SEAMSTER v. TREADAWAY (2026)

Charles Seamster appeals from two trial court orders. First, Seamster appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for temporary protective order and dismissing a family violence ex parte protective order. Second, Seamster appeals an order granting attorney fees to Jason Treadaway under OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's ruling on the family violence orders but reverse the trial court's order awarding attorney fees to Treadaway.

“The grant or denial of a motion for protective order generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, we will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion.” Bland v. Bland, 347 Ga. App. 273, 274 (819 SE2d 78) (2018) (punctuation omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is unsupported by any evidence of record or where that ruling misstates or misapplies the relevant law.” Id. (punctuation omitted).

The record shows that Seamster and his ex-wife (the “Mother”) are the parents of the minor child, A. S. Treadaway is married to the Mother and is A. S.’s step-father. A. S. is autistic and also receives treatment from a psychiatrist for mental health conditions, including opposition defiant disorder. A. S. had a recent change in her medication which her psychiatrist suggested may be a contributing factor to recent changes in her behavior.

On August 7, 2024, Seamster filed a petition for temporary protective order against Treadaway. The petition alleged that on August 5, A. S., who was then 10 years old, had been hiding under her bed at the Mother and Treadaway's residence when Treadaway broke the bed and injured A. S. by dragging her out of her bedroom by her feet and legs. Seamster also requested temporary custody of A. S. The trial court entered a family violence ex parte protective order on August 7, which, among other things, awarded Seamster temporary custody of A. S. Treadaway filed an answer and counterclaim with the trial court, seeking attorney fees under OCGA § 19-13-4(a).

The trial court held a final hearing on September 18, 2024.¹ The trial court heard testimony from Seamster, Treadaway, a nurse practitioner who treated A. S. on August 7, 2024, at an urgent care facility, and a counselor who forensically interviewed A. S. Seamster also introduced video footage of the interior of the house that was captured on security cameras which showed some of the incident.

Seamster testified that on August 5, he received a “weird message” from A. S. Seamster went to A. S.’s school the next day where she told him that Treadaway hurt her back. Seamster contacted law enforcement who advised him to take A. S. to the headquarters of Crimes Against Children, where she was interviewed by a counselor for the Safe Path Children's Advocacy Center.

The counselor testified that she forensically interviewed A. S., who told the counselor that she and the Mother got into an argument, after which the Mother walked away. A. S. then became upset, locked herself in the bathroom for a period of time, and then hid underneath her bed in her bedroom. Treadway lifted the bed up and pulled A. S. by the arm, so A. S. moved away from him into a corner. A. S. then began kicking her feet, and Treadaway grabbed A. S. by the feet and ankles and dragged her out of the bedroom, across the carpet and floor.

Treadaway's testimony about the incident was similar, but not identical, to the child's. Treadaway testified that the bed did not break when he lifted it up, but instead that “the bed came apart” because the metal railing disconnected from the footboard. He also testified that although he was frustrated with A. S., he was not angry when he pulled A. S. out from underneath the bed. Rather, he testified he was “just trying to deal with the situation.” He also testified that A. S. “occasionally” goes under her bed, and that after this incident he thought about how he could act differently in the future. Treadaway has handled this in the past by turning off the light in the room, sitting in a chair, and talking to A. S. until she calms down. Treadaway also testified that he has tried to be the best step-parent he could be for A. S., and that he welcomed her into his family as if she was his own daughter. Treadaway further testified that Seamster had physically, emotionally, and mentally abused the Mother for years and that he has tried to limit contact with Seamster.

Seamster brought A. S. to an outpatient urgent care facility two days after the August 5 incident, where a nurse practitioner performed a physical assessment of A. S. That nurse practitioner testified that the majority of A. S.’s back had redness and bruising. She also testified that these injuries were consistent with a bed falling on top of her. Photos of A. S.’s bruising were introduced into evidence, which the nurse practitioner stated showed less bruising than what she observed in person. The nurse diagnosed A. S. with contusion of her thoracic spine in addition to strain of muscle of the thoracic spine level.

Treadaway also testified that on one occasion in August 2022, prior to his marriage to the Mother, he went to the Mother's home in response to her “complete state of desperation and tearful frustration,” because A. S. refused to get out of bed to go to school and that he carried A. S. into the kitchen so she could take her mental health medication and that he told A. S. that he would “force the medication into her mouth and down her throat like one would administer medication to a dog.” Treadaway then picked up A. S. and carried her to the bus stop, where she appeared to be in “some sort of catatonic state, whimpering and making weird puppy-like sounds[.]”

