MILLER v. STATE (2026)

Ronnie Miller appeals his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Tesfaye Birru.¹ Miller contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that he argues was seized without probable cause as a result of misrepresentations or false statements made by the police in multiple warrant affidavits. He also contends that the trial court's order allowing a substitute expert witness to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution to confront witnesses against him. For the reasons below, we vacate the judgment of the trial court as to the denial of the motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we vacate and remand on the motion to suppress issue, we do not reach Miller's other enumeration regarding expert witness testimony.

1. Facts

The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On February 19, 2020, Birru owned the “Tic Toc” convenience store in DeKalb County. Around 10:00 p.m. while Birru was attempting to lock the store for the night, a masked assailant ambushed Birru and shot him. As Birru was lying on the ground, a second assailant approached and shot him once in the head before the assailants fled.

Surveillance footage from the Tic Toc convenience store, a nearby Citgo gas station, and a Microtel hotel situated behind Tic Toc showed the assailants’ movements prior to, and immediately after, the shooting and depicted the following. At 9:36 p.m., a red sedan pulled up to a pump at the Citgo gas station before pulling out and heading in the direction of Tic Toc. At 9:40 p.m., in much grainier video footage, a vehicle pulled into the entrance of the Microtel with its lights off and backed into a parking space, with the front of the car pointed in the direction of Tic Toc. At 9:58 p.m., the first assailant emerged from the car parked in the Microtel parking lot and ran across the lot toward Tic Toc. Seconds later, two more people exited the same car and began walking toward the store before one can be seen suddenly running toward the store.

The first assailant — wearing a camouflage jacket with a hoodie underneath, dark pants, black and blue shoes, and gloves in his back pocket — approached the store, “creeping” around the left corner of the building to hide behind the ice machine next to the store's entrance. When Birru exited his store and began to lock the door, the first assailant emerged from behind the ice machine and shot Birru. That assailant then ran behind the convenience store in the direction of the Microtel. Moments later, as Birru lay on the ground, a second assailant — wearing a gray hoodie, dark pants, and red shoes — approached from the left corner of the building and fired one shot into Birru's head before running back in the direction of the Microtel. About one minute after the assailants were first seen emerging from the car in the Microtel parking lot, two assailants ran back toward the parked car at the Microtel, and a few seconds later, the third person from the car — who never made it over to the store or near the victim — also ran across the parking lot to the car. After the three assailants got in the car, the car pulled out of the Microtel parking lot and drove away.

Around 10:30 p.m. that night, law enforcement responded to the scene and located six 9mm cartridge casings and one .40-caliber cartridge casing. Out of the collected 9mm casings, one was Hornady brand, three were RP brand, and two were PMC brand. After reviewing surveillance footage, law enforcement determined that the red-colored Honda or Chevy vehicle that was seen pulling up to the Citgo gas pump before heading in the direction of Tic Toc was the suspects’ vehicle.

The investigation was not developing any significant leads at that time, so law enforcement held a press conference. The following day, law enforcement received information that directed the investigation toward Miller. Law enforcement identified Miller's address and found that a 2017 Chevy Impala was registered to that address, and from his driver's license information, law enforcement identified a phone number associated with Miller ending in -8355.

After receiving Miller's name during the investigation, law enforcement discovered a pre-existing “be on the lookout” or “BOLO” depicting Miller's face, connected to an alleged armed robbery that occurred at an Exxon gas station in Rockdale County on January 13, 2020, more than a month before the February Tic Toc shooting. The BOLO from that January 2020 robbery contained still images of Miller that were taken from the surveillance footage of the incident. The footage showed Miller arrive at the Rockdale Exxon approximately 30 minutes before closing, exit his burgundy Chevy Impala, enter the store, purchase a drink, and leave. The footage showed that, approximately 30 minutes later, after the store manager locked up for the night, three masked men — one wearing a camo jacket — approached the store manager at gunpoint. The manager of that Exxon testified that the men ordered him to give them money from the register and that one man hit him in the face with the gun. The manager testified that he recognized the voice of one of the armed robbers as the same voice of the customer who purchased a drink about 30 minutes prior — a man later identified as Miller.

After reviewing the surveillance footage from the January 2020 Exxon robbery, law enforcement took out an arrest warrant for Miller in connection with its investigation of the February 2020 Tic Toc shooting and arrested him the next day. Law enforcement executed a search warrant at Miller's home and located a box of PMC 9mm live ammunition. Law enforcement executed a search warrant for Miller's red sedan and located a camouflage jacket, a blue and black shoe, gloves, a camo mask, and two cell phones. Pursuant to multiple search warrants, law enforcement performed extractions of the two phones associated with Miller: one a Samsung SM-A505U (ending with number - 8355) and, the other, a Samsung Galaxy G920T (ending with number -9710).

The extraction of the -9710 phone revealed a contact listed as “Rarri” with a phone number ending in -6516 and another contact listed as “Ronnie” with the phone number matching the - 8355 phone. At some point during the investigation, law enforcement developed a lead regarding a second suspect, Miller's co-defendant, Character. The call logs of Miller's -9710 cell phone showed several calls made to and received from “Rarri” (phone number ending in -6516) on the night of the shooting: three outgoing calls to “Rarri” between 8:20 p.m. and 8:36 p.m. and an incoming missed call from “Rarri” at 10:52 p.m. Law enforcement connected the -6516 phone to Character.

