SANDERS v. STATE (2026)

Appellant Quintavious M. Sanders was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in relation to the shooting death of Marquez Luster.¹ On appeal, Sanders argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that he had no duty to retreat, violated his right to a unanimous verdict when it substituted the alternate juror, and erred when it failed to instruct the reconstituted jury to begin their deliberations anew. Sanders also contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several respects. Finally, Sanders argues that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the errors at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. Maya Smith and Jordan Linton had a longstanding, “on and off” relationship. In May 2019, Smith was pregnant with Linton's child, but she had recently started dating Sanders and was staying in an apartment with him.

On May 8, 2019, Omina Edokpayi was driving Luster – who rode in the passenger seat – and Linton – who rode in the backseat – to run errands. While they were out, Edokpayi received a text from Smith asking him for a ride. Edokpayi drove to Smith's apartment complex, called Smith to unlock the gate, and entered the complex.

Linton exited the car, went upstairs to the second floor, and knocked on Smith's door. When Smith opened the door, Linton began “yelling” and “grabbing” Smith, but he did not attempt to enter the apartment. Smith and Linton came down the stairs to the parking lot, where they continued arguing, and then Smith “stormed off” back upstairs and into the apartment. Linton followed her up the steps and continued “yelling at the door,” but did not enter the apartment.

At that point, Edokpayi got out of his car and went upstairs to “try to intervene” and “de-escalate the situation.” He and Linton returned to the parking lot and were standing near Edokpayi's car when Smith walked out onto the apartment balcony and continued arguing with Linton.

Sanders then joined Smith on the balcony and began “talking, yelling, back and forth” with Linton. Linton saw Sanders pull out a gun, stated, “there's a gun,” and took off running towards the front of the complex. At that point, Sanders exited the apartment and “ran down the steps.”

Edokpayi saw Sanders holding the gun, began running, and fell near his car. Sanders then “held [Edokpayi] at gunpoint” until Smith came downstairs and pulled Sanders off him.

Meanwhile, Luster, who was still sitting in the front passenger seat of Edokpayi's car, exited the car with “his hands up” in an attempt to “de-escalate the situation.” Edokpayi testified that he saw no physical or verbal altercation between Sanders and Luster. Smith, however, testified that Sanders “pushed” Luster, and the two men began “tussling.”² Sanders then shot Luster once in the chest. Edokpayi put Luster into the car, picked up Linton – who called 911 – and drove towards the nearest hospital.

Despite medical intervention, Luster died from his injury. The medical examiner who conducted Luster's autopsy testified that he suffered a single, fatal gunshot wound to the left side of his chest. The bullet was retrieved from the right side of Luster's torso. No firearm was found among Luster's belongings.

An officer who responded to the apartment complex saw a man and woman, later identified as Smith and Sanders, coming “out of the wood line directly behind the apartment,” looking “kind of disheveled, sweaty ․ like they had been running.” Smith told the officer that they were walking back from the mall and had just arrived at the apartment complex.

A maintenance worker for the apartment complex, who witnessed the incident, provided an interview to investigators on the day of the shooting, which was audio recorded.³ In the interview, which was introduced into evidence and played for the jury during the interviewing investigator's testimony at trial, the worker explained that he witnessed the shooter arguing with the men in the parking lot, and then the shooter “walked straight up to the guy on the passenger side of the car, walked close up to him and shot him in his chest.” He stated that there were no other “weapon[s] out” at the time and agreed that the shooter and the victim were not “in a big fight” when the gun was fired.

A crime scene investigator testified that he found a cartridge case at the scene and a .380 caliber handgun buried in a pile of leaves in the wood line behind the complex. An expert in forensic ballistics and firearms examination testified that both the cartridge case found at the scene and the bullet recovered from Luster's body were fired from the pistol found in the wooded area.

Sanders testified in his own defense. He testified that, on the day of the shooting, he was in his bedroom when the door to his apartment “burst open” and he saw Smith “struggling to close the door.” Smith told Sanders that Linton was there, and Sanders then heard more “banging” at the door. Smith went out onto the balcony, and Sanders “grabbed a gun” from his bedroom.

