INQUIRY CONCERNING WILLIAMS v. << (2026)

Shermela J. Williams is a former judge of the Fulton County Superior Court, having served from January 2021 to February 2026. During her tenure as a judge, the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) initiated these disciplinary matters against her, alleging 32 violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”). Following a hearing, the JQC Hearing Panel found that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence 28 of those counts and that discipline is authorized under the Georgia Constitution for all counts. The Hearing Panel concluded that removing Williams from the bench was proper and filed its report and recommendation with this Court. Following that filing, the parties fully briefed the issues before this Court. However, while this case was pending, Williams resigned her judicial position. And it is that resignation that presents the difficult question remaining in this case.

Judicial discipline cases often carry a number of complex and interconnected factual and legal questions. We are frequently tasked with determining whether sufficient evidence of a particular violation or violations exists, whether that evidence provides clear and convincing proof of a violation or violations, whether the violation warrants discipline under the Constitution, and what sanction or sanctions should be imposed. Those questions are not particularly difficult in this case. The fact of Williams's resignation, however, is a different matter. We are in agreement that the JQC provided clear and convincing proof of multiple serious violations of the CJC and that those violations would, ordinarily, support removal from office. But because Williams resigned her judicial office, we conclude that she cannot be removed from that same office. So we must determine what, if anything, we can and should do next.

Having reviewed the factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation of discipline from the Hearing Panel, as well as the initial and supplementary briefing submitted by the Director and counsel for Williams, we hold as follows. With respect to the counts for which Williams was found responsible, the Hearing Panel's findings are supported by the evidence presented, and thus, are not clearly erroneous. We adopt those factual findings and conclude that they do present clear and convincing evidence of the violations found by the Hearing Panel. Further, we conclude that those proven violations would ordinarily warrant removal from office of a sitting judge. But we dismiss this case without prejudice because Williams cannot be removed from an office she does not hold, and we decline in this case to assert any authority we may have to sanction former judges. Our dismissal without prejudice expressly authorizes the JQC to reinstate proceedings if Shermela J. Williams becomes a judicial candidate or judge in the future. See Inquiry Concerning Judge Gerald John-son, 316 Ga. 876, 878–79, 892 S.E.2d 1 (2023). In the event the JQC reinstates proceedings under such circumstances, those proceedings will resume in the same procedural posture as this proceeding occupies at the conclusion of this opinion (i.e., the alleged violations having been found to be proven by clear and convincing evidence and to be of a nature that warrant discipline — leaving only the imposition of discipline for the consideration of the Court).

1. Background and Procedural History

Williams was admitted to the State Bar of Georgia in 2011, and on March 6, 2020, she qualified to run for the office of judge of the Fulton County Superior Court. In June 2020, she won a contested election and began serving as a Fulton County Superior Court Judge on January 1, 2021. Williams was re-elected by Fulton County voters in 2024 with no opposition.

In June 2024, the JQC filed formal charges against then-Judge Williams, alleging 17 counts of misconduct across multiple provisions of the CJC, including 20 counts of failure to timely rule on matters before her. The JQC filed an additional set of charges in February 2025, alleging 15 counts of misconduct. Before the final hearing, the Director withdrew Count 6 in the second set of charges as duplicative of Count 15 in the first set of charges. Williams admitted to the majority of the failure-to-timely-rule charges.¹

A consolidated final hearing on both sets of charges was held on May 21–23, June 26–27, and July 14, 2025. The Hearing Panel issued its Report and Recommendation on October 2, 2025, finding that the Director had proven by clear and convincing evidence 14 of the 17 counts in the first set of charges and all 14 counts in the second set of charges. The Hearing Panel concluded that discipline was constitutionally authorized given Williams's pattern of misconduct and dishonesty. In so doing, the Hearing Panel concluded that Williams had violated multiple rules of the CJC and recommended as a sanction that she be removed from office. Williams filed a Notice of Exceptions to the Report and Recommendations (“Exceptions”), see JQC Rule 24(F), arguing that the Hearing Panel ignored or failed to properly credit mitigating evidence and that the recommended discipline was unfair and disproportionate. The Director filed a response to those Exceptions.

2. Analysis

As discussed more below, we agree with and affirm the Hearing Panel's findings that Williams's misconduct with respect to 28 of the 32 counts (S24Z1139: Counts 1–3, 7–17; S25Z0722: Counts 1–5, 7–15) was proven by clear and convincing evidence. Those counts relate to four separate matters: (1) Williams's ex parte communications with a party in a divorce case assigned to her; (2) a personal phone call made to opposing counsel on behalf of a family member; (3) the unlawful detention of a witness; and (4) numerous failures to timely rule. After considering and rejecting a preliminary procedural challenge from Williams arising from her denied motion to quash, we consider each of these four matters in turn within the following analytical rubric.

First, we review the Hearing Panel's findings as to Williams's conduct with respect to each matter. “We generally review factual findings by the JQC Hearing Panel for clear error and defer to the Hearing Panel's credibility determinations.” Inquiry Concerning Judge Peterson, 319 Ga. 316, 319, 903 S.E.2d 645 (2024) (quoting Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer II”), 316 Ga. 855, 860, 892 S.E.2d 3 (2023)). See also Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer I”), 315 Ga. 841, 847, 885 S.E.2d 738 (2023). Williams argues in her Exceptions to the Report and Recommendation that the Hearing Panel's factual findings as to each of the matters at issue are clearly erroneous because, she says, the Panel did not credit evidence that supported different findings and did not interview witnesses who could have provided helpful testimony on her behalf. But the record does not compel different findings, and “[t]o the extent the record contains evidence that could support findings in either direction, the Hearing Panel was authorized to make the findings that it did.” See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 319, 903 S.E.2d 645. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the parties’ briefing, we conclude that the Hearing Panel's findings that are material to our ultimate conclusion in this case are supported by evidence in the record and are not clearly erroneous. And we defer to and adopt those findings, as outlined below.

Next, we consider whether, by “clear and convincing proof,” the findings support the Hearing Panel's conclusions that Williams's actions amounted to violations of the CJC rules as charged. Id. at 320, 903 S.E.2d 645 (quoting Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 847, 885 S.E.2d 738). And we review the Hearing Panel's legal determinations de novo. Id. As explained below, we agree with the Hearing Panel's conclusions that Williams violated multiple provisions of the CJC.

And finally, we agree with the Hearing Panel's conclusion that the proven violations are sufficient to support its recommended sanction – removal from office. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a) (setting forth five grounds for discipline: “for willful misconduct in office, or for willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office, or for habitual intemperance, or for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute”). The fact that the proven violations warrant removal from office does not end our analysis as it generally would, however, because Williams has resigned from her judicial position during these proceedings. Thus, we are faced with the question of whether the Constitution authorizes us to impose the sanction we have determined is warranted for Williams's actions in light of the fact that she no longer holds judicial office. For the reasons explained below, we decline to impose discipline at this time. And we further decline the JQC's invitation to assert any inherent authority we may have to impose some other sanction. Accordingly, we decline to impose sanctions against Williams unless she again pursues or obtains judicial office.

(a) Preliminary Challenge

Williams first challenges the Hearing Panel's denial of her motion to quash, arguing that the Panel applied the wrong legal standard to her motion and that its denial violated her due process rights under the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VIII. We disagree and affirm the denial of her motion to quash.

