DORSEY v. STATE (2026)

Appellant Nakia Dorsey was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Jayne Salazar-Chavez and the nonfatal shooting of Brandon Wilson.¹ On appeal, Dorsey contends that the trial court abused its discretion under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) in admitting two exhibits depicting him with firearms, and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to renew her objection to the trial court declining to give two pattern jury instructions on identification. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion and because any deficiency on the part of trial counsel was not prejudicial, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following. In October 2021, 22-year-old Wilson—who was on leave from the military—met 16-year-old Salazar-Chavez. Soon thereafter, the pair began an exclusive romantic relationship. Most of their relationship was long-distance, as Wilson was stationed in South Korea or North Carolina while Salazar-Chavez attended high school in DeKalb County.

Wilson testified at trial as follows. Going into November 2022, after the two had been together for just over a year, the relationship was “pretty rough.” They argued frequently; Wilson speculated that “something wasn't right” and that Salazar-Chavez might have been cheating on him. On November 10, 2022, Wilson got some time off from the military and decided to surprise Salazar-Chavez with a visit while he was on his way home to Georgia. Salazar-Chavez was “shocked” when Wilson arrived between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. that night. When Wilson confronted Salazar-Chavez about his suspicions that she was cheating on him, she denied it. Unconvinced, Wilson asked to see her phone.

After Salazar-Chavez unlocked her phone, Wilson saw “disturbing” and sexually suggestive texts, sent at 10:24 p.m. that day from a phone with the contact name “zz3[.]” When Salazar-Chavez refused to tell Wilson who “zz3” was, Wilson decided to call the number associated with the contact. The call was uneventful; the man on the line simply said “[h]ello” and hung up when Wilson did not respond. But after Salazar-Chavez again refused to tell Wilson anything about the man's identity, Wilson called back again. This time, Wilson and the man who answered “exchang[ed] words.” Wilson was “mad,” “cussing,” and “threatening” the man; the man was “going back and forth with [Wilson] yelling, cussing,” “taunting [him],” and “laughing.” Wilson then hung up and sent the following texts to the man from Salazar-Chavez's phone: “B**ch N***a leave her tf alone” and “This my only warning my N***a.” The man responded: “You the one crying [ ]” and “Do some bout it.”²

Wilson and Salazar-Chavez left her home briefly in Wilson's car, and while they were away, the man Wilson had spoken with continued to call Salazar-Chavez's phone. The man instructed Wilson to “pull up,” so Wilson decided to head back to Salazar-Chavez's house and “see what [the man] was going to do.” When the pair got back to the house, no one was there, so they left again. All the while, the man “wouldn't stop” calling Salazar-Chavez's phone. He was “still yelling and cussing”; demanded his “stuff back,” including a ring; and told Salazar-Chavez that he was “outside [her] house right now.” In a subsequent call, the man again told Wilson to “pull up” and “handle [his] problems like a man.”

As shown in surveillance video from a neighbor's house, Wilson and Salazar-Chavez pulled up to her house at 11:04 p.m. Wilson testified that he then saw a man with “some dreads” and wearing all black standing in the neighbor's yard, before seeing “a red laser beam point[ed] across [Wilson's face].” At that point, Wilson “knew there was a weapon.” He then saw the weapon—which was being held like a “long gun” with the “right arm holding the barrel” and “left hand holding a trigger.” The man started screaming: “Yeah. F**k, n****r. Y'all going to stop f**king playing with me.” As soon as the man “got done saying that, bullets started flying.” Wilson immediately turned around and sped away from the scene as bullets riddled his car; he “heard a loud scream” from Salazar-Chavez and noticed her “choking on her blood,” and “grabbing her throat, trying to breathe.” He called 911 at 11:05 p.m. and stopped at a nearby gas station to render aid to Salazar-Chavez. But, he testified, “[s]he was gone.”

Wilson was shot in his left leg; Salazar-Chavez was shot in her left arm and the left side of her chest. A medical examiner testified that Salazar-Chavez died from the shot to her chest.