Law enforcement also obtained a search warrant for the phone records for the -6516 phone number that was associated with Character and, from those records, located an Instagram account linked to Character and the -6516 phone number. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant for the Instagram account linked to Character which revealed messages between Character's account and another account on the day of the shooting and the day after the shooting indicating that the “move didn't go right.”

Agent James Berni with the FBI Cellular Analysis Survey Team analyzed the cell tower location data of the three cell phones and testified that the two phones associated with Miller and the phone associated with Character used cell phone towers that were in close proximity to Tic Toc between 9:41 p.m. and 10:22 p.m. on the night of the February 19, 2020, shooting there and had similar movement patterns that night. Similarly, the - 9710 phone associated with Miller and the -6516 phone associated with Character were both in close proximity to the Exxon gas station on the night of the January 13, 2020, armed robbery there and had similar movement patterns that night as well.

2. Analysis

Miller contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because over a dozen searches during the investigation were authorized only as the result of law enforcement including multiple “false statements,” “lies,” and reckless misrepresentations or “overstatements” in the warrant affidavits. Additionally, he argues that the trial court erroneously considered law enforcement's “post-h[o]c explanations” of the misrepresentations from the investigators’ testimony at the motion to suppress hearing when determining that probable cause existed at the time the magistrate judges reviewed the affidavits. Because the trial court failed to engage in a proper analysis of whether the false statements included in the warrant affidavits were made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), we vacate the trial court's order, remand, and direct the trial court to conduct the proper analysis.

(a) Legal Framework

“When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Mickel, 321 Ga. 751, 757, 917 S.E.2d 175 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). In reviewing such a ruling, we keep “in mind that a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.” Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668, 672, 853 S.E.2d 650 (2021).

“A search warrant will issue only based upon an oath or affirmation stating facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed.” State v. Britton, 316 Ga. 283, 286, 888 S.E.2d 157 (2023). When reviewing an affidavit to determine if probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, a magistrate judge's task “is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ․ there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Shirley v. State, 297 Ga. 722, 723–24, 777 S.E.2d 444 (2015). See also Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 49, 875 S.E.2d 636 (2022) (“The probable cause test requires only a fair probability—less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion of possibility—which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)). And in analyzing probable cause, “a magistrate may draw ‘reasonable inferences ․ from the material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant.’ ” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 57, 61, 810 S.E.2d 113 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).

In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that, “where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause,” the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides the defendant the right to a hearing. 438 U.S. at 155–56, 98 S.Ct. 2674. If the evidence presented at the hearing supports a finding of intentional or knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, the false statements must be removed from the affidavit or the omitted truthful information must be added, “and the affidavit must be reexamined to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant.” Carter v. State, 283 Ga. 76, 77, 656 S.E.2d 524 (2008) (punctuation omitted). If the defendant shows the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard by a preponderance of the evidence, “and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674.

(b) Motion to Suppress Hearing

By way of important background to this issue, in addition to the February 2020 shooting at Tic Toc that is the subject of the charges against Miller here, there was also evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing — although not admitted at trial due to the court's granting of Miller's motion in limine — of an additional robbery of the same store in June 2019. Specifically, surveillance footage at Tic Toc on June 15, 2019, showed a masked perpetrator arrive at Tic Toc as Birru was attempting to lock the front doors, force Birru into the store at gunpoint, and rob the store before locking Birru in the bathroom. Importantly, the surveillance footage never showed the perpetrator of the June 2019 robbery unmasked or any vehicle that the perpetrator used in connection with the robbery.

Prior to trial, Miller filed a Fourth Amended Motion to Suppress arguing that the evidence seized as a result of a number of searches should be suppressed because the warrants that authorized the searches contained numerous false statements. Specifically, Miller took issue with 15 warrant affidavits.² At the motion to suppress hearing, which spanned three different days, the State presented testimony from the law enforcement officers who wrote the affidavits or who sought the warrants. The trial court ultimately denied Miller's Fourth Amended Motion to Suppress.

(c) Relevant Search Warrants and Related Affidavits

On appeal, Miller takes issue with the same misrepresentations in mostly the same warrant affidavits that he highlighted in his motion to suppress and argues that the misrepresentations in the affidavits were material, intentional, and should never have been considered in the trial court's probable cause analysis. Further, he contends that the trial court improperly used testimony from the motion to suppress hearing to “explain away” the misrepresentations. We will address each warrant affidavit and the allegedly false statements or omissions contained therein in turn, the trial court's findings as to the statements, and Miller's arguments on appeal relating to such statements.

(i) March 2020 search of Miller's Sprint cell phone records (ending in -8355) (“Affidavit 1”)