On the first day of the hearing, Williams filed a motion to quash formal charges or, in the alternative, a request to stay the disciplinary proceedings for a full evidentiary hearing on her motion to quash. Williams's motion alleged that Judges Stacey Hydrick and Victoria Darrisaw, who served on the investigative panel that initiated the instant proceedings, failed to disclose “significant financial and public support” for the incumbent judge whom Williams originally defeated in her first election. Williams further alleged that Judge Hydrick failed to disclose that she knew two of the witnesses against her. Williams argued that this undisclosed conduct amounted to an appearance of impropriety in violation of CJC Rule 1.2,² which deprived her of a fair tribunal and violated her due process rights under both the state and federal constitutions. The Hearing Panel denied the motion to stay the proceedings. And following oral argument, the Panel denied the motion to quash, finding the motion untimely under the scheduling order because the information was publicly available.³ See CJC Rule 2.11(A), Cmt. [2] (“The public filing of a campaign contribution disclosure report or financial disclosure statement shall be deemed disclosure to all parties of the information contained therein.”). Despite deeming the motion untimely, the Panel proceeded to consider and then deny the motion on the merits, finding that the JQC rules governed recusal for the investigative panel and that, under that standard, neither judge member was required to recuse. See JQC Rule 3(F)(2). Moreover, even assuming the CJC applied, the Panel found none of the grounds for recusal applied to this case. Finally, the Panel found that, even if Judge Hydrick's recusal had been required, there would still be a quorum because another judge would still be on the investigative panel. See JQC Rule 3(C) (quorum for formal charges requires at least one judge to be on the investigative panel).

In her Exceptions filed in this Court, Williams argues that the Panel applied the wrong legal standard to her motion when it treated it as a belated motion to recuse under JQC Rule 3(F)(2) rather than applying the recusal standard under the CJC. See CJC Rule 2.11(A) (providing instances in which a judge should disqualify herself from a proceeding). Williams argues that the CJC standard applies because it always governs a judge's conduct, and there is no exception for when a judge is serving on the investigative panel of the JQC. Williams's argument that CJC Rule 2.11 governs when a judge should be disqualified from his service on the investigative panel is incorrect.

CJC Rule 2.11 standards for disqualification patently apply in the context of the judge's work as a judge in presiding over cases. But when a judge is acting as a member of a JQC investigative panel, that judge is not presiding over any case as a judge. It is the prospect of presiding in a judicial capacity that triggers the recusal provisions of the CJC, and there is no question that Judge Hydrick was not presiding in such a capacity when acting as a member of the investigative panel. Indeed, in defining the “investigative panel,” the JQC Rules note that it is “responsible for the prosecutorial and administrative functions of the Commission.” Investigative Panel, JQC Terminology. See also CJC Rule 2.5, Cmt. [4] (noting that while “the primary role of judges is to serve as the arbiters of facts and law for the resolution of disputes,” they may also have other, administrative and/or policy-making duties to which some of the requirements of the CJC apply differently or not at all); JQC Rule 3; OCGA § 15-1-21(e)(2)(A) (providing that “[t]he investigative panel shall be responsible for ․ [t]he investigative, prosecutorial, and administrative functions of the commission”). Accordingly, JQC Rule 3(F)(2) governs recusal for investigative panel members. See JQC Rule 3(F)(2) (“A member of the Investigative Panel shall recuse himself or herself from any matter in which recusal would be required of a prosecutor under Georgia law and the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, treating the Commission as the member's client.”). And Williams does not argue how any of that Rule's grounds for recusal were met here.

Williams further argues that she was denied due process when her motion was denied without an opportunity for her to conduct further discovery into the alleged conflict and present evidence at a hearing. Again, we disagree. The Georgia Constitution explicitly provides that “[n]o action shall be taken against a judge except after hearing and in accordance with due process of law.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VIII. “Based on this provision, this Court has said the JQC's authority to enforce the Code is not unlimited, inasmuch as the Constitution requires the Commission to afford due process to judges and provides for this Court to review the imposition of discipline.” Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 849, 885 S.E.2d 738 (cleaned up). See also id. (“the gravity of the judicial discipline proceeding requires that it be fundamentally fair and in keeping with the basic requirements of due process” (cleaned up)); Hood v. Carsten, 267 Ga. 579, 580, 481 S.E.2d 525 (1997) (“The fundamental idea of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (quotation marks omitted)). Here, Williams was afforded due process. A hearing was held on her motion to quash, and Williams cites no authority that due process requires permitting the additional discovery she sought here. See Hood, 267 Ga. at 580, 481 S.E.2d 525 (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (cleaned up)). She in fact obtained the information on which she based her motion, albeit belatedly. That motion failed not because the underlying factual basis was insufficiently developed but because the CJC recusal standard did not apply. She does not explain, nor is it apparent to us, how additional detail would have changed this outcome.

We turn now to the events giving rise to the charges against Williams.

(b) Ex Parte Communications in a Pending Action

With respect to Counts 1–3 in case number S24Z1139, the Hearing Panel found the following facts and made the following conclusions pertaining to Williams's ex parte communications in a pending matter.

(i) The Hearing Panel's Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to the Material Facts Pertaining to Counts 1–3 in Case Number S24Z1139

In September 2021, the father of Brandy Alexander's child filed a petition for modification of parenting time and contempt against her, and the case was assigned to Williams. Alexander had previously served as a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) in unrelated cases before Williams. Alexander and Williams also had discussed being members of the same sorority.

Alexander's attorney contacted Williams's chambers to request that a senior judge be appointed to Alexander's case instead.⁴ Williams subsequently called Alexander on her cell phone regarding the request and indicated to Alexander that even though her staff attorney warned her that the conversation would be ex parte, Williams was comfortable making the call because she and Alexander were members of the same sorority. As to Alexander's request that a senior judge be appointed, Williams indicated that she would retain the case rather than transfer it, move the case off the general calendar, and close the courtroom to protect Alexander's privacy.

A portion of this conversation occurred on speaker phone in the presence of another witness — a senior attorney in Alexander's office — who confirmed the substance of the conversation and testified that Williams stated several times that, because she and Alexander were members of the same sorority, Williams “had [Alexander's] back.”

Before the Hearing Panel, Williams confirmed that she called Alexander but claimed that she was initially unclear what the call was about after receiving a note from her staff that simply read, “Brandy Alexander Senior Judge.” She denied that her staff attorney expressed concern about the ex parte nature of her conversation with Alexander. Williams claimed that she realized only during the course of the conversation with Alexander that the conversation was in reference to Alexander's own pending case. According to Williams, she then explained the process of appointing a senior judge to a case, told Alexander she would keep the case, and discussed other case logistics and scheduling. The Hearing Panel credited Alexander's and the senior attorney's testimony regarding the substance of this call. And Williams did as Alexander testified she had promised to do with respect to her case.

At the hearing on Alexander's domestic case, opposing counsel questioned the unusual procedure used in setting the case for a hearing, with counsel noting that she had not received a response from Williams's staff regarding an earlier email in which she inquired why the case had been diverted from the normal course. Williams responded that she pulled Alexander's case from the mass calendar in light of the fact that Alexander had other cases pending before Williams in her capacity as a guardian ad litem. Williams did not inform opposing counsel of the ex parte conversation. Opposing counsel moved for Williams to recuse from the case, though she eventually withdrew the motion.

Before the Hearing Board, Williams blamed her staff for opposing counsel's lack of knowledge, claiming that her staff failed to follow her instruction to contact opposing counsel and inform them about her conversation with Alexander. The Hearing Board rejected this explanation, highlighting the fact that Williams failed to disclose the ex parte conversation to opposing counsel, even when counsel expressed her obvious confusion and indicated that she never received a response from Williams's staff as to why the case was proceeding on a different track.

Alexander and the opposing party eventually filed a motion to recuse Williams.⁵ Williams discussed that motion on a phone call with a friend, Edidiong Aaron, who testified before the hearing panel. According to Aaron, Williams admitted to initially calling Alexander, whom she did not identify by name, and inquired about her request for a senior judge. Williams also discussed with Aaron a pending motion to recuse, her frustration with the motion, and her concern that, if she recused, it would appear she had done something wrong which could hurt her in a future election. Williams disputed saying as much, but the Hearing Panel did not credit her testimony.

