DISCOUNT FIBERGLASS POOLS INC v. SMITH (2026)

We granted this discretionary appeal to consider whether the Clayton County Superior Court erred in reversing the determination by the State Board of Workers’ Compensation Appellate Division (“the Board”) that Appellee-Employee Stanley Chuck Smith, Jr. was not entitled to temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits or to ongoing medical expenses after Appellant-Employer Discount Fiberglass Pools and Appellant-Insurer Technology Insurance Company, Inc. controverted Appellee's claim. As explained below, we agree with Appellants that the superior court applied the wrong standard when reviewing the decision of the Board and that, when viewed through the proper legal lens, the final award by the Board should have been affirmed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the superior court.

1. In September 2023, while employed by Discount Fiberglass Pools, Appellee was pushed to the ground during a physical altercation with the business owner's son; Appellee allegedly sustained injuries to his upper buttocks/back area as a result of the fall. In the months that followed, Appellee received medical treatment for his injury and continued working limited duty until November 2023 when he, along with a dozen other employees, was laid off by his employer. Appellee thereafter collected unemployment benefits for 14 weeks.

While Appellants initially “accepted the claim on a ‘medical only’ basis, meaning it had provided medical benefits without fully accepting the compensability of the claim,” Appellants controverted the claim in September 2024, and a hearing was conducted in February 2025 before an administrative law judge. The ALJ concluded that Appellee's claim was compensable but that, pursuant to Maloney v. Gordon County Farms, 265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995), Appellee was not entitled to TTD benefits because Appellee's termination had been unrelated to his injury and he had failed to conduct a diligent job search.¹ However, the ALJ could not determine from the record evidence whether Appellee required ongoing medical treatment for the injury; consequently, Appellants were ordered to arrange a medical exam for that purpose. Both parties appealed the award to the Board.

Following oral argument and a review of the record before the ALJ, the Board adopted in part and reversed in part the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and award of the ALJ. The Board affirmed the conclusions that Appellee's claim was compensable and that Appellee was not entitled to TTD benefits because “there was no evidence that [Appellee] performed a suitable job search” after he was terminated from his employment for reasons unrelated to his injury. However, the Board reversed that portion of the ALJ decision ordering Appellants to arrange for a medical exam, reasoning that Appellee had failed to meet his burden of “proving that any need for medical treatment after the date of controvert [was] reasonably necessary or related to his work injury.” Appellee thereafter sought review of this decision in the Superior Court of Clayton County.

Following a hearing, the superior court affirmed the finding of compensability but reversed the Board's decision as to both TTD benefits and ongoing medical treatment. First, the superior court concluded that the Board “erred as a matter of law” in denying TTD benefits, reasoning that there was evidence in the record that Appellee had both “demonstrated a diligent job search” during the 14 weeks in which he was drawing unemployment and had briefly attempted to work at a fast-food restaurant. As to ongoing medical treatment, the superior court concluded that Appellee's hearing testimony detailing his need for ongoing treatment was “totally conceivable and credible given the nature of his fall from being physically shoved.” Consequently, the superior court ordered Appellants to pay TTD, as well as all reasonable and necessary medical treatment for Appellee's injury and any aggravation. This discretionary appeal now follows.

2. As we have explained before,

[t]he issue on appeal to the superior court is whether there is “any evidence” to authorize a finding in accordance with the contentions of the prevailing party before the [Board]. The rule is that the decision of the trier of fact will not be set aside on appeal if there is any evidence to support the finding. The [Board's] findings of fact are not to be set aside because the reviewing court disagrees with the conclusions drawn therefrom. When using the ‘any evidence’ criteria, the facts are to be construed in a light most favorable to the party prevailing before the [B]oard. Reviewing courts do not consider the weight of evidence.

Cobb Gen. Hosp. v. Burrell, 174 Ga. App. 631, 631, 331 S.E.2d 23 (1985) (citation modified).

In this case, it is clear that the superior court did not apply the deferential “any evidence” standard. Instead, the superior court applied a “de novo” standard and independently reassessed the record evidence after apparently concluding that the Board had misapplied “a legal standard to the undisputed facts.” This was error.