Investigators who responded to the scene recovered 11 nine-millimeter cartridge casings, and a firearms examiner later testified that all 11 of those casings were fired from the same firearm. During Salazar-Chavez's autopsy, a medical examiner recovered a bullet; a firearms examiner testified that it was “possible” that bullet was fired from the same gun as the cartridge casings. Although the firearms examiner could not determine the precise model of firearm from which the casings and bullet were fired, he testified that they were “consistent with being fired” by an Intratec nine-millimeter pistol, or a TEC-9. He also testified that although the TEC-9 is a pistol, it can have an extended magazine in front of the grip and trigger that would allow it to be operated “by having one hand on the grip and then one hand on the magazine,” similar to a long gun.

Investigators later discovered that the phone number associated with the “zz3” contact belonged to Dorsey, and it was not disputed at trial that it was his phone number or that he was the man communicating from that phone number to Salazar-Chavez's phone the night of the shooting. Cell phone records showed significant activity between Dorsey's phone and Salazar-Chavez's phone the night of the shooting. From 10:28 p.m. until 11:01 p.m., there were a total of 11 calls between the two devices, 10 of which were made from Dorsey's phone to Salazar-Chavez's phone.

An FBI special agent testified about Dorsey's, Salazar-Chavez's, and Wilson's phones’ cell site location information.³ At the time of the first call between Dorsey's and Salazar-Chavez's phones at 10:28 p.m., the cell tower data was consistent with Dorsey's phone being at his residence and Salazar-Chavez's phone being at her residence. Beginning at 10:47 p.m., Dorsey's phone was no longer pinging off the cell tower near his residence; instead, it was pinging off the cell tower closest to Salazar-Chavez's home, which “cover[ed] the majority of [Salazar-Chavez's] neighborhood.” Dorsey's phone continued using this tower from that time until at least 11:01 p.m. that night. The phone did not use any cell towers for the next seven minutes, but at 11:08 p.m., it used a cell tower between Salazar-Chavez's residence and Dorsey's residence. And at 11:17 p.m., it was using a tower in the area of Dorsey's residence, which was 3.9 miles and an approximately 11-minute drive from Salazar-Chavez's home.

A digital forensics analyst testified about performing data extractions on two cell phones that were recovered when Dorsey was arrested. One of the phones, which contained the SIM card for the phone number associated with the “zz3” contact, contained 27 pictures of Salazar-Chavez and a screenshot of a “news article that was talking about the case” from November 13. That phone's data also showed that the user took 288 steps between 11:01 p.m. and 11:09 p.m. on the night of the shooting.⁴ And at some point between November 13 and November 15, the phone number was changed.⁵ The other phone's GPS data showed that, from 10:51 p.m. until 11:07 p.m. on the night of the shooting, it was a “couple doors down,” or 52 meters, from Salazar-Chavez's home, with a degree of certainty of 126 meters. And on November 12, Salazar-Chavez's contact in the phone was altered; the picture associated with her contact was changed to “a ghost with the tongue sticking out.”

Dorsey was arrested at his sister's apartment on February 3, 2023. The murder weapon was never recovered.

2. Dorsey contends that the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting two exhibits—State's Exhibits 193 (“the video”) and 130 (“the photo”)—that depicted Dorsey with firearms. Relying heavily on Baker v. State, 318 Ga. 431 (2024), Dorsey contends the danger of unfair prejudice from these exhibits—that they depicted him as a “proud, violent gunman” with a “propensity for gun violence”—substantially outweighed their probative value because they did little to prove that Dorsey was the shooter. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either exhibit.

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Subject to certain exceptions, “[a]ll relevant evidence shall be admissible.” OCGA § 24-4-402. Rule 403 is one of those exceptions; it provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by,” among other things, “the danger of unfair prejudice.” “We have often reiterated that the major function of Rule 403 is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Baker, 318 Ga. at 441 (cleaned up). We consider the probative value of evidence through the following lens:

Generally speaking, the greater the tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable, the greater the probative value. And the extent to which evidence tends to make the existence of a fact more or less probable depends significantly on the quality of the evidence and the strength of its logical connection to the fact for which it is offered. Probative value also depends on the marginal worth of the evidence—how much it adds, in other words, to the other proof available to establish the fact for which it is offered. The stronger the other proof, the less the marginal value of the evidence in question. And probative value depends as well upon the need for the evidence. When the fact for which the evidence is offered is undisputed or not reasonably susceptible of dispute, the less the probative value of the evidence.

Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 75–76 (2016) (cleaned up).

In evaluating prejudice under Rule 403, “we have said that in a criminal trial, inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion.” Baker, 318 Ga. at 441 (quotation marks omitted). Relevant evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has the capacity to “lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof specific to the offense charged”; often, such improper bases include a defendant's bad character or propensity for violence. Id. at 441–42 (quotation marks omitted). “In all, however, the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.” Id. at 442 (quotation marks omitted). And in reviewing Rule 403 claims, we “look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 419 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).

(a) Video (State's Exhibit 193)

(i) Background

State's Exhibit 193 was a single video containing two video clips that had been posted to Dorsey's Instagram page in February 2022, nine months before the shooting. The first 17 seconds of the video depicted Dorsey brandishing a handgun with a green laser sight attached to it, next to a man who was singing and holding a large stack of cash. The next 50 seconds showed Dorsey standing in front of a car while appearing to rap or otherwise perform with a gun visible in his side pocket and a large stack of cash in his hand. In the last 8 seconds of the video, he brandished what appeared to be the same handgun with the green laser sight attached.

When the State sought to introduce the video at trial, Dorsey lodged a Rule 403 objection. In response, the State argued that the video was probative of Dorsey's access to a laser sight—something that was “not ․ standard for every firearm” and that “an ordinary person in the community would not have access to.” And because Dorsey was not legally prohibited from possessing firearms, the State asserted the video was not unfairly prejudicial. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court admitted the video.

The video was played—without sound—just once, during the testimony of an investigator who was the State's final witness and who testified that the video depicted Dorsey with a firearm that had a green laser sight. During closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced the video several times: “[Dorsey] likes using lasers.”; “[W]e show you this video ․ to show this is someone who has access to lasers.”; “[S]omehow in the middle of the night in DeKalb County there is a laser pointed at [Wilson's] car. This is not ․ some kind of military zone—what? Lasers? But we know [Dorsey] had access to lasers for firearms.”; and “He not only had access to [lasers], but felt the need to post and keep on his social media those videos.”

(ii) Probative Value

It is not difficult for us to conclude that the video was relevant and probative of Dorsey's access to the distinctive sight mechanism that Wilson—the only surviving witness to the shooting—saw immediately before the shooting began: a laser. See Olds, 299 Ga. at 75 (noting that the probative value of evidence “depends significantly on ․ the strength of its logical connection to the fact for which it is offered”). The murder weapon was never recovered; Wilson provided only a general description of the gun itself; and the firearms examiner could not definitively determine the model of the gun used in the shooting. Because there was no direct evidence connecting Dorsey to the specific gun used in the shooting, the State had a real need to tie Dorsey to the gun—including its distinctive laser attachment—and the video the State presented in Exhibit 193 was the only evidence through which it was able to show that Dorsey had access to and was familiar with guns with laser attachments. See id. at 76 (recognizing that probative value depends on the “need for the evidence” and “how much it adds ․ to the other proof available to establish the fact for which it is offered”). See also Lee, 318 Ga. at 419 (acknowledging that the State's “need” for testimony that the appellant previously possessed the type of gun used in the shooting “was greater in [a] case based on circumstantial evidence because it provided an additional set of facts from which the jury was authorized to infer [appellant's] guilt” (quotation marks omitted)). Although the probative value of the video was somewhat diminished by it being posted nine months before the shooting and depicting Dorsey with a green (rather than a red) laser sight, the evidence that Dorsey had used a gun with a laser sight at all and the State's need to connect Dorsey to a gun with a laser sight shows that the video had important probative value. See Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 483–84 (2018) (recognizing that challenged evidence retained probative value despite diminishing factors such as temporal remoteness and dissimilarity where, among other things, there was a “high prosecutorial need for the evidence”). Cf. Baker, 318 Ga. at 444 (determining that a video of appellant with a firearm “tended to prove little” about his access to those types of firearms when “the State offered no evidence at trial about when [it] was recorded”).