In its order on the petition, the trial court ruled that: regardless of how the injury occurred, Treadaway had not intended to harm A. S., that the event was an isolated circumstance, and that Seamster had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an act of family violence between Treadaway and A. S. had occurred in the past and may occur in the future. The trial court then denied the petition and dismissed the family violence ex parte order entered on August 7.

The trial court then held a hearing in March 2025 on Treadaway's motion for attorney fees, after which the trial court awarded attorney fees to Treadaway in the amount of $15,000 under OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(4). Seamster filed an application for discretionary appeal, which we granted. This appeal followed.

1. First, Seamster argues that the trial court erred in denying the petition for the 12-month family violence protective order after Treadway committed two distinct acts of family violence against A. S. by: (1) causing the bed to be dropped on A. S.’s back and then (2) dragging A. S. by her ankles, on her back, across ten feet, causing spinal bruising and visible rug burn. We disagree.

The Family Violence Act is codified at OCGA § 19-13-1 et seq. Pursuant to OCGA § 19-13-1,

the term “family violence” means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between ․ stepparents and stepchildren ․ living in the same household:

(1) Any felony; or

(2) Commission of offenses of battery, simple battery, simple assault, assault, stalking, criminal damage to property, unlawful restraint, or criminal trespass.

The term “family violence” shall not be deemed to include reasonable discipline administered by a parent to a child in the form of corporal punishment, restraint, or detention.

Upon review of protective orders under the Family Violence Act,

it is not this Court's function to second-guess the trial court in cases such as this, which turn largely on questions of credibility and judgments. The trial court is in the best position to make determinations on these issues, and we will not overrule its judgment if there is any reasonable evidence to support it.

Quinby v. Rausch, 300 Ga. App. 424, 425 (685 SE2d 395) (2009).

The trial court heard evidence that: Treadaway dragged A. S. out from underneath the bed, injuring her; Treadaway did not break the bed, but rather the railings dislodged from the footboard as he lifted it; he was not angry when he did this; and he has handled similar situations calmly in the past. As stated earlier, we must affirm if there is any reasonable evidence to support the trial court's conclusion. There was evidence from which the trial court could have found that Treadaway did not intend to harm A. S. and that no family violence occurred. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the petition for temporary protective order and dismissing the family violence ex parte protective order. See Sinclair v. Daly, 295 Ga. App. 613, 616 (672 SE2d 672) (2009) (trial court abused its discretion in granting stalking protective order where the evidence did not show that the appellant engaged in a pattern of intimidating and harassing behavior that placed the appellee in reasonable fear for his safety).

2. Seamster next argues that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Treadaway under OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10). We agree.

“As a general rule, Georgia law does not provide for the award of attorney fees even to a prevailing party unless authorized by statute or by contract.” Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App. 822, 824(1) (543 SE2d 733) (2000). “When awarded by statute, such fees may be obtained only pursuant to the statute under which the action was brought and decided.” Id.

OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) provides that a trial court “may ․ grant any protective order or approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of acts of family violence[,]” and that “[t]he orders or agreements may ․ [a]ward costs and attorney's fees to either party[.]” “This statutory authorization for attorney fees is in derogation of common law, and, thus, must be strictly construed.” Bishop v. Goins, 305 Ga. 310, 311 (824 SE2d 369) (2019) (citations omitted).

The trial court rejected Seamster's argument that OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) did not authorize an attorney fees award in this case. The court awarded fees under the statute, reasoning that: (1) this Court held in Durrance v. Schad, 345 Ga. App. 826 (815 SE2d 164) (2018) and Brooks v. Hayden, 355 Ga. App. 171 (843 SE2d 594) (2020), that “a trial court has discretion to award costs and attorney fees [under OCGA § 16-5-94(d)(3)] where [a stalking] petition results in the entry of a court order or a consent agreement designed to end the conduct constituting stalking, i.e., where the court rules on the merits of the petition”; (2) the holding of these cases applies here because the language of OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) mirrors the language of OCGA § 16-5-94(d)(3); and (3) the plain language of OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) provides that the court may award fees and expenses to either party.

Next, the trial court found that an award of attorney fees was appropriate here because Seamster: made multiple unsubstantiated allegations of abuse against Treadaway and the Mother and continued to make unsubstantiated allegations against Treadaway in direct contradiction of the order denying Seamster's petition for temporary protective order; intentionally omitted information in order to avoid disclosing the custody modification proceeding, and attempted to bypass that proceeding in order to obtain custody of A. S.; and took little or no responsibility for any of the conduct alleged against him.