Because evidence presented at the hearing supports the Hearing Panel's findings that are material to our ultimate conclusion, those findings, as recounted above, are not clearly erroneous. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 323, 903 S.E.2d 645.

(ii) Williams Violated CJC Rules 1.2(A), 2.4(B), and 2.9(A)

The Hearing Panel concluded that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.2(A) (Count 1), 2.4(B) (Count 2), and 2.9(A) (Count 3) in case number S24Z1139 in connection with this ex parte communication.⁶ We agree.

Crediting the testimony of Alexander, her attorney, and the senior attorney in Alexander's office over Williams's account, the Hearing Panel found that Williams called Alexander—with whom Williams had a professional relationship—discussed Alexander's pending case, and implied that Alexander would receive favorable treatment. The Hearing Panel also rejected Williams's testimony that she did not realize her staff had failed to inform opposing counsel of the ex parte call even after counsel inquired about the case being moved from the mass calendar at the hearing. In sum, the Hearing Panel found that Williams testified untruthfully about this incident and that she allowed her relationship with Alexander to affect how she handled the case.

Williams's untruthful testimony regarding this incident underscores her consciousness of wrongdoing. Cf. Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 871, 892 S.E.2d 3 (judge's actions in stalling and obfuscating “when confronted with the consequences of [his] actions” were indicative of “conscious wrongdoing motivated by self-interest”). Accordingly, we have no difficulty concluding, as the Hearing Panel did, that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that by so acting, Williams failed to promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of CJC Rule 1.2(A); permitted her relationship with Alexander to influence her judicial conduct and judgment in violation of CJC Rule 2.4(B); and participated in ex parte communications not required under the circumstances, communications that were intended to provide Alexander with procedural benefit and were not disclosed to opposing counsel in violation of CJC Rule 2.9(A). See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 339–40, 903 S.E.2d 645 (holding that ex parte communications violated CJC Rules 1.2(A) and 2.9(A)); Inquiry Concerning Anderson, 304 Ga. 165, 166–67, 816 S.E.2d 676 (2018) (holding that a judge violated CJC Rule 2.9(A) when he communicated with parties to a lawsuit individually).

(iii) Williams's Conduct Constitutes Willful Misconduct in Office Such that Discipline is Authorized Under Paragraph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution

Having determined that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.2(A), 2.4(B), and 2.9(A), we now turn to whether the Georgia Constitution authorizes discipline for these violations. The Hearing Panel found that Williams's actions constituted willful misconduct in office because she acted in bad faith. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a). We agree.

“[W]illful misconduct in office” means “actions taken in bad faith by the judge acting in her judicial capacity.” Peterson, 319 Ga. at 328, 903 S.E.2d 645 (quotation marks omitted). For an action to be taken in “bad faith,” the duty breached by the judge must be known to her and the judge must be “acting with some self-interest or ill will.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). See also Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866, 892 S.E.2d 3 (“Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.” (cleaned up)).

Here, Williams was clearly acting in her judicial capacity when she contacted Alexander about her pending case. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 341, 903 S.E.2d 645. And the Hearing Panel's findings that she acted in bad faith are supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. With respect to the three counts collectively, the Panel determined that Williams's staff advised her not to call Alexander ex parte, that she did so anyway, that she acted with the purpose of benefitting Alexander based on their relationship, and that she attempted to mislead opposing counsel and the investigators as to what had occurred. The Panel noted that while Williams acknowledged the ex parte phone call, she attempted to justify her actions and, when that failed, attempted to deflect blame. These credibility determinations were based in significant part on the Panel's observations of Williams's live testimony, as well as the testimony of other witnesses. And these credibility determinations are “the kind of finding to which we offer considerable deference.” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866, 892 S.E.2d 3. The Panel's finding of bad faith is supported by the record and is therefore not clearly erroneous. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 328, 903 S.E.2d 645. As such, we agree that Williams's actions constituted “willful misconduct in office” and that discipline is authorized. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a).⁷

Accordingly, based on the Panel's findings that her actions were taken in her judicial capacity and in bad faith, Williams's conduct constitutes willful misconduct in office, such that Paragraph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution authorizes discipline for her actions with regard to this matter. See id. See also Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 860–73, 892 S.E.2d 3 (holding that a judge's violations of CJC Rule 1.1 and 1.2(A) — which were not done negligently but with self-interest and showed that he could not “be trusted to handle judicial matters before him with honesty and integrity” — amounted to bad faith).

(c) Phone Call on Behalf of a Family Member

With respect to Counts 4–5 in case number S25Z0722, the Hearing Panel found the following facts and made the following conclusions pertaining to a phone call made by Williams on her uncle's behalf.

(i) The Hearing Panel's Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to the Material Facts Pertaining to Counts 4–5 in Case Number S25Z0722

Shortly after a domestic contempt case was filed against her uncle, Williams left a message for a junior attorney listed as counsel of record for the opposing party and whose firm had another case pending in front of Williams, to call Williams on her personal cell phone after hours. When she spoke to the associate, Williams introduced herself as “Judge Williams” but claimed she was not calling in her capacity as a judge but rather in her personal capacity on behalf of her uncle, who was representing himself in the case. The Hearing Panel credited the associate's testimony that Williams then began advocating for her uncle — specifically, Williams discussed the merits of the case, requested an extension on her uncle's behalf, and opined that she would have dismissed the case had it come before her. Two days later, the associate received an email from Williams's uncle; the email had apparently been forwarded to the associate, was notably sophisticated, and used legal terminology not typically used by pro se litigants. Williams was evasive about the substance of the call, which received some significant discussion by the Panel, with the Panel using her testimony to emphasize her lack of truthfulness and candor. The associate believed, and the Hearing Panel found, that Williams drafted the email on her uncle's behalf.

Evidence presented at the hearing supports the Hearing Panel's findings that are material to our ultimate conclusion. Thus, those findings, as recounted above, are not clearly erroneous. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 323, 903 S.E.2d 645.

(ii) Williams Violated CJC Rules 1.2(B) and 1.3

The Hearing Panel concluded that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.2(B)⁸ (Count 4) and 1.3 ⁹ (Count 5) in connection with this matter. We agree.

The Hearing Panel credited the associate's testimony regarding the substance of the call with Williams and, after making a credibility determination regarding Williams's evasive testimony on this point, found that she deliberately contacted the junior associate on the case because she would be the easiest to influence with regard to her uncle's case, that she did so after-hours, and that she wrote a follow-up email regarding his case on his behalf. In sum, the Hearing Panel found Williams's testimony about this interaction to be untruthful, which indicated her consciousness of wrongdoing. Accordingly, we have no difficulty concluding, as the Hearing Panel did, that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Williams did not exhibit the high standards of conduct required of judges when she requested that the least experienced attorney on the case call her at a time when that junior attorney was more likely to be isolated, improperly discussed her uncle's case in violation of CJC Rule 1.2(B), and lent the prestige of her office to advance her uncle's, and by extension, her own, interests in violation of CJC Rule 1.3. See Inquiry Concerning Judge Anthony Peters, 289 Ga. 633, 634 & n.4, 715 S.E.2d 56 (2011) (concluding that judge's inappropriate use of judicial office to advance family member's personal interests constituted a violation of former CJC Canon 2(B), which is substantially similar to current CJC Rule 1.3).

(iii) Williams's Conduct Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice Such that Discipline is Authorized Under Paragraph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution

With respect to Counts 4 and 5, the Hearing Panel concluded that Williams's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice because her actions, though outside her judicial capacity, were taken in bad faith. We agree.