In Affidavit 1, Detective J.B. Williams wrote, “Miller was then compared to the robbery that took place on 6/15/2019 from the video that was obtained from that incident. After matching several facial features and body features of Miller, we are certain that he is that male in that robbery as well.” In its order denying the motion to suppress, before the trial court began its analysis of the individual statements within the affidavit, the trial court found: “The defendant has failed to establish that any of the statements in this search warrant affidavit are deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, as the police had a rational and good faith basis in coming to their presented conclusions.” Returning to the specific statement about the detectives’ identification of Miller, the trial court then credited Detective Williams's explanation of how the detective arrived at his ultimate conclusion that law enforcement was “certain” that Miller was the perpetrator in the June 2019 footage, as was stated in the search warrant affidavit. Specifically, the court credited the detective's explanation that he evaluated the perpetrator's body type, gait of walk, gait of running, and general and specific facial features to arrive at his determination that the perpetrator was Miller. The court also concluded, without further explanation, “any omission of the fact that the perpetrator of the June 15, 2019 armed robbery was wearing a mask, would not be material to the determination of probable cause given the totality of evidence provided to the court for its consideration of the search warrant.” On appeal, Miller argues that law enforcement's omission of the fact that the perpetrator of the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery was wearing a mask is a material omission and that the trial court's finding to the contrary “defies common sense.” He argues that law enforcement's statement that they could “certain[ly]” identify Miller as the perpetrator was, at a minimum, stated with a reckless disregard for the truth, and that, despite the detective's own testimony that the fact that someone is wearing a mask could be important to the determination that someone was identifiable, law enforcement repeatedly misrepresented that they could identify Miller, and the repeated misrepresentations were intentional.

In Affidavit 1, Detective Williams also wrote,

On the Citgo and Microtel cameras you can see the sedan that the suspects were in. On the Citgo gas station camera, we observed a maroon o[r] red in color Honda or Chevrolet vehicle. At the Citgo gas station, the vehicle is there before the shooting, then leaves and proceeds to park in the Microtel parking lot next to the incident location.

In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court stated that Detective Williams viewed the footage and concluded that the vehicle was a late model red or burgundy Chevrolet Impala and that Miller could not prove that Detective Williams's statements were false or made with a reckless disregard for the truth. On appeal, Miller argues that the statement is too definitive in light of the blurry video quality making it impossible to identify “discernable features” in the footage, that law enforcement cannot “draw an inference” that the red sedan that left the Citgo was the same vehicle seen pulling into the Microtel in the grainy footage based only on timestamps, and that “[t]his was a reckless conclusion based on inference.”

In Affidavit 1, Detective Williams also explained the anonymous tip that law enforcement received following the news conference with the local news stations:

On 3/4/2020 I was notified by Detective Smith that someone called in with a tip about the male suspect that was wearing a camo jacket. The tipster also stated that the vehicle was a Chevrolet Impala not a Honda as the news stated. The tipster advised the male that was in the camo jacket was Ronnie Miller. I did research Miller to learn that he did own a 2017 Chevrolet Impala and obtained his cell phone number from his driver's license and probation records.

In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court acknowledged that some of the information about the tip that the detective testified to at the hearing had not been provided to the judge who was reviewing the affidavit and that, given the nature of the anonymous call, the detectives were not in a position to assess the veracity or reliability of the unnamed tipster. But the court explained that the detectives corroborated the tip by comparing the suspect vehicle shown on surveillance footage from near the scene on the night of the murder to Miller's registered vehicle and determined that the vehicles had the same color, make, and model. The court further explained that law enforcement corroborated the tip by comparing footage from the June 2019 robbery to footage from the February 2020 murder and then to photographs of Miller and determining that the perpetrator was likely the same person, namely Miller. On appeal, Miller argues that law enforcement failed to provide the judge reviewing the affidavit any facts from which the judge could independently determine the reliability of the informant other than the fact that he drove a Chevy Impala and contends that Detective Williams's statement that he “did research Miller” was insufficient corroboration because law enforcement failed to corroborate any information regarding future activities not easily available to the general public.

(ii) March 2020 arrest warrant (“Affidavit 2”)

In Affidavit 2, the probable cause section of the affidavit — written by the magistrate judge reviewing the affidavit ³ — read, “Police were able to place the accused at the location of the shooting based on his cell phone records obtained by search warrants.” In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court agreed with the detectives that the use of the phrase “at the location of” was not a false statement or made with reckless disregard for the truth and was “of little importance to the ultimate finding by the judge” and that “[m]inor factual inaccuracies, which are only peripherally relevant to the showing, will not void the warrant where their presence in the affidavit is not such as to reflect on the credibility of the affiant.” On appeal, Miller argues that the language used in Affidavit 2 of records placing him “at the location of the shooting” was a misrepresentation, as evidenced by law enforcement's changing of the language in affidavits filed later to state in more general language only that the records placed his cell phone “in the same sector” or “in the area” of Tic Toc but that, by the time law enforcement began using the new language in affidavits, law enforcement already had seized evidence to be used against Miller.

In Affidavit 2, the probable cause section of the affidavit included a statement, similar to one from Affidavit 1, about the identifiability of Miller's face in surveillance footage. But unlike in Affidavit 1, where Detective Williams stated that he was specifically comparing surveillance footage from the February 2020 murder at Tic Toc to the June 2019 robbery of Tic Toc, the statement written in Affidavit 2 by the magistrate judge in the probable cause section read, “The video from the second armed robbery captures [Miller's] face, by which he can be identified.” In the trial court's order discussing the alleged falsities in Affidavit 2, the trial court again explained that law enforcement analyzed the gait, body type, and facial features of the perpetrator of the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery and compared those to photographs of Miller to determine that they were the same person. The court, again, stated, “[A]ny omission of the fact that the perpetrator of the June 15, 2019 armed robbery was wearing a mask, would not be material to the determination of probable cause given the totality of evidence provided to the court for its consideration of the search warrant.” On appeal, Miller argues that law enforcement was misrepresenting that it could identify Miller's face in the footage of the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery without also informing the magistrate judge reviewing the affidavit that the perpetrator of that robbery was actually wearing a mask and hoodie.

