COLLINS v. STATE (2026)

Nicholas Collins was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Larvondrick Wright, who intervened in a dispute between Collins and Collins's then-girlfriend.¹ On appeal, Collins argues that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his malice murder conviction, that the trial court erred in two respects, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. These claims fail, so we affirm.

1. At the time of the crimes, Collins was in a relationship with Whitney Pace, and the two shared an apartment. On the night of the shooting, Pace went to her mother's home because, while she was at work, an intoxicated Collins had called her, cussed her out, and hurled insults at her. Pace's mother shared a home with Wright, the victim, as well as Wright's daughter and Pace's brother. Collins was not welcome at Pace's mother's home because, days before the shooting, he had pinned Pace to a tree by her throat in front of her child.

While Pace was at her mother's home, Collins called her several times more before he showed up at the home. Wright's daughter let Collins into the home, and he approached Pace on the couch and whispered to her, “[W]e can do it the easy way or we can go redrum,” which frightened Pace because “redrum” is “murder” spelled backwards. Collins then began choking Pace and bit her on the head. During an ensuing physical altercation, Pace's family members forced Collins from the home while Pace's mother called 911. Pace and Collins continued arguing outside the home. Wright then stepped between the two, he and Collins scuffled, and Collins withdrew a gun and pointed it at Wright's daughter, who tried to knock the gun out of his hand. Collins tried to fire the gun three or four times, but it appeared to misfire and only clicked in Wright's daughter's face. Wright pushed his daughter out of the way and told Collins to “fight him like a man.” Collins shot Wright in the chest then pointed the gun at Pace and pulled the trigger, but the gun misfired again. Collins then fled the scene. Six months later, Collins was apprehended by the United States Marshal Service.

2. Collins first argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of federal constitutional due process to support his conviction for malice murder. He asserts that the State failed to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt. But, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that the evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain Collins's conviction.

“Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695, 878 S.E.2d 502 (2022) (cleaned up). When considering the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “[t]his Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony but rather defers to the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Id.

A person commits the offense of malice murder “when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1(a). “To find a defendant guilty of malice murder, the jury must find that the defendant acted with malice, which incorporates the intent to kill.” Upshaw v. State, 323 Ga. 257, 262, 925 S.E.2d 152 (2026) (quotation marks omitted). “[C]rimes which are defined so as to require that the defendant intentionally cause a forbidden bad result are usually interpreted to cover one who knows that his conduct is substantially certain to cause the result, whether or not he desires the result to occur.” Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 473, 831 S.E.2d 761 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). And “whether a killing is intentional and malicious is for the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances.” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 624, 626, 814 S.E.2d 353 (2018) (cleaned up).

Here, the evidence at trial was sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins intentionally killed Wright and was therefore guilty of malice murder. Collins fought with Wright and then pointed a gun at Wright's daughter. Even though the gun repeatedly misfired, Collins pulled the trigger several times while pointing the gun at Wright's daughter. He then pointed the gun at Wright, pulled the trigger yet again, and the gun discharged, striking and killing Wright. That evidence was more than enough for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins acted with malice—that is, with the intention to kill Wright—when Collins pointed his gun at Wright and fired at him. See Welch, 306 Ga. at 473, 831 S.E.2d 761 (evidence sufficient to support malice murder conviction where evidence showed that defendant “put his finger on the pistol's trigger, pointed the pistol at [the victim], and shot her[.]”); Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 830, 700 S.E.2d 544 (2010) (evidence that, after threatening the victim, defendant “h[eld] a loaded 9mm handgun with his finger on the trigger, pointed the gun at [the victim], and shot her” was “sufficient to show from the external circumstances that [defendant] caused the victim's death with deliberate intention, thereby establishing express malice”). Accordingly, this claim fails.

3. Collins next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of certain prior difficulties between him and Pace, namely Pace's testimony that Collins previously hit her with a broom handle, burned her ear with a cigarette, and spit on her. Collins asserts that this evidence was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) because, he says, the evidence fails to satisfy any of the three prongs of the test for the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence. See Walton v. State, 322 Ga. 401, 407 n.4, 920 S.E.2d 116 (2025). “The party offering other acts evidence for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) must show that (1) it is relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant's character; (2) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice under OCGA § 24-4-403; and (3) there is sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the other act.” Id. Here, Collins argues that the evidence was inadmissible because the trial court failed to make a specific finding that the evidence was relevant to a non-character purpose, because the evidence fails to meet the standard of OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”), and because there was insufficient evidence that he committed the other acts.

The record reflects, however, that, at trial, Collins objected to the admission of this evidence only on Rule 403 grounds. So we review his remaining two arguments for plain error. See Bryant v. State, 324 Ga. 273, 283, 929 S.E.2d 802 (2026) (applying plain error review to unpreserved evidentiary objection). That means Collins must show “a legal error that was not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious, and affected his substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). And if Collins makes those showings, “we have the discretion to remedy the error, but only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). If “one prong of the plain error test is not satisfied, we need not address the other prongs of the test.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). As to Collins's Rule 403 argument that was raised at trial, we review the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. See Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 622, 837 S.E.2d 824 (2020).

