HICKS v. STATE (2026)

Appellant Ryan Hicks was convicted of felony murder and other crimes after Tamara Taylor was killed while Hicks was fleeing from law enforcement officers.¹ On appeal, Hicks raises several enumerations of error based on the trial court's exclusion of the Georgia State Patrol's written pursuit policy from the evidence admitted at trial. He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that he was on felony probation at the time of the incident, that vacatur and remand are necessary to correct sentencing errors, and that reversal is required because of the cumulative prejudice caused by various alleged trial court errors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed that on April 5, 2024, Hicks led law enforcement officers on a high-speed vehicle chase on Interstate 285 that ended when Hicks exited the interstate and ran a red light while traveling nearly 100 miles per hour, crashing into Taylor's vehicle and killing her nearly instantaneously.

Atlanta Police Department Sergeant David Hollerman testified that on April 3, 2024, two days before the collision, he observed a silver Dodge Ram truck with a broken brake light, ran the tag to discover that the truck was registered to Hicks, who was on felony probation, and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. The truck fled onto Interstate 285, driving recklessly through traffic at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. Hollerman initially pursued the truck but ceased his pursuit after he lost sight of the truck on the interstate.

On April 5, Hollerman was informed that license plate reader cameras had detected Hicks's truck nearby where he was patrolling, so Hollerman notified members of the Georgia State Patrol, including Trooper Michael Tennant, of the situation. Hollerman spotted the truck and attempted to initiate a traffic stop for the still-broken brake light, but the truck fled again. After Hicks's truck entered Interstate 285, Tennant took over as the primary officer in pursuit.

At trial, Tennant testified that on April 5, Hicks's truck drove in a reckless manner on Interstate 285 by weaving across multiple lanes, tailgating other vehicles, and passing vehicles on the shoulder of the interstate – all at speeds near or greater than 100 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone. Tennant testified that he maintained a distance from Hicks's vehicle to allow himself to respond adequately to Hicks's traffic maneuvers and to encourage Hicks to drive less recklessly and remain on the interstate, where there was controlled access, no intersections, and no pedestrians. Nevertheless, Hicks “swerved hard right” across all lanes of traffic and drove through the gore and dirt median to exit at Campbellton Road. Tennant testified that because of the safety concerns of continuing the pursuit on the surface streets, he was “getting ready to terminate the pursuit,” when “[t]he truck came upon a red light” at the intersection of Campbellton Road and Barge Road, “failed to stop for the red light, ran the red light[,] and T-boned another vehicle.” The crash ejected Taylor from her vehicle and killed her almost immediately from multiple severe injuries. Tennant called for medical assistance and placed Hicks under arrest as Hicks was attempting to exit his truck. No one else was in Hicks's vehicle.

On cross-examination, Hicks questioned Tennant about proper pursuit policy and whether Tennant followed it, and the State elicited on re-direct examination that Tennant's pursuit was reviewed by his superiors at the Georgia State Patrol, who determined that Tennant followed the Georgia State Patrol policy during the pursuit.

The dash cam videos, showing the pursuit both from Tennant's and Hollerman's vehicles, were admitted at trial. Other evidence, including traffic cameras and crash data from the airbag control modules of both vehicles, showed that Hicks was accelerating as he approached and entered the intersection at a speed of 97 miles per hour, striking Taylor's vehicle, which had the right of way. After the collision, law enforcement officers found over an ounce of marijuana in multiple bags in Hicks's truck.

2. Hicks contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the Georgia State Patrol's pursuit policy from the jury's consideration after the defense proffered it as relevant to causation and foreseeability, arguing that Tennant's conduct during the pursuit violated the policy such that it was Tennant's conduct that legally caused Taylor's death. As explained below, however, Hicks's claim fails.

