BARKER v. STATE (2026)

Appellant Brinden Corey Barker appeals from his convictions for malice murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Hoyt Taylor Daniel.¹ On appeal, Barker argues that the trial evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions and that this Court should grant him a new trial on the “general grounds.” As explained below, Barker's claims fail, so we affirm his convictions.

1. The trial evidence showed the following. The shooting occurred around 9:00 p.m. on a Sunday in October 2020. That weekend, Barker was socializing with several friends, including co-indictee Nakoda Fermine, Tristen Oxenreider, Kaleb Parr, and David Couch.² On Saturday, Barker and Fermine went to a gas station, where Daniel (the victim in this case) was present. Daniel's girlfriend testified that Daniel had told her he was meeting Fermine on Saturday to sell him a gun. And although Fermine denied planning to meet Daniel, Barker and Fermine, who both testified at trial, affirmed that a discussion about purchasing a gun from Daniel occurred at the gas station.³ After talking to Daniel, Barker and Fermine left the gas station.

Later that weekend, Fermine contacted Daniel through social media to discuss purchasing the gun, and Daniel said he was willing to sell it for $150. Although neither Barker nor Fermine had enough money to cover the purchase price, Fermine arranged with Daniel to purchase the gun at Daniel's residence on Sunday night. Couch testified that Barker and Fermine told him that “they were going to rob” Daniel. And when Barker drove Fermine to Daniel's residence, Barker brought a Glock handgun with him.

When Barker and Fermine arrived at Daniel's residence on Sunday night, Barker parked in the driveway. Daniel approached the driver's side window and gave Barker his gun in exchange for a “a wad of money,” which Daniel quickly realized was not enough to cover the agreed-upon purchase price.

Fermine and Barker gave different accounts of what happened next. According to Fermine, Barker “tried to rob [Daniel].” Fermine testified that Barker “cocked” the gun Barker had brought with him, and Fermine then heard three gunshots ring out. Barker, by contrast, claimed that he fired at Daniel in self-defense. Barker said that Daniel started yelling at him after checking the amount of money Barker had handed him, so Barker told Daniel to back away. According to Barker, Daniel then took a couple steps back, pulled up his shirt, and reached toward his “hip area for what [Barker] believed was a gun.” In response, Barker said, “I pulled my Glock out from under my leg, put one in the chamber, and fired in his direction about three times.” However, when asked on cross-examination if he saw Daniel with a gun, Barker responded, “I don't know what I saw” and “I don't recall.”

After firing at Daniel, Barker backed his vehicle out of the driveway and drove away with Fermine. Barker then drove Fermine to Fermine's home. On the way, according to Fermine, Barker pointed a gun at Fermine and said that, if Fermine said “anything ․ about what just happened, then he would shoot [Fermine].”

Although Barker and Fermine briefly parted company, they got together again later that night, when they met up with Oxenreider, Parr, Couch, and several other people to go to a haunted house. Barker testified that, after meeting up with the group, he told Oxenreider that he “shot at [Daniel] before [Daniel] could shoot at [him]” and told everyone that he thought Daniel was going to shoot him. Oxenreider similarly recalled Barker saying that Barker had shot Daniel before Daniel could shoot him. And Couch added that Barker said that Daniel reached for his waistband.

Barker testified that he did not know that night whether he had in fact hit Daniel when he fired in Daniel's “general direction” and that he only learned that he had shot and killed Daniel the next day, when he saw a social media post about Daniel's death. But Oxenreider testified that Barker told him on the night of the shooting that Barker had shot Daniel, and Oxenreider and Parr both testified that Barker said on the night of the shooting that he had “caught a body,” meaning that Barker had killed someone.

Daniel's body was discovered lying on the ground close to his driveway the morning after the shooting. Responding officers found seven one-dollar bills lying under Daniel's body but did not find any weapons on him or nearby.

A few days after the shooting, Barker's father drove Barker to the Sheriff's Office, where Barker planned to turn himself in. Before they reached the Sheriff's Office, however, their vehicle was stopped by officers. Barker was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, and he turned over a Glock handgun, telling an officer, “[T]he gun I used is in the backseat.”

At trial, the State introduced surveillance footage from a body shop near Daniel's residence, which captured images of Barker's vehicle around the time of the shooting. Officers recovered one shell casing at the crime scene, as well as two shell casings from the roof of Barker's vehicle, consistent with someone firing out the window from the driver's seat. A firearms expert determined that the three cartridge cases were fired from the Glock handgun that Barker had turned over to officers when he was arrested. And the medical examiner testified that Daniel had three gunshot entrance wounds in his chest and had died from multiple gunshot wounds. Although the gun that Barker and Fermine obtained from Daniel on the night of the shooting was never recovered, Daniel's girlfriend testified that Fermine tried to sell a gun to someone a couple days after the shooting.

