COLEMAN v. STATE (2026)

Michael Coleman appeals his convictions related to the shooting death of Tina Mune-ath.¹ On appeal, Coleman argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, his trial counsel was ineffective, and there were a number of constitutional and structural errors. As explained in more detail below, the evidence was sufficient to support Coleman's convictions, Coleman has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective, and his other claims of error are either waived or are unsupported by the record. Therefore, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at Coleman's trial.

The trial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts showed the following. During their almost 15-year relationship, Coleman and Mune-ath had gotten into many arguments, and many turned physically violent, including one instance in which Coleman threatened Mune-ath with a firearm. Mune-ath and her five children moved to different states as a result of her tumultuous relationship with Coleman, but Coleman would eventually reunite with them. Mune-ath owned a black and silver Taurus 9mm handgun, but she was never seen carrying it. Instead, Coleman would often have it in his possession.

On the morning of February 27, 2019, Mune-ath was at her Fulton County apartment with Coleman and her daughter, Pawnthipe Mune-ath, and Pawnthipe's boyfriend. Coleman, whom Pawnthipe described as “trying to aggravate somebody like he always does,” threatened Pawnthipe and her boyfriend, saying that “[their] time would come.” Pawnthipe and her boyfriend left the apartment and walked to a nearby gas station. A few minutes later, Mune-ath and Coleman arrived at the gas station, and Coleman immediately began threatening Pawnthipe's boyfriend inside the store. Pawnthipe and her boyfriend managed to leave the store and began to walk back toward the apartment. Coleman followed and threatened them some more before walking back to the black Dodge SUV that he had arrived in with Mune-ath. Pawnthipe's boyfriend said that when Coleman was threatening him outside the gas station, Coleman was slowly reaching for a 9 mm gun at his side. Mune-ath drove away from the gas station with Coleman as her passenger.

Later that day, a black SUV was parked outside an emissions testing center in Fulton County when witnesses heard arguing and a “pop” sound coming from inside the vehicle. Witnesses said a man got out of the passenger seat, walked around to the driver's side, and repeatedly pistol-whipped the female driver. When the driver exited the vehicle and attempted to run, the male shot the driver in the back and hit her several more times with the gun before throwing it and leaving in the vehicle. He soon collided with another vehicle and fled on foot. Pawnthipe viewed surveillance footage of the shooting at trial and identified Coleman as the assailant.

Responding officers found Mune-ath unresponsive. She was taken to the hospital, but she died from her wounds. The gun that was recovered from the crime scene was a Taurus 9mm handgun. Police recovered shell casings from the scene, including one from inside the black Dodge SUV, and testing revealed that those casings were fired from the recovered handgun.

2. The evidence was sufficient to support Coleman's convictions.

Coleman argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of federal constitutional due process. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6, because the evidence presented was entirely circumstantial and did not rule out every reasonable theory other than guilt. We disagree.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Questions about the weight and credibility of evidence, the inferences to be drawn from it, and the resolution of any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence are left to the jury. See Anderson v. State, 319 Ga. 56, 59, 901 S.E.2d 543 (2024). “Due process allows for a conviction to rest on circumstantial evidence alone, but under Georgia statutory law, a conviction that rests only on circumstantial evidence cannot stand unless the evidence ‘excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Lee v. State, 322 Ga. 44, 56, 917 S.E.2d 683 (2025) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6; punctuation omitted). “Whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable, and whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any such hypotheses, are questions for the jury, and we will not disturb the jury's findings unless they are insupportable as a matter of law.” Id. at 56–57, 917 S.E.2d 683 (cleaned up).

Here, Coleman is wrong that this case rested solely on circumstantial evidence. There was surveillance footage of the shooting and eyewitness testimony, and this constituted direct evidence of guilt. See Wilson v. State, 322 Ga. 76, 94, 917 S.E.2d 726 (2025) (distinguishing other cases as involving direct evidence in the form of, among other things, eyewitness testimony and surveillance footage); Douglas v. State, 321 Ga. 739, 747–48 & n.7, 917 S.E.2d 115 (2025) (eyewitness testimony constitutes direct evidence and “is not converted into circumstantial evidence by a witness's lack of credibility” (cleaned up)). This defeats Coleman's claim under OCGA § 24-14-6 that the case was entirely circumstantial. See id. See also Green v. State, 322 Ga. 617, 620–21, 921 S.E.2d 307 (2025).

As to the federal constitutional sufficiency of the evidence, there is no dispute that Mune-ath was shot outside an emissions center and died from those gunshot wounds. There is also no dispute that Mune-ath was shot by a Taurus 9mm handgun that was recovered from the scene and that matched the type of gun she owned and that Coleman was frequently seen carrying. Mune-ath's daughter viewed the surveillance video capturing the incident and testified that the man who shot her mother was Coleman. Although Coleman argues that the witnesses gave varying accounts that were in conflict with each other and with the physical evidence about the number of times Mune-ath was shot, “it is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence insufficient.” Graham v. State, 301 Ga. 675, 677, 804 S.E.2d 113 (2017) (quotation marks omitted).

3. Coleman has failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Coleman argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine witnesses and investigate his case more thoroughly, review cell phone data on his phone, and pursue certain motions. These claims fail.

To prevail on any of his claims, Coleman must show both that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Coleman must “overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel's decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 855, 823 S.E.2d 325 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). Our review of counsel's performance applies an objective reasonableness standard and is not limited to any subjective reasons offered by counsel for her conduct. See Lane v. State, 312 Ga. 619, 623, 864 S.E.2d 34 (2021). A defendant generally must do more than make generalized allegations of deficient performance; the defendant can only establish deficient performance by pointing to a specific deficiency shown by the record. See Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731, 739, 141 S.Ct. 2405, 210 L.Ed.2d 812 (2021) (“The burden of rebutting th[e] presumption [that counsel's performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct] rests squarely on the defendant, and it should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome it. In fact, even if there is reason to think that counsel's conduct was far from exemplary, a court still may not grant relief if the record does not reveal that counsel took an approach that no competent lawyer would have chosen.” (cleaned up)); Henry v. State, 307 Ga. 281, 283, 835 S.E.2d 602 (2019) (“It is [Appellant's] burden to show deficient performance and prejudice through competent evidence, for a silent or ambiguous record is not sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of reasonable performance.” (punctuation omitted)).² To demonstrate prejudice, Coleman must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Mims, 304 Ga. at 855, 823 S.E.2d 325 (quotation marks omitted). The failure to meet either of the prongs is fatal to an ineffectiveness claim. See Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733, 770 S.E.2d 610 (2015). In considering an ineffectiveness claim, we review a trial court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 534, 690 S.E.2d 801 (2010).

Here, regarding many of his claims, Coleman baldly asserts that had trial counsel done more or done things differently, such as cross-examining witnesses or investigating more thoroughly, trial counsel might have unearthed exculpatory evidence. But Coleman fails to identify any particular witness whom counsel unreasonably failed to interview or any specific line of investigation or questioning that counsel should have, but did not, pursue, so his generalized claims that counsel was deficient for failing to do more at trial or to prepare for trial fail to establish deficiency. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 319 Ga. 758, 764, 906 S.E.2d 699 (2024) (defendant failed to establish deficient performance where he provided no record citation, argument, or legal authority to support any his claims); Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 334, 877 S.E.2d 202 (2022) (defendant did not show that trial counsel was deficient where defendant “offer[ed] no evidence in support of this claim other than suggesting that additional investigation could have led to exculpatory evidence”).

Similarly, Coleman's generalized allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue certain motions is insufficient to carry his burden of establishing deficient performance. Coleman first argues that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress. To establish deficient performance in failing to file a motion to suppress, a defendant “must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion.” Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240, 249, 882 S.E.2d 329 (2022) (quotation marks omitted). But Coleman does not even argue that any particular physical evidence, identification, or statement would have been suppressed had trial counsel gone forward with these motions. Thus, he has failed to establish that any such motion would have succeeded, so this claim fails. See Roseboro v. State, 308 Ga. 428, 435, 841 S.E.2d 706 (2020).

