 827 S.E.2d 892 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency’ to prove or disprove a fact, whereas the probative value of evidence derives in large part from the extent to which the evidence tends to make the existence of a fact more or less probable.” Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 75, 786 S.E.2d 633 (2016) (emphasis in original). “Generally speaking, the greater the tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable, the greater the probative value.” Id.

Here, the challenged evidence helped the State show that the couple had a volatile relationship, characterized by Reynolds's jealousy of other men—and Living in particular—that had previously led him to commit acts of violence in the months and weeks leading up to the stabbing and why Peralta lied in her initial statements to the investigating officers. It also gave context as to why Reynolds would have been angry that Living was in the apartment and was motivated to stab Living when he attempted to intervene in the altercation between Reynolds and Peralta. See Collins v. State; ––– Ga. ––––, ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, 2026 WL 2398297, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Aug. 13, 2026, S26A1018) (evidence of appellant's violent conduct toward girlfriend helped explain why his girlfriend chose to go to her mother's home on the night of the shooting, provided the source of acrimony between appellant and her family, and gave context for the confrontation that led to the victim's shooting); Hughes v. State, 312 Ga. 149, 152–53, 861 S.E.2d 94 (2021) (evidence that appellant had previously vandalized the victim's grandmother's car was part of the chain of events leading to the charged crimes and was reasonably necessary to complete the story regarding the increasingly hostile relationship between appellant and members of the victim's family). Thus, Peralta's testimony about the state of the relationship between Reynolds and Peralta had significant probative value.

As we have explained, evidence is not unfairly prejudicial for purposes of Rule 403 simply because it inculpates the defendant, as all evidence that inculpates the defendant is “inherently prejudicial.” Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 738, 883 S.E.2d 802 (2023). “Unfair prejudice under this rule means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 394–95, 807 S.E.2d 425 (2017) (quotation marks omitted). Insofar as Reynolds suggests that the evidence of his violence towards Peralta was unfairly prejudicial, it is not clear or obvious that the significant probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. See Miller v. State, 320 Ga. 255, 267, 908 S.E.2d 586 (2024) (no plain error in the trial court's admission of domestic violence against victim given the other acts’ “significant probative value” and the “fairly minor” nature of the other acts); Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414, 419, 788 S.E.2d 442 (2016) (in prosecution for murder of wife, evidence about violence towards appellant's ex-wife “was prejudicial—as almost all evidence presented by the State will be,” but “it demonstrated that the violence was a mechanism for control of his intimate partners,” and therefore its “significant probative value” was not outweighed by any prejudice). Thus, to the extent that Reynolds asserts that this evidence should not have been admitted under Rule 403, this claim fails under plain error review.

2. Reynolds also asserts that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in several respects. In order to prevail on these claims, Reynolds must show both that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish deficiency, an appellant must “show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Momon v. State, 322 Ga. 848, 850, 922 S.E.2d 368 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). To show prejudice, an appellant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 365, 882 S.E.2d 289 (2022). Because an appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to succeed, if Reynolds fails to meet one prong, we need not examine the other. See Jackson v. State, 324 Ga. 11, 14, 928 S.E.2d 52 (2026).

(a) Reynolds first claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to move to suppress the fruits of the State's “seizure” of his cell phone password and subsequent search of his cell phone in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The record shows that when the lead detective discovered that Reynolds was on probation in DeKalb County, he arranged for Reynolds to be brought in for a meeting with his probation officer. At that meeting, the detective served a DeKalb County search warrant ¹² on Reynolds, telling him, “Here's a copy of the search warrant for you, and you know that I'm seizing your cell phone. You've got to provide me the password to your phone.” After Reynolds complied, the detective then obtained a Fulton County search warrant for the cell phone information and turned the device and password over to Investigator Mark Taylor with the Atlanta Police Department for extraction.

On appeal, Reynolds appears to concede that there is no clear, controlling precedent that the exchange between the detective and Reynolds—during which Reynolds was handed a copy of the warrant and told that he needed to provide his password—was a “search” that violated Reynolds's rights under the Fourth Amendment. He nonetheless argues, however, that the detective's request exceeded the scope of the warrant because the warrant did not specify that the cell phone's password could be seized, and because the cell phone password was not an item listed to be seized in the warrant, the detective violated Reynolds's Fourth Amendment rights by directing him to provide his password. Reynolds's claim fails.

In connection with claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, we have made it clear that trial counsel does not perform deficiently in failing to advance an extension of existing law. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 323 Ga. 496, 501, 925 S.E.2d 899 (2026) (“It is well settled that trial counsel does not perform deficiently when he fails to advance a legal theory that would require an extension of existing precedents and the adoption of an unproven theory of law.” (cleaned up)). Because Reynolds points to no authority that a verbal request to a defendant for his cell phone password is a search under the Fourth Amendment for which a warrant is required, and we are not aware of any such authority, Reynolds has failed to show that his counsel was deficient for not challenging the search of his cell phone on this basis. See id.

