ALLEN v. STATE (2026)

Daniel Lee Allen was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Dwayne Louder.¹ On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Allen's prior involvement with drugs, that the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Allen was arrested for Louder's murder in New York, and that the trial court violated Allen's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by forcing him to proceed with second-chair counsel for part of his trial after his lead counsel became ill.

Those claims of error fail. The evidence of Allen's prior drug use was admissible under the old Evidence Code because it was relevant to his motive to commit the charged crimes. Any error in allowing evidence that Allen was arrested in New York was harmless because it is highly probable that it did not contribute to the verdict. And Allen's representation by competent second-chair counsel for the last few days of trial did not violate his right to counsel. So his convictions are affirmed.²

1. The evidence at trial showed the following.

On the afternoon of January 2, 2010, Allen and four others, Sade Davidson, Toray Porter, Kelly Stephens, and Arthur Barrett, made a plan to rob Louder, a drug dealer. Allen needed money, as he had told an acquaintance a few days earlier.

All four of Allen's companions testified at trial and told substantially the same story. The plan got underway when Porter called Louder and arranged to meet him at a home in LaGrange, supposedly to buy some drugs. Allen and the rest of the group drove to the meeting place in Davidson's car. Davidson stayed in the car while the other four went into the home. When Louder arrived and parked, Allen, Porter, Stephens, and Barrett came out of the home. One of them, either Allen or Porter, pulled a gun on Louder and forced him into the back seat of his car. Porter, Stephens, and Barrett then got into Louder's car, and Allen got into Davidson's car.

The group left to go to Louder's home. Stephens drove Louder's car, with Louder, Porter, and Barrett in the passenger seats. Davidson followed in her car with Allen. According to Davidson, she refused to go at first, but after Allen pulled out a gun, she went along. As they drove, Allen used Davidson's cell phone to call Porter. Allen told Porter to ask Louder “who was all in his house.” After hanging up, Allen said he would “probably kill the baby's mama and the little girl.”

The two cars arrived at Louder's home. Allen, Porter, Stephens, and Barrett brought Louder into his home at gunpoint. Inside were Louder's girlfriend, Shakina, and their eight-year-old daughter, N.L. Louder told Shakina, “Baby, do what they say. We are being robbed.” The intruders threatened Louder, “If you keep playing with us, we're going to off somebody. Somebody is going to die here if you keep playing with us.” Louder told the men where to find his money and possessions. When the defendants had taken what they wanted — including drugs, money, and a TV — they tied Louder's hands behind his back and tied up Shakina and N.L. on the floor in a “hog-tie position.” They told Shakina that she would “see [her] boyfriend again tonight” if she did not call the police. Then the group left, taking Louder with them.

The two cars left Louder's home, with Stephens driving Louder's car, accompanied by Allen, Porter, and Louder, with Davidson following in the other car with Barrett. The defendants in the two cars were in phone contact during this drive, and they talked about whether to kill Louder.

Eventually, the cars pulled off of a dark road into a field. Stephens and Porter got out of Louder's car and ran to Davidson's car. Behind them, Allen got out of Louder's car, stood at the open back door, and shot Louder as he lay in the back seat. Then Allen came to Davidson's car, “swapped guns,” and went back and “shot the guy some more,” saying he had to “make sure he was dead.” As the group left the murder scene, Allen told Porter to “get rid of the gun.” And he told the others, “If y'all say something, we're all going to go down for murder.”

Louder's body was found the next day in the back seat of his car, dead of multiple gunshot wounds. The GBI determined that the projectiles and spent cartridge casings recovered from the scene had been fired from at least two different guns.

Right after the killing, the defendants returned to Stephens's home and divided up the stolen drugs and money. Then Allen and some of the co-defendants went to another location so that Allen could buy some crack cocaine, which Allen promptly snorted. The next night, Allen called his girlfriend and told her that “[h]e wasn't going to be able to see [her] anymore” because “everything went wrong.”

2. Allen claims that the trial court should have excluded evidence of his prior involvement with drugs. We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Smith v. State, 322 Ga. 881, 883, 922 S.E.2d 406 (2025).