Sanders further testified that, while Smith was “still yelling off the balcony,” he left the apartment and went downstairs for “crowd control” and to “put a little pep in everybody's step.” As Sanders came down the steps with the gun, Linton ran away. Edokpayi was standing by the curb but started backing up towards his car, stumbled, and fell. Sanders “lifted [Edokpayi] up,” with the gun in his hand, and told him to get Linton and leave. Edokpayi said there was no need for a gun, and then Luster got out of the car.

According to Sanders, after Luster said that he was “not afraid” of Sanders's gun, Sanders pointed the gun at Luster. Luster then showed Sanders “a bigger gun in [his] waist line.” Sanders told Luster to get in the car, and the two “tussled.” Luster then “reached for his pistol and before he c[ould] ․ fully reach for his pistol, [Sanders] shot him.” Sanders “threw” the gun across a gate, he and Smith briefly left the apartment, and then officers arrived at the scene as they were coming back.

2. Sanders argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that he had no duty to retreat in his use of justified deadly force. See OCGA § 16-3-23.1.⁴ We disagree.

As Sanders acknowledges, because he did not request this charge or object to the trial court's charge as given to the jury, this claim is reviewed for plain error only. To show plain error, Sanders must establish that “(1) the alleged error was not affirmatively waived, (2) it was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and (3) it affected [his] substantial rights, which ordinarily means showing that it affected the outcome of the trial.” Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 133 (2023) (citation omitted).

Sanders's claim fails because he has not shown an obvious error. “The no-duty-to-retreat instruction is required only when the issue of retreat is raised by the evidence or placed in issue.” Whittaker, 317 Ga. at 133 (citation and punctuation omitted). “Without evidence to warrant the [no-duty-to-retreat instruction], it cannot be said that the failure to give it was error.” Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537, 542 (2013).

During Sanders's testimony, “he was not questioned as to why he did not leave the scene, and the State did not argue that he should have retreated.” Rana v. State, 320 Ga. 66, 76 (2024) (cleaned up). To the contrary, the State suggested only that Sanders had no reason to leave the apartment in the first instance or to approach anyone in the parking lot. The record thus does not show that the principles of retreat were placed in issue, and, accordingly, the trial court did not commit an obvious error in failing to charge on those principles. See Whittaker, 317 Ga. at 133 (trial court did not commit any obvious error by not giving a no-duty-to-retreat instruction where “nothing in the record suggest[ed]” that “the State used th[e] evidence to argue that [defendant] should have retreated” or that “the duty to retreat was placed at issue”).

3. Sanders contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict when it substituted the alternate juror even though Juror Number 2 was willing to participate. Because Sanders has waived appellate review of this claim, it fails.

During deliberations, the court received a note from the jury that read “I need to go. I can't handle this.” After determining that Juror Number 2 wrote the note, the juror was brought into the courtroom and, when asked about the meaning of the note, she responded: “This is just too much. It's too emotional for me. ․ I feel intimidated.” The court then asked Juror Number 2, “if I let you resume with this jury, would you continue to discuss and deliberate with your peers[?]”Juror Number 2 responded “If I can speak and discuss with my peers, then, yes,” to which the court responded, “You can.”

At this point, Sanders's trial counsel said, “It sounds like she's willing to participate,” and the court agreed. The jurors reentered the courtroom, where the court re-read the general deliberations pattern instruction, and the jurors were told to resume their deliberations. Juror Number 2, however, was unwilling to go back to the jury room and confirmed that she was “refusing to continue [her] deliberations.”

The State asked the court to “direct [Juror Number 2] that she took an oath” and “[i]nstruct her to go back into the room and deliberate[.]”Sanders's trial counsel suggested that the court let the jurors break for the weekend and bring them back the following Monday. The trial court stated that it planned to release Juror Number 2 and bring in the alternate juror; neither the State nor Sanders's trial counsel had any objection. At that point, the jury sent another note to the court asking for the alternate juror.

