Rodriquis Martin v. The State (2026)

Rodriquis Martin appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his motion for an out-of-time appeal. Because the trial court correctly dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, we affirm.

In June 2018, Martin pleaded guilty to malice murder and burglary and did not appeal. However, on November 12, 2025, he filed a pro se motion for an out-of-time appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1. That statute allows a defendant to move for leave to file an out-of-time appeal but sets time limits for the filing of such motions. Under OCGA § 5-6-39.1(a)(1), a defendant must “move for leave to file an out-of-time motion for new trial or notice of appeal within 100 days from the expiration of the time period for the filing of such motion or notice.” And under OCGA § 5-6-39.1(b), if a defendant previously had either a motion for an out-of-time appeal or a granted out-of-time appeal dismissed under Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022), the defendant had the right to move for an out-of-time appeal until June 30, 2026. These statutory time limits “are jurisdictional.” Merilien v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0704, slip op. at 2 (Ga. Aug. 13, 2026). Here, Martin's motion did not satisfy either of these time limits. First, the motion was not filed within 100 days of the expiration of the time for Martin to appeal his 2018 convictions. See OCGA § 5-6-39.1(a)(1). Second, the record does not show that Martin had previously filed a motion subject to the decision in Cook, and thus could not have filed a new motion for out-of-time appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1(b), even before June 30, 2026. See OCGA § 5-6-39.1(b). Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Martin's motion and properly dismissed it. See Merilien, ___ Ga. at ___, slip op. at 2 (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal where the motion did not meet the time limits of OCGA § 5-6-39.1 and therefore properly dismissed the motion).¹

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to the procedures of OCGA § 5-6-39.1, Martin was attempting to obtain an appeal from his guilty plea. We note that OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3), which was enacted as part of the same act that created OCGA § 5-6-39.1, see Ga. L. 2025 252, § 1–2, requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal to bring “direct appeals from guilty pleas.” And OCGA § 5-6-35(d) requires that “any such application must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the challenged decision.” Charles v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A1046, slip op. at 3 (Ga. Aug. 13, 2026) (cleaned up). Finally, although OCGA § 5-6-39.1 permits a defendant to move for leave to file an out-of-time motion for new trial or notice of appeal, it “says nothing about out-of-time applications for discretionary appeal.” Id. (cleaned up) (holding that where the defendant had obtained leave to file an out-of-time notice of appeal from his guilty plea under OCGA § 5-6-39.1(a), this Court was required to dismiss the appeal because the defendant failed to meet the deadline for filing an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35).

Ellington, Justice.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.