At trial, the State called two of Louder's friends, Shamarcus Owens and Borvius Slaton, to testify that they, Louder, and two other men were involved in selling cocaine and that they earned tens of thousands of dollars doing so. Owens was called first. Early in Owens's testimony, Allen asked for the jury to be excused. He then objected that Owens and Slaton would testify that they had sold crack cocaine to Allen in the past, which, in Allen's view, was more prejudicial than probative and was impermissible character evidence. The State responded that the relationship between Louder and Allen — that of drug dealer and drug buyer — was “completely relevant to this case” because “the motive is drugs and money.”

The court overruled Allen's objection. When the jury was brought back in, both Owens and Slaton testified that they had seen Allen buy crack cocaine from Louder at some unspecified point in the past. Slaton also testified that, on the evening that Louder was killed, Louder came into Slaton's home, “grabbed some crack” from on top of the TV, and left, saying he would be right back.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Allen's objection to this evidence. Because Allen was tried in 2012, his trial was governed by the old Evidence Code. See Bradford v. State, 323 Ga. 675, 680 n.8, 926 S.E.2d 579 (2026). And under the old Code, evidence of a defendant's involvement with drugs was admissible to show motive as long as the State could show a connection between the drug use and the defendant's reason for killing the victim.³ See Cook v. State, 274 Ga. 891, 896, 561 S.E.2d 407 (2002). The State established that connection here: Allen used crack cocaine; he told an acquaintance a few days before the killing that he needed money; he knew Louder was a drug dealer who was likely to have both money and crack cocaine; and right after the murder he used money he had stolen from Louder to buy crack cocaine. Together, that evidence allowed the jury to infer that Allen robbed Louder to get money to buy drugs. That's just the sort of motive connected to a defendant's involvement with drugs that supported the admission of such evidence under the old Evidence Code. See Desire v. State, 295 Ga. 254, 255–56, 759 S.E.2d 498 (2014) (evidence of defendant's drug use was relevant to support State's theory that defendant “attacked the victim in order to steal money from him,” where evidence showed that defendant was asking people for money on the day of the crimes and that he went to a friend's house to buy drugs after the crimes); Thornton v. State, 292 Ga. 87, 88, 734 S.E.2d 393 (2012) (“Evidence of Thornton's prior illegal drug use and drug dealing was properly admitted to show his motive to rob a home where he believed illegal drugs and money would be found.”). And although Allen was charged with kidnapping and killing Louder, not robbing him, his motive to rob Louder was still relevant, because the evidence authorized the jury to find that the kidnapping and murder were part of, and grew out of, the robbery. See Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 68, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005) (evidence of defendant's drug use was relevant to show motive because the victim was killed while Young was robbing him, and the evidence showed that Young was committing the robbery to get money to buy drugs).

Allen protests that the State brought in the drug evidence “solely to impugn his character” and that the evidence's “minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect.” But even if the drug evidence did cast Allen's character in a bad light, it was also relevant to his motive to rob Louder, which in turn was relevant to the question of whether Allen kidnapped and killed Louder as part of a robbery. The evidence was therefore admissible for that purpose even if it incidentally placed Allen's character in issue. See Thomas v. State, 274 Ga. 156, 161–62, 549 S.E.2d 359 (2001). And the trial court had discretion here to conclude that the evidence's relevance outweighed any prejudicial effect. See Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 872, 883 n.10, 874 S.E.2d 73 (2022) (under the old Evidence Code, a trial court was required to “balance the probative value of evidence with its prejudicial effect”). That is, the jury was not likely to find Allen guilty of murder and kidnapping because he used drugs, rather than because of the evidence in the case against him. Cf. Flakes v. State, 323 Ga. 477, 487, 926 S.E.2d 53 (2026) (explaining, under the new Evidence Code, that “the danger of unfair prejudice arises when evidence has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one”) (quotation marks omitted). The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence.

3. Allen claims that the trial court should not have let the State tell the jury that he was arrested for Louder's murder in New York. In Allen's view, that fact was prejudicial and not relevant because there was no evidence that he went to New York to escape accountability.

Evidence at trial showed that Allen was originally from New York and that he moved to Georgia about four years before Louder was killed. The record also shows that Allen was in New York when he was arrested in connection with Louder's killing, several weeks after the murder.