(iii) Unfair Prejudice

Although there was some danger of unfair prejudice from the video—which depicted Dorsey at times flashing a gun and laser at the camera and rapping or otherwise performing with a gun sticking out of his pocket and a stack of cash in his hand—its capacity to lure the jury into declaring guilt based on Dorsey's character, rather than on proof specific to the offenses charged, was not great. See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 739–40 (2023) (concluding that although a rap video “may have cast [appellant] in an unflattering light, it did not do so unfairly”). That is so for multiple reasons. First, Dorsey was legally permitted to possess firearms, a fact that was emphasized several times to the jury through witnesses and in closing. See Floyd v. State, 321 Ga. 717, 729–30 (2025) (“[O]ur caselaw shows that evidence that a defendant owned or carried a gun is not necessarily bad character evidence which shows a propensity for gun violence.”) (collecting cases). Second, the State did not play the audio associated with the video. That reduced the risk of unfair prejudice because the jury could not definitively discern that Dorsey was rapping, let alone what he was saying. Compare United States v. Gamory, 635 F3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “it was error under” Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to play a rap video to the jury when “[t]he lyrics presented a substantial danger of unfair prejudice because they ․ could reasonably be understood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle”).⁶ Given this, a reasonable juror was not likely to conclude that the video itself cast Dorsey as a “proud, violent gunman” with a “propensity for gun violence.” Compare Baker, 318 Ga. at 444 (noting that the rap video portrayed appellant “as a violent gunman”).⁷

(iv) Balancing

On balance, we conclude that the probative value of the video was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice therefrom. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting it. See Lee, 318 Ga. at 419 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting gun-related evidence).

(b) Photo (State's Exhibit 130)

(i) Background

State's Exhibit 130 was a “selfie” photo that Salazar-Chavez had taken of herself and Dorsey. The photo depicted the inside front seat of a car; Dorsey was seated in the front driver's side seat and Salzar-Chavez in the front passenger seat. Both Dorsey and Salazar-Chavez were smiling, and a firearm—which appeared to have an optic sight attached to it—was tucked between Dorsey and the center console.

At trial, the State sought to introduce the exhibit for two purposes. First, because the firearm depicted in the photo had a sight attachment on it, the State claimed the photo was “circumstantial evidence that [Dorsey] ha[d] access to the types of equipment and firearms that [were] at issue in this case.” Second, because it was taken just five days before the shooting; was the only photo the State had of Salazar-Chavez and Dorsey in the same location; and was taken, according to its data, in Salazar-Chavez's neighborhood, it linked Salazar-Chavez and Dorsey close in time and proximity to the shooting. To support its argument that the photo was not unfairly prejudicial, the State reiterated that Dorsey was legally allowed to possess firearms. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court admitted the photo.

The State used the photo in its opening statement, presentation of evidence, and closing argument. In its opening statement, the prosecutor showed the photo and pointed out the firearm. During its presentation of evidence, the prosecutor used the photo to question three witnesses. The first witness, who performed the data extraction on Salazar-Chavez's cell phone, testified that the data from the phone showed that the photo was taken in Salazar-Chavez's neighborhood five days before the shooting. The second witness, a cell phone analyst, demonstrated on a map where the photo had been taken. And the third witness, the lead investigator, identified Dorsey in the photo and testified that the firearm next to Dorsey appeared to be an “AK-style pistol” with a “red dot sight,” and that a TEC-9 is a type of this style pistol. During closing, the prosecutor used the photo to emphasize the presence of the sight mechanism on the gun and Dorsey's access to firearms.