And finally, in Affidavit 2, the probable cause section of the affidavit read, “Surveillance video obtained in connection to a second armed robbery shows the same car captured in the surveillance video obtained from this crime investigation.” In its order, the trial court credited Detective Williams's testimony that he was intending to refer to the January 2020 Rockdale County Exxon armed robbery that showed Miller exit his 2017 burgundy Chevy Impala approximately 30 minutes prior to that Rockdale armed robbery taking place. On appeal, Miller argues that the trial court “went beyond the warrant” by finding that law enforcement was intending to refer to the Rockdale robbery when it included this false statement in this affidavit. Miller contends that the statement is material because it would cause the judge reviewing the affidavit to incorrectly assume that Miller's car, and therefore Miller, had been involved in another armed robbery at the same location just months prior to the February 2020 shooting.

At the end of its discussion of Affidavit 2, the trial court found: “The defendant has failed to establish that any of the statements in this search warrant affidavit are deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, as the police had a rational and good faith basis in coming to their presented conclusions.”

(iii) March 2020 search of residence (“Affidavit 3”)

In Affidavit 3, Detective B.P. Kershaw stated, “Miller's cell phone recorders (sic) (obtained by search warrants) placed him at the scene during the incident.” In its order, the trial court credited the testimony of Detectives Williams and K.E. McQuilkin — neither of whom wrote Affidavit 3 — who testified that the cell phone data showed that the phone was “active in the known location,” and was “in the sector of the location during the relevant time period.” Further, the court found that Detective Williams's — again, not the affiant — use of the word “scene” instead of “location” or “area” was not a false statement or made with reckless disregard for the truth and was “of little importance to the ultimate finding by the judge,” as it also found for Affidavit 2. On appeal, Miller argues that the trial court erred by failing to find that stating that the data placing Miller “at the scene” was a misrepresentation because the detective testified that he could not say the cell phone data placed Miller at the scene but, rather, he could only state that Miller was in the scene's cell phone tower sector. He argues that this misrepresentation was material because any judge reviewing the affidavit would find probable cause based on Miller being at the location but that, without this “gross misrepresentation,” there was no remaining probable cause in this affidavit.

In Affidavit 3, Detective Kershaw also stated, “The video collected from the 6/16/19 incident captured one of the suspect's face which matches the likeness of Ronnie Miller.” In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court again credited Detective Williams's testimony that he analyzed the gait, body type, and facial features of the perpetrator of the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery and of the February 2020 Tic Toc shooting and compared those to photographs of Miller to determine that they were the same person. The trial court again included the statement that any omission of the fact that the perpetrator was wearing a mask would not be material. On appeal, Miller makes the same arguments about this statement that he did about the similar one in Affidavit 1 which also claimed to identify him by the face and omitted the fact that the perpetrator was wearing a mask.

In Affidavit 3, Detective Kershaw also stated, “The same suspect vehicle can be seen parking approximately 1/10 of a mile near a Citgo at 2900 Evans Mill Road just prior to the 6/1[5]/19 incident and can be seen driving through the parking lot just prior to the 2/19/20 incident.” In its order, the trial court acknowledged that the State conceded at the motion to suppress hearing that this was a false statement because, although the car was seen in footage of the Citgo parking lot just prior to the February 2020 shooting, the car was not seen on any footage in connection with the June 2019 robbery. The trial court, nevertheless, found that Miller failed to show “that the inclusion of this false statement was deliberate or done with a reckless disregard for the truth” because Detective Kershaw testified that, following conversations with other detectives, he misunderstood when the car had been seen at the Citgo. On appeal, Miller makes the same arguments about this statement that he did about the similar one in the probable cause section of Affidavit 2, contending that the admitted misrepresentation was material and meets the burden to have the court reconsider probable cause without the misrepresentation.

Also in Affidavit 3, Detective Kershaw wrote, “We received an anonymous tip after airing the information on the news identifying one of the suspects as Ronnie Juval Miller.” The trial court explained that, by obtaining Miller's cell phone records, the judge reviewing the affidavit was provided with sufficient corroborating information to establish the reliability of the informant's information. On appeal, Miller makes the same argument about this statement as he does the statement about the anonymous tip in Affidavit 1.

After the trial court analyzed the alleged misstatements in Affidavit 3, the trial court found: “The defendant has failed to establish that any of the statements in this search warrant affidavit are deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, as the police had a rational and good faith basis in coming to their presented conclusions.”

(iv) March 2020 search of Chevy Impala (“Affidavit 4”), March 2020 search of clothing at the DeKalb County jail (“Affidavit 5”), April 2020 search of black Samsung (SM-A505U) (“Affidavit 6”), & April 2020 search of chrome Samsung (SM-G920T) (“Affidavit 7”)

In Affidavits 4-7, Detective Williams included the same statement from Affidavit 1 stating that detectives were “certain” that Miller was the male involved in the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery. In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court repeated its explanation of this statement from its analysis of Affidavit 1, including the crediting of Detective Williams's testimony and the finding that any omission of the fact that the perpetrator was wearing a mask would not be material. On appeal, Miller makes the same arguments about this statement in these affidavits that he did about it for Affidavit 1.