(b) Reynolds next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that the trial court gave in connection with Reynolds's opening statement, which Reynolds claims was a comment on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1). This statute provides that “[i]t is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge's opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1).

During his opening remarks to the jury, which were delivered just prior to the start of the defense case and after the State had already presented its case-in-chief, trial counsel argued, “We'll explain exactly where that knife came from. We're going to tell you exactly what it was, what it looked like, all the details surrounding that knife, which the State has not done.” Outside the presence of the jury, the State objected:¹³

It appears that the defense is alluding to some evidence that the jury is going to see that the State has not even been presented to ․. So at this point, I have no knowledge of anything he's discussing at this point and I'm going to ask that it not be allowed.

Trial counsel responded that Reynolds “is going to testify about it. All I'm doing is previewing Mr. Reynolds’[s] expected testimony, which is the purpose of opening statement.” The trial court proposed to inform the jurors that “[t]here was perhaps a suggestion during the course of the opening statement that there exists an unidentified weapon that is being withheld from your consideration. That is not the case.” Neither party raised an objection to the proposed instruction, which the trial court then gave. Recommencing his opening statement, trial counsel then told the jury: “Ladies and gentlemen, again, we do not believe the evidence will show that the State is hiding anything from you with regard to the weapon. That was not the intention behind our argument.”

We conclude that the trial court did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57 when it corrected an inference that counsel admitted he had not meant to put before the jury. “To violate this statute, the trial court's comments must pertain to a disputed issue of fact.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 272, 882 S.E.2d 227 (2022) (cleaned up). Even assuming that the instruction was a comment on the evidence, Reynolds has not and cannot make the showing that the comment pertained to a disputed issue of fact because counsel conceded at trial that it was undisputed that the State was not attempting to hide any weapon from the jury. See id. at 274, 882 S.E.2d 227 (no violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 when the appellant “does not explain how this remark pertained to a disputed issue of fact” (cleaned up)); State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634–35, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010) (trial court did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57 when it commented on whether the State had proven venue by asking: “Why don't we go ahead and do that before we forget it[?]”). Thus, an objection would have been meritless, and counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection under OCGA § 17-8-57. See Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 85, 911 S.E.2d 638 (2025) (counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to make a meritless objection).

(c) Reynolds also asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to testimony from a detective about the nature of domestic violence and how the relationship between Peralta and Reynolds was consistent with domestic violence.

Specifically, Reynolds points to parts of the lead detective's testimony and in particular this exchange during direct examination:

Q: So based on your interview, your July 6th, 2020, interview with Ms. Peralta, what conclusion had you reached as it relates to your investigation?

A: The conclusion I made after July 6th was that Ms. Peralta was withholding information. She was -- basically hindered the investigation. She was either a witness or participated in the death of Kenya Living.

Q: In your experience, is this typical in domestic violence relationships?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And in your experience with domestic violence, does the victim go back to the perpetrator?

A: Yes, ma'am.

The lead detective was later asked whether all domestic violence is physical, to which he responded that “[t]here is emotional and verbal abuse in domestic violence relationships.” Using Reynolds's text messages, the detective testified regarding the relationship between Peralta and Reynolds: “[I]t was a strange relationship. It was off and on. There seemed to be some form of hostility. I don't want to say borderline domestic violence, but it was a harsh relationship that was on and off.” He explained that he was able to corroborate a domestic violence incident involving the couple in March 2020 from a police report. The detective read several text messages between Peralta and Reynolds to the jury and agreed that such exchanges were “[t]ypical [in] domestic violence” situations.

Reynolds argues that this testimony amounted to a recitation of “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” specifically the effects and characteristics of domestic abuse, without being either noticed or qualified as an expert witness under OCGA § 24-7-702(b).

At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified that the detective was “opining on the dynamics of abusive relationships,” which “sounds like something a psychologist or psychotherapist would talk about.” He agreed that “to opine on anything like that you would need to be qualified as an expert, and notice would have needed to be provided by the State.” Counsel offered no strategic reason for not objecting.

Pretermitting whether trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the detective's testimony as inadmissible expert witness testimony, Reynolds has not shown prejudice as the testimony was largely cumulative of both Peralta's and Reynolds's testimony about their bad relationship and why Peralta initially lied to police, and the evidence of Reynolds's guilt was strong.¹⁴ See Division 1. Accordingly, this claim fails. See Beard v. State, 317 Ga. 842, 849–50, 896 S.E.2d 497 (2023) (because evidence on domestic violence was cumulative, any deficiency in failing to object did not amount to prejudice).