The trial court brought Juror Number 2 back into the courtroom and asked her whether she was “willing to return to the jury room and continue deliberations with [her] colleagues?” She responded, “If I have no choice, yes,” but she explained that “I'm not emotionally equipped for this.” At that time, the State requested the alternate, and Sanders's trial counsel agreed: “It sounds like she's not going to keep deliberating. I think we should dismiss her and bring in the alternate.” The court then dismissed Juror Number 2 and brought in the alternate juror.

“Affirmative waiver, as opposed to mere forfeiture by failing to object, prevents reversal.” Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 37 (2018). Here, Sanders's trial counsel expressly requested that Juror Number 2 be dismissed and that the alternate be seated. Sanders has thus waived appellate review of this claim. See Heinze v. State, 310 Ga. 552, 559 (2020) (where defendant agreed to the removal of a juror and invited the trial court's action, he affirmatively waived appellate review of any resulting claim of error regarding the juror's removal).

4. Sanders argues that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the reconstituted jury to begin their deliberations anew after substituting the alternate juror. We are not persuaded.

When the court first sent Sanders's jury to begin deliberations, it placed the alternate juror “on call” and provided instructions about what would happen if she were called to rejoin the jury. In part, the court told her that “they will restart deliberations.”

After Juror Number 2 was dismissed and the alternate joined the jury, the entire jury re-entered the courtroom. The court first read the questions that had already been raised by the jury and provided its responses to each “so that [the alternate juror] can at least be brought up to speed.” The court then directed the jury as follows:

I'm going to direct that you go back into the jury room and continue to deliberate. Now this is our reality. It's only so much I'm going to say today, because ․ other people got commitments to do other things. I fully understand the alternate just got back in. I'm going to let you resume your deliberations or you can have your deliberations for a short period of time, and then I'm going to bring you back out and I'm going to send you home, and bring you back at a different date and time.

So with that said, go into the jury room, continue to deliberate. Take as much time as you need. I'm not rushing you. I'm not complaining, but I will be sending you home shortly.

Neither party objected to the instruction, and the jury returned its verdict later that afternoon.⁵

Because Sanders did not object at trial, we review his claim regarding these jury instructions for plain error. See Howard v. State, 307 Ga. 12, 14–18 (2019) (applying plain error review to defendant's claim that the trial court's instructions to the reconstituted jury were insufficient), disapproved of on other grounds by Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876 (2023).

To start, Georgia's statute governing the replacement of a juror provides, in relevant part:

If at any time, whether before or after final submission of the case to the jury, a juror ․ upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or is discharged for other legal cause, the first alternate juror shall take the place of the first juror becoming incapacitated.

OCGA § 15-12-172. The statute does not require trial courts to instruct the reconstituted jury to begin its deliberations anew. See Howard, 307 Ga. at 16–17 (considering rules in other jurisdictions that explicitly require trial courts to instruct a reconstituted jury to begin its deliberations anew but noting that “Georgia's statute governing the replacement of a juror with an alternate contains no such provision”).

Moreover, while this Court has rejected arguments that a trial court failed to instruct a reconstituted jury that it must begin deliberations anew based on the language that it gave,  ⁶ we have not held that any such language is required. To the contrary, we have declined to follow decisions from other jurisdictions imposing this requirement. See Howard, 307 Ga. at 17 (explaining that the decisions relied upon by the defendant from federal courts and other state courts are “inconsistent with Georgia's statutory scheme for alternate jurors as laid out in OCGA § 15-12-168 et seq., particularly the provision that the trial court may for good cause substitute an alternate ‘whether before or after final submission of the case to the jury’ ”). And we have explained the constitutional underpinnings of our juror-substitution statute:

When an alternate later is admitted to the panel of twelve in substitution for an original, he has full access to previous deliberations and may apprise himself of what has transpired in his absence by asking appropriate questions or by listening to the deliberations. We shall presume that he casts his vote knowingly and intelligently. Our statute [allowing the substitution of alternate jurors] promotes the important state interest of judicial efficiency by avoiding unnecessary retrials when a juror who is participating in a case becomes unable to continue.