Also in Affidavits 4-7, Detective Williams included the same statement about being able to see the red Honda or Chevrolet present at the Citgo prior to the shooting, then leaving, then parking in the Microtel parking lot next to Tic Toc. In its order denying the motion, the trial court repeated its explanation of this statement from its analysis of Affidavit 1 that many law enforcement personnel viewed the footage and concluded that the vehicle was a late model red or burgundy Chevrolet Impala and that Miller was unable to prove these statements were false. On appeal, Miller makes the same arguments about this statement that he did about it for Affidavit 1.

And in Affidavits 4-7, Detective Williams presented the same statement about the anonymous tip to the magistrate judges as he did in Affidavit 1. In its order denying the motion, the trial court explained that the magistrate judges reviewing the affidavits had sufficient corroborating information to establish the reliability of the unknown informant because law enforcement obtained or presented information regarding the defendant's cell phone records, the defendant's alleged involvement in a prior robbery at the incident location, and the discovery of the clothing used in the January 2020 Rockdale County Exxon armed robbery and in the February 2020 DeKalb Tic Toc shooting. On appeal, Miller makes the same argument about this statement as he does the statement about the anonymous tip in Affidavit 1. After the trial court analyzed the alleged misstatements in Affidavits 4-7, the trial court found for each affidavit: “The defendant has failed to establish that any of the statements in this search warrant affidavit are deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, as the police had a rational and good faith basis in coming to their presented conclusions.”

(v) April 2020 search of Sprint cell phone records (ending in -8355) (“Affidavit 8”) & July 2020 search of T-Mobile cell phone records (ending in -9710) (“Affidavit 9”)

In Affidavits 8 and 9, Investigator S.M. Bailey wrote, “Police were able to place [Miller] at the location of the shooting based on his cell phone records.” The trial court explained that Investigator Bailey testified that his basis of knowledge that cell phone records placed Miller “at the location” was that he reviewed Detective McQuilkin's analysis of Miller's call detail records before he included that statement in the affidavit. The trial court found that Bailey's statement was not false or made with reckless disregard for the truth because using the language “at the location” versus “in the area of” was “of little importance,” as it did for the same statement in the probable cause section of Affidavit 2. On appeal, Miller takes issue with the use of the language “at the location” as he did for the same language in Affidavit 2 and for the “at the scene” language in Affidavit 4.

Investigator Bailey also wrote in Affidavits 8 and 9, “Surveillance video obtained in connection to a second, unrelated armed robbery at the same location on 6/15/19 shows the same car captured in the surveillance video obtained from this crime investigation.” In its order, the trial court acknowledged that the State conceded at the motion to suppress hearing that this was a false statement. But the trial court then found there was no evidence that Investigator Bailey deliberately included the statement knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth. The court, nonetheless, found that this statement should be stricken from the affidavit and the remaining portions examined for probable cause and then found that there was sufficient probable cause remaining in the affidavit without the statement.

In Affidavits 8 and 9, in the sentence immediately following the statement referencing the second robbery occurring at the same location on 6/15/19, Investigator Bailey wrote the same statement that was included in the probable cause section of Affidavit 2: “The video from the second armed robbery captures [Miller's] face, by which he can be identified.” The trial court credited Investigator Bailey's testimony that law enforcement analyzed the gait, body type, and facial features of the perpetrator of the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery and of the February 2020 Tic Toc shooting and compared those to photographs of Miller to determine that they were the same person, and the court, again, included the statement that any omission of the fact that the perpetrator was wearing a mask would not be material. On appeal, Miller makes the same arguments relating to these findings as he did to those regarding Affidavit 2.

Also in Affidavits 8 and 9, Investigator Bailey stated that “[p]olice received an anonymous tip after airing information on the news identifying Ronnie Miller as a participant in the shooting of the decedent.” In the order, the trial court found that Miller failed to show that this was a false statement following Investigator Bailey's testimony that he included that statement after reviewing case notes of other detectives. Further, the trial court found that Miller's cell phone records and law enforcement's information about Miller's involvement in a prior robbery at the incident location comprised sufficient corroborating information to establish the reliability of the informant. On appeal, Miller makes the same arguments about the lack of corroboration.

In Affidavits 8 and 9, Investigator Bailey also wrote, “Surveillance video shows a red or maroon Chevrolet sedan enter the hotel parking lot and park. ․ Both men fled to the waiting Chevy sedan, which fled the area.” The trial court explained that the investigator testified that he included this statement after reviewing the relevant surveillance videos and determining that the vehicle in the footage was consistent with a red or maroon Chevrolet sedan. On appeal, Miller continues to challenge that the footage was of such poor visual quality that the statement was too definitive in light of the blurry video quality.

After the trial court analyzed the alleged misstatements in Affidavits 8 and 9, the trial court found: “The defendant has failed to establish that any of the statements in this search warrant affidavit are deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, as the police had a rational and good faith basis in coming to their presented conclusions.”

(vi) September/October 2020 search of T-Mobile cell phone records (ending in -8355) (“Affidavit 10”)

In Affidavit 10, Investigator M.S. McLendon made the exact same statements as Investigator Bailey made in Affidavits 8 and 9. In its order, the trial court made the same findings for each of these statements but offered slightly different explanations. The trial court ultimately found that Investigator McLendon's statement that the same car captured during the February 2020 shooting was also seen on footage of the June 2019 robbery should be stricken from the affidavit but concluded that Miller failed to show that any of the statements made by Investigator McLendon were deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. And on appeal, Miller makes the same arguments as to the remaining statements as he did for those in Affidavits 8 and 9. After the trial court analyzed the alleged misstatements in Affidavit 10, the trial court found: “The defendant has failed to establish that any of the statements in this search warrant affidavit are deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, as the police had a rational and good faith basis in coming to their presented conclusions.”