“When a person who is a judge acts outside of that capacity, this Court's ability to discipline the judge is more limited. In order for actions taken outside of a judge's judicial capacity to constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and thus within our constitutional power to discipline, those actions must be taken in bad faith.” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 861, 892 S.E.2d 3 (cleaned up). Thus, we may discipline Williams for her violation of CJC Rules 1.2(B) and 1.3 only if her conduct was carried out in bad faith. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 336, 903 S.E.2d 645.

The Hearing Panel found that Williams contacted the junior associate after normal business hours. Although Williams testified that she called the associate on the case because she was the signatory, the Panel did not credit that testimony and found instead that Williams contacted the least senior attorney on the matter because she would likely be the easiest to influence. Williams conceded at the hearing that she should not have made the phone call and that doing so was a “complete lapse in judgment” triggered by extreme emotional stress arising from the illness of her grandmother and the death of her mother. However, the Panel noted that Williams was dishonest during her initial testimony regarding this event, equivocating on the material and damaging parts of the call and then revising her testimony only after the associate testified. The Panel found that Williams was not forthcoming and that her actions in this respect were not merely negligent but were motivated by self-interest. Those findings are not clearly erroneous, so we conclude that Williams's actions were taken in bad faith. Accordingly, we conclude that her actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute and that discipline is authorized. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a). See also Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 871, 892 S.E.2d 3 (noting that where a judge, “when confronted with the consequences of [his] actions, does not cooperate or try to rectify his wrongs, but stalls and obfuscates ․ present[s] a picture of not mere negligence, but conscious wrongdoing motivated by self-interest”).

(d) Jailing of Molly Dennis

With respect to Counts 1–3 in case number S25Z0722, the Hearing Panel found the following facts and made the following conclusions pertaining to the jailing of Molly Dennis.

(i) The Hearing Panel's Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to the Material Facts Pertaining to Counts 1–3 in Case Number S25Z0722

The facts relating to this incident are generally undisputed. As part of a contentious divorce action assigned to Williams, Dennis, who was then in her early twenties and had been accused of damaging and stealing items from her father's home, testified on her mother's behalf. Dennis admitted to breaking some photos and flushing some of her father's medicine down the toilet but otherwise denied theft or damage. During that proceeding, there were instances of general courtroom “misbehavior and disruption” by Dennis and her mother, which Williams reprimanded. Dennis later testified to the Hearing Panel that, at various points during the proceeding, Williams questioned and lectured Dennis, filed her nails, used a cell phone, and took a phone call.

During closing arguments of that proceeding, Williams ordered the courtroom deputy to place Dennis in custody. The deputy handcuffed Dennis and walked her to the front of the courtroom, where Williams lectured her on potential sentences for certain felony offenses that, in Williams's opinion as a former prosecutor, Dennis had arguably committed. Williams then directed the deputy to “[g]o show her what the cell looks like,” and instructed counsel to continue with closing arguments. The deputy placed Dennis in a holding cell, locked the cell door, and left her alone in the cell for 15 to 45 minutes.¹⁰ Dennis, still handcuffed, was eventually returned to the courtroom and Williams again lectured Dennis, this time regarding her behavior and involvement in her parents’ divorce. Only after that lecture were the handcuffs removed. Evidence presented at the hearing supports the Hearing Panel's findings that are material to our ultimate conclusion, so we conclude that those findings, as recounted above, are not clearly erroneous. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 323, 903 S.E.2d 645.

(ii) Williams Violated CJC Rules 1.1, 1.2(A), and 2.8(B)

The Hearing Panel concluded that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.1 ¹¹ (Count 1), 1.2(A)¹² (Count 2), and 2.8(B)  ¹³ (Count 3) in connection with this incident. We agree with that conclusion.

The Panel found that Williams directed the unlawful arrest and false imprisonment of Dennis without any legal authority. See In re Williams, 347 Ga. App. 189, 191, 818 S.E.2d 260 (2018) (Although a trial judge “has the authority to summarily punish for contemptuous conduct committed in his or her presence, due process requires that such punishment cannot be meted out until the contemnor is given reasonable notice of the charge and an opportunity to be heard.”). In her Exceptions, Williams focuses on her intent in connection with this incident, indicating that she did not intend to place Dennis in custody or under arrest but rather to “detain[ ]” her to demonstrate the seriousness of Dennis's perceived misconduct. However, Williams eventually admitted to the Hearing Panel that she lacked legal authority to have Dennis handcuffed and placed in the holding cell and admitted that she was “technically” wrong to do so, though she maintains in her Exceptions that her actions lacked “malice or abuse of power.” But Dennis was neither charged with contempt, nor was she under arrest for any other pending charges. Accordingly, Williams failed to extend the minimum requirements of due process of law to Dennis before ordering that she be handcuffed and placed her in the holding cell. See In re Williams, 347 Ga. App. at 191, 818 S.E.2d 260. Based on this conduct, as well as Williams's behavior on the bench during the proceedings, we therefore conclude, as the Hearing Panel did, that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Williams violated CJC Rule 1.1, 1.2(A), and 2.8(B). See Inquiry Concerning Baker, 313 Ga. 359, 361–62, 870 S.E.2d 356 (2022) (failure to comply with the law constitutes a violation of CJC Rules 1.1 and 1.2(A)).

(iii) Williams's Conduct Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice Such that Discipline Is Authorized Under Paragraph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution

With respect to Counts 1–3, the Hearing Panel concluded that Williams's conduct, as outlined above, constituted inappropriate judicial actions, which, even if taken in good faith, was prejudicial to the administration of justice and brought the judicial office into disrepute and that discipline is authorized. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a).¹⁴ We agree.

For actions taken in a judicial capacity, “[c]onduct prejudicial to the administration of justice refers to inappropriate actions taken in good faith by the judge ․, but which may appear to be unjudicial and harmful to the public's esteem of the judiciary.” Peterson, 319 Ga. at 341, 903 S.E.2d 645 (cleaned up). Here, Williams was clearly acting within her judicial capacity during her dealings with Dennis. And Williams conceded that she acted without legal authority in placing Dennis in the holding cell—though she claims that her intentions were constructive, albeit misguided. However, even crediting Williams's explanation for her actions, as the Hearing Panel did, we agree that Williams's actions “appear[ed] to be unjudicial and harmful to the public's esteem of the judiciary.” Peterson, 319 Ga. at 341, 903 S.E.2d 645. In particular, by acting out of self-interest in putting her personal feelings above the law in jailing Dennis so as to “teach her a lesson,” Williams failed to separate the authority of the judicial office she holds from her personal convictions and so acted in a manner that was “unjudicial.” In the particulars described, unable to see that she was the servant of the law and not its embodiment, she set herself above it. And in doing so, she harmed the public's esteem of the judiciary, as evidenced by Dennis's statements to the Hearing Panel regarding her impressions of the judiciary following her experiences. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel's findings that Williams's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice was authorized by the evidence, and disciplined is authorized under Paragraph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a).

(e) Failures to Timely Rule

With respect to Counts 7–17 in case number S24Z1139 and 7–15 in case number S25Z0722, the Hearing Panel found that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.1 and 2.2 pertaining to her failures to timely rule. Williams admitted to Counts 8, 9, and 11–17 in case number S24Z1139 and Counts 7–9 and 11–15 in case number S25Z0722, before later admitting in her Amended Admissions and Stipulations to all failure-to-timely-rule counts contained in both sets of formal charges. See JQC Rule 23(A) (providing for discipline by consent based on a “judge's admission of some or all of the formal charges or the judge's admission that evidence exists with which the Director could properly prove some or all of the formal charges”). The Hearing Panel found that Williams's admissions, along with her testimony and other evidence the Director presented at the hearing, supported findings that, with respect to these counts, Williams failed to comply with OCGA § 15-6-21(b) (requiring decisions on motions within 90 days of argument or submission). But we need not reach the issue of whether Williams violated CJC 1.1 and 2.2 by failing to timely rule here and whether these additional violations would ordinarily warrant removal because the numerous other violations would typically be sufficient to warrant sanctions.