Coleman also argues that counsel should have filed a speedy trial demand, and this argument fails for a similar reason. Because a delay in bringing a case to trial may work to a defendant's advantage, a defendant must show that trial counsel's failure to file a speedy trial demand was objectively unreasonable. See Lee v. State, 323 Ga. 327, 334–35, 924 S.E.2d 278 (2025). Coleman offers no argument that a speedy trial claim would have been successful or that trial counsel's decision not to pursue this demand was unreasonable, so he has not shown that trial counsel was deficient. See Shank v. State, 290 Ga. 844, 848, 725 S.E.2d 246 (2012) (generalized allegations of unreasonable professional conduct are insufficient to make affirmative showing of deficient performance).

The only unpursued motion about which Coleman provides meaningful argument concerns his claim that counsel should have moved to bifurcate the felon-in-possession count. But this claim is meritless, because the felon-in-possession count (Count 6) was the predicate felony for one of the felony murder counts (Count 3). And we have held that an attorney is not deficient for failing to seek bifurcation of a felon-in-possession count when the count serves as a predicate offense for a charged felony murder count. See Talley v. State, 314 Ga. 153, 165, 875 S.E.2d 789 (2022) (“A motion to bifurcate should be denied where the count charging unlawful firearm possession might serve as the underlying felony supporting a felony murder conviction.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, counsel was not deficient for failing to file the motion.

4. Coleman's other claims of error are waived or unsupported by the record.

Coleman argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on the collective prejudice resulting from a number of other alleged errors. We disagree.

(a) Waived claims

Coleman argues that the racial composition of the jury pool was unconstitutional. But Coleman waited until after his conviction to challenge the jury list, raising the issue for the first time in his amended motion for new trial. As we have previously explained, Georgia “has long required a criminal defendant to raise a challenge to the jury lists at the time the jury is ‘put upon him’ or else he waives his right to object.” Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 185, 850 S.E.2d 110 (2020) (quoting Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 286, 206 S.E.2d 439 (1974)). Because he waited to challenge the composition of the jury list until after his conviction, Coleman has waived any such challenge. See Hill, 310 Ga. at 185, 850 S.E.2d 110. And plain error review is unavailable for this type of claim. See Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 497, 842 S.E.2d 22 (2020) (listing the types of claims that are subject to plain error review and noting that this Court will not extend such review to other types of claims).

Coleman also argues that several jurors (Jurors 11, 15, 26, and 27) were biased and should have been removed. But Coleman concedes in his brief that he did not seek to strike these jurors, nor did he object when these jurors were impaneled. Therefore, he has waived this argument. See Ensley v. State, 294 Ga. 200, 203, 751 S.E.2d 396 (2013) (defendant waived appellate review of his claim that the trial court erred by not replacing a juror). And plain error does not extend to this type of claim, either. See McCabe v. State, 319 Ga. 275, 284–85, 903 S.E.2d 78 (2024) (plain error review is unavailable for claim that trial court failed to remove jurors where defendant never sought or received rulings on requests to remove those jurors).

(b) Unsupported claims

Coleman also argues that he was denied the right to counsel during the plea and arraignment phase when “counsel came in one month after the plea and arraignment.” This claim is not supported by the record. The record shows that Coleman was represented by counsel soon after his arrest, as counsel filed a request for bond in March 2019, more than two months before the indictment was returned. Different counsel substituted in over time. Coleman was represented by counsel at a pretrial hearing in March 2019, more than two years before his December 2021 trial, and counsel who represented him at trial was counsel of record as of March 2021. When Coleman waived his right to a formal indictment and entered his formal plea on the eve of his trial, he was represented by counsel. Because the record shows that Coleman had counsel during his plea and arraignment, his right-to-counsel claim fails.

To the extent Coleman argues that the collective prejudice from all the trial court errors and trial counsel's deficiencies warrant a new trial, this claim fails because he has not shown that the court erred in any way or that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4), 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020) (to establish cumulative prejudice a defendant must demonstrate that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial” and “considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury's deliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Because there are not multiple errors to aggregate, Coleman's collective prejudice claim fails.

Judgment affirmed.

I join in full the Court's decision affirming Coleman's convictions. I write separately to heed then-Chief Justice Benham's call nearly 30 years ago and begin the process for ending our purely voluntary exercise of jurisdiction over direct appeals in non-death-penalty murder cases. See Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 739, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999) (Benham, C.J., concurring specially) (“I believe the time has come for this Court to comply with the change in its appellate jurisdiction in non-capital murder cases brought about by passage of the 1983 Georgia Constitution ․”).

1. Before 1983, the Georgia Constitution gave us direct appellate jurisdiction over “all cases of conviction of a capital felony[.]” Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV; Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV. We construed “capital felony” as describing the class of “ ‘felonies to which the death penalty is affixed as a punishment under given circumstances’ ” as opposed to felonies “ ‘in which under no circumstances would death ever be inflicted as a penalty.’ ” Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 402, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caesar v. State, 127 Ga. 710, 712, 57 S.E. 66 (1907)). “In other words, our appellate jurisdiction turned on the statutory penalties for the crime of conviction, not anything specific about the particular case.” Hart v. State, 322 Ga. 1, 5, 917 S.E.2d 631 (2025).

But that constitutional text was changed in the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which now vests us instead with direct appellate jurisdiction over “cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8). The very next year, we held that this new language no longer gave us direct appellate jurisdiction in murder cases in which the “district attorney did not give timely notice to the defense that the state intended to seek the death penalty.” State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524, 524, 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984).¹ In short, from 1984 to 2012, the law of Georgia was settled that this Court lacked direct appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases. See also Rhyne v. State, 264 Ga. 176, 177, 442 S.E.2d 742 (1994) (holding that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to decide non-death-penalty murder appeal). But we nevertheless kept deciding such appeals. See Thornton, 253 Ga. at 524, 322 S.E.2d 711 (notwithstanding its jurisdictional holding, concluding that “[a]s a matter of policy, however, we deem it appropriate, at the present time, that all murder cases be reviewed by this court” and ordering that the Court of Appeals was to transfer all such cases to this Court). In 2012, a concurrence joined by the full Court opined in dicta that Thornton was wrong and the Court did have direct appellate jurisdiction over all murder appeals. See Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 567–72, 722 S.E.2d 765 (2012) (Hunstein, C.J., concurring). But as we explained last year, the Neal concurrence did not overrule Thornton and was wrong in any event. See Hart, 322 Ga. at 4–11, 917 S.E.2d 631. And we squarely reaffirmed that the Georgia Constitution does not vest direct appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases in this Court. Id. We acknowledged that Thornton did not explain what authority we had to require the Court of Appeals to transfer to us appeals over which we lacked direct appellate jurisdiction, but we concluded that we do have the power to decide direct appeals in such cases solely by virtue of the discretionary exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction. Id. That is the settled law of Georgia, and the other concurrence (notwithstanding its continued disagreement) properly acknowledges that “the majority's decision in Hart is binding precedent, and we must follow it.”

2. In Hart, the Attorney General raised our lack of jurisdiction and argued that we should transfer that murder appeal (and all future ones not implicating the death penalty) to the Court of Appeals. Although we agreed with the Attorney General that we lacked direct appellate jurisdiction, we declined to change our practice “at this time.” Hart, 322 Ga. at 10, 917 S.E.2d 631. We acknowledged that such cases occupy a substantial portion of our attention and observed that “the Court of Appeals is well suited to handle such cases[.]” Id. And we noted that were we to change course, we could still grant certiorari following Court of Appeals decisions as we now do in other areas, and “we would have increased capacity to focus on legal questions with a broader application instead of many of the fact-bound issues that we currently consider.” Id. But, we observed, “notwithstanding the merits of the policy considerations advanced by the State, other competing policy considerations are at issue as well.” Id. In particular, stakeholders in the criminal justice system rely on the current arrangement, and resource deployment and procedures of both “the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court are based on this Court's exclusive review of non-death-penalty murder appeals — such that it would be difficult to retreat from the Thornton transfer order without proper planning and coordination.” Id. (emphasis added). “Accordingly,” we concluded, “we decline to retreat from Thornton’s transfer order at this time, which is best understood as reflecting a decision to retain jurisdiction over this and other non-death-penalty murder appeals pursuant to our certiorari jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added).