(ii) Probative Value

Taken just five days before the shooting, the photo was relevant and probative in the two ways articulated by the State (and noted above) when it sought to admit the photo at trial. As to the gun in the photo, the lead investigator testified that it was an AK-style pistol with a red dot sight mechanism attached. Considered alongside the lead investigator's testimony that the TEC-9 was a type of AK-style pistol and Wilson's testimony that he saw a laser (which he believed was an optical sight mechanism used with a gun) the night of the shooting, the photo was probative of Dorsey's close-in-time access to the type of gun—an AK-style pistol—and type of attachment—a sight mechanism—that the State theorized was used in the shooting. See United States v. Carr, 607 FApp'x 869, 873 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding that a photo of the defendant brandishing firearms was “probative of the fact that [he] owned two firearms, similar to those brandished” during the crime). That said, the probative value was somewhat undermined by testimony from the firearms examiner that the gun in the photo was not consistent with the TEC-9 variant that the State theorized was used in the shooting, and by testimony that the sight mechanism was a red dot sight, not a laser. See Olds, 299 Ga. at 75. Even in light of these differences, the evidence showed that the cartridge casings recovered at the scene were consistent with being fired from a TEC-9; that the TEC-9 is a type of AK-style pistol; and that the gun in the photo was an AK-style pistol with a sight mechanism attached. The photo, therefore, was still probative of Dorsey's close-in-time access to an AK-style pistol with a sight mechanism, even if not of his access to the specific TEC-9 variant or sight mechanism offered by the State.

As to the second proffered purpose, the photo depicted Salazar-Chavez and Dorsey together just five days before the shooting, and there was testimony and data offered to show that it was taken in Salazar-Chavez's neighborhood. In this way, it was probative of Salazar-Chavez and Dorsey's relationship and of Dorsey's familiarity with her neighborhood, where the shooting occurred. See Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 622 (2020) (concluding that evidence was probative to show the nature of the victim's and defendant's relationship and the defendant's potential motive in shooting the victim). Notably, although the photo was the only one the State had of Salazar-Chavez and Dorsey in the same location, its probative value was somewhat diminished by other evidence, which Dorsey did not dispute at trial, that showed the pair had been together on several occasions and that Dorsey had spent time in the neighborhood. See Olds, 299 Ga. at 76.

(iii) Unfair Prejudice

Although the probative value of the photo was somewhat limited, the risk of unfair prejudice from the photo was low. It most prominently featured a smiling Dorsey next to a smiling Salazar-Chavez, with the gun barely visible and tucked between the seat and center console of the car. Dorsey was not brandishing the weapon, nor did he appear angry or violent. Moreover, as with the video in State's Exhibit 193, Dorsey was legally permitted to possess firearms—a fact that was emphasized to the jury several times and further reduced the already-minimal risk of unfair prejudice from the photo. See Floyd, 321 Ga. at 729–30.

(iv) Balancing

Although the probative value of the photo was lower than that of the video, so too was the risk of unfair prejudice. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting it. See Davidson v. State, 304 Ga. 460, 463–64 (2018) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting evidence where “[t]he probative value ․ may have been limited, but the prejudicial impact was limited too”).

3. Dorsey argues that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to renew her objection when the trial court declined to give Dorsey's requested jury charges on identification. We disagree.

To prevail on this claim, Dorsey must establish that his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washing-ton, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). For deficiency, Dorsey “must demonstrate that his counsel performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 84 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, Dorsey “must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). If Dorsey fails to make a sufficient showing on either prong, we need not address the other. See id.

Prior to trial, defense counsel requested, among other things, that the trial court give the jury two pattern instructions on identification. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) §§ 1.35.10 (Identification; Reliability), 1.35.11 (Identification; Burden of Proof) (4th ed. 2007). During the initial charge conference, trial counsel again requested the identification charges based on Wilson's description of the shooter, but the trial court reserved ruling on whether to give them. At the final charge conference, the trial court informed the parties that it would not give the identification charges because they did “not apply” to the “facts of this case.” Defense counsel did not object then or at the conclusion of the trial court's charge to the jury, but nevertheless emphasized her view in closing arguments that the State had failed to prove identity. At the motion for new trial hearing, defense counsel testified that her trial strategy was “the identity issue of ‘it wasn't me. It had to have been someone else.’ ” She also testified that she had no strategic reason for not objecting when the trial court declined to give the identification instructions.