3. Disposition

Having determined that Williams violated numerous provisions of the CJC, the next step in the ordinary course of our analysis would be to consider appropriate sanctions. Here, the JQC has recommended removal, and, in supplemental briefing, has argued that this Court has the authority to permanently ban Williams from judicial office based on the inherent constitutional power of the Court to regulate and govern the judicial branch found beyond the specific provisions related to JQC proceedings. And we would typically agree that these proven violations would, collectively, warrant the removal of Williams under ordinary circumstances. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 347, 903 S.E.2d 645 (holding that removal from office was the appropriate sanction based on pattern of violations and lack of candor during investigation); Inquiry Concerning Fowler, 287 Ga. 467, 472, 696 S.E.2d 644 (2010) (removal from office warranted where the judge exhibited a “consistent pattern of misconduct” that stemmed from “willful misconduct in office” and “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute,” among other things (quotation marks omitted)); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 406, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002) (removal appropriate where the judge, among other things, demonstrated a lack of competence in the law, failed to safeguard basic constitutional rights of litigants, and failed to respect and comply with the law with respect to multiple matters of misconduct, which “demonstrate[d] a troubling pattern of ineptitude and misconduct”).

However, the next step in the typical process of considering appropriate sanctions has been disrupted by Williams's resignation from her judicial position. We cannot impose a sanction of removal from office here because Williams no longer holds judicial office. And the question of what this Court can and should do next under these circumstances is one as to which we are split, as evidenced by the separate writings. However, for differing reasons, the majority of the Court agrees that these cases should be dismissed without prejudice and that, should Shermela J. Williams become a judicial candidate or judge in the future, the JQC is authorized to reinstate proceedings based on this Court's determination that Williams's multiple violations of the CJC would warrant removal from judicial office if she had remained in office. See Johnson, 316 Ga. at 878–79, 892 S.E.2d 1. And should the JQC reinstate proceedings under such circumstances, those proceedings will resume in the same procedural posture as that which this proceeding occupies at the conclusion of this opinion (i.e., the alleged violations having been found to be proven by clear and convincing evidence and to be of a nature that warrants discipline — leaving only the imposition of discipline for the consideration of the Court).

Dismissed without prejudice.

I concur in the Court's opinion dismissing this case without prejudice. I write separately to do three things: (1) explain that the judicial-discipline powers the Georgia Constitution gives us expressly are limited to disciplining sitting judges, (2) articulate key principles for understanding the scope and nature of our inherent powers, and (3) explain why in my view an application of those principles leads me to conclude that we should not — and perhaps cannot — impose discipline on former Judge Williams.

Justice Bethel's thoughtful dissenting opinion argues that this Court has “inherent judicial power” to discipline a former judge who resigns from judicial office during disciplinary proceedings and that we should exercise that inherent power to impose discipline in this case. I am not so sure.

1. The Georgia Constitution's express provisions regarding judicial discipline extend only to the discipline of sitting judges.

The Georgia Constitution contains three provisions expressly granting various actors power over judicial discipline. The Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly shall by statute create the Judicial Qualifications Commission (the “JQC”), “with such commission having the power to discipline, remove, and cause involuntary retirement of judges as provided by this Article.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VI(a) (“Paragraph VI”). The following paragraph provides that “[a]ny judge may be removed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for” five different categories of misconduct. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a) (“Paragraph VII”). And the final paragraph provides that “[n]o action shall be taken against a judge except after hearing and in accordance with due process of law” and “[n]o removal or involuntary retirement shall occur except upon order of the Supreme Court after review.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VIII (“Paragraph VIII”). Each of these provisions speaks only of disciplining a “judge.” The most natural reading of “judge” is “a person holding the office of judge.” I do not read any of these provisions as explicitly giving this Court the authority to impose judicial discipline on persons who served as judges previously but have resigned pending disciplinary proceedings; someone who has ceased to hold the office of judge (by resignation or otherwise) has ceased to be a “judge.” And I see no constitutional text in any of these provisions (or any other constitutional provision, for that matter) that confers authority to impose judicial discipline on persons who have ceased serving as a judge. To my mind, that is sufficient to resolve the question of our express power under these provisions.

The JQC notes that the definition of “judge” in Article VI “contains no temporal limitations.” See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. III (“The term ‘judge,’ as used in this article, shall include Justices, judges, senior judges, magistrates, and every other such judicial office of whatever name existing or created.”). It argues that the phrase “any judge” in Paragraph VII “is not textually restricted to ‘current judges,’ ‘sitting judges,’ or ‘active judges.’ ” But the Constitution's definition of judge makes clear that it refers to “judicial office,” see id., and someone who has left that office has thus ceased to be a “judge.” The JQC also contends that the term “judge” can be understood to include a judge who resigned, because “judges generally retain the honorific ‘judge’ title after retirement” as “judicial service defines individuals for the rest of their lives.” But the fact that some may use such “honorifics” after leaving office does not make a “judge” (as the Constitution uses that term) out of someone who no longer holds judicial office.

The JQC also argues that Paragraph VII shows that the word “judge” can include former judges, because it says that judges may be “suspended from office” and uses the present tense when referring to the suspended judge as a “judge.” See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(c) (“While a judge is suspended from office ․.” (emphasis added)). But, as the JQC notes, a “suspended” judge may later be reinstated. Id. at Par. VII(b)(1), (3), (6). Thus, the fact that the Constitution at one point refers to a person suspended from office as a “judge” is not very strong evidence that a person who has resigned from judicial office (and thus has no possibility of being reinstated, at least to the same office from which they have permanently separated themselves) is still a “judge” within the meaning of Paragraph VII. Moreover, Paragraph VII refers to a “judge” being “removed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined[.]” “[R]emoved” and “suspended” clearly apply only to persons currently holding judicial office, and under the canon of ejusdem generis (Latin for “of the same kind or class”), the term “otherwise disciplined” would be understood in the light of those terms, such that we might assume that “otherwise disciplined” refers to the sort of discipline that might be inflicted upon a sitting judge, such as a reprimand. See Inquiry Concerning Crawford, 310 Ga. 403, 409 & n.6, 851 S.E.2d 572 (2020) (Blackwell, J., concurring, joined by Boggs, Peterson, and Bethel, JJ.) (expressing doubt that the Court has constitutional authority to impose as judicial discipline lifetime disqualification from judicial office).

Given these textual points, and the complete absence of any precedent in which we have applied any of these provisions to discipline a former judge, I conclude that our express power to discipline Georgia judges under these constitutional provisions ends when that judge leaves office. I turn next to our inherent power.

2. Our caselaw makes clear that the Georgia Constitution also grants us inherent powers, but only for actions genuinely necessary to the exercise of our express powers, and we should exercise inherent power cautiously.

“From the Constitution, the legislative department, as well as every other part of the Government, derives its power[.]” Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, 219 (1850). And our Constitution grants different powers to each of the three branches. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (“The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others except as herein provided.”). As a general matter, the legislative power is the broadest. See Sears v. State of Ga., 232 Ga. 547, 553–54, 208 S.E.2d 93 (1974) (“The inherent powers of our State General Assembly are awesome. ․ [The General Assembly] is absolutely unrestricted in the power to legislate, so long as it does not undertake to enact measures prohibited by the State or Federal Constitution.”).