That decision to continue the status quo at that time was not a commitment to continue to decide such direct appeals indefinitely. It was, instead, a recognition that we should not begin transferring those cases to the Court of Appeals without a proper respect for that court as a partner in the judicial system and without adequate notice to it and others of our plans to do so. This concurring opinion provides such notice, and the long lead time we are providing is intended to give the Court of Appeals sufficient time to prepare.²

3. Ending our practice of automatically granting certiorari-before-judgment in every non-death-penalty murder appeal makes sense for several reasons. First, given the size of our Court, the resources we devote to resolving fact-specific claims in these cases is far less efficient than the manner in which three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals can decide them, and all of the time and energy we voluntarily spend on such appeals detracts from the time and energy our mandatory and exclusive duties require, which is detrimental to the public that we serve. Second, deciding all direct murder appeals in published opinions binding on all other courts in the state creates too much binding precedent, and that precedent is often less helpful to other courts than we might think. And third, even without direct appeals in all murder cases, our published opinion caseload will still be among the heaviest in the country. I explain each of these in detail below.

A. Efficiency

The resources we devote to resolving murder appeals that present ordinary legal issues is far less efficient than the way the Court of Appeals can decide cases. Deciding cases on a nine-justice court with all nine justices participating in every case expends far more judicial resources per case than when those cases are reviewed instead by a three-judge panel at the Court of Appeals. We have three terms of court a year, and over the last several years, we have averaged around 45 non-death-penalty murder opinions per term. Using that number as an example, in one term of court, each justice on our Court authors five such opinions and reviews and edits another 40 opinions. By contrast, there are fifteen Court of Appeals judges, and they decide cases in five panels of three. So for 45 murder appeals, each Court of Appeals judge would author three opinions and review and edit only another six opinions, except for those rare cases that require consideration by all 15 judges. See Stephen Louis A. Dillard, Open Chambers Revisited: Demystifying the Inner Workings and Culture of the Georgia Court of Appeals, 68 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 23–24 (2016). In other words, the Court of Appeals can decide five cases with approximately the same time and effort that it takes our Court to decide one. Shifting murder cases to the Court of Appeals would significantly reduce the number of opinions each justice reviews and only marginally increase the number of opinions each Court of Appeals judge reviews. This would be a dramatically more efficient use of limited judicial resources.

Looking at the total caseload of both courts also illustrates this point. Although our total caseload is about half that of the Court of Appeals, our per-justice caseload is about double the per-judge caseload of the Court of Appeals. In calendar year 2024,³ our total caseload was 1437 cases, which included direct appeals, petitions for certiorari, habeas petitions, and every other type of matter we are responsible for deciding. The Court of Appeals's total caseload for calendar year 2024 was 2666 cases.⁴ But because the Court of Appeals decides cases in five panels made up of three judges each, each Court of Appeals judge participated in deciding about 533 cases in calendar year 2024.⁵ In comparison, each nonrecused justice on our Court is responsible for reviewing and deciding every case in our caseload, meaning that each justice reviewed (and played a part in deciding) each of the total 1437 cases in our caseload in calendar year 2024. Plainly, both courts work extremely hard. The point here is simply that the Court of Appeals is designed to be more efficient in terms of the total number of cases it handles and is better suited to handle the volume of non-death-penalty murder appeals that we currently review each year.

Focusing our limited judicial resources on resolving murder appeals ultimately detracts from the time to devote to the core tasks assigned to this Court by the Constitution and the General Assembly. The Constitution reserves seven responsibilities, both in terms of categories of cases and administrative duties, exclusively to this Court. Those responsibilities include:

Review of appeals in constitutional question cases, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II(1);

Review of appeals in election contest cases, see id. at Par. II(2);

Review of granted certiorari cases, see id. at Par. V;

Review of certified question cases, see id. at Par. IV;

Regulation of the practice of law, see, e.g., In the Matter of Brown, 319 Ga. 465, 478, 904 S.E.2d 343 (2024);

Oversight of judicial discipline, including unilateral promulgation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VI–VIII, see also Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer, 315 Ga. 841, 854, 885 S.E.2d 738 (2023); and

Oversight of the judicial system generally, see, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. II, see also id. at Sec. IX, Par. I.

And there are five additional categories of cases within our direct appellate jurisdiction unless the General Assembly statutorily provides otherwise (and it has not), so we are obligated to exercise direct appellate jurisdiction over those categories of cases. Those categories of cases include:

All equity cases involving the death penalty, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(2), see also OCGA § 15-3-3.1(a)(2);

All habeas corpus cases, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(4);

All cases involving extraordinary remedies regarding the death penalty, see id. at (2), (5), see also OCGA § 15-3-3.1(a)(4);

All cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(7); and

All cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed, see id. at (8).

Regardless of how we might assign relative importance to each of these 12 responsibilities compared to murder cases, this much is inescapably true: we're the only Court that can do these 12 things. The Court of Appeals is not permitted by law (and as to the first seven, cannot be permitted by law) to do them. But the current state of the law is that the Court of Appeals can take the initial review of non-death-penalty murder appeals; we're simply choosing to do them ourselves as a result of our Court's policy decision in Thornton made 42 years ago. And every such murder appeal we choose to decide in the first instance is time and effort that cannot be spent on these 12 non-optional, core tasks of this Court.

And as Georgia grows, as the legal system changes, and as other developments occur, these 12 core tasks become more demanding. For example, the frequency of significant or emergency election litigation has picked up materially over the past three election cycles. That trend seems likely not just to continue, but to accelerate for at least some time. See Bryan P. Tyson, et al., State Constitutional Law: Developments in Georgia Election Law, 77 Mercer L. Rev. 109, 110 (2026) (“As long as Georgia remains a battleground state with close elections, litigation over the administration of elections will continue. While Georgia law has developed significantly over the past seven years, there is no indication that the trend to run to court to deal with close elections will change at any point soon.”). Executions, which have functionally been on hold for years, seem likely to resume soon, and that brings a substantial amount of emergency work with it as well. See State v. Federal Defender Program, Inc., ––– Ga. ––––, 931 S.E.2d 123 (2026) (reversing trial court order permanently enjoining Attorney General from pursuing executions of certain death row inmates). When an emergency case arrives, we all have to drop whatever we're doing and focus on it. Certiorari petitions have also increased dramatically over the past several years, and it seems likely that they will continue to do so. And regulating the practice of law, judicial discipline, and our many other administrative duties have become more demanding as our state has grown.

B. The current system creates too much precedent.

Over 2022–24, murder opinions have made up from 55% to 59% of our published opinion caseload each year (but only about 10% of our total caseload). Put another way, of the 667 opinions we issued from 2022 to 2024, 379 of those opinions were in murder cases. Each one of these opinions is published and binding on all Georgia courts, including this Court (unless and until we overrule it). And if we make a material mistake in one of these cases (which is nearly unavoidable given the volume of murder cases we review), only this Court (or, in rare instances, the United States Supreme Court) can correct that mistake. But correcting our own mistakes is not easy — we have to wait for the issue to be squarely raised by the parties in a later case, usually years after the initial error, and even then, stare decisis often will prevent us from changing course.

As an intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals is better suited to conduct an initial review in non-death-penalty murder cases in at least three ways. (1) This Court can correct important mistakes by granting certiorari, which is much quicker than fixing our own errors. (2) Correcting an error on certiorari actually fixes the error in the case in which it was made (and can do so without making unnecessary binding precedent on other issues). (3) Some of the Court of Appeals's mistakes will be in unpublished opinions, which the Court of Appeals's rules say are not binding on lower courts, see Ga. Ct. App. R. 33.2(b), meaning those errors do not harm the clarity and development of the law more broadly.