Pretermitting whether the identification charges were apt to the evidence presented and whether trial counsel was deficient for failing to renew her objection to the lack of such charges, Dorsey has not shown that any such failure was prejudicial. In closing argument, defense counsel focused heavily on the issue of identification. The trial court then thoroughly charged the jury on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, the State's burden of proof, credibility and impeachment of witnesses, and the elements of each offense—including the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dorsey committed them. “Thus, the jury was instructed on the general principles of law underlying a defense of misidentification,” and “there is no reasonable likelihood of a different result at trial had counsel secured an instruction on identification.” McLean v. State, 291 Ga. 873, 878 (2012) (quotation marks omitted) (assuming that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to trial court's lack of an identity instruction and concluding that there was no prejudice when the jury was instructed on the State's burden of proof, presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and credibility and impeachment of witnesses). See also Lynch v. State, 291 Ga. 555, 558 (2012) (noting that a “review of the charge as a whole ․ show[ed] that the jury was charged on the concepts of presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, credibility and impeachment of witnesses, and alibi” and holding that appellant had failed to show prejudice); Springs v. Seese, 274 Ga. 659, 661 (2002) (concluding, in a habeas case, that there was no prejudice from counsel's failure to request an identity charge when “the jury was instructed on the general principles of law underlying a defense of misidentification” and “defense counsel focused almost entirely on the issue” in closing argument) (cited in McLean and Lynch).

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The shooting occurred on November 10, 2022. In April 2023, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Dorsey for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault against Salazar-Chavez, aggravated assault against Wilson, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At the conclusion of a jury trial lasting from July 24 to August 7, 2023, the jury found Dorsey not guilty of malice murder but guilty of all other counts. The trial court sentenced Dorsey to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder, 20 consecutive years in prison for the aggravated assault of Wilson, and 5 consecutive years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The aggravated assault count against Salazar-Chavez merged into felony murder. On August 27, 2023, Dorsey timely filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel on October 8, 2025. On December 9, 2025, following two hearings, the trial court denied his motion. That same day, Dorsey filed a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   The man also texted: “Put my s**t in the mailbox I'll be by to get it”; “Give it to [my sister] tomorrow”; “At school and have a great one.” But Wilson did not see those messages that night.

3.   The special agent explained that cell tower data reveals “a general area of where the device is,” not an “exact location.”

4.   The analyst explained that an iPhone—which this phone was—keeps track of the user's “movement,” and “if [the user was] walking or running,” it can note “how many steps [the user] might've taken and what the distance was and during what time frame.”

5.   The analyst testified that switching phone numbers would not “automatically delete” call and text data from a phone. Upon an initial search of the phone, however, the analyst was unable to locate any messages or calls between Dorsey's phone and Salazar-Chavez's phone. It was only upon a full extraction of the phone data that the analyst discovered several interactions between it and Salazar-Chavez's phone.

6.   Because Rule 403 is “materially identical” to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, we look to federal appellate cases for guidance in interpreting the rule. See State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556–58, 560 (2018).

7.   To the extent Dorsey argues that the State's use of the video at trial is evidence that it carried a significant danger of unfair prejudice, he is incorrect. The State did not use the video to show that Dorsey had a propensity for gun violence or otherwise capitalize on any danger of unfair prejudice inherent therein. Instead, the State used the video to support the need for which it claimed the video was probative: to connect Dorsey to the distinctive laser sight that Wilson observed before the shooting. Compare Baker, 318 Ga. at 446 (“[T]he trial court allowed the prosecutor to capitalize on the video's prejudicial impact by emphasizing the video not to prove the purposes for which the State now asserts the video was probative, ․ but for the purpose of showing [appellant's] alleged propensity for violence[.]”). And to the extent the State's comment during closing that Dorsey “felt the need to post and keep” the video “on his social media” improperly commented on Dorsey's character, it was made in passing and in the middle of the State's otherwise proper and tailored discussion of the video.

Warren, Presiding Justice.

All the Justices concur.