Although the Judicial Branch is the subject of an entire Article of Georgia's Constitution, that Constitution says very little expressly about the nature of the power it vests in Georgia courts beyond the fact that it is so vested. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I (“The judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in the following classes of courts․.”). And although the core of the judicial power is to “resolve controversies about the relative rights and obligations of the parties before [the court], and to enter judgments that bind the parties to those decisions,” Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 624, 911 S.E.2d 583 (2025), effectuating that responsibility sometimes requires the exercise of additional power. We have long called this additional power “inherent power,” and have recognized that it exists both in individual cases with respect to controlling the proceedings, and (at least for this Court) more broadly with respect to the judicial system as a whole.

Early on, we made clear that this notion of inherent power of the judiciary flowed from the constitutional separation of powers among the branches of state government. “[W]hen the constitution declares that the legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct ․, it hereby invests those officials charged with the duty of administering justice according to law with all necessary authority to efficiently and completely discharge those duties the performance of which is by the constitution committed to the judiciary, and to maintain the dignity and independence of the courts.” Lovett v. Sandersville R. Co., 199 Ga. 238, 239, 33 S.E.2d 905 (1945) (citing precursor to Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III).

Considered in this light, inherent judicial power cannot extend to everything that is merely useful or helpful to us in the exercise of our express judicial power; that would include far too much. Rather, inherent judicial power includes only those things genuinely necessary to the exercise of our express judicial power. This notion is consistent with our precedent. See id. at 239, 33 S.E.2d 905 (declaring in case about trial management that inherent judicial power includes “all necessary authority to efficiently and completely discharge those duties the performance of which is by the constitution committed to the judiciary, and to maintain the dignity and independence of the courts” (emphasis added)); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 111, 166 S.E.2d 718 (1969) (judiciary has power to create a unified state bar organization; judicial power “includes the authority to perform any function reasonably necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, improve the administration of justice, and protect the judiciary as an independent department of the government” (emphasis added)); Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 249 Ga. 632, 634, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982) (inherent power allows a court to order county commission to pay expenses for “a compelling need essential to the orderly administration of the court” (emphasis added)); State v. McMillan, 253 Ga. 154, 163–64, 319 S.E.2d 1 (1984) (Smith, J., concurring specially, joined by majority of Court) (relying on Lovett’s “all necessary authority” language to conclude statute that conditioned receipt of retirement benefits on appointment to office of senior judge, which was in turn conditioned on not practicing law, was unconstitutional infringement on this Court's inherent and exclusive power to regulate the practice of law); Matter of Oliver, 261 Ga. 850, 851–52, 413 S.E.2d 435 (1992) (this Court has inherent power to prescribe educational requirements for admission to practice of law; quoting “any function reasonably necessary” language from Wallace); Sacandy v. Walther, 262 Ga. 11, 12, 413 S.E.2d 727 (1992) (superior court judges are authorized to appoint indigent counsel, citing Wallace for the proposition that superior court judges “have the inherent power to take action necessary to efficiently and completely discharge [their] duties” (cleaned up)). This requirement of necessity — if carefully and properly applied — prevents courts from using inherent judicial power to step into legislative or executive roles.

Our precedent is also clear that this Court has at least some inherent power regarding judicial discipline, notwithstanding the Constitution's express provisions on that subject. See Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 591, 250 Ga. 796, 797, 300 S.E.2d 807 (1983) (a determination by this Court that a judge's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice is an exercise of the express power of removal contained in the Constitution, “as well as within the inherent power of this Court by virtue of its creation by the Constitution, and, the delegation to it of Constitutional responsibilities,” as “[o]ur powers are equal to our duties” (quotation marks omitted)); Judicial Qualification Comm'n v. Lowenstein, 252 Ga. 432, 433–34, 314 S.E.2d 107 (1984) (rejecting constitutional challenge to campaign-fundraising restrictions in Code of Judicial Conduct, relying on Wallace’s language that judicial power includes “the authority to perform any function reasonably necessary to” carry out the duties of the judiciary); In re Judicial Qualifications Comm'n Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, 300 Ga. 291, 293–94, 794 S.E.2d 631 (2016) (relying on Lowenstein for the proposition that “the authority to prescribe more particularized standards for judicial conduct belongs to this Court as an incident of the judicial power”).

We gave the most attention to our inherent powers in the judicial discipline context in Lowenstein. That case involved a constitutional challenge to a provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct on the ground that this Court lacked authority to promulgate that canon and that the canon violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. See 252 Ga. at 433–34, 314 S.E.2d 107. Our holding there about our inherent authority to regulate judges is best understood as determining that this Court — as opposed to another branch of government — had the authority to promulgate the Code, because as a matter of separation of powers, both regulation of the practice of law and regulation of the conduct of judges are exclusive functions of the judiciary. See id. (“[T]his Court has the authority to promulgate and enforce Canon 7B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (1974)[.]”). And I have no quarrel with that holding. Irrespective of whether the Court was correct as a textual matter that existing constitutional language empowering the Supreme Court to “prescribe rules governing privilege, confidentiality, and practice and procedure” in all judicial discipline proceedings conferred authority to promulgate substantive rules of judicial conduct, no constitutional text (then or now) purported to vest that power anywhere else.¹ And that power must necessarily be vested in some part of government, because the existence of substantive rules of judicial conduct is a necessary precondition for the system of judicial discipline that the Georgia Constitution did and does expressly create. Accordingly, we were correct to hold as a matter of separation of powers that this necessary implicit power was vested in this Court. But Lowenstein did not decide anything about whether our power to regulate judges extends to persons who are no longer judges.

Our caselaw also makes clear that courts should be cautious in determining that a specific set of facts constitutes a necessity sufficient to exercise inherent judicial power. We have stated that “[t]he inherent power of the court must be carefully preserved, but also cautiously used,” and never as “an instrument for judicial glorification.” Grimsley, 249 Ga. at 634, 292 S.E.2d 675. We have further cautioned that the judiciary's inherent power “is not a sword” that gives “the judicial branch the right to invade the province of another branch of government,” but “a shield” that “arms the judicial branch with authority to prevent another branch from invading its province,” given that it is “a principle flowing from the separation of powers doctrine.” McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court of Chatham, 260 Ga. 315, 316, 392 S.E.2d 707 (1990).

We have most frequently applied this caution to the exercise of inherent power by other courts; we have invalidated certain attempts by lower court judges to compel other branches to fund judicial functions, particularly where other mechanisms existed to preserve the needs of the judiciary. See Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570, 572, 651 S.E.2d 679 (2007) (reversing order that county pay costs associated with defense of criminal defendant; although statute previously recognized the “inherent power of the court” to appoint counsel and order compensation and reimbursement, that code section was effective only until establishment of state public defender council); DeKalb County v. Adams, 272 Ga. 401, 402–03, 529 S.E.2d 610 (2000) (concluding trial court exceeded its power in ordering county to commit public funds to compensate the appointed authority of a civil litigant, while acknowledging courts’ “inherent authority to take action necessary to discharge their duties efficiently and completely”); In re DeKalb County Courthouse Fire Sprinkler System, 265 Ga. 96, 98, 454 S.E.2d 126 (1995) (“[b]earing in mind the caution in McCorkle that the inherent powers of the courts are to be used as a shield and not a sword,” determining that judge who issued certificate of need requiring issuance of fire sprinklers in the courthouse exceeded his authority).

In sum, our caselaw is clear that we do have inherent power regarding judicial discipline. Our inherent power may be exercised only when genuinely necessary. And we should be cautious before concluding that a particular exercise is necessary. I now turn to how I would apply those principles here.