Our precedent in murder cases is also less helpful to lower courts than we may think — it's unwieldy and overturned more often than our non-murder cases. A survey of our opinions issued 2018–25 demonstrates this point: Over those eight years, we issued 20 opinions either overruling or disapproving of prior cases, and 13 (or 65%) of those cases were murder appeals. Again, this makes sense given the volume of murder appeals and our policy of acting as the first (and on issues of Georgia law, only) layer of appellate review. If the Court of Appeals performed initial review in these cases, it seems likely that fewer errors would survive our level of review; although we have great confidence in the Court of Appeals to reach correct decisions in these cases, the simple fact is that two levels of review are more likely to get something right than only one. Transferring these cases to the Court of Appeals will provide that safeguard.⁶

The volume of our precedent is problematic for both lawyers and judges; it makes researching any frequently occurring issue extremely difficult because lawyers and judges must wade through vast oceans of caselaw to get answers to even simple questions. (For context, we have more than 200 binding opinions discussing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the last three years alone.) More than one very good lawyer and judge has shared with me that they want to keep up with developments in our precedent but find it impossible to read the vast number of opinions we issue every year on routine issues that occur regularly in criminal cases. It should not be so difficult to keep up.

Unlike the typical petition for certiorari, our current policy of granting certiorari in all murder cases (and not limiting the grant to specific issues) also prevents us from limiting our review to well-presented issues in cases that cleanly and squarely present and allow us to decide the important legal issues in question. As a result, murder cases are often messy in ways that invite disagreement and preclude clear resolution of important questions (and again, in a published opinion that binds everyone on everything we decide). Most murder appeals also involve our assessment of a factual record. With nine justices reviewing each murder opinion, it's natural to have more disagreement about how to read a record than a three-judge panel would. And this sort of issue — how best to read the record on a factual point — is necessarily almost always lacking the gravity that the Constitution makes a necessary condition for exercising our certiorari jurisdiction. The rare exception is something like establishing the proper standard of review, which of course is the kind of legal issue that can be easily corrected on certiorari.

Our decision to exercise certiorari jurisdiction in murder cases that clearly lack “gravity” and “great public importance” strikes me as difficult to square with our constitutional mandate to exercise certiorari jurisdiction only in cases that meet this standard. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V (“The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance.”); Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 40(1) (“Certiorari generally will not be granted merely to correct an asserted error, particularly when the asserted error concerns only the sufficiency of evidence, the correctness of factual findings, or the application of a properly stated rule of law to the facts of a particular case.”). Thus, although a number of murder cases would undoubtedly meet the certiorari standard, the failure to make a case-by-case determination on this issue and instead exercise certiorari prospectively on an entire class of cases is in some tension with our constitutional constraints. See also Hart, 322 Ga. at 19–21, 917 S.E.2d 631 (Pinson, J., concurring) (noting that the Thornton transfer order is a poor fit for granting certiorari because (1) not every murder appeal is “of gravity or great public importance,” and (2) our certiorari jurisdiction is limited to cases “in the Court of Appeals,” and when a case has never been in the Court of Appeals, “there is a serious argument that our certiorari jurisdiction does not extend to that case”). And it is also worth noting that in a society governed by the rule of law, our following the constitutional standard has its own value independent of the policy outcomes.

In short, the sheer number of binding murder opinions we publish every year makes keeping up with our caselaw difficult and researching recurring issues needlessly complex for lawyers, trial judges, and the public. This results in more errors that are more difficult to correct. And this will continue to be the case so long as we keep prospectively granting certiorari in all murder appeals without regard to the issues they raise.

C. Even without non-death-penalty murder direct appeals, we will remain among the busiest high courts in the country.

With 227 total published opinions in calendar year 2024, our Court issued more published, reasoned opinions than any other state supreme court except North Dakota, which lacks an intermediate appellate court. In short, we are one of the busiest state supreme courts in the nation. And even without murder direct appeals, our published opinion caseload would still be heavy compared to other states. With 100 published opinions in 2024 still within our jurisdiction for reasons other than being a non-death-penalty murder case, our court would still rank in the top 20.⁷

4. The results of our decision in Thornton to keep deciding all murder appeals in the first instance have been inefficient, make the law less consistent and reliable, and impair our work on the many other matters for which the Georgia Constitution vests responsibility solely in us. And discontinuing this practice would still leave this Court among the busiest high courts in the country. And although some of us who join this opinion do so reluctantly, we nevertheless agree that it is now time to begin the planning and coordination that this shift requires.

Accordingly, effective starting with cases docketed July 1, 2027, we will cease exercising direct appellate jurisdiction over all appeals in murder cases “in which the district attorney has not given timely notice to the defense that the State intends to seek the death penalty,” Hart, 322 Ga. at 9, 917 S.E.2d 631, and are not otherwise within some other part of our direct appellate jurisdiction. We expect to issue an order at that time, rescinding the Thornton transfer order, ordering that all direct appeals in non-death-penalty murder cases docketed after July 1, 2027, be docketed in the Court of Appeals, and providing whatever additional direction may become necessary.⁸

I fully agree with the majority opinion that Coleman's convictions and sentences should be affirmed. I write separately because, for the reasons that follow, I disagree with certain aspects of the other concurring opinion's analysis and its ultimate conclusion regarding our general appellate jurisdiction over some non-death-penalty murder appeals, and I also disagree with the policy decision to discontinue exercising our certiorari jurisdiction over these appeals, even taking as a given this Court's binding precedent concluding that we do not have direct appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases.

A little over a year ago, this Court issued our decision in Hart v. State, 322 Ga. 1, 917 S.E.2d 631 (2025), where, after being asked by the Office of the Attorney General to reconsider our appellate jurisdiction over direct appeals of murder cases “in which the death penalty was not sought,” id. at 4, 917 S.E.2d 631, and after concluding that we lacked general appellate jurisdiction over these cases, we decided to retain jurisdiction over such appeals pursuant to our extensive certiorari jurisdiction, noting the inherent policy considerations and practical impact of ceasing to undertake this review. Id. at 5, 10, 917 S.E.2d 631 (citing State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524, 524, 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984)). See also Sup. Ct. R. 40; Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V. I specially concurred in Hart because—although I disagreed with the majority opinion that our certiorari jurisdiction was the only basis for asserting our appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder appeals—I nevertheless agreed that it was one such basis for doing so. See Hart, 322 Ga. at 21, 917 S.E.2d 631 (LaGrua, J., concurring specially). However, I strongly believe now as I did then that, in addition to our certiorari jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases, this Court has “mandatory appellate jurisdiction” over direct appeals in some non-death-penalty murder cases, as well, because they fall into the class of cases “in which the death penalty was imposed or could be imposed” under the Constitution of Georgia of 1983, Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph III(8) (hereinafter “Paragraph III(8)”). Id. at 21–22, 30, 917 S.E.2d 631 (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8) (quotation marks omitted)).

Today, even though nothing has changed in the intervening time since Hart was issued to lessen the gravity of non-death-penalty murder appeals, Chief Justice Peterson has authored a concurring opinion, joined by all of my colleagues, which declares that, as of July 1, 2027, this Court will be “ending our purely voluntary exercise of jurisdiction over direct appeals in non-death-penalty murder cases.” Concur. Op. at ––––. And so, for many of the same reasons I specially concurred in Hart, I write separately again to, among other things, reemphasize that Paragraph III(8) of the 1983 Constitution provides this Court with a “sound basis” for exercising our “mandatory appellate jurisdiction in some non-death penalty murder cases,” Hart, 322 Ga. at 30, 917 S.E.2d 631 (LaGrua, J., concurring specially), and to underscore why I believe it is our constitutional responsibility to review these cases on appeal and why the Court is erring in declining to continue to exercise certiorari jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder appeals.¹

1. “[T]he judicial branch, like the legislative and executive branches, has only the power granted to it by the people through their Constitution.” State v. Murray, 286 Ga. 258, 266, 687 S.E.2d 790 (2009) (Nahmias, J., dissenting). “Indeed, even the legislature cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court beyond the limits of the Constitution.” Id. (citing Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 401–02, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977) (“The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is declared by the constitution[,] and the legislature is without power by mere enactment to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to decide questions that are not of the class to which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited by the constitution.” (cleaned up))).