2. On appeal, Barker argues that the trial evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions because the evidence did not disprove his justification defense. We disagree.

“Evidence is sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process if a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 849, 907 S.E.2d 281 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Id. at 849–50, 907 S.E.2d 281 (cleaned up).

As relevant here, a person is justified in using deadly force “if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” OCGA § 16-3-21(a). But “[a] person is not justified in using force” if he is “attempting to commit[ ] [or] committing ․ a felony.” OCGA § 16-3-21(b)(2). See Hughes v. State, 310 Ga. 453, 458, 851 S.E.2d 580 (2020) (explaining that a defendant is “not entitled to claim self-defense” if “he was committing a felony” when the shooting occurred).

Although “the State has the burden of disproving [a defendant's justification] defense beyond a reasonable doubt” at trial, Frison v. State, 323 Ga. 156, 160, 924 S.E.2d 274 (2025), “it is the defendant's burden [on appeal] to show that the trial evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process,” Rainey v. State, 324 Ga. 22, 26, 928 S.E.2d 55 (2026) (quotation marks omitted). And because a jury presented with “conflicting evidence” regarding self-defense “may reject any evidence in support of a justification defense,” the mere fact that some trial evidence supported a self-defense finding does not show that the State failed to disprove a defendant's justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Rogers v. State, 323 Ga. 752, 755–56, 927 S.E.2d 208 (2026) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Barker has not shown that the trial evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions for murder and armed robbery.⁴ Although Barker contends that his testimony at trial showed that he acted in self-defense, other evidence suggested otherwise, including: Fermine's testimony that Barker tried to rob Daniel with a gun, which supported a finding that Barker was committing the felony of attempted armed robbery when the shooting occurred; Couch's testimony that Barker and Fermine admitted they intended to rob Daniel; the testimony of Barker's friends that Barker admitted on the night of the shooting that he had “caught a body,” a phrase indicating that he had killed someone and that conflicted with Barker's trial testimony that he did not know on the night of the shooting whether he had in fact shot someone; Fermine's testimony that Barker threatened to shoot him if he told anyone what happened; Barker's equivocation on the stand about whether he saw Daniel with a weapon; and the fact that officers did not find a weapon on or near Daniel when they located his body. The jury was authorized to “assess[ ] the credibility of the witnesses and other evidence” and to reject the evidence tending to support a justification defense, including Barker's “self-serving testimony that he was defending himself.” Davis v. State, 312 Ga. 870, 871, 873, 866 S.E.2d 390 (2021). Accordingly, this claim fails.

2. Barker also argues that this Court should grant him a new trial on the “general grounds,” under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.⁵ This argument, however, is misguided. As we have explained, such a claim “presents nothing for us to review” because OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 “vest[ ] the decision to grant or refuse to grant a new trial solely in the trial court,” and Barker “has not asserted that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion.” Bryant v. State, 324 Ga. 273, 280–81, 929 S.E.2d 802 (2026) (cleaned up). This claim therefore fails.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The crimes occurred on October 11, 2020. On January 7, 2021, a Haralson County grand jury indicted Barker and Nakoda Hayden Fermine for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2 and 4), armed robbery (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 5), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6), theft by taking (Count 7), and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (Count 8). The trial court severed Fermine's case from Barker's, and Barker was tried before a jury on June 20–26, 2023. The jury found Barker guilty of all charges against him except for Count 8 (violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act). The trial court sentenced Barker to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1) plus consecutive terms of life in prison and five years in prison for armed robbery (Count 3) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6), respectively. The trial court merged for sentencing purposes the aggravated assault charge (Count 5) with the malice murder charge (Count 1) and the theft by taking charge (Count 7) with the armed robbery charge (Count 3). And the felony murder charges (Counts 2 and 4) were vacated by operation of law. Barker timely moved for a new trial on July 10, 2023, and filed an amended motion for new trial through new counsel on June 4, 2025. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Barker's motion for new trial, as amended, on October 3, 2025. Barker timely filed a notice of appeal directed to this Court. The case was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   The record contains a discrepancy as to the proper spelling of Fermine's first name. We have adopted the spelling contained in the indictment.

3.   At trial, Barker claimed that Fermine wanted to buy the gun, while Fermine claimed that Barker wanted to buy the gun.

4.   To the extent that Barker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his theft-by-taking charge, his claim is moot because that charge was merged for sentencing purposes. See Edwards v. State, 323 Ga. 161, 163, 924 S.E.2d 251 (2025).

5.   OCGA § 5-5-20 provides that, “[i]n any case when the verdict of a jury is found contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a new trial before another jury.” And OCGA § 5-5-21 provides that “[t]he presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.”

Colvin, Justice.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P. J., not participating.