At trial, the State announced that during Hollerman's testimony, the State received an email from Hicks's trial counsel stating that the defense intended “to use and introduce into evidence the Georgia State Patrol Pursuit Policy during Tennant's forthcoming testimony.” The State objected to the admission of that evidence under OCGA § 24-4-401 as irrelevant or, in the alternative, on the basis that it should be excluded under OCGA § 24-4-403 because it would confuse the issues. In response, Hicks's trial counsel argued that the policy was relevant to show whether Tennant was a proximate cause of Taylor's death by acting in reckless disregard of the pursuit policy and that its admission would not confuse the jury. The trial court reserved ruling at that time and invited the parties to provide any authority they had on the issue while the court researched it.

The next morning when court reconvened, the court heard a brief discussion and argument on the issue, then concluded, “I'm going to rule it out.” Hicks tendered a copy of the policy as Defendant's Exhibit 2 for “potential appeals purposes[,] not for anything going back,” and the trial court admitted it for record purposes only.

During Tennant's direct examination, the State elicited testimony about Tennant's training in pursuit technique, what methods or tactics he uses during a pursuit, and what factors he considers during a pursuit. At that point, the trial court called the attorneys for a bench conference, where the court ruled that this line of questioning “opened the door” to Hicks cross-examining Tennant about the policy and whether he followed it. The State then objected to the written policy itself being admitted into evidence, and Hicks's defense counsel stated, “I will enter it for identification, he's going to need his memory refreshed, I'm sure.” The State also stated, “if the defense wishes to pursue this on cross-examination, I would like to follow up that this officer – his pursuit was reviewed by his superiors and he was cleared and it was found to be within conformity of their policy.” The trial court clarified:

[W]e'll see what the cross entails and, obviously, if the cross entails this suggestion that he didn't follow the policy, then you ought to be able to get in on redirect that a determination was made. So they're on notice of that. And in terms of the policy document itself coming in, if it needs to be used to refresh, obviously, that can happen and it sounds to me like the defense is in agreement, is that correct, that the policy itself not go out?

Hicks responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”

On cross-examination, Hicks asked Tennant various questions about what factors Tennant was required to consider under the pursuit policy and whether his conduct conformed with the policy, but Tennant never required the written policy to refresh his recollection. Hicks also never moved to admit the policy into evidence. On redirect, Tennant testified that his superiors reviewed his pursuit and “[t]he determination was that I followed proper policy procedures. I followed state law and conducted the pursuit in accordance with the applicable state laws and policies thereof as pertaining to the Georgia State Patrol policies.”

Although Hicks initially sought and failed to get the written policy admitted into evidence, Hicks never argued that the written policy should be admitted into evidence after being given the opportunity to do so when the trial court ruled that the State opened the door to questioning about the policy during the direct examination of Tennant. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d); Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 670–71, 911 S.E.2d 554 (2025) (where appellant failed to object or otherwise seek a different evidentiary ruling but instead agreed to the procedure about which he complained on appeal, we review that claim only for plain error); McGarity v State, 311 Ga. 158, 162, 856 S.E.2d 241 (2021) (appellant's failure to preserve an objection to the exclusion of evidence means “he has waived his right to ordinary appellate review, and this enumeration is reviewable only for plain error”). And to show plain error, Hicks “must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Holloway, 320 Ga. at 670–71, 911 S.E.2d 554 (citation omitted). “To show that the error affected his substantial rights, [Hicks] is required to show that error probably affected the outcome of his trial.” Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 707, 808 S.E.2d 671 (2017). “The failure to meet one element of this test dooms a plain error claim.” Davis v. State, 311 Ga. 225, 230, 857 S.E.2d 207 (2021).

Pretermitting whether Hicks affirmatively waived this issue or whether there was clear error, Hicks's claim fails because he has not demonstrated that the exclusion of the written policy likely affected the outcome of his trial. The evidence of Hicks's guilt was overwhelming where it is undisputed that Hicks was fleeing from law enforcement when his vehicle struck Taylor's vehicle, killing her almost instantaneously.