(vii) May 2021 DeKalb County search of Chevy Impala and infotainment system (“Affidavit 11”) & May 2021 Rockdale County search of Chevy Impala (“Affidavit 12”)

In Affidavits 11 and 12, Investigator McLendon included the same statements as were made in Affidavits 8, 9, and 10, and the trial court made the same findings for the statements in Affidavits 11 and 12 as it did for those affidavits, including the determination that the statement about the car being seen on the June 2019 robbery surveillance footage should be stricken but that, even without that statement, the affidavits still contained sufficient probable cause. Miller makes the same arguments regarding those findings for this affidavit on appeal. After the trial court analyzed the alleged misstatements in Affidavits 11 and 12, the trial court found: “The defendant has failed to establish that any of the statements in this search warrant affidavit are deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, as the police had a rational and good faith basis in coming to their presented conclusions.”

(viii) July 2021 search of first Gmail account (“Affidavit 13”) & July 2021 search of second Gmail account (“Affidavit 14”)

In Affidavits 13 and 14, Investigator McLendon makes the same statements regarding the red or maroon Chevy sedan visibly pulling into the hotel parking lot and regarding receiving a tip as Investigators Bailey and McLendon did in Affidavits 8-12. The trial court's findings as to these statements were the same as the court's findings as to those statements in Affidavits 8-12, and Miller makes the same challenges to those statements on appeal as he did for the preceding affidavits.⁴

(d) Franks Analysis

The issues that Miller alleges exist in these warrants can be sorted into five categories: (1) misrepresentations about Miller's vehicle being present at the June 2019 robbery; (2) misrepresentations about the identifiability of Miller as the perpetrator of the June 2019 robbery; (3) misrepresentations about Miller's cell phone records placing him specifically at Tic Toc for the February 2020 shooting; (4) misrepresentations about the identifiability of Miller's car in grainy surveillance footage; and (5) a lack of sufficient corroboration of the anonymous tipster.

Although we review a trial court's findings on disputed questions of material fact for clear error, we review questions of law de novo. Mickel, 321 Ga. at 757-58, 917 S.E.2d 175. This includes the question of whether a trial court has applied the correct legal standard. Under Franks, the legal standard a court must apply in reviewing allegations of false statements in warrant affidavits is whether a false statement was included in a warrant affidavit knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. Britton, 316 Ga. at 288, 888 S.E.2d 157. As to what constitutes “reckless disregard for the truth,” the United States Supreme Court in Franks explained that the negligent or innocently mistaken inclusion of a false material statement in an affidavit is “insufficient” to raise constitutional concerns. See 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674. After Franks, however, many federal courts of appeals have provided additional contours to the United States Supreme Court's narrow explanation. A majority of federal courts of appeals have held that “reckless disregard for the truth” may be inferred by showing that the affiant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the statement. See United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Bolden, ––– F.4th ––––, 2026 WL 1702519, at *––––, 25-1734, slip op. at 8 (7th Cir. June 12, 2026); United States v. O'Neill, 94 F.4th 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2024); Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque, 964 F.3d 900, 908 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 647-50 (3rd Cir. 2011); United States v. Finley, 612 F.3d 998, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2010); Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., Maryland, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1376 (1995) (5th Cir. 1995). “This subjective test may be met not only by showing actual deliberation but also by demonstrating that there existed ‘obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.’ ” Davis, 617 F.2d at 694. And “[w]ith respect to omissions, ‘reckless disregard’ can be established by evidence that a police officer ‘failed to inform the judicial officer of facts [he] knew would negate probable cause.’ ” Miller, 475 F.3d at 627.⁵ We conclude that this articulation of how to apply the “reckless disregard for the truth” language of Franks is consistent with Franks, and we adopt it.

With these standards in mind, it is not clear to us that the trial court — which, we acknowledge, did not have the benefit of this opinion when it issued its order —applied the proper standard. A trial court may consider testimony from the motion to suppress hearing in making its findings as to whether a false statement was included knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 609, 878 S.E.2d 505 (2022) (explaining that, in construing the evidence in favor of the trial court's judgment while reviewing a motion to suppress, “this Court can consider the pretrial testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, as well as the trial transcript”). See also White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 98, 428 S.E.2d 789 (1993) (considering the testimony from both the motion to suppress hearing and the trial to affirm the denial of the motion to suppress). Here, the trial court relied upon the testimony of Detectives Williams and McQuilkin and Investigator Bailey to explain how the affiants arrived at the conclusions they made. But in concluding that Miller failed to establish that any of the challenged statements in any of the warrant affidavits were deliberately false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, the trial court appears to have considered only whether the officers had a “rational and good faith basis” for including the false statement.

It is not clear to us that such a basis for rejecting a Franks argument incorporates any consideration of whether the officer “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the affidavits,” O'Neill, 94 F.4th at 539; whether such serious doubts might be inferred from the officer having “obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information which he was asserting,” Brown, 631 F.3d at 647-48; or whether the officer “failed to inform the judicial officer of facts [he] knew would negate probable cause,” Miller, 475 F.3d at 627. Moreover, notwithstanding an officer's good-faith reliance on another officer's investigation, a false statement in an affidavit is not saved just because the affiant misunderstood the statement from another officer or incorporated a false statement from another officer's previous affidavit. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 164 n.6, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (noting that “police could not insulate one officer's deliberate misstatement merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity”).