3. I would exercise caution and thus decline to use our inherent power to discipline former Judge Williams.

Both this Court and the JQC have taken significant action regarding former Judge Williams. We have determined that former Judge Williams committed multiple serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. We have determined that those violations would warrant removal if former Judge Williams were still in a judicial office from which we could remove her. And we have determined that these proceedings can be reinstated in this precise procedural posture — with the proper level of discipline determined, but not yet imposed — if former Judge Williams ever again becomes a judge or judicial candidate. We have said all these things publicly in a published opinion. And, perhaps most importantly, former Judge Williams is no longer a judge today as a direct result of the JQC's proceedings. To the extent that any other greater discipline is available, neither the Constitution nor the dissenting opinion specifies what discipline that might be. And to the extent that some lesser discipline (like a reprimand) might be possible, it's difficult for me to see what more that might add beyond the opinion we've already issued, much less so much more that it would warrant us deciding the novel and difficult question of using inherent judicial power in a way we have never yet used it.² Given all of this, our caselaw's exhortation to be cautious in our exercise of inherent power seems to me to apply here and counsel that we dismiss without prejudice.

That said, I fully agree with the dissenting opinion's sentiment that allowing judges to shortcut the disciplinary process by resigning is unseemly at best. And I agree with the dissenting opinion that the General Assembly should seriously consider amending the qualifications statute to impose a ban on people who do. If it did so, it would make the difficult question of our proper exercise of inherent power in this context unlikely to arise in the future.

I concur with the majority's conclusion that Williams violated numerous provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“the Code”) and the determination to dismiss these cases without prejudice. I also agree with the dissent that this Court does have the inherent authority to impose discipline on a former judge for conduct committed while in office after that judge subsequently resigns and before the conclusion of a judicial disciplinary proceeding. However, I would not exercise that inherent authority here.

The integrity of the judicial system and making sure those that participate in it are accountable is of paramount importance. A judge who commits multiple, serious violations of the Code threatens the integrity of the judicial system by bringing “the judicial office into disrepute,” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII, regardless of whether that judge has resigned from office. As Chief Justice Peterson recognizes in his concurrence, we long ago said that judicial power “includes the authority to perform any function reasonably necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, improve the administration of justice, and protect the judiciary as an independent department of the government.” Concurrence at 9 (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 111, 166 S.E.2d 718 (1969)). Thus, I have no difficulty agreeing with the dissent that we have the inherent authority to impose discipline in these matters.

Nevertheless, I would not impose discipline here—even assuming that a majority of the Court agreed we had the inherent authority to do so—because the Court has not provided clear notice that we will exercise such authority in these circumstances. Since this is the first time any of us have expressly said we do have this authority, I am not comfortable saying we should exercise it for the first time here. Therefore, I concur with the majority in dismissing these cases without prejudice.

However, going forward, should a majority of the Court conclude that we do have such inherent authority, I would say that these writings, at least for this jurist, provide sufficient notice of that authority, and I would not hesitate to exercise that authority in an appropriate case.

The Court today dismisses without prejudice these judicial discipline cases, which were pending against a former judge who resigned following the investigation, evidentiary hearing, findings of multiple violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and a recommendation of removal from office by the Judicial Qualifications Commission. Upon review of the recommendation and the record, the Court holds that several of the violations have been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that the violations are of a sort that would ordinarily result in removal from office. In dismissing these cases, the Court specifies that these proceedings may be reinstated if the former judge later becomes a judicial candidate or judge. The two obvious explanations for a dismissal of this sort are that the Court either lacks jurisdiction to discipline former judges who are not holding or pursuing judicial office, or the Court has such jurisdiction, but declines to exercise it here. I dissent from the dismissal because I believe this Court has jurisdiction to discipline individuals for official misconduct committed during service as a judge and because I would exercise that jurisdiction to address the troubling findings of serious official misconduct here.

(a) The judicial power of the State of Georgia is constitutionally vested in this Court and the other courts of the State, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I, and “is constitutionally declared to forever remain separate and distinct from the legislative and executive powers,” Judicial Council of Ga. v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, 288 Ga. 294, 297, 702 S.E.2d 894 (2010). We have long recognized that our state constitution gives this Court “inherent power to control the judicial branch of government.” Forston v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 472, 479, 208 S.E.2d 68 (1974).

The constitutional declaration that the powers of the three branches of government shall forever remain separate and distinct provides the courts with inherent powers, as it [“]invests those officials charged with the duty of administering justice according to law with all necessary authority to efficiently and completely discharge those duties the performance of which is by the constitution committed to the judiciary, and to maintain the dignity and independence of the courts.[”]

Judicial Council of Georgia, 288 Ga. at 297–98, 702 S.E.2d 894 (cleaned up) (quoting Lovett v. Sandersville R. Co., 199 Ga. 238, 239, 33 S.E.2d 905 (1945)). See also In re DeKalb Cty. Courthouse Fire Sprinkler Sys., 265 Ga. 96, 97, 454 S.E.2d 126 (1995) (“It is only in aid of the fulfillment of the judicial function that courts possess inherent powers.”); Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 249 Ga. 632, 634, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982) (Inherent judicial “power is a principle which arises from the doctrine of separation and equality of the branches of government.”). “The term ‘inherent power of the judiciary’ [thus] means that power which is essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court.” Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 110, 166 S.E.2d 718 (1969). Simply put, the judicial branch, like the other branches, has the inherent power to do those things necessary to discharge its constitutional responsibilities (excluding constitutional responsibilities expressly reserved to the other branches), and this Court has the ultimate constitutional responsibility for administering the judicial branch in Georgia. It seems to me that the Chief Justice and I agree on this much.¹

However, I understand our precedent to contemplate the applicable necessity, unless expressly limited by the constitution, to be as broad as the judiciary's duty to the public. See McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court of Chatham County, 260 Ga. 315, 316, 392 S.E.2d 707 (1990); Judicial Qualifications Com'n v. Lowenstein, 252 Ga. 432, 433, 314 S.E.2d 107 (1984) (“Our powers are equal to our duties.”). It is not the courts themselves that are “intended to be the beneficiaries of the inherent power. It is the people” who are meant to benefit from this power. Grimsley, 249 Ga. at 634, 292 S.E.2d 675. So it seems plain to me that our duty to administer, safeguard, and defend the judicial branch necessarily includes the power to discipline those whose actions pose an internal threat to the judiciary. Looking to the other branches to address the internal operations of the courts simply because a proven bad actor has left service within the branch seems, to me, to invite a blurring of the separation of powers.

Of course, as the Chief Justice ably explains, Paragraphs VI and VII of our Constitution expressly provide the basis for and procedure by which sitting judges are disciplined. And those provisions obviously control the circumstances under which they are implicated. But I do not understand the existence of those provisions to limit the inherent power of the courts; they simply establish the mechanism for addressing disciplinary cases for active judges. See Wallace, 225 Ga. at 110, 166 S.E.2d 718 (noting that the court's “inherent power” is “essential to its being and dignity and does not require an express grant to confer it”); Lowenstein, 252 Ga. at 433, 314 S.E.2d 107 (recognizing this Court's inherent authority to regulate the conduct of judges). It makes perfect sense to provide for a detailed and defined process for investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating, and concluding disciplinary cases concerning sitting judges. This provides protection for all participants in the process (which takes place entirely within the branch). And this approach seems particularly wise where the subject of disciplinary inquiries and actions might stay in judicial service. The need for those special procedures and protections is diminished, however, where the subject has left judicial service. But the importance of accountability for official misconduct ² — and the need to protect the existence, dignity, and functions of the branch — remains. And, in my view, so does our authority to act accordingly.³

(b) Here, because the subject of the inquiry resigned, she is no longer a judge. Therefore, our authority to discipline her emanates not from the specific constitutional provisions outlining the process for disciplining sitting judges but from this Court's inherent judicial power to protect the judicial branch and to maintain the dignity of the courts. I believe that authority exists as an essential function under our constitutional responsibility to operate a separate and independent branch of government. And, contrary to the Chief's thoughtful view I believe the exercise of this Court's inherent power is necessary here and warranted given the nature of the charges — many of which carried the potential sanction of removal — and particularly the findings by the JQC following an evidentiary hearing — which appear supported by the record.⁴

While this Court's decision does not clarify the question of which branch can discipline judges who resign before the disciplinary process is complete, I hope our partner branches do not endeavor to assume that duty themselves. I worry about clarity and consistency in a world where a statute might control discipline for the conduct of an individual who leaves judicial office before the conclusion of the judicial disciplinary process while the Code of Judicial Conduct and JQC rules would control the process if the disciplinary process had concluded sooner. It is distressing to think about the prospect of a judge facing disciplinary proceedings being in a position to actively consider which set of rules was more favorable to her situation.