Moreover, Hicks has not shown how the admission of the pursuit policy would have made any difference in the outcome where Hicks was permitted to question Tennant in depth about the details of the policy and whether the policy was followed. On appeal, despite conclusory assertions that Tennant violated the policy, Hicks does not explain how Tennant did not follow the policy or point to any evidence in the record of Tennant's alleged failure to follow the policy. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Hicks has not met his burden of showing that the failure to admit the written policy into evidence probably affected the outcome of the trial, meaning Hicks has failed to satisfy the third prong of the plain error test. See, e.g., Walton v. State, 322 Ga. 401, 411, 920 S.E.2d 116 (2025) (“Given th[e] strong evidence supporting his convictions, the cumulative nature of the contested [ ] evidence, and [appellant's] superficial treatment of this claim, [he] has not shown that any error ․ likely affected the outcome of his trial.”); Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 245, 869 S.E.2d 423 (2022) (holding that appellant did not meet his burden of showing that his substantial rights were affected because the other evidence of guilt was strong and included testimony on the same point as the evidence at issue). Accordingly, this claim fails.

3. In a distinct but related claim, Hicks contends that the trial court's causation rulings and instructions improperly constrained the jury's consideration of intervening cause. More specifically, Hicks argues that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury that an abnormal, unforeseeable intervening act can break the proximate causal chain, while also excluding the written policy, which Hick's characterizes as the primary evidence supporting that theory. Hicks also states that this error was compounded by the court's decision not to instruct the jury on OCGA § 40-6-6(d)(2).²

During the charge conference, the trial court explained that there was no “evidence that would make it appropriate to give the intervening cause part of [the suggested pattern instruction on proximate cause]. We don't have an intervening cause. We have, at most, another proximate cause. Intervening is something that happens between the original, you know, wrongdoer or tortfeasor and the ultimate bad result. Does anybody disagree?” Hicks's trial counsel replied, “No, I agree.” And when the trial court described what instruction it planned to give on felony murder and proximate cause, Hick's counsel stated, “I think it works.” The trial court also decided during the charge conference, without objection, not to charge the jury on OCGA § 40-6-6(d)(2).

Because Hicks did not object to the trial court's jury instructions on proximate cause, this claim is also reviewed for plain error only. See Hughes v. State, 310 Ga. 453, 456, 851 S.E.2d 580 (2020). And because Hicks affirmatively agreed that the Court should not charge the jury on intervening cause, he affirmatively waived that issue and cannot satisfy the first prong of the plain error test. See, e.g., id. at 457, 851 S.E.2d 580 (“By agreeing with the trial court, [Appellant] affirmatively waived his right to challenge the trial court's action.”); Brown v. State, 298 Ga. 880, 882, 785 S.E.2d 512 (2016); Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 809–10, 771 S.E.2d 362 (2015).

To the extent Hicks separately claims that the trial court committed plain error in not instructing the jury on the language of OCGA § 40-6-6(d), the unequivocal testimony at trial was that Tennant “followed proper policy procedures,” and, as noted above, other than making conclusory arguments on appeal that Tennant acted in reckless disregard of the policy, Hicks does not explain how Tennant did not follow the policy or point to any evidence in the record of Tennant's alleged failure to follow the policy, much less how Tennant acted with reckless disregard of it. Hicks, therefore, has failed to meet his burden of showing that even slight evidence supported an instruction on OCGA § 40-6-6(d), meaning he has failed to show a clear and obvious error in the trial court's refusal to give that instruction. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 321 Ga. 278, 287, 912 S.E.2d 639 (2025) (“Because [appellant] has failed to point to even slight evidence that he reasonably believed at the time of the shooting that force was necessary to defend himself against the victims’ imminent use of unlawful force, the trial court did not commit a clear or obvious error in omitting a jury charge on justification.”). Accordingly, Hicks has not shown plain error, and this claim fails.

4. In a separately enumerated error, Hicks contends that the trial court's “policy-evidence framework permitted State bolstering while depriving the jury of the underlying standards.” Although not entirely clear, Hicks appears to argue that the trial court abused its discretion not only by excluding the written policy, but also by permitting the State to ask on redirect whether Tennant's superiors determined that he followed the policy and that these errors prejudiced him.