(d) In his final claim of ineffective assistance, Reynolds asserts that counsel failed to impeach three witnesses’ testimony about Living's good character with Living's prior felony convictions, which Reynolds claims would have helped him show that he was in reasonable fear for his life and acted in self-defense.

Prior to trial, the trial court granted the State's motion under Rules 403 and 405 to exclude Living's “felony history or arrests.” At trial, the State elicited testimony about Living's good character from several witnesses. Living's mother testified, “Kenya never met a stranger. He was a mama's boy. He loved to help people ․ even at times when he couldn't help himself. ․ He was just always trying to help somebody. He loved hard.” Peralta testified that Living “was a good man.” And Living's girlfriend testified, “Kenya was a giver. ․ He was always trying to ․ help somebody. And I would call his mom and be like, ‘Who is this Kenya is trying to help?’ And ․ she would just tell me ‘You know Kenya.’ ”

At the motion for new trial hearing, Reynolds produced certified copies of convictions that Living had on his record: Arson in the First Degree, Interference with Government Property and Possession of a Weapon by an Inmate in 2012; Possession of a Firearm by a First Offender Probationer in 2008; and Aggravated Assault and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony in 2008. Trial counsel agreed on cross-examination that impeaching Living's mother with evidence that her son was a criminal would not “have been such a great move in front of the jury.” However, he testified that it was not “a matter of strategy” to avoid admitting the convictions through another witness and that the convictions “could have made a big difference in the jury's consideration of our story.”

On appeal, Reynolds argues that the State opened the door to counsel impeaching Living's mother, his girlfriend, and Peralta with Living's felony convictions under OCGA § 24-6-621, which provides that “[a] witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by the witness.”¹⁵ Rule 621 permits cross-examination about “any discrepancies in [a witness's] testimony.” Taylor v. State, 302 Ga. 176, 180, 805 S.E.2d 851 (2017). Because Rule 621 has been carried forward from former OCGA § 24-9-82 and has no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, we may look to our prior precedent in construing Rule 621, see id. at 180 n.5, 805 S.E.2d 851, but “the applicability of the old cases is also limited by other newly adopted provisions of the current Evidence Code.” Corley v. State, 308 Ga. 321, 325, 840 S.E.2d 391 (2020).

Here, as counsel acknowledged, there was an objective strategic reason not to impeach the victim's mother in front of the jury for the fairly brief comments about Living's good character. Although trial counsel testified that it was not a matter of strategy to avoid impeaching Peralta and Living's girlfriend with the convictions, a reasonable lawyer could conclude that the strategy with Peralta's mother also applies to the brief character testimony from Living's girlfriend and mother of his child. Moreover, counsel could have reasonably concluded that attacking Peralta's passing reference that Living “was a good man” was risky because it could have opened the door to Peralta testifying about other good things that Living did, thereby undercutting his theory of self-defense.¹⁶ See Lynch v. State, 291 Ga. 555, 558, 731 S.E.2d 672 (2012) (no ineffective assistance when trial counsel “wanted to avoid the strategy of attacking the dying victim's credibility, which he considered risky”); Smith v. State, 288 Ga. 348, 354, 703 S.E.2d 629 (2010) (reasonable strategic decision to not introduce evidence of the defendant's good character, as trial counsel “did not wish to open the door to potentially damaging questions on cross-examination regarding whether the opinions of the good character witnesses would have changed if they knew that someone had caused the death of a child”). Because reasonable counsel could have had a strategic reason for not impeaching on these grounds, this claim fails. See Lane v. State, 312 Ga. 619, 623, 864 S.E.2d 34 (2021) (noting that “we are not limited in our assessment of the objective reasonableness of lawyer performance to the subjective reasons offered by trial counsel for his conduct”). See generally Chance v. State, 291 Ga. 241, 246, 728 S.E.2d 635 (2012) (“The decision whether to impeach a witness through introduction of certified copies of prior convictions is a matter of trial strategy.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

3. Reynolds claims that he was so prejudiced by the accumulation of errors at trial that he should be granted a new trial. “To establish cumulative error, [an appellant] must show that at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury's deliberation that they denied [him] a fundamentally fair trial.” Perrault v. State, 316 Ga. 241, 248, 887 S.E.2d 279 (2023) (cleaned up). We have assumed, without deciding, one trial court error—permitting Peralta to testify about how Reynolds slashed her tires and burglarized her home—and presumed that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the lead detective's testimony about the nature of domestic violence. However, in both instances, we concluded that there was no prejudice because the evidence of Reynolds's guilt was strong and the challenged evidence was cumulative of other unobjected-to evidence.