As an initial matter, even if the evidence before the Board were undisputed, which it is not, “in the absence of precedential law that under identical evidence a certain legal conclusion or ‘legal inference’ is demanded” a superior court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the [B]oard[.]” Conquest Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Hughes, 215 Ga. App. 400, 400, 450 S.E.2d 865 (1994) (citation modified). Further, when viewed in the appropriate light, the decision of the Board should have been affirmed as to both the TTD benefit, as well as on-going medical treatment.

(a) As to the TTD benefit, the record supports the Board's finding that Appellee had failed to conduct a diligent job search. Although there was evidence that Appellee looked for work during the 14 weeks he received unemployment and that he attempted to work at a fast-food restaurant, there was also evidence that, once his unemployment benefits stopped, his job search was, at best, passive or, at worst, stopped entirely. This evidence was sufficient to authorize the Board to conclude that Appellee had failed to conduct a diligent job search and, thus, to deny TTD benefits. See, e.g., Brown Mech. Contractors, 317 Ga. App. 106, 110(1), 728 S.E.2d 757 (2012); Master Craft Flooring v. Dunham, 308 Ga. App. 430, 432-35, 708 S.E.2d 36 (2011). Further, contrary to the superior court's ruling, there is no indication here that the Board misapplied Maloney. Instead, it appears that the superior court simply disagreed with the Board's factual findings and application of the law to those facts; this does not constitute an error of law by the Board. See Brown Mech. Contractors, 317 Ga. App. at 110 (1), 728 S.E.2d 757; compare R. R. Donnelley v. Ogletree, 312 Ga. App. 475, 481(2), 718 S.E.2d 825 (2011) (Board misapplied law to the facts when imposing job-searching requirements not required by statute or Maloney).

(b) The record also supports the Board's conclusion that Appellee failed to establish his need for ongoing medical treatment for his compensable injury. Tellingly, at the conclusion of the initial hearing in February 2025, the ALJ had “no idea what [Appellee's] medical condition ha[d] been since February [2024]” because, as shown by the record, Appellee had provided no documentation concerning the treatment of his compensable injury after that date.² Additionally, the record shows that Appellee acknowledged that he stopped taking pain medication for his injury in May 2024.

Finally, while Appellee testified that he wanted to seek additional treatment for his injury but had not after the claim was controverted because of financial concerns, the record also shows that Appellee's claim was not controverted until September 2024, approximately 6 months after his last known visit for his compensable injury. Additionally, Appellee acknowledged that, to the extent that he purportedly sought treatment for his compensable injury after the claim was controverted -- which, again, there are no records of -- his medical insurance actually covered the cost of any subsequent treatment; thus, as Appellee explained, he paid only a few dollars out of pocket and owed no money for any alleged treatment after the claim was controverted. The Board was not required to credit Appellee's inconsistent testimony about whether he was seeking treatment or not.

Instead of conducting this type of evidence review -- and construing the record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party -- the superior court made independent factual findings and credibility determinations, opining that Appellee's claim of “continuing pain and discomfort, past his last doctor's visit on February 28, 2024, [was] totally conceivable and credible[.]” However, “neither the superior court nor this Court has any authority to substitute itself as a fact finding body in lieu of the [Board].” Master Craft Flooring, 308 Ga. App. at 434, 708 S.E.2d 36.

Based on the foregoing, “[t]he superior court erred in setting aside an award of the [B]oard supported by some evidence. The superior court should have affirmed the award.” Cobb Gen. Hosp., 174 Ga. App. at 631, 331 S.E.2d 23 (citation modified).

Judgment reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “In the case of a claimant who seeks to resume compensation benefits due to a change in condition after his employment has been terminated for reasons unrelated to his job-related injury, that claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered a loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related injury; continues to suffer physical limitations attributable to that injury; and has made a diligent, but unsuccessful effort to secure suitable employment following termination.” Master Craft Flooring v. Dunham, 308 Ga. App. 430, 433, 708 S.E.2d 36 (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2.   While the record includes additional medical documentation from after February 2024, none of these visits specifically concerned his back injury; his injury is mentioned only in passing in these documents.

Pipkin, Judge.

Dillard, P. J., concurs. Gobeil, J., concurs fully in Divisions 1 and 2a and concurs in judgment only as to Division 2b.