To the extent this enumeration complains of the written policy not being admitted into evidence, it fails for the same reasons stated in Division 2. Any additional claim that because of the exclusion of the policy, it was separate error to permit the State to elicit from Tennant that his superiors determined he had followed the policy after the defense sought to cross-examine him on the subject, is also reviewed for plain error because Hicks never objected to this line of questioning or the trial court's rulings in this regard. See Hughes, 310 Ga. at 456, 851 S.E.2d 580.

In his appellate brief, Hicks does not make any meaningful argument about why this testimony was objectionable, does not cite any case or statute to support his argument, and does not point to any particular testimony about the policy that he claims prejudiced him. Therefore, Hicks has failed to meet his burden of affirmatively showing plain error, and this claim fails. See Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 523, 813 S.E.2d 343 (2018) (explaining that “[t]he burden is always on the appellant in asserting error to show it affirmatively by the record” (cleaned up)). See also Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 650, 884 S.E.2d 346 (2023) (explaining that “[i]t is not the function of this Court to cull the record for a party to find alleged errors or to form arguments on the appellant's behalf” (cleaned up)).

5. In another related enumeration of error, Hicks contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to allow the written policy to go back with the jury during its deliberations. Again, to the extent this enumeration complains of the written policy not being admitted into evidence, it fails for the same reasons stated in Division 2. And because Hicks has failed to show that the trial court plainly erred in excluding the written policy from evidence, he also cannot show that the trial court erred in not sending that non-admitted exhibit back with the jury during deliberations. See Green v. State, 317 Ga. 250, 253, 892 S.E.2d 733 (2023) (“Properly admitted original documentary evidence ․ is properly allowed to go out with the jury during deliberations.”).

6. Hicks contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence that he was on felony probation because that evidence had marginal probative value and created a substantial risk of unfair prejudice that was not cured by the trial court's limiting instructions on the evidence. See OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). We disagree.

The State filed a pretrial motion asking the trial court to admit evidence that at the time of the crash, Hicks was on felony probation as either intrinsic evidence or as evidence of motive under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) to show why Hicks fled from law enforcement. At a pre-trial hearing on the motion, Hicks argued that evidence that he was on felony probation should not be admitted as either intrinsic or under Rule 404(b) because that evidence was unnecessary and unfair. The court admitted the evidence and instructed the jury during the final jury instructions that the evidence that Hicks was on felony probation was “admitted for a limited purpose,” and the jury was permitted to consider that evidence “only insofar as it may relate to motive,” and “may not infer from any evidence of the defendant being on felony probation that the defendant is of a character that would commit the crimes that are currently charged.”

Pretermitting whether the felony probation testimony was intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to show motive under Rule 404(b),³ Hicks argues that either way it should have been excluded under Rule 403, which provides in pertinent part that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ․.” We have explained that “the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly,” Whited v. State, 315 Ga. 598, 605, 883 S.E.2d 342 (2023) (citation omitted), and “[w]hen an appellate court reviews ․ the proper application of the Rule 403 balancing test, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” West v. State, 305 Ga. 467, 473, 826 S.E.2d 64 (2019) (citation omitted). In conducting our review of the admission of evidence under Rule 403 for a clear abuse of discretion, “we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Wilson v. State, 312 Ga. 174, 190, 860 S.E.2d 485 (2021) (citation omitted).