The most prominent example from the trial court's order that demonstrates the trial court's failure to consider whether the statements in the affidavit were made or omitted in reckless disregard for the truth under the Franks standards outlined above is the trial court's findings regarding the omission of the fact that the perpetrator of the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery was wearing a mask. In Affidavits 1 and 4-7, the affiant stated that law enforcement was “certain” that Miller was the perpetrator of the June 2019 armed robbery after “matching several facial features and body features of Miller.” And in Affidavit 3, the affiant stated that the footage “captured one of the suspect's face which matches the likeness of [Miller].” At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Williams testified that, although knowledge of whether a person is masked “could be useful to identification,” Detective Williams never included the fact that the perpetrator of the June 2019 armed robbery was wearing a mask that extended from the nose down in any affidavit that he presented to reviewing judges. The trial court, nonetheless, credited the detective's testimony that he was able to identify Miller from other factors, such as Miller's walk, gait, and body type before concluding that the omission of the fact that the perpetrator was masked would not be material to the court's determination of probable cause. But under Franks and the standards outlined above for considering recklessness, it is unclear whether the trial court's conclusion incorporates any consideration of whether the officer may have had “obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the” statement that law enforcement was “certain” Miller was the perpetrator, Brown, 631 F.3d at 647-48, or whether the officer “failed to inform the judicial officer of facts [he] knew would negate probable cause,” Miller, 475 F.3d at 627.

Another example is that in Affidavit 3, Detective Kershaw stated, “The same suspect vehicle can be seen parking approximately 1/10 of a mile near a Citgo ․ just prior to 6/16/19 incident and can be seen driving through the parking lot just prior to the 2/19/20 incident.” At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Kershaw conceded that he knew this statement was false. But the detective also testified that he misunderstood when the car was seen at the Citgo and realized the June 2019 date was a mistake after the fact. The trial court, nonetheless, found that Miller was unable to show that the inclusion of this false statement was deliberate or done with a reckless disregard for the truth. It is not clear to us whether the trial court, in making this finding, considered whether there may be “obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the statement,” like surveillance footage that law enforcement had at its disposal. Accordingly, we remand for the court to conduct the proper Franks analysis, reexamining the statements made in each affidavit under the standards outlined above.

(e) Anonymous Tip

In light of our conclusion as to the trial court's Franks analysis, the trial court must also reconduct its analysis of whether the anonymous tip in this case may be relied on in determining whether each warrant was supported by probable cause. In the reasonable suspicion, investigatory stop context, the United States Supreme Court has held that “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity․. But under appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (cleaned up). To be considered reliable, an anonymous tipster's information must be “reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 242, 103 S.Ct. 2317. See also Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (explaining that an officer's corroboration of certain details can make the anonymous tip “sufficiently reliable”); Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 166-67, 527 S.E.2d 847 (2000) (“It has been held that a tip from an informant of unknown reliability is generally insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but that the tip may provide the basis for reasonable suspicion if the tip provides details that the police can corroborate by observation.”). Also relevant to the reliability of an anonymous tip is the accuracy of any other information the tipster may have provided: “[A]n informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other things, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (quotation marks omitted).

In contrast, a tipster who does not explain how he knows the facts that he alleges, does not suggest that he has any familiarity with the affairs of the object of the tip, or does not include predictions of future behavior that could be corroborated to assess the tipster's credibility may be deemed insufficiently reliable. See id. And we have discounted the weight of uncorroborated anonymous tips in the probable-cause context as well. See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 105-06, 657 S.E.2d 213 (2008) (“In this case, unlike other cases where an anonymous tipster's information has been corroborated, the information contained in the affidavit failed to provide any reason under the totality of the circumstances known to officers to believe that the information was from a credible source.”); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 172, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008) (“As to the report from the concerned citizen that narcotics were being sold from the subject address, the magistrate was given nothing other than the affiant's conclusory statement that the tipster was a concerned citizen. Thus, that informant is not entitled to a preferred status, and the information he or she provided is relegated to the status of rumor.” (cleaned up)).

Here, although the trial court acknowledged that the detectives “were not in a position to assess the ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ or ‘basis of knowledge’ of the unnamed informer,” the trial court found that the detectives corroborated the details that had been provided by the anonymous tipster by confirming the address and vehicle registration associated with Miller provided by the tipster, and the court found that the judges reviewing the affidavits were provided sufficient corroborating information to establish the reliability of the information provided by the unnamed informer. Specifically, for Affidavit 3, the trial court found that law enforcement provided the judge reviewing the affidavit with sufficient corroborating information “[b]y obtaining the defendant's cell phone records, pursuant to a valid search warrant.” For Affidavits 4-7, 9, and 10, the trial court found that the cell phone records plus information that Miller was involved in “a prior robbery at the incident location,” — the June 2019 armed robbery — plus the discovery of clothing used in both the January 2020 Exxon robbery and the February 2020 Tic Toc shooting all provided sufficient corroborating information. For Affidavit 8, the trial court found that the cell phone records and the information about the involvement in the June 2019 Tic Toc armed robbery provided sufficient corroborating information. And for Affidavits 11-14, the trial court found that the cell phone records and matching clothing provided sufficient corroborating information.