Tanner v. State, 242 Ga. 437, 438 (1978) (citations omitted).

Sanders has failed to identify “on-point controlling authority” or the “unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule” indicating that a trial court must convey the begin anew principle to a reconstituted jury, much less that it must do so using magic words or specific language. See Hill v. State, 321 Ga. 177, 182 (2025) (“[T]o show clear and obvious error, an appellant must cite to on-point controlling authority or to the ‘unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule’ that plainly establish that the trial court erred.”). As a result, he has failed to establish plain error, and so his claim of error fails.

5. Sanders contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in several respects. For Sanders to prevail on his ineffective assistance claims, he must prove both deficient performance by his trial counsel and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To show deficiency, Sanders must establish that trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687–88. The law recognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. Id. at 689.

Even if Sanders proves that his counsel's performance was deficient in this constitutional sense, he also must prove resulting prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To satisfy the prejudice prong, Sanders must show that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 US at 694. And “[i]f either Strickland prong is not met, this Court need not examine the other prong.” Fraser v. State, 322 Ga. 544, 547 (2025) (citation omitted). We conclude that Sanders's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance for the reasons stated below.

(a) Sanders first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to stipulate, under Old Chief v. United States, 519 US 172 (1997), to the convicted felon status element of Count 5 and to object to the admission and publication of State's Exhibits 61 and 62.

Count 5 of the indictment charged Sanders with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. To establish Sanders's status as a convicted felon, the State introduced two exhibits: State's Exhibit 61, a final disposition sheet reflecting Sanders's 2015 felony conviction for robbery (“the 2015 conviction”), and State's Exhibit 62, a final disposition sheet reflecting Sanders's 2019 felony conviction for theft by taking (“the 2019 conviction”).

At trial, after laying a foundation for the admission of the certified copies of Sanders's prior convictions through an investigator, the State tendered – and the court admitted – copies of those two convictions into evidence. The investigator made no further mention of those convictions in his testimony.

Later, Sanders exercised his right to testify. On cross-examination, Sanders testified that he was not a convicted felon at the time he shot Luster. Upon further questioning by the State, however, Sanders admitted that he pled guilty to robbery – a felony – in 2015 and agreed that he was not allowed to possess a firearm at the time of Luster's shooting.

In its closing argument, the State referenced Sanders's 2015 conviction in reference to the State having satisfied its burden to demonstrate Sanders's status as a convicted felon. The State did not reference Sanders's 2019 conviction.

At the motion for new trial hearing, Sanders's trial counsel testified that she did not recall any specific reason for not stipulating to Sanders's felon status under Old Chief, but the fact that she did not led her to believe that she “thought there was something mitigating about that robbery that would make it not sound as scary as the charge.” She also testified that her plan was to “explain ․ what the charge was so that the jury wouldn't think it was some worse thing like murder.” But she agreed that the lack of questions at trial explaining the prior robbery would have been an “omission.” And she admitted that she had no strategic reason for not objecting when the State moved to admit State's Exhibit 62 – the 2019 conviction that was not the underlying conviction for Count 5. She also agreed that it was “not strategic” to have two certified copies of the prior convictions back with the jury during deliberations.

In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court concluded that counsel's strategy was reasonable and that – even if there was no strategic reason – “this decision was unlikely to have affected the outcome of Sanders’[s] trial given the evidence presented and the parties’ chosen trial strategies.”

Assuming that counsel was deficient in failing to stipulate to Sanders's felon status and in failing to object to the admission of the two felony convictions at the time the State moved to admit them, those convictions may have been admissible pursuant to OCGA § 24-6-609(a)(1) once Sanders elected to take the stand.⁷ That Sanders then also chose to deny that he was a convicted felon such that the State was permitted to impeach him with the 2015 conviction likewise shows that the 2015 conviction would have come into evidence anyway. And even though the State did not choose to impeach Sanders with the 2019 conviction, Sanders has not shown that there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the State not been allowed to put the 2019 conviction into evidence, particularly given that the State did not otherwise point to or rely on the 2019 conviction to support its case after it was admitted. See Fraser, 322 Ga. at 551 (“[E]ven if counsel had offered to stipulate to the admission of the conviction during the State's case-in-chief, the State would have been able to use the [prior] conviction later when [defendant] elected to testify.”). Thus, Sanders has not shown that he was prejudiced in this respect.