Specifically, Peralta testified at trial that Reynolds was the aggressor in the confrontation with Living; Reynolds immediately fled the scene after stabbing Living, taking the weapon with him, and then texting Peralta, “I know you'll give [the police] everything”; and the medical examiner's testimony was inconsistent with Reynolds's theory of self-defense. The challenged evidence was also largely cumulative of the other evidence of Reynolds's violence toward Peralta, including testimony from Peralta, the lead detective, and even Reynolds's own testimony. Accordingly, even assuming that Reynolds can aggregate the prejudice from trial court error with deficient trial counsel performance, he has failed to show that the prejudicial effect from the assumed trial court error and assumed deficient performance denied him a fundamentally fair trial. See Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 568, 883 S.E.2d 773 (2023) (“Appellant's [cumulative-error] claim fails because Appellant has not demonstrated that the prejudicial effect of the assumed trial court errors and ineffective assistance denied him a fundamentally fair trial, given the strong evidence against him.”).

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The crimes were committed on July 6, 2020. In August 2021, a Fulton County grand jury jointly indicted Reynolds, Marcos Sandavol, and Jessica Peralta for their respective roles in Living's death and subsequent efforts to impede the investigation. Reynolds was charged with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and conspiracy to commit a felony (Count 4). Sandoval and Peralta were charged with conspiracy to commit a felony (Count 4); Peralta was also charged with giving false statements (Count 5) and hindering the apprehension of a criminal (Count 6). Sandoval and Peralta entered negotiated guilty pleas prior to trial. At a jury trial held in April and May 2023, Reynolds was found guilty of all counts. On May 12, 2023, the trial court sentenced Reynolds to serve life in prison for malice murder and a concurrent five-year term for conspiracy to commit a felony; the remaining counts either merged for sentencing purposes or were vacated by operation of law. Reynolds timely filed a motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel in March 2024 and July 2024. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, as amended, on December 17, 2025. Reynolds timely filed a notice of appeal, and his case was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   Peralta testified that she understood “12” to mean the police.

3.   Reynolds admitted at trial that he texted Peralta after leaving her apartment.

4.   Sandoval explained that he understood “security” to mean Living, who had worked as a private security guard nearby.

5.   This statute provides:Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The prosecution in a criminal proceeding shall provide reasonable notice to the defense in advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused by the court upon good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required when the evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove the circumstances immediately surrounding the charged crime, motive, or prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged victim.OCGA § 24-4-404(b).

6.   This statute provides that even “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403.

7.   The State argues that, because Reynolds did not object to Peralta's testimony about Reynolds slashing her tires and burglarizing her home despite the trial court's direction that Reynolds would need to object at the appropriate time, this claim is reviewed for plain error only. See Bryant v. State, 324 Ga. 273, 283, 929 S.E.2d 802 (2026) (applying plain error review to unpreserved evidentiary objections). But we need not decide the applicable standard of review because we pretermit error and decide on harmlessness.

8.   Reynolds does not argue on appeal that the admission of this testimony was error.

9.   In March 2020, Peralta claimed that Reynolds had “dragged [her] to the car and wouldn't give [her] dog back.” She tried to “not get the police involved” but the situation “just got out of hand.” After officers responded, she was able to go home with her dog.

10.   Reynolds testified that he had been “trying to shoot back at her” because “[s]he would kick [him] out of the car all the time” and “this was the one time [he] asked her to get out of [his] car.”

11.   Although Reynolds focuses his arguments under Rule 622 and Rule 404(b) on the two specific bad acts, Reynolds references in passing “Peralta's testimony about Reynolds's behavior in their relationship” in arguing on appeal that the testimony should not have been admitted under Rule 403.

12.   The warrant authorized “[s]eizure of AT&T Wireless mobile device handset with the IMEI number 310410263248689 during the day and time of the homicide is associated with cellular number ***.***.0440 and or mobile device currently in service with said mobile cellular number of ***.***.0440.”

13.   The trial court first intervened and admonished counsel to “keep this to opening statement.”

14.   To the extent that Reynolds argues on appeal that the detective should not have been permitted to testify about the violent acts committed by Reynolds against Peralta under Rule 403, that unobjected-to claim is not preserved for ordinary appellate review and fails for the same reasons as his arguments about why Peralta's testimony on these same issues should not have been admitted. See Division 1.

15.   Reynolds does not argue that the felony convictions should have been admitted under any other provision of the Evidence Code, so we limit our analysis to Rule 621.

16.   Peralta had already testified that Living was best friends with her stepbrother Sandoval and that he was “very protective” of Peralta especially after he learned about other crimes that had been committed in her apartment complex.

McMillian, Justice.

All the Justices concur.