Before trial, Allen moved in limine to exclude any evidence of his arrest in New York and extradition back to Georgia. The State argued in response that the fact that Allen left the state was admissible as evidence of flight. The trial court expressed doubt that there was evidence of flight, but it ruled that the State could introduce evidence that Allen was arrested in New York, although not that he was extradited back to Georgia. Ultimately, Allen and the State agreed to a stipulation that Allen was brought back to Georgia from New York on February 17, 2011. (Allen made clear that he was not waiving his objection to the evidence, but that, in light of the court's ruling that the evidence was admissible, he preferred that it come in by stipulation.) The State then presented that stipulation to the jury. And the State referred to the stipulation in its closing argument, saying that it showed Allen was “connected to” the murder. The State argued: “And guess what he did? He went to New York. He left. He wasn't going to stick around here. And where did we get him back from? New York.”

Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present the stipulation, the error was harmless. A non-constitutional evidentiary error is harmless if it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Scott v. State, 323 Ga. 312, 316–17, 925 S.E.2d 124 (2026). When we assess whether an error was harmless, we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors would. See id. at 316, 925 S.E.2d 124. Applying that standard here, it is highly probable that the mention of Allen's arrest in New York did not contribute to the verdict. First, the evidence of Allen's guilt was quite strong. All four of his co-defendants testified that he shot and killed Louder. Their stories were largely consistent with each other, and they were corroborated at least in part by other evidence, including the testimony of Shakina and the ballistics report. And Allen's own statements before and after the murder — telling an acquaintance beforehand that he needed money, and telling his girlfriend afterward that he “wasn't going to be able to see [her] anymore” because “everything went wrong” — also point to his guilt. By contrast, the fact that Allen was arrested in New York was not likely to carry much weight with the jury. The jury was told that Allen had spent most of his life in New York, so it was not remarkable that he might visit there; and he was arrested there more than six weeks after the murder, which hardly proves that he fled immediately to avoid accountability (even if the State did suggest as much during its closing). Put simply, Allen's New York arrest was of negligible import compared to the evidence of his guilt, and so it was highly probable that evidence of the arrest did not contribute to the verdict. See Samuels v. State, 323 Ga. 629, 636, 926 S.E.2d 648 (2026) (evidence of the defendant's alleged drug dealing, which may have been admitted in error, was harmless where the evidence of guilt was “strong” and the drug-dealing evidence was “not unusually inflammatory”) (quotation marks omitted); Smith, 322 Ga. at 884–85, 922 S.E.2d 406 (evidence that the defendant's driver's license was suspended, which may have been admitted in error, was harmless where the evidence of guilt was “compelling” and the suspended license “played a minor role in the State's case”) (cleaned up); Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 762–63, 922 S.E.2d 56 (2025) (expert testimony that may have been admitted in error was harmless where the evidence of guilt was “quite strong” and the expert testimony was “not especially prejudicial” because it concerned only general principles about domestic violence and was not specific to the case).

4. Finally, Allen claims that the trial court violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, after Allen's lead counsel got sick, the court did not declare a mistrial or continue the trial for long enough to allow lead counsel to recover, but instead forced Allen to proceed with his second-chair counsel for the rest of the trial. The claim that the trial court should have declared a mistrial is not preserved for our review because Allen did not move for a mistrial in the trial court. See Smith v. State, 323 Ga. 246, 253, 925 S.E.2d 113 (2026). A trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Foster v. State, 322 Ga. 425, 431, 920 S.E.2d 90 (2025).

Late on the fourth day of trial, a Thursday, Allen's lead counsel, Allen Adams, asked to be excused from the courtroom because he was “getting sick.” Adams eventually went to the emergency room and was not able to continue with trial. On Friday morning, the trial court announced that the trial would be continued until Monday so that Adams's co-counsel, Monica Hamlett, could “make sure she's up to speed on everything.”

On Monday morning, Allen said that he would prefer to have Adams continue to represent him “because that's who I started with.” He said that while Hamlett might be qualified, she had been on the case for only two or three months and did not have the same knowledge as Adams. However, Allen said that if it was not possible to continue with Adams, then “I guess we'll move on.” And when the trial court explained that it was not possible to continue with Adams, and that Hamlett was “qualified” and “ready to step in if need be,” Allen said, “I'm ready.”