(b) Sanders also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on “no duty to retreat.”

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that, even though her justification theory focused on self-defense, she did not request a charge on no duty to retreat because “everything was pretty much happening outside the apartment” and agreed that retreat did not appear to be a significant part of the case.

In its order denying Sanders's motion for new trial, the trial court found that trial counsel's explanation regarding her decision not to ask for the no-duty-to-retreat instruction was “not so ‘patently unreasonable’ that it amounted to deficient performance.” The trial court also relied on its analysis of Sanders's companion plain error claim based on the lack of a no-duty-to-retreat instruction in which it concluded that the lack of the instruction “did not affect the outcome of Sanders’[s] trial.”

Because it was “not error to fail to give a charge on no duty to retreat,” as discussed above in Division 2, “trial counsel's failure to object to the lack of such a charge was not deficient performance” as required under Strickland. Higginbotham v. State, 287 Ga. 187, 192 (2010). Sanders has not shown that the no-duty-to-retreat instruction was warranted by the evidence, and trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to request a jury charge that was not authorized by the evidence. See Whittaker, 317 Ga. at 137 (where the no-duty-to-retreat instruction was not supported by the evidence, trial counsel's failure to request the instruction was not deficient performance); Redding v. State, 311 Ga. 757, 768 (2021) (because the no-duty-to-retreat instruction was not “adjusted to the facts,” trial counsel could not be faulted for failing to request a jury charge that was not authorized by the evidence).

(c) Sanders next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that self-defense was an “absolute defense” to the felon-in-possession charge.

When asked at the motion for new trial hearing why she did not request a charge on OCGA § 16-11-138,⁸ trial counsel responded that she felt “the charge of justification was enough and ․ that [Sanders] was justified in having a firearm ․ for the purposes of defending himself and others.” Trial counsel further testified that she was not familiar with OCGA § 16-11-138, but that she nonetheless believed that “the jury charge as a whole, combined with [her] argument, adequately explained” justification to the jury for its consideration.

The court found that counsel's actions were reasonable and “did not rise to the level of deficient performance.” The trial court also found that “[s]ince the trial evidence established that Sanders possessed the weapon before he even knew Luster was present at the scene, OCGA § 16-11-138 would likely have no application to his case.”

To support this claim, Sanders argues only that counsel's failure to request the “absolute defense” instruction was “not strategic, and thus deficient performance, as Sanders's defense focused on his use of a firearm in self-defense.” But the jury was properly and thoroughly instructed on justification, and given the fact that Sanders possessed the firearm at issue well before the confrontation giving rise to the shooting, we fail to see how this instruction would have aided Sanders's defense as to the felon-in-possession charge. See State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 300 (2020) (defendant is not “completely immunized from prosecution as a felon in possession of a firearm ․ if he possessed a firearm outside the period of time when there was a necessity to defend himself or another person”). Thus, Sanders's trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request this charge, and this claim fails.

(d) Sanders argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, “provocation,” and “mutual combat.”

At the motion for new trial hearing, Sanders's trial counsel testified that she did not have an “independent recollection” of a conversation with Sanders about lesser-included offenses, but she believed that they “talked about doing an all-of-nothing defense and not asking for voluntary [manslaughter].”

Sanders testified that his trial counsel did not discuss lesser-included offenses with him and that he never told her to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy for the case. But Sanders also testified that his counsel explained how she would present a justification defense, that he agreed with what she presented, and that his perspective was “you're my counsel, so I'm going to take your word for it and I'm going to trust you.”

In its order denying Sanders's motion for new trial, the trial court credited trial counsel's testimony that she made the strategic choice to pursue an all-or-nothing defense, and the court determined that it was reasonable to pursue such a strategy.