(a) The Supreme Court's Murder Jurisdiction under the Pre-1983 Constitutions

Throughout the Supreme Court's history, the Court has reviewed direct appeals of murder cases under a constitutional grant of jurisdiction. Initially, the Court did so “[a]s the sole appellate court from 1845 until 1906,” receiving “all appeals from the superior courts,” including murder appeals. Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 567, 722 S.E.2d 765 (2012) (Hunstein, C. J., concurring) (citing Dawson v. State, 130 Ga. 127, 129–30, 60 S.E. 315 (1908)). In 1906, after a constitutional amendment established the Court of Appeals and conferred upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction over “all cases of conviction of a capital felony,” Ga. L. 1906, p. 24, this Court—interpreting “all cases of conviction of a capital felony” to mean “every capital felony where the law provides for punishment by death as a penalty, whether or not the penalty [wa]s imposed in the specific case”—continued to exercise its jurisdiction over all murder appeals. Neal, 290 Ga. at 567–68, 722 S.E.2d 765 (Hunstein, C. J., concurring) (citing Caesar v. State, 127 Ga. 710, 712–13, 57 S.E. 66 (1907)). For the next 70 years, as the “language assigning capital felony convictions to the Supreme Court” remained unchanged by the Georgia Constitutions of 1945 and 1976, id. at 568, 722 S.E.2d 765 (Hunstein, C. J., concurring) (citing Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV; Ga. Const of 1945, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV), this Court continued to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over “cases involving murder convictions, because murder was (and is) a ‘capital felony.’ ” Murray, 286 Ga. at 264–65, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., dissenting).

(b) The Supreme Court's Murder Jurisdiction under the 1983 Constitution

In 1983, the people of Georgia ratified a new Constitution, which “reorganized and modified to some extent the provisions regarding this Court's jurisdiction.” Murray, 286 Ga. at 268, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., dissenting). Relevant here, the Georgia Constitution of 1983 “altered the language used to describe this Court's general appellate jurisdiction over murder cases,” Neal, 290 Ga. at 569, 722 S.E.2d 765 (Hunstein, C. J., concurring), by conferring on this Court general appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ll cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8).

Since the 1983 Constitution took effect more than 40 years ago, this Court has periodically engaged in an examination of its general appellate jurisdiction over murder appeals under this Constitution, and despite some differing viewpoints and writings on both sides of the issue, this Court has nevertheless continued to “exercise[ ] jurisdiction over all cases in which the appellant has been found guilty of murder.” Hart, 322 Ga. at 5, 917 S.E.2d 631. Until today.

Notably, when this Court has wrestled with its murder jurisdiction under the 1983 Constitution, much of that struggle has focused on how to interpret the phrase “in which a sentence of death ․ could be imposed” in Paragraph III(8).² See e.g., State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524, 524, 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984) (determining that the Court did not have general appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of an order suppressing evidence in a pending murder prosecution because the State had failed to give timely notice of its intent to seek the death penalty against the defendant, rendering the case one where “a sentence of death” could not be imposed, but nevertheless retaining jurisdiction over this and all future murder appeals as a “matter of policy”) (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8));³ Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 739–41, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999) (Benham, C. J., concurring specially) (opining that the phrase “ ‘could be imposed’ ․ speaks to the future and is applicable to those cases in which the possibility of the imposition of the death penalty still exists,” but noting that the Court still retained jurisdiction over Weatherbed's murder appeal—even though he was sentenced to life in prison—because doing so complied “with the Thornton order”); Murray, 286 Ga. at 265–66, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., dissenting) (opining that the Thornton Court's holding—i.e., “that our Court now lacks direct appeal jurisdiction over murder cases in which the death penalty can no longer be imposed”—was “consistent with the language of the new constitutional text,” but concluding that this Court could nevertheless “properly take all murder appeals as a categorical exercise of our longstanding and almost-unlimited certiorari jurisdiction”); Garcia-Jarquin v. State, 314 Ga. 555, 557, 878 S.E.2d 200 (2022) (Bethel J., concurring). And, while Thornton held that the 1983 Constitution did not give this Court direct appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases, see Thornton, 253 Ga. at 524, 322 S.E.2d 711—a holding with which the Weatherbed special concurrence and Murray dissent agreed—three years after Justice Nahmias issued his dissenting opinion in Murray, he and the five other Justices on the then-seven-Justice Court joined then-Chief Justice Hunstein's concurring opinion in Neal, in which the whole Court agreed that,

[a]lthough the 1983 Constitution altered the language used to describe this Court's general appellate jurisdiction over murder cases, it did not change our jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals involving life-imprisonment murder convictions.

Neal, 290 Ga. at 569, 722 S.E.2d 765 (Hunstein, C. J., concurring).

After engaging in a detailed review of the constitutional history of the 1983 Constitution—including its drafting history and the committee minutes discussing its provisions ⁴ —and providing an explanation of why Thornton was decided incorrectly, Chief Justice Hunstein's concurring opinion determined that the constitutional history of the “could-be imposed language” of Paragraph III(8) showed “that the framers of the 1983 Constitution intended it to apply to all murder cases, whether the death penalty or life imprisonment was imposed.” Neal, 290 Ga. at 572, 722 S.E.2d 765 (Hunstein, C. J., concurring). Relying on this intent, the other concurring opinion called on the Court to “interpret our State Constitution as giving us jurisdiction over life-imprisonment murder convictions, thus making unnecessary the transfer order adopted in Thornton.” Id. at 572, 722 S.E.2d 765. And, for the next 14 years, the Court did interpret the 1983 Constitution this way, consistently exercising its direct appellate jurisdiction over murder appeals—though I acknowledge that some members of the Court periodically questioned that jurisdiction before today.

Specifically, in 2022, ten years after the Neal concurring opinion was issued, Justice Bethel wrote a concurring opinion in Garcia-Jarquin, 314 Ga. at 557, 878 S.E.2d 200 (Bethel J., concurring), suggesting that the Neal concurring opinion's interpretation of the could-be-imposed language of Paragraph III(8) rendered the words “ ‘was imposed’ (and the distinction between the two types of cases) meaningless and completely superfluous.” Id. at 564, 878 S.E.2d 200. But the concurring opinion agreed with Justice Nahmias's dissenting opinion in Murray that this Court was nevertheless “empowered to assert discretionary jurisdiction over murder (and any other cases) based on our expansive power of certiorari.” Id. (citing Murray, 286 Ga. at 266–72, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., dissenting)).

Three years later, this Court issued Hart, where—in reliance on Thornton and the special concurrence in Weatherbed—the majority opinion concluded that “the change of text in the 1983 Constitution meant that this Court no longer had jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases.” Hart, 322 Ga. at 8, 917 S.E.2d 631 (citing Weatherbed, 271 Ga. at 740–41, 524 S.E.2d 452 (Benham, C. J., concurring)). In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion determined that, “although the 1983 Constitution provides that this Court has general appellate jurisdiction in classes of cases in which a sentence of death ‘was imposed or could be imposed,’ ” Hart, 322 Ga. at 9, 917 S.E.2d 631, the Neal concurring opinion “concluded that this Court has jurisdiction of cases in every murder case, whether or not a sentence of death was ever sought or imposed,” which rendered the “was imposed” language of Paragraph III(8) “complete surplusage.” Id. The majority opinion thus concluded that “Thornton correctly held that a murder case in which the district attorney has not given timely notice to the defense that the State intends to seek the death penalty is not a case ‘in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed.’ ” Hart, 322 Ga. at 9, 917 S.E.2d 631 (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8)).

I disagreed with that conclusion in Hart, and I disagree with the similar conclusion reached in the concurring opinion today, see Concur. Op. at –––– – –––– (concluding that “the settled law of Georgia” is that “the Georgia Constitution does not vest direct appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases in this Court”) (citing Hart, 322 Ga. at 4–11, 917 S.E.2d 631), because I do not interpret the jurisdictional language of Paragraph III(8) this way. Here's why.