We discern no clear abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting the evidence that Hicks was on felony probation under Rule 403 to show motive. That Hicks was on felony probation was highly probative to show his motive for leading police on a high-speed chase and committing the various crimes for which he was tried. See Calhoun v. State, 308 Ga. 146, 153, 839 S.E.2d 612 (2020) (“[T]he counterfeit bills were relevant to explain why [appellant] engaged in such dangerous behavior leading up to the fatal crash. Though motive is not an essential element of any offense, evidence of motive is generally relevant in murder prosecutions,” including felony murder predicated on fleeing.). See also Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 486–87, 819 S.E.2d 468 (2018) (“Motive is the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent. Overall similarity between the charged crime and the extrinsic offense is not required when the offense is introduced to show motive, but the extrinsic evidence must be logically relevant and necessary to prove something other than the accused's propensity to commit the crime charged.” (cleaned up)). And although Hicks claims that the marijuana in the vehicle was the actual motive for fleeing, the State was not limited to producing evidence of just one potential motive. See White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 371–73, 379, 903 S.E.2d 891 (2024) (summarizing multiple pieces of evidence admitted to support multiple State theories of motive and holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence was relevant and probative “because the evidence lent support to the State's theory that at least part of [defendant's] motive to murder [victim] was to financially exploit him”).

Moreover, the probative value of the evidence that Hicks was on felony probation when he fled is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Not only was the evidence of Hicks's guilt overwhelming and the felony probation evidence was highly probative of Hicks's motive to flee from law enforcement and to commit the crimes for which he was tried, but the risk of unfair prejudice was marginal because the State merely elicited testimony that Hicks was on felony probation, without presenting any details about what the underlying felony was or seeking the admission of Hicks's prior felony conviction. Thus, it was not likely that the jury convicted Hicks because of his felony probation status. See, e.g., Dempsey v. State, 323 Ga. 576, 584–85, 926 S.E.2d 528 (2026) (holding that where “the references to [appellant's] probation status were brief, and the jury was never told why [appellant] was on probation,” it was “not likely that the jury convicted [appellant] solely because of his probation status,” and “[f]or these reasons, the probative value of the probation-status evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”).

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in admitting the felony probation evidence under Rule 403, and this claim fails.

7. Hicks next contends that the judgment should be vacated and remanded to correct certain merger errors. Specifically, Hicks points to the trial court's statements at the sentencing hearing, where it initially stated that Count 2 merged but then clarified that it was vacated by operation of law and that Counts 7–11 merged into Count 3, which the trial court merged into Count 1. Hicks argues that the trial court's comments reflect uncertainty over which counts were to be vacated or merged and how, and that this Court should therefore vacate any judgment that should have been vacated by operation of law and remand for entry of a corrected judgment and sentence. But Count 2 was properly vacated by operation of law, so no remand is required for this reason. See Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 251, 477 S.E.2d 562 (1996) (because the defendant was convicted of felony murder, the vehicle homicide count had to be vacated).

The final disposition and sentence also show that the trial court merged the traffic offenses (Counts 7–11) into the conviction for fleeing and attempting to elude (Count 3). Although Hicks argues that the trial court may have erred in merging the traffic offenses into the fleeing conviction, any such error benefitted Hicks, and the State affirmatively states in its appellate brief that it does not challenge that issue on appeal. Because any merger errors benefitted Hicks and the State does not raise them by cross-appeal, we exercise our discretion to decline to address Hicks's merger argument, which if Hicks were to prevail would mean that Hicks should have been sentenced on the traffic offenses.⁴ See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 698, 808 S.E.2d 696 (2017).

8. Lastly, Hicks argues that “[t]he record reflects that the court discussed prior continuances and counsel issues before trial, including that the case had been continued from earlier trial calendars and that, absent private counsel ready to try the case, the matter would proceed with the public defender's office. The record also reflects multiple voir-dire cause rulings, including rulings granting some strikes for cause and denying at least one defense motion to strike. Standing alone, trial-management decisions are often reviewed deferentially. But they must be considered in context.” Hicks argues that the cumulative effect of the court's rulings, including those argued in his first six enumerations of error, deprived him of a fair trial.