Regardless of whether the evidence presented at trial could have supported a voluntary manslaughter instruction or the defenses of mutual combat or provocation, trial counsel was not deficient for pursuing a theory of self-defense instead. “Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all-or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.” Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893 (2019). The evidence presented at trial and at the motion for new trial – that Sanders shot Luster but was justified in doing so – supported the self-defense theory, even if the evidence also authorized the jury to reject that theory.

Even though counsel acknowledged at the motion for new trial hearing that the evidence may have supported other defenses, “a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Velasco, 306 Ga. at 893 (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, counsel's decision to pursue a theory of self-defense instead of another possible theory was “not so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it under the circumstances.” Id. See McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 866 (2019) (Nahmias, PJ, concurring specially) (“Presenting inconsistent defenses to the jury, particularly when the evidentiary support for one defense is considerably weaker than for others or where a defense is contradicted by the defendant's own account of events, risks losing credibility for all of the defenses,” so “a decision by defense counsel to forgo the option of presenting an inconsistent alternative defense and instead to focus on the defense or defenses that he reasonably believes to be the strongest under all the circumstances will usually not constitute deficient performance”).

6. Finally, Sanders contends that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the errors at trial. To establish cumulative error, a defendant must show that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial” and that “the multiple errors so infected the jury's deliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Because we have assumed only one error relating to trial counsel's failure to stipulate to Sanders's convicted felon status (Division 5(a)), there is no cumulative error to consider. See Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 573, 579 (2021) (holding that cumulative error analysis “does not apply when, as here, there are not multiple errors to consider cumulatively”).

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The crimes occurred on May 8, 2019. On August 1, 2019, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Sanders, charging him with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), aggravated assault (Counts 4 and 6), possession of a firearm by a conviction felon (Count 5), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7).After a trial from June 21 to 24, 2022, a jury found Sanders not guilty of Count 6 and guilty of all other counts. On July 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced Sanders to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count 1, ten years in prison for Count 5 (consecutive with Count 1), and five years in prison for Count 7 (consecutive with Counts 1 and 5). Count 4 was merged into Count 1 for sentencing purposes. Counts 2 and 3 were vacated by operation of law. On September 1, 2022, the trial court vacated Sanders's sentence and re-sentenced him to reflect the time he had already spent in custody.Sanders filed a timely motion for new trial on September 2, 2022, which was amended through new counsel on August 2, 2025. Following a hearing on August 7, 2025, the trial court denied Sanders's motion for new trial, as amended, on September 25, 2025. Sanders timely filed a notice of appeal on September 25, 2025. This case was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   Smith testified that she saw “a portion of a gun” in Luster's waistband. But according to Edokpayi and Linton, none of the men in Edokpayi's car were armed.

3.   The maintenance worker testified at trial, but even after the State attempted to refresh his recollection using his statement, he claimed not to remember much from the day of the shooting.

4.   OCGA § 16-3-23.1 provides:A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, relating to the use of force in defense of self or others ․ has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and use force as provided in said Code sections, including deadly force.

5.   Although the record contains no explicit time stamps for the deliberations, the commentary during trial indicates that the removal of Juror Number 2 took place around 4:00 p.m., and the alternate juror arrived 20-30 minutes after she was called. The verdict form was filed at 5:13 p.m.

6.   See, e.g., Howard, 307 Ga. at 15, 18 (no “obvious error beyond reasonable dispute” in trial court's instructions to the reconstituted jury using the terms “fresh start,” “get him caught up to speed,” “catch them up to speed,” and “resume your deliberations”); Sharpe v. State, 288 Ga. 565, 569–70 (2011) (no error in trial court's instruction to the reconstituted jury to bring the alternate juror “up to speed” after making a “fresh start”).

7.   OCGA § 24-6-609(a)(1) provides that, for purposes of impeachment:Evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted ․ if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.

8.   OCGA § 16-11-138 provides: “Defense of self or others, as contemplated by and provided for under Article 2 of Chapter 3 of this title, shall be an absolute defense to any violation under this part.”

Land, Justice.

All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.