Because some of these details may be affected by the trial court's Franks analysis on remand, the trial court must conduct its analysis of the anonymous tip after its Franks analysis to determine whether “the information contained in the affidavit ․ [provided] any reason under the totality of the circumstances known to officers to believe that the information was from a credible source” and was therefore sufficiently reliable to be considered for purposes of assessing probable cause. Harper, 283 Ga. at 105-06, 657 S.E.2d 213.

Although the analysis of whether an anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated is different from the Franks analysis, those analyses are related here. This is because the affidavits in this case incorporate statements made in previous affidavits, often repeating exact phrases and statements. And, in some affidavits, statements from prior affidavits — such as the cell phone records placing Miller at the scene, in the area, or in the same sector of Tic Toc (see Affidavits 3-14) and that Miller could be identified by face in the footage of the June 2019 robbery or that law enforcement was “certain” Miller was the perpetrator of that robbery (see Affidavits 1 & 3-10) — were used as explanation for how the anonymous tip was corroborated. But after applying the Franks analysis to each statement and warrant affidavit, some of the statements from prior affidavits that are used to support a finding that the tip was sufficiently corroborated may be excised from the affidavits for purposes of assessing probable cause. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (explaining that if the “allegation of perjury or reckless disregard” with respect to statements made in a warrant affidavit “is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence,” probable cause must be reassessed “with the affidavit's false material set to one side”). And any statements excised from the affidavit for being false and made with reckless disregard under Franks would also need to be excised from the trial court's review of whether the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated. After this analysis, if the trial court determines that the anonymous tip was not sufficiently corroborated, the anonymous tip would need to be excised from the affidavits prior to the trial court's reexamination of the affidavits to determine whether sufficient probable cause remains.

(f) Conclusion

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the trial court to review each of the warrant affidavits at issue in this case in accordance with the proper standard outlined in Franks and above. This analysis begins with determining whether each statement highlighted by Miller was a false statement or misrepresentation, followed by an analysis of whether the statement was included deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth under the standards clarified above. After conducting that analysis and excising any statement shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be included in the affidavit intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, the trial court should conduct a fresh analysis of whether the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated in each of the affected warrant applications. After these steps, the trial court should then assess each of the warrant affidavits to determine whether each warrant remains supported by probable cause under the proper standards.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The crimes occurred on February 19, 2020. A DeKalb County grand jury initially indicted Miller on December 1, 2020, and later re-indicted him together with Ricky Character on March 21, 2023, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 4), aggravated assault (Count 5), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7) and re-indicted Miller alone for an additional count of felony murder (Count 3) and for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). At the conclusion of a joint trial that began on June 20, 2024, a jury found Miller and Character guilty on all of their respectively charged counts. On July 9, 2024, the trial court sentenced Miller to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1). The felony murder counts (Counts 2 and 3) were vacated by operation of law, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault count (Count 5) into the conviction for malice murder (Count 1). The trial court imposed 30 years in prison for the criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 4), to run consecutively to Count 1; ten years in prison for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6), to run consecutively to Count 5; and five years in prison for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7), to run consecutively to Count 6.Although Miller does not raise the issue on appeal, the trial court erred when it imposed the prison sentence for the Count 6 conviction to run consecutively to Count 5, which had already been merged into Count 1. See Adams v. State, 323 Ga. 279, 287–88, 925 S.E.2d 144 (2026) (vacating the sentence on a count that was imposed to run consecutively to the sentence on another count that this Court vacated). We note this potential sentencing error for the trial court's consideration on remand if it does not become moot following the trial court's new ruling.Miller timely filed a motion for new trial by trial counsel on July 12, 2024, and new counsel filed a brief in support of the motion on July 31, 2025. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on August 21, 2025. Miller filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   In the motion to suppress, Miller also took issue with a March 2020 geofence warrant issued out of DeKalb County, but because he does not mention this issue on appeal, we will not address it here.

3.   At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Williams explained that, for this affidavit, the detective orally testified to the contents of this affidavit to the magistrate judge who then wrote the “Probable Cause” section of this affidavit before signing it along with the detective.

4.   On appeal, Miller also includes in the list of searches and seizures that he challenges a March 2020 search of Sprint cell phone records (ending in -8355) that was conducted by Rockdale County law enforcement, but other than listing this warrant on one page of his brief on appeal, Miller does not make any other argument regarding the specific contents of the affidavit as he does for the warrant affidavits applied for by DeKalb County law enforcement. Accordingly, we will not be addressing this affidavit or its contents. See Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 650, 884 S.E.2d 346 (2023) (“It is not the function of this Court to cull the record for a party to find alleged errors or to form arguments on the appellant's behalf.” (quotation marks omitted)).

5.   Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has not yet adopted a bright-line rule for recklessness in the Franks context, it has held that an affiant made a false statement with reckless disregard for the truth when the affiant “should have recognized the error, or at least harbored serious doubts” about the truth of the statement, United States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986), and in another case, it assumed for purposes of the appeal that a latent print identification mentioned in an affidavit was a misstatement because the affiant “had reason to doubt the veracity of this statement,” Aguirre-Jarquin v. Seminole Cnty., 158 F.4th 1276, 1302 (11th Cir. 2025).

Ellington, Justice.

All the Justices concur.