(a) Turning first to the arguments that were not preserved for ordinary appellate review — that the challenged evidence fails the first and third prongs of the Rule 404(b) test for admissibility — Collins has not shown legal error, much less a clear and obvious one. That's because the disputed evidence was admissible as intrinsic evidence: it provided context for the charged crimes and helped complete the story of the crimes for the jury. Thus, we need not consider its admissibility under Rule 404(b). See Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 24, 860 S.E.2d 509 (2021).

As we have explained,

[e]vidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. Evidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury. Evidence of other acts is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness's accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted. And this sort of intrinsic evidence remains admissible even if it incidentally places the defendant's character at issue.

Heade, 312 Ga. at 24–25, 860 S.E.2d 509 (cleaned up).

Here, evidence of Collins's violent conduct toward Pace helped explain why Pace chose to go to her mother's home on the night of the shooting, provided the source of acrimony between Collins and Pace's family, and gave context for the confrontation that led to Wright's shooting. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 312 Ga. 149, 152–53, 861 S.E.2d 94 (2021) (evidence that defendant vandalized car belonging to murder victim's grandmother was properly admitted as intrinsic evidence because it showed tension between defendant and members of victim's family and explained both why defendant was not permitted in victim's home and why victim followed defendant out of his home before defendant shot him); Clark v. State, 306 Ga. 367, 373–75, 829 S.E.2d 306 (2019) (evidence that defendant hit and pushed murder victim's wife was properly admitted as intrinsic evidence, as it provided context for the charged offenses by explaining why the family did not want defendant in the home and why victim followed defendant outside to make sure that he left); Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 486–87, 807 S.E.2d 350 (2017) (evidence of defendant's HIV status and prior sexual assault of murder victim's sister was intrinsic because it helped explain why the sister refused the defendant's advances and increasing conflict between the two that culminated in the charged crimes). Thus, “[w]hen considered in light of the other evidence in this case,” the challenged evidence “was reasonably necessary to complete the story for the jury and was therefore intrinsic evidence.” Heade, 312 Ga. at 25, 860 S.E.2d 509. And because the evidence was admissible as intrinsic evidence, Collins cannot show legal error in its admission under Rule 404(b), so this claim fails.

(b) Moving on to Collins's Rule 403 argument, we conclude that Collins has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence under Rule 403.

Intrinsic evidence, like that at issue here, must satisfy Rule 403, see Hughes, 312 Ga. at 153, 861 S.E.2d 94, which authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” OCGA § 24-4-403. “But the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly.” Carter v. State, 317 Ga. 689, 693, 895 S.E.2d 295 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to employ Rule 403's extraordinary remedy here. As just explained, the challenged evidence helped contextualize the charged crimes and helped complete the story of the crimes for the jury. It explained the tension between the involved parties and identified the impetus for the confrontation that led to Wright's shooting. Evidence of Collins's prior violent conduct towards Pace clearly had strong probative value. Further, any unfair prejudice arising from that evidence did not outweigh its probative value. There was little risk that the jury would find Collins guilty of killing Wright solely because he previously behaved violently towards Pace. See Carter, 317 Ga. at 694, 895 S.E.2d 295 (“The prejudicial effect of evidence is ‘unfair’ if it has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” (quotation marks omitted)). The evidence of that violent conduct was serious, but Pace's testimony about that violence was brief and not likely to lead the jury to render a verdict on some improper basis. And, in any event, any unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the value of explaining to the jury why and how Collins ended up in a fatal confrontation with Wright. See, e.g., Hughes, 312 Ga. at 153, 861 S.E.2d 94 (any unfair prejudice did not outweigh probative value of evidence that defendant vandalized victim's grandmother's car, which helped explain tension between defendant and victim's family that led to fatal confrontation); Clark, 306 Ga. at 374–75, 829 S.E.2d 306 (similar). We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by not excluding this evidence under Rule 403, so this claim fails.

4. In his third enumeration of error, Collins contends that the trial court erroneously denied his two motions for mistrial. Collins first moved for a mistrial after the State elicited a partial response from Pace that she did not report previous instances of domestic violence because Collins “let [her] know that if anything happened to him, that his family from Chicago and Ohio—.” Collins argued that a mistrial was necessary because Pace's response referenced her fear that Collins's family “would come and get her,” in purported violation of the parties’ pretrial agreement to exclude testimony about that issue. The trial court denied Collins's motion and instructed the jury to disregard Pace's partial response.

Later, Collins again moved for a mistrial after a witness for the State testified that she sought the assistance of the United States Marshal Service to locate Collins and explained that the Marshal Service “track[s] down the fugitive.” Collins moved for a mistrial based on the reference to fugitives, again in purported violation of a pretrial agreement between the parties to exclude testimony about the details of his apprehension.² The trial court again denied Collins's motion and instructed the jury to disregard the witness's response.

On appeal, Collins summarily asserts that both motions concerned the admission of impermissible character evidence and that the trial court's curative instructions were insufficient. We are unpersuaded.