As articulated by Justice Bethel's concurring opinion in Garcia-Jarquin and emphasized in my concurring opinion in Hart, the 1983 Constitution “changed the jurisdictional definition of the crime (capital felonies) to the punishment (cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed).” Hart, 322 Ga. at 26, 917 S.E.2d 631 (LaGrua, J., concurring specially) (citing Garcia-Jarquin, 314 Ga. at 558, 878 S.E.2d 200; quotation marks omitted). Specifically, Paragraph III(8) of the 1983 Constitution delineates this Court's general appellate jurisdiction over a certain class of cases based on the “actual or possible punishment (as opposed to speaking in terms of the crime at issue),” and “it is the punishment of death, either in actuality (‘was imposed’) or possibility (‘could be imposed’), which is the trigger for our jurisdiction.” Id. at 26–27, 917 S.E.2d 631. “Capital felonies” include crimes other than murder, but United States Supreme Court precedent has limited the death penalty to murder such that the 1983 Constitution's change in the terms used makes clear that those crimes in which the death penalty could not be imposed would not be within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, consistent with its practice at the time. See OCGA § 17-10-30 (describing circumstances under which death penalty may be imposed for aircraft hijacking, treason, rape, armed robbery, and kidnapping); OCGA § 16-6-1 (death penalty for rape); OCGA § 16-8-41 (death penalty for armed robbery); OCGA § 16-5-40(d) (death penalty for kidnapping for ransom or with bodily injury); OCGA § 16-5-44 (death penalty for hijacking an aircraft). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (reversing imposition of death penalty for rape as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).

In prior cases where either a majority of the Court or one or two Justices questioned the meaning of Paragraph III(8)’s “could be imposed” language, they did not take into consideration that Paragraph III(8)’s change in language was intended to eliminate non-murder capital felonies from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, but instead, focused on the fact that “the district attorney ha[d] not given timely notice to the defense that the State intend[ed] to seek the death penalty.” Hart, 322 Ga. at 9, 917 S.E.2d 631. See also Weatherbed, 271 Ga. at 740–41, 524 S.E.2d 452 (Benham, C. J., concurring specially); Thornton, 253 Ga. at 524, 322 S.E.2d 711. However, I submit that we should not be focusing on whether the State provided proper notice, but instead on whether the death penalty “could be imposed” in the abstract for this class of case because, if so, our jurisdiction attaches. Id. at 27, 917 S.E.2d 631 (LaGrua, J., concurring specially).

Importantly, in giving this Court general appellate jurisdiction over the class of “cases in which a sentence of death ․ could be imposed,” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8), Paragraph III(8) said nothing about considering external factors, such as the requirement that the State give the defendant notice of its intent to seek the death penalty or other circumstances affecting whether the death penalty has been timely or properly sought. In fact, this Court promulgated the Unified Appeal Procedure to be followed in cases in which the death penalty is sought, including the rule requiring the prosecuting attorney to provide notice of the State's intent to seek the death penalty “during the first proceeding” and to prepare and file a “written notice of such intention” with the clerk of the superior court. See U.A.P. II(C)(1); OCGA § 17-10-36. Interpreting our constitutional jurisdiction through the lens of rules we enacted seems contrary to our ordinary practice. No one would question a murder defendant's constitutional right to have such notice, but I do not agree that we can narrow our appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution by promulgating rules. According to the plain language of Paragraph III(8), this class of cases is determined simply by assessing the theoretical punishments for the crime (i.e. the death penalty was in fact “imposed” or “could be imposed”), not by focusing on rule-created mechanisms, such as whether the State properly notified the defendant of its intent to seek the death penalty. As the Weatherbed Court made clear, murder “belongs to a class of case in which the death penalty can, under certain circumstances, be imposed,” and “[t]he fact that the State has chosen not to pursue the death penalty does not change the class of case to which it belongs.” Weatherbed, 271 Ga. at 738–39, 524 S.E.2d 452.

For these reasons, I submit that Paragraph III(8) gives this Court general appellate jurisdiction over all murder cases where the death penalty was or could be imposed, which may include murder cases in which the State ultimately elected not to seek the death penalty and the defendant was punished by a sentence of life imprisonment or life without the possibility of parole. And, in reaching this conclusion, I note that there are murder cases that fall outside the ambit of our general appellate jurisdiction and over which we can only exercise jurisdiction pursuant to our certiorari jurisdiction. See e.g., OCGA § 16-5-1(e)(2) (providing that “[a] person convicted of the offense of murder in the second degree” shall not be eligible for the death penalty but “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30 years.”); OCGA § 17-10-30 (providing the offenses for which the death penalty may be imposed); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the death penalty for defendants who were under 18 years of age when the murder was committed); Raines v. State, 309 Ga. 258, 263, 845 S.E.2d 613 (2020) (noting that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for juveniles”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V (providing for this Court's jurisdiction to “review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance”). In short, while the “entire class of cases,” Concur. Op. at ––––, largely drives my conclusion that we have direct jurisdictional authority over most murder appeals, I recognize there are and will be murder cases where the death penalty cannot legally be imposed, and in such cases, our jurisdiction is limited to certiorari review.

2. Notwithstanding my position, I recognize that the majority's decision in Hart is binding precedent, and we must follow it. However, I strongly believe that we should nevertheless continue to exercise jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder appeals under “our longstanding and almost-unlimited certiorari jurisdiction.” Murray, 286 Ga. at 266, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., concurring). See also Hart, 322 Ga. at 10–11, 917 S.E.2d 631. The Georgia Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V. As Justice Nahmias noted in his dissenting opinion in Murray,

Murder cases are by their nature “of gravity [and] great public importance.” Thus, this Court might grant review on certiorari in many or even most murder cases if they went first to the Court of Appeals for decision, and it serves the interests of judicial economy and of seeking finality in murder judgments to skip that intermediate review.

Murray, 286 Ga. at 270–71, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., dissenting) (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V).

In my view, little has changed since 2009 when Murray was issued—certainly nothing that would minimize the “gravity” and “great public importance” of murder cases or alter Justice Nahmias's assessment that “the interests of judicial economy and of seeking finality in murder judgments” are served by “skip[ping] ․ intermediate review” in the Court of Appeals and directly reviewing those judgments in this Court. Murray, 286 Ga. at 270–71, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., dissenting). As observed in my special concurrence in Hart, “if we truly believe that murder is the most heinous crime one can commit in our society, it is perfectly reasonable and appropriate that the State's highest court be charged with considering appeals in those cases.” Hart, 322 Ga. at 29–30, 917 S.E.2d 631 (LaGrua, J., specially concurring) (cleaned up). This is so because, regardless of whether a defendant has already been convicted of murder and sentenced to death or to spending the remaining years of his or her life in prison or whether a defendant is still potentially facing the death penalty or life imprisonment, the significance of the crime and its impact—on the victims’ families, defendants, defendants’ families, the general public, our court system, prosecutors, and criminal defense attorneys—demand our review. I believe that these are the policy reasons supporting the Thornton Court's transfer order, and they are as applicable today as they were 40 years ago.

3. Today, the other concurring opinion announces that, after temporarily maintaining the “status quo” in Hart, non-death-penalty murder appeals will begin docketing in the Court of Appeals in July of next year. Concur. Op. at ––––. However, the other concurring opinion does not address why non-death-penalty murder appeals no longer have sufficient gravity or great public importance for this Court to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction. Instead, relying largely on policy considerations, the other concurring opinion explains that returning this jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is, essentially, more efficient, creates less precedent, and still leaves this Court with one of the “heaviest [caseloads] in the country.” Id. at ––––. I cannot endorse the other concurring opinion's approach for several reasons.

First, with respect to our efficiency as a Court, I recognize that the volume of murder appeals we review each year is sizeable and occupies a significant amount of our time—time that we must also spend on administrative responsibilities and other appeals— but I believe our Court has nevertheless consistently given all our duties the time and energy they deserve, even when reviewing cases that may not fall under our exclusive jurisdiction. I believe that this time has been well-spent on reviewing non-death-penalty murder appeals, rather than on our other responsibilities, which despite our caseload have been met with diligence. Moreover, once non-death-penalty murder appeals are docketed in the Court of Appeals, as opposed to our Court, our caseload will be cut by more than half—if a docket review of the past few years is any guide. And, notably, over the past 15 years—well before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic—we docketed remarkably few direct death penalty appeals—on average, less than two a year—reflecting that these cases did not add significantly to the overall volume of direct appeals reviewed by this Court and are unlikely to do so in the future.