But we have assumed only one error in deciding Hicks's enumerations of error. Therefore, there is no prejudice to cumulate. See Madera v. State, 318 Ga. 593, 600, 899 S.E.2d 132 (2024). And in regard to what the State refers to as Hicks's “grab-bag of conclusory” claims generally referencing trial court rulings on continuances, representation, and voir-dire, Hicks not only fails to provide any citations to authority or the record to support those “claims,” he does not specify or point to a single such ruling that he is challenging. As such, Hicks has failed to meet his burden of showing cumulative error. See Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 855, 907 S.E.2d 281 (2024) (“Because Appellant has not specifically identified the objectionable testimony, has not included any meaningful legal analysis, and simply makes vague assertions of error and cites to one large chunk of the transcript, he is not entitled to a review of this claim.” (cleaned up)).

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Taylor died on April 5, 2024. On June 28, 2024, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Hicks for felony murder predicated on fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer on April 5, 2024 (Count 1), homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Count 2), fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer on April 5, 2024 (Count 3), possession of more than an ounce of marijuana (Count 4), fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer on April 3, 2024 (Count 5), aggressive driving (Count 6), following too closely (Count 7), driving unsafe or improperly equipped vehicle on April 5, 2024 (Count 8), driving on gore (Count 9), driving in an emergency lane (Count 10), reckless driving (Count 11), and driving unsafe or improperly equipped vehicle on April 3, 2024 (Count 12). The State nolle prossed Count 6 before trial. At a trial held in April 2025, the jury found Hicks not guilty of the counts related to the prior pursuit of Hicks's vehicle on April 3, 2024 (Counts 5 and 12), and guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced Hicks to serve life in prison for Count 1 and a concurrent ten-year sentence for Count 4. The trial court merged Counts 7-11 with Count 3 and merged Count 3 with Count 1 for sentencing purposes. Count 2 was vacated by operation of law. Hicks filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended by new counsel. The parties waived a hearing on Hicks's motion for new trial, and the trial court denied his motion, as amended, on January 7, 2026. Hicks filed a timely notice of appeal on February 6, 2026, and the case was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   OCGA § 40-6-6(d)(2) provides:When a law enforcement officer in a law enforcement vehicle is pursuing a fleeing suspect in another vehicle and the fleeing suspect damages any property or injures or kills any person during the pursuit, the law enforcement officer's pursuit shall not be the proximate cause or a contributing proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death caused by the fleeing suspect unless the law enforcement officer acted with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures in the officer's decision to initiate or continue the pursuit. Where such reckless disregard exists, the pursuit may be found to constitute a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death caused by the fleeing suspect, but the existence of such reckless disregard shall not in and of itself establish causation. (emphasis added).

3.   We have recognized that both intrinsic and other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b) may be offered to prove motive, but because Hicks is only arguing that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 in either instance, and because both intrinsic evidence and Rule 404(b) evidence are subject to Rule 403, we need not decide whether this evidence was intrinsic or other-acts evidence governed by Rule 404(b). See Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 266–67, 875 S.E.2d 659 (2022) (“[W]hether addressed under Rule 404(b) or as intrinsic,” it is required “that the evidence satisfies Rule 403,” and “[t]hus we need not decide whether some of the ․ evidence offered to prove Appellant's motive ․ would be better analyzed as intrinsic motive evidence or as Rule 404(b) motive evidence.”); Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 622 n.6, 837 S.E.2d 824 (2020) (declining to decide whether the motive evidence at issue was better treated as intrinsic evidence or as other-acts evidence governed by Rule 404 (b)); see also Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 n.3, 807 S.E.2d 350 (2017) (recognizing that “[f]or evidence of other crimes or acts to be admissible under Rule 404 (b), ․ it must satisfy Rule 403,” and that “[i]ntrinsic evidence must also satisfy Rule 403”).

4.   We express no opinion on whether the offenses of following too closely (Count 7), driving unsafe or improperly equipped vehicle (Count 8), driving on gore (Count 9), driving in an emergency lane (Count 10), and reckless driving (Count 11) merge into fleeing or attempting to elude (Count 3) under the “required evidence” test. See Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 215, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006) (“Under the required evidence test, on the other hand, the applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” (cleaned up)).

McMillian, Justice.

All the Justices concur.