The decision to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, it is well established that a trial court can negate the potentially harmful effect of improperly introduced evidence by prompt curative instructions rather than by granting a mistrial. In addition, juries are presumed to follow curative instructions in the absence of proof to the contrary. A new trial will not be granted unless it is clear that the trial court's curative instruction failed to eliminate the effect of the prejudicial comment.

Lewis v. State, 314 Ga. 654, 667, 878 S.E.2d 467 (2022) (cleaned up).

Here, Collins has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his mistrial motions and instead issuing curative instructions. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the challenged testimony immediately after that testimony was given, and the jury presumptively followed those curative instructions. See id. Even assuming the challenged testimony carried some prejudicial value, we cannot say that the trial court's curative instructions “clear[ly] ․ failed to eliminate the effect of the prejudicial comment[s].” Id. at 667, 878 S.E.2d 467. See also id. at 667–68, 878 S.E.2d 467 (no abuse of discretion in denying motion for mistrial where trial court promptly gave a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard the challenged testimony).

Collins's bare assertion that the curative instructions were insufficient to eliminate the prejudicial effect of the disputed evidence is unavailing. For one thing, Collins points to no evidence supporting that assertion, and we ordinarily presume that curative instructions do mitigate the prejudicial effect of improperly introduced evidence. See Lewis, 314 Ga. at 668, 878 S.E.2d 467. For another, the challenged testimony was brief and, with respect to Pace's testimony, incomplete. That is hardly enough to show that Collins was denied a fair trial, so this claim fails. See Swims v. State, 307 Ga. 651, 654–55, 838 S.E.2d 751 (2020) (“Whether to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (quotation marks omitted)).

5. Finally, Collins argues he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not call Collins's mother to testify in his defense. He argues that his mother would have testified about an alleged attack on Collins around the time of the shooting, in turn supporting a jury instruction on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. To prevail on this claim, Collins must show both that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

The deficiency prong requires the defendant to show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms. ․ The prejudice prong requires the defendant to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Momon v. State, 322 Ga. 848, 850–51, 922 S.E.2d 368 (2025) (cleaned up). Collins has not shown that his attorney performed deficiently.

“A decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of counsel's trial strategy and tactics and will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made the decision under the circumstances.” McKelvey v. State, 311 Ga. 34, 43–44, 855 S.E.2d 598 (2021). Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that Collins's mother refused to speak to trial counsel, was hostile to trial counsel and his staff, and behaved poorly during trial (including by livestreaming from the courthouse during trial and by posting discovery documents on social media). Based on that behavior, trial counsel believed Collins's mother would be a combative, ineffective witness and declined to call her for that reason. We cannot say that trial counsel's strategic decision not to call Collins's mother as a witness was objectively unreasonable under those circumstances. See, e.g., Atkinson v. State, 301 Ga. 518, 526–27, 801 S.E.2d 833 (2017) (deeming reasonable trial counsel's strategic decision not to call witness whom counsel was “concerned ․ might not be a credible witness”). Collins therefore has not shown deficient performance, so this claim fails.³

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The crimes occurred on March 27, 2020. On September 29, 2021, a Laurens County grand jury indicted Collins for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault of Wright (Counts 3–4), two counts of aggravated assault of Wright's daughter (Counts 5–6), and simple battery of Pace (Count 7). At an October 2023 trial, a jury found Collins guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Collins to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive 20-year term on Count 5, and a concurrent 12-month term on Count 7. The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.Collins timely filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Collins's motion for new trial, as amended, on January 22, 2026. Collins timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   The prosecutor explained that she did not understand the pretrial agreement to exclude testimony about the involvement of the Marshal Service, only that there would be no mention of the fact that Collins was found hiding beneath the floorboards of his aunt's home.

3.   Collins also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to place on the record counsel's conversation with the trial court and the prosecutor about a potential mistrial in light of Collins's mother's social media posts and by failing to request that the jurors be questioned about their possible exposure to those posts. But the record shows that Collins did not raise these claims in his motion for new trial and, instead, raises them for the first time on appeal. As such, these claims are not preserved for appellate review, and we do not address them. See, e.g., Weston v. State, 321 Ga. 554, 557–58, 915 S.E.2d 901 (2025) (ineffective assistance claim not preserved for appellate review where appellant failed to raise claim in motion for new trial).Also embedded in this enumeration of error is a one-sentence assertion that the trial court plainly erred by failing to put on the record the discussion with Collins's trial counsel and the prosecutor about a mistrial in light of Collins's mother's social media activity and by failing to ensure that Collins was present for that discussion. The absence of any legal argument to support that assertion, however, means Collins has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating error on appeal. See, e.g., Gines v. State, 324 Ga. 46, 63, 928 S.E.2d 16 (2026) (concluding that “skeletal argument” was insufficient to meet “burden of showing error affirmatively by the record” because it is “not this Court's responsibility to cull the record in search of support for the appellant's claims” (quotation marks omitted)).

Bethel, Justice.

All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.