Additionally, I am not so confident that the Court of Appeals can easily absorb jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder appeals, and I am concerned about the potentially heavier burden upon its Judges, staff attorneys, support staff, and Clerk's Office as was contemplated by Justice Nahmias's dissenting opinion in Murray, where he noted that, “given the current structure of Georgia's appellate system, it was and is not unreasonable for this Court to take the burden of reviewing murder cases from the Court of Appeals.” Murray, 286 Ga. at 271, 687 S.E.2d 790 (Nahmias, J., dissenting). Taking “the burden of reviewing murder cases from the Court of Appeals,” id., is arguably even more critical today given the changes to the Court of Appeals’ jurisdictional authority, changes which were made for the purpose of enhancing our efficiency and the administration of justice.⁵

With the enactment of OCGA § 15-3-3.1 in 2016, jurisdiction in five categories of cases shifted from this Court to the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court of Appeals now has general appellate jurisdiction in the following classes of cases that were formerly heard by this Court: (1) “Cases involving title to land”; (2) “All equity cases, except those cases concerning proceedings in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed and those cases concerning the execution of a sentence of death”; (3) “All cases involving wills”; (4) “All cases involving extraordinary remedies, except those cases concerning proceedings in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed and those cases concerning the execution of a sentence of death”; and (5) “All divorce and alimony cases.” Id.⁶

Despite these changes, the other concurring opinion suggests that the Court of Appeals would be far more efficient in “resolving murder appeals that present ordinary legal issues” because of this Court's “limited judicial resources”; the manner in which we review such cases; and the other “core tasks assigned to this Court by the Constitution and the General Assembly,” Concur. Op. at ––––, all of which existed when the General Assembly used constitutional authority to ease some of our judicial burden ten years ago. And I continue to believe that exercising our appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder appeals is a burden the State's highest court should bear and that placing this burden on the Court of Appeals will increase their workload—a workload that already increased in 2016 when the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 15-3-3.1.⁷

Thus, while the jurisdictional question is undoubtedly a legal and constitutional question we alone can decide, I agree with the concurring opinion in Garcia-Jarquin, where Justice Bethel said:

I am mindful that following the clear language of the 1983 Constitution with respect to direct appeals would have a significant practical impact on the operations of this Court and the Court of Appeals. Responsible resource stewardship would almost certainly require an analysis of the impact on the Court of Appeals. That question and whether any net taxpayer savings could be realized should be a matter of discussion with the Court of Appeals and the General Assembly.

314 Ga. at 565, 878 S.E.2d 200 (Bethel, J., concurring).

Certainly, as to timelines and resources, if a consensus cannot be reached, we will ultimately have to make the final decision and move forward. In the meantime, however, because this Court has been exercising murder jurisdiction since our inception, I would prefer to have discussions with the Court of Appeals and the General Assembly about the transition and implementation before announcing a specific date.⁸

The other concurring opinion also notes that giving jurisdiction of non-death-penalty murder appeals to the Court of Appeals will address the creation of too much precedent from our Court in murder cases ⁹ and further opines that, despite this jurisdictional shift, we “will remain among the busiest highest courts in the country.” Concur. Op. at ––––. I do not find these policy reasons to be compelling enough to warrant this transfer of jurisdiction.

As to precedent, the other concurring opinion explains that, because of the “sheer number of binding murder opinions we publish every year,” we risk making mistakes; we create voluminous and “unwieldy” precedent that is “problematic for both lawyers and judges”; and we are prevented from “limiting our review to well-presented issues in cases that cleanly and squarely present and allow us to decide the important legal issues in question” through certiorari review. Concur. Op. at –––– – ––––.

As an initial matter, I struggle to grasp the meaning of “too much precedent,” and while the other concurring opinion indicates that lawyers and judges “find it impossible to read the vast number of opinions we issue every year” in murder cases, Concur. Op. at ––––, I submit that the problem lies not in the issuance of too many decisions, but rather, in their length. Over the past ten years, our opinions have gradually gotten longer and longer, and in murder appeals specifically, we often explain every step in our analysis, even when a succinct analysis would suffice to address questions governed by existing law. While thorough analysis is important in offering guidance to litigants, attorneys, and lower courts, to the extent there is an issue with the amount of precedent, the first solution ought to be shortening murder appeal opinions rather than shifting jurisdiction.

I am also concerned that shifting our appellate jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder cases to the Court of Appeals—a court consisting of 15 judges who sit in three-judge panels—will result in more binding precedent for trial courts, not less, and potentially inconsistent rulings on important legal issues. And, regardless of whether the decisions of the Court of Appeals are published binding precedent or not, trial courts and trial lawyers will still rely on the rationale of their decisions when ruling on or arguing the issues presented in currently-pending cases.¹⁰ And, while the other concurring opinion suggests we can “correct important mistakes by granting certiorari” in non-death-penalty murder cases, emphasizing there would likely be “fewer errors” if there were “two levels of review,” Concur. Op. at –––– – ––––. I note that, historically, we have not granted certiorari review in many criminal cases, but I hope that would change for murder cases after this transfer takes effect.¹¹

In that vein, very troubling is the reality that criminal defendants—whether convicted of murder or otherwise—do not currently have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel when filing petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court, as that right extends only through prosecution of a direct appeal. See Paino v. State, 263 Ga. 331, 435 S.E.2d 24 (1993). See also Wooten v. State, 245 Ga. 724, 266 S.E.2d 927 (1980) (holding that appointed counsel has no duty to apply for certiorari after a criminal conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, absent a superior court order); Strozier v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 597, 216 S.E.2d 847 (1975) (noting that a criminal defense attorney's duties are discharged when the right of review by direct appeal is completed); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (concluding that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel for discretionary state appeals); OCGA § 17-12-23(a)(4) (providing that the circuit public defender shall provide representation to an indigent criminal defendant in any “direct appeal” of a criminal proceeding, without extending that right to discretionary certiorari review). Given the current lack of a right to appointed counsel when filing petitions for certiorari, I am not persuaded that we will correct “important mistakes” on cert when those mistakes are raised by pro se defendants.

In summary, I recognize that this bench works extremely hard on every case we consider, but I do not consider the fact that murder appeals add significantly to our workload to be an influence in deciding whether non-death-penalty murder appeals have gravity.

So, if policy considerations are what moves the needle in terms of determining whether this Court should keep jurisdiction over non-death-penalty murder appeals, I submit that the gravity of non-death-penalty murder appeals far outweighs any policy reasons in favor of delegating them elsewhere. For decades, this Court has determined that non-death-penalty murder cases deserve our attention as a matter of gravity and policy. I see no reason to depart from that course now.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mune-ath was killed on February 27, 2019. In May 2019, a Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment charging Coleman with malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2–3), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 4), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). At a December 2021 trial, the jury found Coleman guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Coleman to life in prison on Count 1 and consecutive five-year sentences in prison on Counts 5 and 6. The remaining counts were either vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Coleman timely filed a motion for new trial, which he amended, and the trial court denied it on December 10, 2024, following a hearing. Coleman timely filed a notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   This is not to say that the defendant necessarily has the burden to produce additional evidence beyond that contained in the trial record.

1.   Regarding the requirement to provide notice of the State's intent to seek the death penalty, the other concurrence notes that this Court promulgated that rule, and “do[es] not agree that we can narrow our appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution by promulgating rules.” See also U.A.P. II(C)(1). But our constitutional jurisdiction is what the Constitution makes it, and many rules — both statutory and court-made — nevertheless affect how that jurisdiction applies in particular cases. And we did not promulgate the UAP of our own accord; rather, we promulgated that rule in obedience to the General Assembly. See OCGA § 17-10-36(a) (“[t]he Supreme Court of Georgia shall establish, by rules, a new unified review procedure” for death penalty cases).