Seamster argues on appeal that an attorney fee award was not authorized under OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) because he was trying to protect A. S.; the statute authorizes an award only in order to bring about a cessation of family violence; and the statute does not authorize an award merely because a petition lacked merit or the petitioner acted improperly during the case. We agree that the statute did not authorize the trial court's award.

In Dalenberg v. Dalenberg, 325 Ga. App. 833 (755 SE2d 228) (2014), an ex-husband brought an action under the Family Violence Act to dismiss or modify a temporary protective order, but subsequently dismissed the action, and the trial court awarded the other party attorney fees under OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10). Id. at 833–34. This Court concluded that the award was not warranted under the statute because the award would not further the goal of bringing about a cessation of acts of family violence. Id. at 836(2). In Suarez, 246 Ga. App. at 824–25(1), this Court held that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) against the non-prevailing petitioners in a proceeding under the Family Violence Act based on a disparity of income, explaining that we failed to see how the award “would assist in bringing about the cessation of acts of family violence.” Id. at 825. This Court stated that “imposing attorney fees upon well-intentioned petitioners seeking to thwart the occurrence or recurrence of family violence would only serve to deter others from filing similar actions.” Id.

OCGA § 16-5-94(d)(3) is nearly identical to OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) and provides that a trial court “may grant a protective order ․ or approve a consent agreement to bring about a cessation of conduct constituting stalking[,]” and that “[o]rders or agreements may ․ [a]ward costs and attorney's fees to either party[.]” This Court has held that “[u]nder the plain language of [OCGA § 16-5-94(d)(3)], the trial court has the discretion to award costs and attorney fees only where the petition results in the entry of a court order or a consent agreement designed to end the conduct constituting stalking.” Durrance, 345 Ga. App. at 829(1). See also Bishop, 305 Ga. at 312 (“[A]n award of costs and attorney fees under OCGA § 16-5-94(d)(3) depends in the first instance on the trial court granting a protective order or approving a consent agreement designed to end the conduct constituting stalking. ․ [A]ny award of costs and fees must be related to the order or agreement and must be included as part of the actual protective order or approved consent agreement.” (citation modified)).

Likewise, in Brooks, this Court affirmed an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 16-5-94(d)(3) and ruled that the trial court's consent order was an order “designed to end conduct constituting stalking.” Brooks, 355 Ga. App. at 173 (emphasis added). Brooks and Durrance do not stand for the proposition that a trial court may award fees under OCGA § 16-5-94(d) when a trial court dismisses a petition for a stalking protective order. Instead, the court only has discretion to enter an award of attorney fees and costs when “the petition results in the entry of a court order or a consent agreement designed to end the conduct constituting stalking.” Durrance, 345 Ga. App. at 829(1) (emphasis added). We are thus unpersuaded by trial court's interpretation of Durrance and Brooks as standing for the proposition that a trial court need only reach the merits of a petition for family violence protective order to award fees. Here, Seamster's petition did not result in the entry of a court order or a consent agreement designed to end family violence. To the contrary, the trial court found that there had been no family violence. Under the plain language of the statute, the trial court had the discretion to award costs and attorney fees only where the petition resulted in the entry of a court order or a consent agreement to bring about a cessation of acts of family violence. The statute does not provide the trial court with the discretion to award costs and fees where no such order or consent agreement is entered—i.e., when the petition is denied. See Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–73(1)(a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (we afford the language of a statute “its plain and ordinary meaning,” and we read its text in the “most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc. v. McRae, 292 Ga. 243, 245(1) (734 SE2d 55) (2012) (when applying a statute “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Thus, given the plain language of OCGA § 19-13-4(a)(10) and this Court's holdings in Dalenberg, Suarez, Durrance, Bishop, and Brooks, an award of attorney fees is not authorized under the statute unless the award is part of a court order or a consent agreement designed to end conduct constituting family violence. In other words, an award is not authorized under the statute simply because, as the trial court found here, the petition was frivolous and the petitioner acted improperly in the context of the litigation. Therefore, the award was not authorized here, and we reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees to Treadaway.²

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although it does not bear on this appeal, Treadaway moved to dismiss the petition for failure to join the Mother as an indispensable party, which the trial court denied. Treadaway also moved to transfer the case to the judge who was presiding over a separate custody modification case between Seamster and the Mother. The court granted that motion and reassigned the case to that judge.

2.   Treadaway's motion to dismiss, motion to remand, and amended motion to remand are denied.

Padgett, Judge.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. McFadden, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.