I do note for the consideration of the General Assembly that it has a tangential authority which might be useful for it to exercise while avoiding the creation of separate laws to govern the pre-departure misconduct ⁵ of those who have left the judiciary. The General Assembly has the authority to establish the qualifications for judges and has exercised that authority with respect to those who have been removed from judicial office. See, e.g., OCGA § 15-1-13(a) (providing that “if a person has been removed from any judicial office upon order of the Supreme Court after review, that person shall not be eligible to be elected or appointed to any judicial office in this state until seven years have elapsed from the time of such removal”). Of course, a judge who resigns from his or her position during the pendency of a JQC investigation and prosecution cannot be removed and therefore avoids this statutory burden on future qualification as a judge, whether elected or appointed. Accordingly, it may be wise for the General Assembly to consider the ways resigning from judicial office during the pendency of a JQC proceeding might affect a person's subsequent qualification to hold judicial office.⁶

In addition, I note that several of the findings of judicial misconduct here implicate provisions of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. While the State Bar (wisely in my estimation) typically withholds pursuing bar disciplinary proceedings that are the subject of judicial discipline proceedings, I view the Court's action here as an indication that the State Bar is free to pursue appropriate disciplinary action against former judges who are members of the State Bar.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Prior to closing arguments at her hearing, Williams filed an Amended Admissions and Stipulations to Formal Charges, which was signed only by her rather than being presented by counsel. However, in the Exceptions, counsel argued that the admissions were prepared by counsel on Williams's behalf.

2.   CJC Rule 1.2 provides:(A) Judges shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.(B) An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. Judges shall participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct and shall personally observe such standards of conduct so that the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.

3.   Williams concedes she filed her motion on the first day of the final hearing, outside the pretrial motion deadline, but argues she filed the motion when she first became aware of the alleged conflict.

4.   Williams's staff attorney denied speaking with Alexander's attorney, but the Hearing Panel found that the staff attorney was not a credible witness and credited the testimony of Alexander's attorney.

5.   Williams denied the motion but then voluntarily recused.

6.   CJC Rule 1.2(A) provides: “Judges shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.”CJC Rule 2.4(B) provides: “Judges shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment.”CJC Rule 2.9(A) provides: “Judges shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. Judges shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to them outside the presence of the parties, or their lawyers, concerning a pending proceeding or impending matter,” subject to certain exceptions.

7.   The Hearing Panel alternatively concluded that an additional constitutional basis existed that would warrant discipline: that Judge Williams's conduct with respect to this matter constituted judicial conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a). We need not decide whether that determination was correct, however, because Paragraph VII(a) authorizes discipline on the ground that Williams committed willful misconduct in office. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 328 n.13, 903 S.E.2d 645.

8.   CJC Rule 1.2(B) provides: “An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. Judges shall participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe such standards of conduct so that the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.”

9.   CJC Rule 1.3 provides: “Judges shall not lend the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of the judge or others.”

10.   The only portion of these facts that Williams disputes is the amount of time that Molly remained in the holding cell.

11.   CJC Rule 1.1 provides: “Judges shall respect and comply with the law.”

12.   CJC Rule 1.2(A) provides: “Judges shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.”

13.   CJC Rule 2.8(B) provides: “Judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom they deal in their official capacity, and shall require similar conduct of all persons subject to their direction and control.”

14.   The Hearing Panel alternatively concluded that an additional constitutional basis existed that would warrant discipline: that Williams's conduct with respect to this matter constituted willful misconduct in office. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a). We need not decide whether that determination was correct, however, because Paragraph VII(a) authorizes discipline on the ground that Williams's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 328 n.13, 903 S.E.2d 645.

1.   Although the relevant constitutional provisions are different now, those differences do not undermine our holding in Lowenstein.

2.   I also note that the lack of clarity regarding what kind of discipline our inherent power might permit us to impose on former judges makes it very hard for a former judge to know how to defend themself. We usually understand that notions of due process require rules to include notice of what penalties can be imposed for violating those rules. If we are not limited to those penalties outlined in the Constitution's express provisions, I don't see how a former judge could know what else they might be facing. And nothing in any of today's opinions does anything to bring clarity to that question.

1.   I am in general agreement with Divisions 1 and 2 of the Chief Justice's concurrence regarding the proper understanding of the nature of the inherent power of the Court.

2.   I do applaud the Court for conducting a thorough review of the record and findings in this case before turning to the question of sanctions. This effort provides public visibility in the nature of a published opinion adopting the factual findings of the Hearing Panel, but I do not believe that visibility is the equivalent of accountability. When official misconduct by judges goes uncensured or is otherwise minimized, there is a withdrawal from the reservoir of goodwill and confidence that our branch fills when it acts with integrity and impartiality. Those of us populating the branch that holds neither the public sword nor the purse have a collective interest in holding ourselves and our colleagues accountable to both protect the institution and foster public confidence.

3.   I recognize that none of our precedent addresses the specific question of whether the inherent constitutional powers of this Court include the authority to sanction former judges for actions taken during their judicial service. And I respect the differing view of my colleagues on this question. In my view, however, those other powers identified as inherent to our Court are consistent with the power I believe we have here.

4.   I wish to note my sincere sympathy with the views of some of my colleagues who are of the opinion that the lack of clear prior authority for the proposition that this Court retains the power of sanction following resignation should cause us to withhold imposing a sanction here. Of course, each of us must find our own balance between the interest of fairness to the accused and the protection of and accountability to the public. I note that the JQC has asserted a continuing jurisdiction perspective for many years, and the Court has never reached a contrary holding. See Inquiry Concerning Crawford, 310 Ga. 403, 406, 851 S.E.2d 572 (2020).

5.   For what it is worth, I note my additional concern that the Court's action here leaves another troubling question open. Suppose a complaint about a former judge surfaces after the judge has left office. If the dismissal here is read as reflecting an inability to act with respect to former judges, it follows that the JQC would not be empowered to investigate the complaint unless and until the person becomes a judge or a judicial candidate. Holding a completed file and disciplinary recommendation indefinitely is one thing. Holding a complaint and possible investigation in suspended animation indefinitely surely jeopardizes the chances that accurate and reliable information will be secured in the process.

6.   As noted above, the Court has broad agreement on most of the questions presented in the cases at hand. And, as highlighted in the Chief Justice's thoughtful concurrence, he and I are in agreement on the opportunity for the General Assembly to consider the future qualifications for office of those who resign with a report and recommendation from the Hearing Panel of the JQC pending, as well. While I am not in agreement with the resolution reached by the majority, I recognize that it obviates the need to decide the extent and application in the present cases of the inherent authority I believe exists. And, I confess I do not have a proposed solution to this conundrum were my view to have prevailed. In any event, as the Chief Justice points out, our resolution here comes with a real and heavy consequence. Namely, should Williams ever return to the bench or become a judicial candidate, she will be facing the imposition of discipline for the violations we conclude were sufficiently proven. That matters.

Per Curiam.

All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., who concurs in judgment only, and Bethel and Land, JJ., who dissent.