2.   Prudent regard for the Code of Judicial Conduct impairs our ability to provide publicly such detailed notice by means other than an opinion like this.

3.   I focus on this date range throughout this opinion because I later compare our published opinion count to that of other state high courts, and 2025 data for other states was not yet fully and readily available at the time of my research.

4.   In calendar year 2025, our respective total caseloads increased to 1603 and 3311.

5.   This number does not include the rare Court of Appeals cases that warrant en banc consideration.

6.   The other concurrence highlights the gravity of murder appeals and argues that our review by certiorari is warranted. And of course all of these murder appeals are important, as are the other cases the Court of Appeals decides every day, including those involving rape, child molestation, armed robbery, voluntary manslaughter, child custody, and termination of parental rights, among many others. And many murder cases do present issues of gravity appropriate for our review by certiorari, depending on how the Court of Appeals decides them. But this is the standard for granting review after the Court of Appeals has first decided it, not a reason to skip the Court of Appeals in the first instance. And that first review by the Court of Appeals is crucial, as illustrated by the fact that granting certiorari-before-judgment (as we have done in every non-death-penalty murder case since 1983) is something we almost never do in any other context. Indeed, the significance of these murder appeals makes initial review by the Court of Appeals important. Providing two levels of review when necessary increases the likelihood of getting those cases right.The other concurrence also raises concerns about criminal defendants having no constitutional right to appointed counsel when filing petitions for certiorari in our Court. That is a correct statement of the law as far as it goes, but there is of course no legal obligation on any counsel (appointed or otherwise) to file a petition for certiorari after losing in the Court of Appeals; our standard for granting certiorari is demanding, most Court of Appeals decisions are correct and so do not leave any cert-worthy issues present, and counsel can be sanctioned for filing a frivolous petition for certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 7. See also Sup. Ct. R. 40(2) (providing that seeking certiorari is not a necessary precondition for exhausting state remedies). Even so, each year we receive well over 100 petitions for certiorari in criminal cases, and a considerable number of those are filed by appointed counsel. The practice of appointed counsel filing petitions for certiorari when appropriate is an important part of our system working properly, and we fully expect it to continue.

7.   We would still have jurisdiction over some non-death-penalty murder cases, just on other grounds. See, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1) (appeals in constitutional question cases).

8.   To be clear, we will not initiate a wholesale transfer to the Court of Appeals of all direct appeals in non-death-penalty murder cases pending in our Court as of July 1, 2027. Instead, the order will direct all direct appeals in non-death-penalty murder cases docketed after July 1, 2027, to be docketed in the Court of Appeals, rather than our Court. This means that, because of the two-term rule, we will still be deciding almost all murder appeals until early 2028.

1.   I recognize that the majority's decision in Hart is binding precedent. I summarize my reasons for disagreeing with that decision in order to address in a single writing the legal issues raised in Hart and the policy concerns raised in the Chief Justice's concurrence.

2.   As noted in my concurring opinion in Hart, “[t]here has been no debate among members of this Court with respect to the ‘was imposed’ subclass of cases within Paragraph III(8),” and we have understood that language to mandate direct appellate jurisdiction in this Court over all cases where “the penalty of death has actually been imposed as a result of [a] conviction.” Hart, 322 Ga. at 27 n.21, 917 S.E.2d 631 (LaGrua, J., concurring specially).

3.   Our Court's records reflect that between July 1, 1983, when the 1983 Constitution became effective, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. VI, and the issuance of Thornton in November 1984, the Court docketed and resolved 40 appeals of murder convictions in which the death penalty was not imposed with nary a doubt uttered about our jurisdiction.

4.   These committee minutes reflect that the then-Chief Justice of this Court and the then-Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals expressly agreed that this Court would continue to have appellate jurisdiction of cases where the defendant was convicted of murder, whether sentenced to death or life imprisonment. See Neal, 290 Ga. at 571, 722 S.E.2d 765 (quoting dialogue among Chief Justice Jordan, Chief Judge Quillian, Governor Busbee, and House Speaker Murphy). While the Hart majority chided the Neal concurrence for its reliance on the committee minutes, I view them not as mere expressions of an individual legislator's “intent” but as providing valuable insight into the framer's views of the Constitution they were preparing for the people to vote upon, as well as this Court's understanding of the jurisdictional provision of the proposed Constitution.

5.   In October 2015, a Georgia Appellate Jurisdiction Review Commission (the “Commission”) was created by then-Governor Nathan Deal to “review the current jurisdictional boundaries of our appellate courts and make assessments about modernizing those courts for efficiencies and to achieve best practices in the administration of justice.” See Creating the Appellate Jurisdiction Review Commission, https://nathandeal.georgia.gov/executive-orders/2015/ (Oct. 1, 2015; last accessed July 22, 2026). The Commission consisted of Justices from the Supreme Court, Judges from the Court of Appeals, members of the General Assembly, civil attorneys, and the executive directors of the Prosecuting Attorneys Council of Georgia and the Georgia Public Defender Council. When the Commission issued its final report in January 2016, it recommended reducing the classes of cases over which the Supreme Court had general appellate jurisdiction under Paragraph III of the 1983 Constitution and shifting that general appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals. See Report of the Georgia Appellate Jurisdiction Review Commission, https://gov.georgia.gov/ (Jan. 2016). The General Assembly adopted the Commission's recommendation and enacted OCGA § 15-3-3.1, which went into effect on January 1, 2017.

6.   Additionally, in 2016, the number of Justices on the Supreme Court increased from seven Justices to nine Justices. See Ga. L. 2016 883, 890. See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. I (“The Supreme Court shall consist of not more than nine Justices[.]”); OCGA § 15-2-1.1 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of nine Justices.”). The number of Judges on the Court of Appeals was also increased from 12 Judges to 15 Judges by a statute passed in 2015. See OCGA § 15-3-1(a) (“The Court of Appeals shall consist of 15 Judges[.]”).

7.   However, I have no doubt the Court of Appeals is well-equipped to handle the complexity and serious nature of these cases.

8.   Moreover, a new governor and many new legislators will take office in January 2027, which will undoubtedly create a significant amount of turnover in our executive and legislative branches.

9.   The other concurring opinion says that, between 2018 and 2025, we issued 20 opinions which were either overruling or disapproving of prior cases, and 13 (or 65%) of those were murder appeals. Concur. Op. at ––––. However, we considered approximately 1,290 murder appeals during that same timeframe, so the percentage of those opinions in which we overruled or disapproved of prior cases was actually quite small—roughly 1%.

10.   The fact that a decision is not to be officially reported may send a message that the issues addressed in that appeal are so well-settled that a published decision is unnecessary. See Ga. App. Ct. R. 33.2(b) (under current Court of Appeals Rule 33.2, decisions issued by a three-judge panel in which a majority of the judges fully concur in the rationale and judgment are binding precedent, but unpublished decisions are not binding precedent). But see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. 5, Par. III (“The decisions of the Court of Appeals insofar as not in conflict with those of the Supreme Court shall bind all courts except the Supreme Court as precedents.”). See also Ga. App. Ct. R. 34, 36.

11.   By way of example, since our general appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ll divorce and alimony cases,” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(6), shifted to the Court of Appeals in 2016, see OCGA § 15-3-3.1(5), we have not granted any petitions for writ of certiorari in cases involving divorce or alimony. During that timeframe, we have only issued decisions in a handful of granted cert cases that arguably involve domestic-relations issues, including termination of parental rights, dependency, legitimation, and/or child custody. See In the Interest of M. R. S., 321 Ga. 521, 915 S.E.2d 630 (2025); Mathenia v. Brumbelow, 308 Ga. 714, 843 S.E.2d 582 (2020); Plummer v. Plummer, 305 Ga. 23, 823 S.E.2d 258 (2019); In the Interest of I. L. M., 304 Ga. 114, 816 S.E.2d 620 (2018); In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 788 S.E.2d 416 (2016).

Peterson, Chief Justice.

All the Justices concur.