Under these circumstances, assuming that the trial court did indeed deny a continuance and that Allen preserved that issue for appeal, the denial did not deprive Allen of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee an indigent defendant the appointed counsel of his choice, only an “effective advocate.” See McCullough v. State, 304 Ga. 290, 296, 818 S.E.2d 520 (2018) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)) (quotation marks omitted). That guarantee was satisfied here. Allen was represented for the last few days of the trial by Hamlett, a lawyer who had been on the case for months and had second-chaired the trial to that point. Allen makes no claim — and did not argue at trial — that Hamlett was ineffective or not prepared to take over. Instead, he focuses on the relationship that he had with his original counsel, Adams, and he contends that once counsel has been appointed, a defendant has the right under the Sixth Amendment to keep the same lawyer to preserve that relationship. But Allen does not support that contention with any authority, and in fact the relevant authority precludes his claim: “[I]n evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (quotation marks omitted). At bottom, Allen was represented throughout his trial by competent counsel, which satisfies the “essential aim” of the Sixth Amendment. See id.

Apart from constitutional issues, a trial court may abuse its discretion by denying an indigent defendant the right to his counsel of choice when the defendant's choice is supported by “objective considerations” and there are no “countervailing considerations” of comparable weight. See Foster, 322 Ga. at 432, 920 S.E.2d 90 (quotation marks omitted). But there were countervailing considerations here: Adams was not available, Hamlett was available and ready, and the court had an interest in continuing the trial rather than postponing it indefinitely. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to postpone the trial until Adams could return. See id. (no abuse of discretion in ordering defendant to proceed with appointed counsel when defendant suggested only that counsel “may not have had enough time to prepare for trial” and defendant did not specify another counsel of choice). Compare Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 222, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991) (trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to appoint counsel of his choice in a death penalty case where chosen counsel was already familiar with the case, “which [was] both legally and factually complex,” and had a longstanding relationship with the defendant, and the only countervailing considerations were that counsel had a “record of antagonizing the Court,” the federal courts have a policy of not appointing previously retained counsel, and another experienced lawyer had agreed to handle the case).

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louder was killed on January 2, 2010. On March 12, 2010, a Troup County grand jury indicted Allen and four co-defendants, Sade Davidson, Toray Porter, Kelly Stephens, and Arthur Barrett, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on kidnapping (Count 2), and kidnapping with bodily injury (Count 3). Porter alone was also indicted for possession of contraband by an inmate (Count 4). The four co-defendants all pleaded guilty to lesser charges, and their cases are not part of this appeal. Allen pleaded not guilty and was tried alone before a jury from August 22 to 28, 2012. He was found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Allen to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and life in prison for kidnapping with bodily injury, to run consecutively. The felony-murder count merged for sentencing. Allen filed a timely motion for new trial on September 14, 2012, which he amended through new counsel on October 29, 2019, and amended for a second time, through different appellate counsel, on October 10, 2023. The parties consented to have the motion decided without a hearing, and the trial court denied the motion on July 21, 2025. The court then entered an amended order two days later, on July 23, 2025. Allen filed a timely notice of appeal. His case was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   After Allen was convicted, almost 13 years passed before his motion for new trial was resolved. There is no excuse for that long delay, particularly because no hearing was held. As we have said before, “these extended and unjustified delays in resolving criminal cases make our State's criminal justice system appear unfair and grossly inefficient.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 259, 811 S.E.2d 420 (2018). See also Sturkey v. State, 319 Ga. 156, 164, 902 S.E.2d 607 (2024) (collecting examples of long delays between conviction and appeal). It is the duty of everyone involved in the criminal justice system, including trial courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and defendants, to make sure that post-conviction motions are “filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” See Sturkey, 319 Ga. at 164–65, 902 S.E.2d 607 (citing Owens, 303 Ga. at 258, 811 S.E.2d 420).

3.   That rule has changed under the new Evidence Code. Under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (Rule 404(b)) of the current Evidence Code, evidence of a defendant's uncharged “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is not admissible “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith,” but it may be admissible for “other purposes,” including “proof of motive,” if it meets the requirements of Rule 404(b) and is not otherwise subject to exclusion under OCGA § 24-4-403. See Lee v. State, 322 Ga. 44, 52, 917 S.E.2d 683 (2025). Applying these provisions, we have explained that when other-acts evidence is offered as proof of the defendant's motive, the State must show a “specific logical link” between the alleged motive — i.e., “the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent” — and the alleged crimes. See Harris v. State, 321 Ga. 87, 98, 913 S.E.2d 570 (2025) (quotation marks omitted).

Pinson, Justice.

All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.